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This dissertation provides new empirical evidence which shows that 
environmental activism has been increasing in China since the early 1990s. It explains 
why participation has increased and why it varies across provinces. It examines the 
potential emergence of environmental movements and shows the utility of applying 
social movement theories to studying participation more broadly. Finally, It shows 
how participation makes a difference in policy outcomes.
Both qualitative and quantitative methods, including a statistical analysis of ten 
years of environmental data, an examination of 125 disputes and over 100 interviews 
in China, are used to examine the dominant modes of citizen participation; these 
include direct citizen protests, the dispute resolution and complaint systems, state-
mobilized campaigns, and environmental social organizations. 
New political opportunities for citizen activism have opened up because 
authorities have encouraged participation. Authorities need particiption to achieve 
policy goals, however this need is in constant tension with the desire to control it. 
While political opportunities have allowed for greater participation, they remain 
limiting factors to the emergence of traditional movements. Grievances, mobilizational 
structures, and framing processes, also are factors in determining patterns of 
participation. The Chinese regime has become more responsive to citizen 
environmental grievances and since the 1980s, there has been a “sophistication” of 
state-society relations. This, however, does not represent a significant change in the 
principals guiding the Chinese state. 
This research illustrates how political opportunity structures in reforming, one-
party, corporatist countries like China differ from such structures in freer states. It 
shows how the Chinese State’s approaches have largely worked in containing 
widespread social unrest. Authorities have encouraged participation in some channels 
but limited it in others. They utilize the familiar tools of rep ssion and suppression as 
well as new tools, including regulations, institutions, and processes, through which 
they shape, channel, and control participation. 
On the other hand, citizens have taken advantage of opportunities. In some 
areas, they have established primarily autonomous environmental groups, practice 
“civil politics,” and have created a vibrant conservation proto-movement. Proto-
movements exhibit many of the attributes of traditional social movements, and can be 
precursors to them, but remain constrained by limited political opportunities. 
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Chapter One
Introduction: Increasing Participation in Environmental Protection and 
The Associated Political and Policy Implications
In the residential area of xx city there is a branch factory of the xx 
City Enamel Plant, that since 1973, in the course of production, has been 
responsible for releasing poisonous gases, emitting soot and ashes, and 
generating noise pollution, which have been serious enough to disrupt the 
lives of nearby residents and threaten their health. On March 12th of 1983, 
the conflict came to a head when the residents wrecked the plant causing 
hundreds of thousand of Yuan in damages. 
The factory emitted poisonous gasses including hydrogen fluoride 
and silicon tetrafluoride among others. Air quality testing revealed that the 
level of hydrogen fluoride in the atmosphere exceeded national standards 
by 2.7 to 13.7 percent. The amount of dust and soot in the atmosphere was 
about five times the national standard. In addition, the vibration and noise 
pollution was very severe. The workshop’s machines produced noise 
pollution at ninety-five decibels, which greatly exceeds the national 
standard. 
The poisonous gases emitted by the factory caused the trees around 
the plant to wilt and die. It also caused the windows of resident’s houses to 
corrode making them look like “cut glass.” Many residents in the area 
experienced lowered red blood cell counts, chronic itching, and emotional 
anxiety. In addition, their nostrils became enflamed, their throats hurt, they 
developed ulcers in their mouths, their gums bled, and their hair fell out.
Since 1976, area residents have negotiated with the enamel plant 
representatives and complained to officials at all levels of the government. 
Some residents even filed class action suits. On several occasions, the 
residents demanded that the factory mitigate its pollution problems and 
clean up the surrounding area. In 1980, the Ministry of Light Industry 
invested 100,000 Yuan to help the plant mitigate its hazardous air 
pollutant and dust emissions. The investments succeeded in reducing the 
hazardous gases and particulate pollution by about half. The city and the 
district environmental protection bureaus directed the plant to build upon 
these successes and continue to decrease their pollution emissions. In the 
end, factory leaders did not build upon the base, continued to engage in 
bad management practices, and in fact, discontinued the operation of the 
pollution reduction equipment already installed, citing economic hardships 
as the reason. As a result, pollution problems increased significantly, 
reaching their previous intensity. Disputes among plant employees and 
nearby residents occurred frequently. 
Finally, in March of 1983, residents who had seen their complaints 
go unheeded took matters into their own hands and gathered to throw 
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bricks and rocks at the plant. The plant managers did not report the 
incidents to the EPB. Instead, they set up spotlights within the factory 
walls to illuminate the activities of the residents. They also dispatched 
militia to “guard the safety of the plant.” On March 12th, three residents of 
the xx Match Factory were throwing rocks at the plant. Militia from the 
branch factory captured them and kept one person as a hostage. They also 
snagged an assistant division chief from the match factory who had gone 
to the enamel factory gate to negotiate. 
This exacerbated the situation and violence escalated. Residents of 
the match factory acted as a mob and tore off the roof of the enamel 
workshop, broke open the door and rushed into the workshop. Their 
actions disrupted production and forced workers to defend themselves. 
Their actions damaged about 50 tons of enamelware, worth hundreds of 
thousands of Yuan, slated for export. In total, the damages to products, 
equipment, and the buildings equaled about 500,000 Yuan. 
After the 1983 incident, the enamel plant was under 
tremendous pressure, so they wrote a letter to the city Ministry of 
Light Industry Office to request funding in the amount of nine 
hundred thousand Yuan in assistance to resolve their noise, 
particulate, and hazardous gas pollution problems. After an exerted 
effort, the factory was relocated in 1984.1
As this story illustrates, some Chinese citizens have joined the millions of 
other people around the globe in participating in local environmental protests.2
Protests of this sort and other forms of political participation, including citizen 
complaints, expert investigations, and political party demands, have proven to be a 
challenge to authorities. For example, in the 1980s, environmental activists in Taiwan, 
Hungary, and other Eastern European nations, were at the forefront of national 
democratic protest movements demanding more accountability and an end to 
autocratic policies.3 Environmental movements were a cause, and not merely the 
effect, of the greater economic and political reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, 
and the eventual fall of the Soviet regime.4 In Japan, environmental activism was seen 
as “fundamentally disruptive to the established ways of power.”5
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Chinese leaders are not blind to these v nts and have good reason to be 
concerned that environmental activism in China could contribute to a popular 
movement demanding more government accountability and add to citizen unrest. 
Prominent figures in China warn that pollution and environmental degra ation have 
worsened to the point of causing economic damages and of threatening social 
stability.6 It is clear that citizen participation and activism regarding environmental 
issues are important in any discussion of social stability in China. 
This dissertation provides new empirical evidence that shows activism and 
participation, which is defined as acts of citizen interest articulation aimed at 
influencing authorities and policy outcomes, has been increasing, through a variety of 
channels, especially since the early 1990s. It provides concrete details regarding how 
channels of participation work. It answers the questions of why participation has 
increased, why there is variation across provinces, and if there is one or more 
environmental movements in China. Finally, it shows how this increasing activism 
and participation makes a difference in policy processes and environmental outcomes. 
It explains how a reforming authoritarian, primarily corporatist7 state has 
channeled, even co- pted activism, as well as how citizens have circumvented state 
controls and taken advantage of political opportunities to expand participation. On one 
hand, Chinese authorities have been able to avert widespread social unrest by 
encouraging participation in some channels – by building new institutions and 
establishing processes through which to shape, channel, and control participation – as 
well as by limiting political opportunities for participation through other channels. On 
the other hand, in some areas of the country, citizens have established mostly 
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autonomous environmental groups, practice “civil politics,” and have created a 
conservation and wildlife conservation “proto-movement.” Proto-movements exhibit 
all the attributes of traditional western social movements, and can arguably be called 
precursors to them, but are constrained by different political opportunity structures. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to examine the dominate 
modes of citizen activism and participation, which include direct citizen protests, the 
dispute resolution system, the environmental complaint system, state-mobilized public 
campaigns, and environmental social organizations (similar to nongovernmental 
organizations). Emerging channels include environmental impact assessment and
public comment processes. It is around these dominant modes of participation that this 
dissertation is organized.
Chapter Overview
This chapter explores the utility of the social movement framework for 
examining increased activism and suggests that variables from the social movement 
literature be used, in conjunction with variables for the general literature on 
participation, to explain increasing participation more broadly. It provides theoretical 
and empirical perspectives on political participation within t e Chinese context. Then 
it illustrates the severity of China’s environmental problems, shows how 
environmental awareness has increased, and introduces the current literature on public 
participation in China’s environmental policy processes. It outlines th  scope and 
methods of this research and explains why it is important. Finally, it provides a 
summary of the major findings, and gives an overview of the dissertation. 
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Environmental Activism Equals an Environmental Movement?
Before it is possible to say there are one or more environmental movements 
emerging in China, a much closer look at the definition of social movements is in 
order. A definition of social movements that is by now well established is one crafted 
by Sidney Tarrow, and others, which asserts that social movements are “collective 
challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction 
with elite opponents, and authorities.”8  Tarrow argues that
“People engage in contentious politics when patterns of 
political opportunities and constraints change and then, by 
strategically employing a repertoire of collective action, create new 
opportunities, which are used by others in widening cycles of 
contention. When their struggles revolve around broad cleavages 
in society, when they bring people together around inherited 
cultural symbols, and when they can build on or construct dense 
social networks and connective structures, then these episodes of 
contention result in sustained interactions with opponents -
specifically, in social movements.”9
With this definition in mind, it became clear that there were limitations to 
utilizing the social movement literature in understanding environmental activism in 
China. Three main problems exist: there are forms of participation that do not fit 
within the framework of environmental movements; participation may not be 
considered contentious by western standards; and it simply is not clear that an 
environmental movement has emerged in China. Along with these problems, come 
opportunities. The opportunities arise because social movement theories can provide 
additional analytic variables to help explain variation in levels of participation more 
generally. Opportunities also exist to add nuance to social movement theories.
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First among the problems is that there are clearly forms of participation in the 
environmental sector in China that do not fit under the rubric of environmental 
movements, i.e. participation at the individual level, mobilized campaigns and some 
group participation. These forms of participation just do not look like social 
movements. However, these forms are important in showing how the state has 
constructed institutions and processes through which to channel citizen activism. 
In addition, while these forms of participation do not lend themselves to the 
wholesale application of the social movement framework, the various factors 
considered important in determining the emergence of social movements still are 
useful for explaining variation in levels of participation through each of the channels. 
Therefore, it is possible to borrow variables from the social movement literature to 
help to explain increasing activism in China. These variables include political 
opportunity structures,10 grievances,11 framing processes,12 and mobilization 
structures.13
Of primary importance is the variable of opportunity structures because in 
China, political opportunities come apriori to other factors, such as mobilizational 
structures and framing. For example, independent social organizations, which now 
mobilize widespread participation, could not have emerged without the 
acknowledgement by party and government officials that they were necessary and the 
encouragement of officials to create such groups. Theoretically, considering China as a 
reforming authoritarian state, it is logical to assume that political openness can be 
considered a primary limiting factor in determining levels of participation. Therefore, 
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in this research more attention has been given to the role of the state and to political 
opportunity structures. 
In China, the role of the state and the methods used by the state to shape the 
emergence of citizen environmental activism started out as being quite similar to what 
we have seen in Eastern Europe and East Asia, but have since become quite different. 
In both Eastern Europe and East Asia, we saw rather rapid political liberalization 
between 1987 and 1989, during which time environmental activism soared and 
environmental movements emerged. In China on the other hand, we see slow and 
methodical opening of political opportunities, making activism increase incrementally, 
almost deliberately. People who try to step too far outside of the available political 
opportunities are harshly dealt with, such as when Dai Qing was put in jail when she 
criticized the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. On one hand, one could argue 
this is has been a rational response by the state. On the other hand, one could argue it 
has been due to a process of institutional learning, or more cynically adaptation, on the 
part of Chinese authorities.
This research illustrates how political opportunity structures in reforming 
authoritarian, socialist countries like China are different from such structures in freer 
states and how these structures shape participation and social m vements. It shows 
how a largely corporatist state tries to keep control by adopting a pre-emptive 
approach. Authorities have been able to encourage participation and frame citizen 
action by utilizing the familiar tools of repression and suppression, as well as utilizing 
new tools including establishing new institutions and processes of interest articulation, 
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regulation, and by taking a pro-active approach in improving environmental 
protection. 
The second reason why utilizing social movement theories dir ctly is 
problematic is that a good portion of the participation in China would not be 
considered contentious. Traditionally, scholars of social movements would focus on 
instances where citizens utilize “repertoires of contention,” i.e. “contentious modes of 
making claims” to provoke social, political, or policy change to look for movement 
precursors.14 However, what is contentious in one society may not be considered 
contentious in another society. Scholars of social movements in western democratic 
countries take the possibility of wide repertoires of contention for granted, simply 
because they study movements in nations with political systems that sanction a high 
level of political participation and allow for many forms of contention. Contentious 
political participation is an original condition in western democracies. However, this 
becomes a problem when attempts are made to examine social movements in non-
western, non-democratic countries because overtly contentious participation is 
sometimes not an original condition of the political landscape. Repertoires of 
contention vary across nations and are based on available or created forms of 
participation and their political contexts. Here, this research is simply suggesting that 
it be recognized that contention is socially constructed and that within the Chinese 
context, contentious politics is more prevalent that people would imagine. 
The third problem with applying social movement theories directly is that it 
was not clear at the beginning of this research if itizen activism revolved around 
broad cleavages in society or if interactions with officials were sustained over long 
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periods. In other words, it was not immediately obvious that one or more 
environmental movements existed in China. 
Social movement research has attempted to explain why social movements 
emerge at certain points in history and not during others. However, it is difficult to 
study social movements until they emerge, so in effect researchers have mainly been 
able to study positive instances of emergence. What phenomena can be examined to 
offer cases in which movements do and do not emerge? One possible answer is to 
examine existing repertoires of political participation, not just contentious 
participation, because movements are more than just contentious politics.
Social movements are one form of group political participation. They are a 
powerful form of political participation that, unlike viable political parties and robust 
interest groups, may not need a democratic environment in which to emerge. This does 
not mean that social movements can develop under any political conditions. Sufficient 
political opportunities must exist. A certain level of political participation must exist. 
Participation in a social movement is inherently a political act, so studying channels of 
political participation is one way to study a potential social movement without 
assuming one has already emerged. This approach views a social movement type 
phenomenon not as a dichotomous variable, but as a continuous variable long a 
spectrum, with political participation at one end and a traditional social movement at 
the other end.
If there is an anti-pollution or other environmental movement in China, it is a 
nascent one, so this study does not start from the premise that one or more citizen 
environmental movements have formed in China. Instead, the study seeks to examine 
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the conditions in China that will help determine if public participation is political and 
has or can accelerate and develop into a traditional social movement. If there were 
little political participation in China, then it would be unlikely that a movement would 
emerge. Consequently, examining political participation at the local level is the 
starting point of this largely interpretive research.15
Participation as Political
To begin to understand what participation is and why it has increased in China, 
a review of the general literature on participation is useful. Most of the early literature 
on political participation looked at participation in western democratic countries and 
primarily examines elections, but some did acknowledge that there are other forms of 
participation.16 Since the 1970s, more and more western scholars argued that 
participation not only includes the selection of officials, but also includes any efforts 
by citizens to influence policy decisions and policy outcomes. The work of Lester 
Milbrath,17 Sidney Verba and Norman Nie,18 and Margaret Conway19 argues that there 
are different styles of participation. They show that political participation in Western 
countries include other ways of influencing decision-making processes and policy 
outcomes, such as participating in interest groups, petitioning representatives, 
protesting, writing critical articles, and public comment processes. Although the right 
to recall officials through voting is obviously powerful, political participation clearly 
includes more than just voting. While these scholars acknowledged that political 
participation should not exclusively refer to voting, it is questionable as to whether 
they would consider participation in China as political, especially during the Mao 
period.
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Chinese Concepts of Participation
The modern basis for political participation by the common man in policy
processes in China is found in the practice of the “mass line” developed and practiced 
by Mao.20 In theory, the mass line practice is informed by the principle of democratic 
centralism.21 In mass line processes, leading organizations are responsive to the 
masses and are to report their work to the masses periodically (through their 
representatives). They are to listen to the suggestions of lower level organizations and 
the masses. They are under the supervision of the masses. All decisions regarding 
directives (fangzhen), policies (zhengce), laws (falu), regulations (fagui), and major 
decisions (jueding) are to be based upon democracy and come up from the masses and 
centralized at the center. Then they are to be carried out through action of the masses. 
Leading agencies are to realize collective leadership and specialization of individuals. 
All major decisions are to be decided by discussion among members of the 
collective.22 So, in theory, public participation in political processes is supported by 
party principles.
Political Participation in the Mao Period
James Townsend argues that some form of participation did occur between 
1949 and 1978, although he admits it was largely ceremonial or paternalistic and was 
designed to support the national interest as defined by the Communist Party.23
Townsend defines participation in Communist societies as “the execution of party 
policies” and “popular political action support for a supreme, unified national interest 
as defined by the Communist Party,” or as “guided involvement in the implementation 
of political decisions.”24
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Some scholars would disagree with the assertion that all participation was 
fundamentally patrimonial and non-political in Mao’s China. They argue that a narrow 
definition of participation is unrealistic and inadequate to study political phenomena in 
communist societies.25 Lucien Pye argued that paternalist participation, or 
participation for the sake of the common good, is still participation.26 Victor 
Falkenheim asserted that significant non-ritual participation did exist in China.27
While some forms of political participation may have existed during the Mao period, 
they existed alongside other more coerced forms of participation, implemented by a 
vast party apparatus that extended down into peoples’ neighborhoods and work places 
(danwei). While not specifically talking about China, Samuel Huntington and Joan 
Nelson argue that even mobilized participation can be political in nature.28
Political Participation at the Individual Level in Post-Mao China
There is more individual freedom in China today and the consequences of 
nonconformity are not as great as they were during Mao’s reign. In today’s China, 
there exist larger “zones of indifference,” areas in which “political power on its own 
volition does not try to penetrate or control.”29 Therefore, individuals today have more 
freedom of choice, so if a citizen participates, it is likely that the individual agrees 
with the policy goals of the campaign and supports the current efforts of political 
actors to achieve those goals. One even could argue that participation not only 
indicates support for specific policy goals, but also provides and indicates support for 
the political regime. 
Scholars of the post-Mao era, such as Tianjin Shi and Kevin O’Brien, argue 
that there is political participation at the individual level in China. Some individuals 
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participate not because they oppose the political regime, but because they are loyal to 
it and are seeking justice and/or are articulating their interests. Sometimes, this type of 
participation is thought of as “remonstrance.”30 Tianjian Shi argues that there is 
political participation in China and that it is far more common than people realize, 
especially in the area of low politics which include local-level issues that touch 
directly on people’s lives.31 Shi argues there can be political participation in countries 
that do not have established democratic institutions and procedures. Shi reminds us 
that political participation occurs not only during the decision-making phase of the 
policy process, but in the implementation phase as well.  
While Shi’s work has been important to point out that political participation 
may occur in societies without pervasive democratic institutions and procedures, Shi 
chooses not to examine more paternalistic forms of participation, such as state-
mobilized campaigns. Paternalistic forms of participation still exist and the 
relationships between paternalistic and more autonomous forms of participation are 
important in understanding the breadth of state society relations in China. Examining 
the range of participation, from paternalistic to contentious, as this study does, will 
provide a more well-rounded picture of changing state-society relations in China. 
Political Participation Defined
The definition of political participation, at the individual level, used in this 
research is: any voluntary action undertaken by ordinary citizens that attempts to 
change the behavior of political leaders and policy or political outcomes. Participation 
is the act of interest articulation or the expression of a grievance that attempts to 
change behavior but need not result in any particular outcome. This means that people 
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can participate and yet have no effect.32 A definition of political participation at the 
group or society level, however, must include the notion of interest aggregation as 
well as interest articulation. Political participation at the level of society implies group 
attempts to change the behavior of political actors or policy outcomes.
Participation at the Group Level
A discussion of participation at the group level warrants review of some of 
Shi’s work in Beijing as well as discussing participation in the form of social 
movements. 
Shi’s work concludes that the Chinese regime eliminates “the organizational
bases for people to articulate their interests collectively.”33 His answer really reflects 
the structure of his research design; using individual survey responses cannot capture 
group responses. 
This research shows that in the environment sector, the government has not 
eliminated channels of interest aggregation, but still shapes people’s behavior and, to 
some extent, controls interest aggregation. Instead of eliminating channels of interest 
aggregation, the government provides channels for group interest articulation and 
allows some group formation through which citizens may aggregate their interests. 
Specifically, citizens may file group petitions, submit multiparty complaints, and file 
class-action suits against polluting enterprises. In addition, citizens can now legally 
join a variety of non-governmental environmental social organizations. 
While these channels limit opportunities, shape group behavior, contain 
contention, and attempt to channel it in non-disruptive directions, they also create 
opportunities to bring people together and allow interest aggregation. In a sense, 
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China’s social organizations and class action suits are political opportunities that allow 
group interest articulation. 
Shi posits that without new group-based political activities emerging in China, 
increasing participation will not lead to regime change or democratization without the 
introduction of political parties. However, widespread political participation in the 
environmental sector could contribute to the momentum of democratization by raising 
citizen expectations of accountability in government.34  The environment is a less 
politically charged issue around which citizens could practice group interest 
articulation, engage in contentious actions with officials, or more likely, other social 
actors, and learn to deal with contending opinions. 
While some evidence indicates that citizens in China tend not to cooperate or 
to aggregate their common interests, the environmental sector may be different and so 
is a most likely case to see interest aggregation. Shi finds that “the primary strategy of 
interest articulation for the urban population in China is exclusion of, rather than 
cooperation with, people with similar attributes. Group and party-based politics 
remains not only unnecessary but also irrational for most participants.”35 However, 
these findings may no longer be valid given the breakdown of the danwei system. In 
any case, the findings do not apply to all circumstances. It only applies when 
participants are in competition for resources. It does not necessarily apply when a 
public good, such as environmental quality, is involved (although not quantity as in 
water shortages). Regime actors cannot parcel out the distribution of a public good, 
such as clean air in the same manner as other types of resources. Clean air for some 
participants does not automatically mean other participants will receive less clean air. 
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In effect, all participants (in a given geographical area) are more or less equally 
affected when a public good is at stake. Since participants are not in competition for 
resources, it makes more sense for them to work in cooperation with each other to 
maintain the supply of the public good in question - here it is environmental quality.
China’s Pollution Problems
There are many specific examples of China’s environmental pollution and 
degradation. China’s environmental problems include the world’s largest population, 
water pollution, water shortages, air pollution, persistent organic pollutants (POPs), 
noise pollution, solid and industrial waste, desertification and sandstorms, 
deforestation and grassland loss, soil erosion, and biodiversity loss.36
China’s population growth constitutes an environmental problem because it 
contributes greatly to the depletion of natural resources. Population growth in the late 
1990s was 1.7 percent, down 0.4 percent from the rate in the 1980s, when the Chinese 
census estimated China’s population at 1.2 billion, including people living on the 
island of Taiwan. Many analysts, however, believe this is a gross underestimation, 
because of the potential high number of “hidden” births. Independent estimates put the 
total figure closer to 1.5 billion.37
Water quality and quantity problems plague every region in China. Forty two
percent of the water in the seven major river systems38 has a water quality index of 
three or worse, meaning that it is unfit for human consumption. The water in 36 
percent of cities across China has reached a quality index of five, and is unusable.39
Drinking Water meets state standards in only six of China’s 27 largest cities. While 
there has been an overall decline in mortality from infectious diseases, diarrheal 
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diseases and viral hepatitis, both associated with fecal pollution of water, are still the 
leading infectious diseases in China.40 Around 60 million people face daily water 
shortages and in some areas in the North and West, factories are forced to suspend 
production because of lack of water.41
Air pollution problems are of increasing concern. A 1997 report conducted by 
the World Bank said chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was considered the 
leading cause of death in China, accounting for 26 percent of all deaths. According to 
an unpublished study, at least 3 million Chinese died of pollution related illnesses in a 
22-year period in twenty of the nation’s largest cities.42 Fine particulates and sulfur 
oxides emitted in coal combustion were the major contributors to this high incidence.  
The same report estimated that economic damage from air pollution in general was 
about US $1.5 billion, with US $15 million alone attributed to respiratory disease.  In 
some northern cities in China, winter levels of SO2 have approached those found in 
the air pollution episodes in London in 1952.43 The London episodes caused an 
estimated 4,000 fatalities. 
China’s solid waste and desertification related problems are growing. Chinese 
cities dump 140 million tons of domestic waste annually, of which only ten percent is 
disposed of in a harmless way.Desertification currently afflicts 27.3 percent of 
China’s land. This area is increasing at a rate of 2,460 km2 each year. The 
desertification of land is so severe in some areas of Inner Mongolia that residents have 
been forced to abandon their villages.44 Sandstorms are becoming ever more common, 
increasing in incidence from five during the 1950s to 23 in the 1990s. The major 
Asian dust events in 1998 were associated with twelve deaths in the Xinjiang 
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Autonomous Region of China.45  In 1999, sand storms caused over US$3.6 million in 
economic damages in Inner Mongolia.46
Finally, while the state has made great efforts to control biodiversity loss, it 
remains a huge problem. Of the 640 species listed by CITES (Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species) as critically endangered, 156 are found in
China, representing one-quarter of the total.47  The indiscriminate and excessive 
hunting of wildlife continues to be extremely serious, and has so far resisted repeated 
attempts at control.48
The Need for Public Participation and Rising Environmental Awareness
Given the severity of China’s environmental problems and the lingering 
environmental policy implementation problems, strong action by both state and non-
state actors is necessary. Citizen environmental awareness and public participation are 
necessary to help to resolve China’s lingering implementation problems. While there 
is a dearth of work examining China’s environmental issues, only a few scholars have 
examined Chinese society’s response to pollution and the role of public participation 
in environmental policy processes.49 One reason why Chinese citizens’ responses to 
rising pollution were not the subject of much study is that they have not always been 
visible. Since the late 1980s, however, it has become possible to measure Chinese 
citizens’ attitudes toward and responses to growing pollution problems. 
A variety of surveys have shown that public environmental awareness levels 
have risen; the National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA)50
conducted one of the earliest surveys in 1990. It showed that 64 percent of those 
polled in 28 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities across China believed 
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environmental degradation in China is serious and an additional 35 percent believed it 
is somewhat serious. Ninety-four percent were worried that their nearby environment 
posed a danger to their health.51 Some evidence indicates that since the late 1980s, 
Chinese citizen environmental awareness levels have risen.52 In the early 1990s, 
environmental awareness was measured by polling citizens’ co cern for the 
environment.53 Later, environmental awareness was conceived of in more 
sophisticated terms and surveys included questions testing environmental 
knowledge.54 A survey conducted by SEPA of 31 provinces, autonomous zones, and 
municipalities in 2000 showed that concern for the environment was still strong. Of 
the 10,495 households surveyed, 56.7 percent believed environmental problems in 
China were “very serious” or “relatively serious.” Only 22.8 percent believed that 
environmental problems wer “not too serious” or “not a concern.” The more 
sophisticated query regarding environmental knowledge revealed that of the thirteen 
knowledge questions, people on average only got 2.8 questions correct.55 This 
indicates that while concern for the environment is quite high, specific knowledge of 
environmental processes is still quite low. The surveys do not reveal how citizens 
translate their awareness into action. While heightened environmental concern does 
not always mean citizens will act on that concern,56 participation in the environmental 
sector and environmental activism has increased. 
Public Participation in China’s Environmental Policy Processes
Despite recent excellent scholarly endeavors to understand environmental 
politics, and policy-making and implementation processes in China,57 very few 
scholars have examined the role of the public in environmental policy processes since 
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the days of Mao’s mass mobilization campaigns.58 There have been many changes in 
the legal, political, economic, and social struc ures in China since the days of Mao It is 
possible to examine new, more autonomous forms of citizen interest articulation in 
operation alongside older forms of mobilization and corporatist organizations and 
understand the interaction between them. 
To say there are few studies does not mean there are none. There have been 
both projects designed to expand participation and scholarly research on various 
channels of participation. One valuable project designed and implemented by the 
American Bar Association has helped three cities in China establish local regulations 
to promote public participation in environmental policy processes.59 There have been a 
handful of scholarly studies on public participation, especially since 2000. Two very 
recent studies acknowledge the role of the general public in environmental protection 
efforts. First, Hua Wang, Jinan Wang, and Genfa Lu examined the impact of 
publicizing enterprises’ environmental performance ratings in the media. They found 
disclosure of ratings significantly reduced pollution in two tests of the “Green Watch” 
program in 2000. Authorities have greatly expanded the program.60 The program does 
not create or expand channels of public participation; it simply allows publication of 
information on polluting enterprises. 
This alone is significant because public disclosure and information is key in 
framing citizens’ perceptions of pollution and whether or not excessive pollution is 
seen as infringing upon one’s legitimate environmental rights. The sooner an 
individual in a country gains access to environmental information, the sooner that 
knowledge will establish an awareness of specific cause and effect relationships 
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between pollution and the possible health and economic impacts for that individual, 
thereby shaping his/her identity in relation to his/her environment. Information is an 
intangible resource and the rate and degree of citizen access to environmental 
information in part accounted for differences in the timing and nature of 
environmental non-governmental organization development and citizen demands for a 
cleaner environment in other states and regions, such as Eastern Europe.61 Access to 
information is not the sole determinant of citizen action, but it has historically been 
one of the first ingredients in forming environmental awareness, or a “green” identity. 
Second, Carlos Wing Hung Lo and Sai Wing Leung examined the effect of 
public opinion on environmental governance in Guangzhou. They found that 
Guangzhou citizens already have developed an environmental co sciousness, although 
they may not put environmental protection as their top priority. Out of the process of 
mass mobilization, citizens have been informally incorporated, to some degree, into 
the policy process as officials respond to their grievances and complaints. EPB 
officials, however, have been warned not to encourage radical environmentalism by 
not “instigating critical public opinion or environmental activists,” indicating there is a 
limit to the public’s voice. Of significance, Lo and Leung point ou  that environmental 
protection authorities have used mass support for a cleaner environment to create a 
“more favorable context” in bureaucratic settings to promote the environmental 
protection agenda.62 Lo and Leung, however, do not elaborate upon the relationships 
between mobilized participation and citizen interest articulation, discuss how public 
opinion has helped to create a more favorable context for environmental protection, or 
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link their research to the broader topics of participation and collective action. These 
gaps are addressed in this research.  
Most of the other studies on participation have focused on the emergence of 
nongovernmental organizations in the environment sector. The case study approach 
has been popular.63 Other works report on conferences to promote the development of 
groups and their interactions.64 One study examines the Chinese environmental social 
organizations through a theoretical lens, outlines the legal framework supporting 
organizations, and discusses the barriers to organization expansion.65 One study has 
systematically surveyed student environmental groups.66 Two other studies focused on 
environmental complaints and disputes.67 Each of these studies is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters.
Peter Ho has tied discussion of environmental groups into the larger issue of 
environmentalism. He compares Chinese groups with those in the former Eastern-bloc 
countries and finds many similarities in the way groups developed in a gradual way. 
He asserts environmentalism in China, in contrast, lacks opportunities and the urgency 
to openly confront the government. Two main factors have shaped environmentalism 
in China: the “greening” of the Chinese state and the strict controls over social 
organizations.68 He refrains from discussing social organizations in terms of being 
social movement organizations. He does not view the interactions these groups have 
with the state as conflictual and stresses the “female mildness” of the groups. 
In contrast, this research argues that select groups have indeed come in 
contention with state and other social actors, once China’s political and cultural 
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contexts are considered. Considering the social construction of contention, some 
actions taken by environmental social organizations have been quit  contentious. 
This dissertation research builds upon these article-length studies of 
participation and goes further by undertaking systematic quantitative and qualitative 
surveys of each of the main channels of participation, explains how channels operate, 
and examines the relationships between participation in each channel. 
Research Scope and Methods
Why Examine Environmental Movements and Participation?
Beyond the fact that rising participation in the environment sector has proven 
to be a political challenge to governments in the past and may become an important 
political challenge to Chinese authorities in the future, there are other reasons for 
examining participation more broadly. 
“Broadening political participation is the hallmark of political 
modernization.”69 Participation is also an essential component of democratization. In 
gradual transitions to democracy, we should see increasing levels of political 
participation. In practice, as long as political participation is rare, there can be little 
gradual movement among the continuum of authoritarianism to democratization. This 
is another reason why the examination of participation in China is vital. Not only is it 
important to examine participation as a result of a shift toward soft authoritarianism or 
of democratization, but it also is important to examine the potential influence of 
participation on any shifts toward a more open system. At the very least, participation 
is a measure of democratization.
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For example, participation could be added to the list of indicators used by 
Minxin Pei in his assessment that China is experiencing “creeping democratization.” 
According to Pei, China is moving toward democratization at a creeping pace. 
Creeping democratization partially is manifest through citizens increasing use of legal 
remedies to assert their legal rights, including their environmental rights.It al o is 
manifest in decreasing repression of pollution victims since 1979 and in citizens’ 
access to representatives of the National People’s Congress, which has been growing 
in political power, albeit slowly and inconsistently.70 Including a measure of levels of 
political participation in China, in more autonomous social organizations and through 
public comment and citizen input processes, would strengthen Pei’s argument. 
The policy implications of this research are equally important. The theoretical 
literature on environmental policy processes, originating from the West, has identified 
public attitudes and citizen participation as a factor in determining the success of 
environmental laws and policies in achieving their intended results.71 This work shows 
that public participation at the local level in China is just as important in improving 
implementation of environmental policy and laws as it is elsewhere. As in other 
nations, public participation helps to raise environmental awareness and puts pressure 
on enterprises and government actors to adhere to environmental laws. 
Increased public participation is timely given that despite significant state 
action to promote environmental protection, implementation problems still plague 
China’s efforts to improve environmental quality. Numerous scholarly studies show 
that the Chinese state has responded to industrial pollution and environmental 
degradation strongly, albeit gradually, since the 1970s by taking steps to improve 
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scientific understanding of the problems and by establishing a relatively 
comprehensive national regulatory framework to manage the problems. This legal 
framework has increased the legitimacy of local environmental protection bureaus 
(EPBs) and their efforts to enforce laws and policies. EPBs have expanded their 
authority and their administrative and scientific capacities considerably in recent 
years. However, in the 1990s, policy implementation problems were still one of the 
most formidable barriers facing Chinese leaders in their attempt to achieve their stated 
environmental protection goals.72 Part of the reason for spotty implementation has 
been the paucity of public pressure at the local level. Over time, increased 
participation should help to resolve enforcement difficulties and eventually to ease 
some of China’s major pollution problems.
Why the Environmental Protection Sector?
There are several reasons why the environmental protection sector is a good 
case for examining public and political participation, social movements, and state-
society relations in China. 
First, although environmental politics is considered an arena of low politics, 
China has some of the worst population and environmental pollution and degradation 
problems in the world. This has implications not only at the domestic level, but has the 
potential to have a huge impact on the regional and global environment, making 
China’s environmental quality an issue of concern for the interna ional community. 
The domestic dimensions of China’s problems were outlined in a previous section; 
this section concentrates on the international dimensions of China’s environmental 
problems. China is now the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide, the major gas 
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contributing to global warming, and is expected to become the largest emitter by 2025. 
It is among the top producers and consumers of ozone-depleting substances, which 
contribute to the destruction of the earth’s ozone layer that protects the planet from 
harmful ultraviolet radiation.73 A Japanese report asserted that the density of sulfur 
oxide (SOx) ions originating from China and finding their way to Japan had increased 
by thirty percent between 1986 and 1991, significantly contributing to Japan’s acid 
rain problems.74 Japan is not the only nation in East Asia affected by transboundary 
acid rain.  North and South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Mongolia are also “net 
importers” of China’s SOx and NOx emissions. It is important to be aware of China’s
environmental policy processes and outcomes, most notably how well China 
implements international environmental agreements and domestic environmental laws 
and policies. If participation is necessary to achieve successful implementation of 
environmental policy goals, then the breadth and depth of participation in the 
environmental sector becomes a legitimate concern of the international community.
Second, it has been found in other nations that public participation in 
environmental policy processes is essential in reaching environmental protection 
goals.75 There are policy implications of a general nature for China and other more 
authoritarian states if it can be shown that participation is necessary to achieve policy 
goals, no matter what a nation’s political system may be. 
Third, environmental politics is typically seen as a “low politics” arena in 
China; according to regime officials, environmental protection is thought of as a sector 
appropriate for “social development,” which indicates that greater opportunities for 
public interest articulation exist in this sector compared with others such as the foreign 
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policy sector. In short, the environmental protection case is a “most likely” case for 
seeing widespread, political participation and an emerging social movement.76
Fourth, focusing on the environment sector allows an examination of the wide 
range of modes of participation available to citizens in China at both the individual 
and group levels. There are both paternalistic and more autonomous modes of 
participation in this sector. The tension between the state’s need for participation and 
the need to control it make environmental protection an ideal case through which to 
understand state-society relations. The main channels of participation are, disputes and
self-help remedies, the complaint system, government mobilized campaigns, and 
environmental social organizations. In addition, new channels are emerging, including 
participation in environmental impact assessments and public comment processes. 
Methodology
Each chapter focuses on one specific channel of participation and examines the 
breadth and depth of participation through that channel at the national, provincial, and 
city levels, where possible. This approach allows a broad overview of participation 
across China and provides specific case-study information about participation at the 
local level. The research has both quantitative and qualitative components
To answer the core question of which specific conditions influence Chinese 
society’s response to pollution and to provide quantitative evidence of the increase of 
public participation over time, the research includes asurvey examining variations in 
environmental complaints at the national and provincial levels across China over a 
ten-year period (1989-1999). It explores the correlations among levels of air pollution, 
levels of environmental awareness, and per capita GDP with the number of citizen 
28
complaints to environmental authorities at the national level, in all provinces and 
selected cities. 
To understand why participation has increased, how citizens participate in 
environmental policy processes, how the government encourages and restricts 
participation, and how participation varies across China, a qualitative component is 
included in the research. The qualitative component is an in-depth comparative 
analysis exploring the specific channels of public participation in three cities, Beijing, 
Chengdu, and Taiyuan.77 Data for the comparison was obtained from a variety of 
sources including interviews (with citizens, EPB officials, lawyers, scholars, victims 
of pollution, NPC representatives and staff, and others) and written materials 
(newspaper and journal articles, policy documents, reference works and scholarly 
books, articles and reports).
Three different cities were chosen in order to get an idea of the variation in the 
types and levels of public participation and political opportunity structures across 
China. These cities were chosen based on a number of criteria: the existence of serious 
pollution problems; variance in the level of per capita gross domestic product; 
similarities in geographical properties; the availability of data regarding pollution 
levels and environmental complaints for a ten-y ar period; and the specific 
administrative and legal status of the cities. The cities chosen are either a provincial 
capital or an autonomous municipality and are the sites where data on citizen 
complaints and environmental accidents are collected. In addition, these sites are the 
focal points for interaction of different levels of political power, such as local, 
provincial, and national. 
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Two of these cities, Beijing and Chengdu, are designated as “clean” or model 
cities, leading one to believe that it would be more likely that participation in the 
environmental protection sector was encouraged. Taiyuan is not designated as a 
“clean” city. It has a very high level of pollution, which should trigger a higher public 
response. Beijing is the political capital of the country, it has a relatively high level of 
per capita gross domestic product, and it has been at the forefront of China’s 
environmental protection work since as early as 1981.78 In addition, Beijing is a 
cosmopolitan city that has been somewhat westernized. Chengdu has a relatively low 
level of per capita income and is the political capital of the southwest. Chengdu has 
some western presence, but not nearly as much as Beijing. Taiyuan has a medium 
level of per capita income, and pollution levels are relatively high compared to the 
other top fifteen polluted cities in China. Taiyuan has the lowest level of Western 
influence and no foreign environmental groups have established themselves in the 
city, although there have been a handful of air pollution management projects with 
foreign input.79
As with many research projects in China, data availability can shape the way in 
which a research project is conducted. In this project, problems of data availability 
constricted analysis at the city level. For example, data on environmental complaints 
was unobtainable in Chengdu. Comprehensive complaint data, however, was available 
at the provincial and national levels so a quantitative analysis of all complaints across 
all of China for a ten-year period could be made at those levels. There are numerous 
obvious data omissions, such as the number of environmental accidents from certain 
provinces in select years, and there are likely others that are not so obvious. Overall, 
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however, the data is still useful for getting a general picture of Chinese society’s 
response to pollution as measured by the numbers of complaints. If anything, the 
numbers are too low; the actual number of complaints is probably higher. 
The channel of dispute resolution can be disaggregated into individual dispute 
cases. Data on specific dispute cases ar  available from a variety of sources, but none 
of these sources is comprehensive. Newspaper articles covering disputes were 
collected from around the country over time, but the information in the articles is 
superficial and does not allow systematic quantit tive analysis. In addition, data on 
specific dispute cases are available from casebooks,80 but the data included in these 
books also are incomplete. Data on specific disputes that occurred in the three case 
cities are available from yearbooks, but again the data are superficial and incomplete. 
Given these conditions it was impossible to collect enough data from dispute cases 
from specific cities or even provinces to conduct a systematic quantitative national-
level survey, so only specific anecdotal evidnce can be presented with which to make 
limited generalizations about contentious politics. 
Not all cities or provinces have independent or even quasi-independent 
environmental social organizations. The lack of such organizations, nevertheless, 
informs this dissertation’s conclusions.
Given these conditions, it was necessary to utilize a variety of research 
approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, as well as focus on different levels of 
analysis to examine variation in participation through various channels (units of 
analysis) across time and location. A number of causal factors contribute to variations 
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in participation in all channels. However, other factors explain variations in only one 
or two channels. 
Findings in Brief
As pollution levels have risen, society has responded by complaining and 
demonstrating against pollution problems and the best the state can do is to try to 
shape, channel, and control the more disruptive forms of participation. Of great 
importance is that the state needs public participation in order to achieve 
environmental protection goals, so there is a constant tension between the need to 
encourage participation and the need to control it. 
Currently, the main channels of participation in the environmental sector 
include the environmental complaint system, the dispute resolution system, direct 
citizen actions, state-mobilized public campaigns, and environmental social 
organizations (similar to nongovernmental organizations). In addition, there is some 
citizen participation in environmental impact assessment processes, in public comment 
processes, and through informal channels. 
As in other countries, the Chinese state prefers certain channels of participation 
to others. Chinese leaders seek to control participation by channeling it into 
institutionalized pathways to avoid social disruption and economic setbacks, while 
seeking benefits for governmental agencies. The most popular of these channels is the 
environmental complaint system, because it provides benefits to both state actors and 
to citizens. Citizen environmental complaints are a “tolerated” form of political 
participation.81
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Participation in the system has increased overall, but not in every province, and 
there is wide variation in participation levels across locations. Empirical data gathered 
on participation through all channels, aggregated at the national level, indicates that 
participation has measurably increased over the last two decades. 
The findings indicate that increases in public participation are primarily due to 
authorities’ recognition of the need for participation and subsequent encouragement of 
participation. This opened political opportunities for increased activism on the part of 
citizens. Official encouragement of participation and greater responsiveness to 
citizens’ environmental grievances created a complex interaction of both top-down 
and bottom-up activism whereby the state and society have entered a positive, 
mutually reinforcing cycle of increasing participation. 
Other factors also have played some rol  in stimulating participation. First, 
pollution levels have continued to rise and more people are being affected, so there are 
more people with environmental grievances. Second, the 1979 Environmental 
Protection Law (trial), and many more recent laws, legitimized enforcement actions 
and provided more legal protection to citizens who make complaints or file suits; it is 
no longer “counterrevolutionary” to take extreme measures to protect one’s legal 
environmental rights. Third, economic development has raised people’s standard of 
living, giving them more disposable income and more free time to engage in activism. 
This factor is more important in some channels, like establishing and developing 
environmental social organizations. It is less important in other channels, especially 
citizen use of the complaint system. Although, when citizens need to take their 
complaint to higher administrative levels, the need for financial resources increases. 
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Fourth, in some areas, environmental education efforts and mediastories have helped 
to increase citizen environmental awareness levels, so more people now see the 
damages caused by pollution not as an “unavoidable by-product” of modernization, 
but as avoidable and “wrong.” 
Public participation in Communist states is ju t as important in achieving 
environmental policy objectives as it is in non-communist states. In China, however, 
the nature of participation is fundamentally different than it is in many western 
nations; participation is more controlled and occurs at different phases of the policy 
process. Nearly all channels of participation operate during the course of policy 
implementation. However, there are signs that this is slowly changing. The relative 
absence of participation at decision-making stages indicates that Chinese authorities 
tend to value participation, not because it would help them make better decisions, but 
because it helps them enforce governmental decisions already made. 
To get someone to pay attention to their problem, citizens, as they have done 
historically, still demonstrate vehemently against polluting enterprises. They may take 
actions such as kidnap an enterprise owner, destroy property, or surround an electric 
power plant. These instances of protest add to the growing evidence that contentious 
politics is alive and well in the PRC.82
Environmental protection and public security officials still repress direct 
citizen action as well as news stories of such action. The role of authorities, however, 
is much more complex. In many cases, environme tal protection and other officials 
have sided with protesters, helping them to get their grievances addressed. Authorities 
have tried to avoid disputes by institutionalizing the environmental complaint system, 
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by accommodating grievances, and by using sophisticated means of social control; 
however, this does not always work. When petitions and complaints do not work, 
citizens often take matters into their own hands. 
Local contentious micro-environmental movements erupt and fade in response 
to specific neighborhood pollution problems. But narrow political opportunities and 
legal remedies, outright repression, the ideology of economic reforms, restricted 
information flows, and the lack of unifying symbols and mobilizing structures, such as 
social movement organizations, all serve to isolate these instances of contentious 
politics from spreading or growing into a unified national anti-pollution movement.
A good portion of organized group participation, the work of environmental 
social organizations (similar to nongovernmental organizations), is still corporatist in 
nature; some organizations, however, are working outside of a corporatist structure 
and are in fact practicing “civic politics.”83 The corporatist groups, the government-
organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs), are actors in a “civic 
corporatist” system, i.e. a system of corporatism in the non-pr fit sector. When 
discussing the popular, more autonomous environmental social organizations, the 
concept of “civil society” may not be quite appropiate, because even these groups go 
through a political vetting when they must get approval from a supervising 
organization that must be willing to be responsible for them. However, these groups 
do practice civic politics. These groups work to affect social ch nge in society. 
Corporatist and popular group initiatives aimed at changing citizen behaviors that 
affect the environment are building momentum in the effort to spread environmental 
values in China’s largest cities. Most of these initiatives are non-contentious, 
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persuasive, and aimed at educating the public, but some organizations have engaged in 
contentious politics with authorities and other social actors. 
Overall, Chinese officials have begun to encourage more participation and 
have become more responsive. Does this mean, however, that there has been a 
fundamental shift in state-society relations in China? Are individual interests still 
considered secondary to collective interests? Is group interest articulation still mainly 
corporatist in nature?84 The research shows that while there has been some policy 
change, there has not been a shift in the fundamental principals guiding state-socie y 
relations.85 Public participation in policy processes still is based on the practice of the 
“mass line,” derived from the principle of democratic centralism, albeit much more 
sophisticated than during Mao’s reign.
Since the 1980s, there has been a sophistication of state-society relations. This 
means that, overall, relations have become more complex, increasingly based on 
rationality, and informed by experience. This sophistication is apparent in the 
institutionalization and rationalization of each channel of public participation.
There is no simple answer to the question of whether or not an environmental 
movement is emerging in China. To argue that a traditional social movement exists in 
China would be contrary to observable evidence. On the other hand, to say that no 
environmental movement of any type is emerging in China would also be contrary to 
observable evidence. It is safe, however, to say that at least one environmental proto-
movement is emerging - a nature and wildlife conservation proto-movement. This 
proto-movement is the closest thing China has to a traditional western social 
movement. 
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Proto-movements exhibit the elements of a social movement, to some degree, 
but are constrained by the lack of political opportunities. The paucity of political 
opportunities leads the movement type phenomenon to be small, to be nascent, or to 
be less contentious. Some proto-movements may develop into traditional movements, 
but some may not – it depends upon the configuration of political opportunities 
shaping it. If there are no changes in the political opportunity structure, then the proto-
movement remains in the proto phase. 
Unlike China’s neighbors, an anti-pollution movement has not emerged in 
China and instances of protest regarding pollution remain isolated cases of contentious 
politics.86 However, there is much activism to promote “green-life” issues, which 
focus on making one’s life greener by recycling, conserving water and energy, and 
making green consumer choices. 
There are significant barriers to the growth of traditional widespread 
environmental movements. First, social networks and environmental social 
organizations still are tethered to the state, which limits their activities, and currently 
available political opportunity structures limit the widespread growth of proto-
movements. Second, there is less space for contentious politics in China, therefore 
citizens involved in collective action tend to shy away from western style highly 
contentious approaches and instead utilize softer contentious approaches suited to the 
Chinese context. Third, collective claims or grievances quickly lose resonance in 
Chinese society because media outlets are controlled by the state, which tends to play 
down negative events and contention in society. There is less of a chance that events 
will be sensationalized and replayed repeatedly in public, as they often are in the west. 
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This inhibits awareness of focusing events that could become symbols to unite 
individuals and groups and motivate sustained collective action. 
Overview of the Dissertation
The dissertation is primarily organized around the distinct channels of 
participation in environmental policy processes in China: disputes and protests, the 
complaint system, state-mobilized campaigns, and environmental social organizations. 
Chapter two discusses participation and social movements in Western and Chinese 
contexts, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. It places the environmental 
proto-movement in China in comparative perspective by examining environmental 
movements in reforming authoritarian nations in East Asian and Eastern Europe. 
There is a discussion of specific aspects of China’s political opportunity structure, 
which limits and/or encourages movement emergence. It provides the theoretical 
foundation for asserting that public participation, including social movements, makes 
a difference in environmental outcomes. 
Chapter three explains changing patterns in the way environmental disputes 
have been handled in the three case cities and across China over time, specifically 
between the 1970s and the year 2001. The findings are based on a rough quantitative 
survey of disputes from four different casebooks,87 newspaper articles, interviews, and 
other sources. It shows that the number of environmental disputes has increased over 
time and that dispute resolution processes have become more sophisticated, rational, 
and institutionalized. It elucidates the conditions under which disputes are resolved 
and seem to make a difference in policy processes and outcomes. It also shows that 
significant deficiencies remain in dispute resolution laws, institutions, and processes. 
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It shows that not all disputes are resolved in China. While the overall number of 
disputes has risen, these local instances of collective action and contentious politics 
remain isolated and relatively unorganized. 
Chapter four shows that the state has tried to channel most grievances through 
the citizen environmental complaint system. It details the structure of the 
environmental complaint system and examines its deficiencies. It argues that Chinese 
authorities established the system for several reasons. First, the complaint system is 
preferred over other channels of participation because it provides benefits to both 
environmental protection authorities and citizens. Second, the complaint system 
allows authorities to channel grievances from people who might otherwise choose 
paths the state considers less desirable to resolve their pollution problems, such as 
initiating a protest, going on strike, or other such disruptive behavior. Third, in 
general, the system encourages individuals to act alone to resolve the problem, thus 
attempting to prevent environmental disputes and uncontrolled collective citizen 
protests. Fourth, officials utilize the complaint system to help them implement 
environmental laws and policies. Citizens act as the eyes and the ears of 
environmental officials and are the “ground troops” in the battle to get enterprises to 
comply with environmental laws and policies. In addition, the system provides higher-
level officials with feedback about what is happening at lower administrative levels. 
Citizens prefer the sanctioned complaint system to other less sanctioned, 
riskier channels of interest articulation such as initiating various forms of protest. 
While filing complaints is not risk-free, it is less politically risky than taking matters 
into your own hands. In addition, compared to organizing a collective protest, filing an 
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individual complaint is easier and is less costly. The complaint system benefits 
citizens because they can use it to stop behavior that harms them. In addition, citizens 
get a sense of satisfaction for voicing a grievance and/or fulfilling their civic duty in 
reporting polluters. 
Also, chapter four illustrates that environmental complaints have measurably 
increased at the national level over the last decade. The story at the provincial level is, 
however, much more complicated. The research shows that Chinese society’s response 
to rising industrial pollution is shaped by several factors, some intrinsic to the 
complaint system and others external to it. Based on previous research, it is 
hypothesized that a number of the factors that shape Chinese society’s response to 
pollution influence public participation more generally, including levels of  “pollution 
density,”88 levels of economic well being, and levels of citizen environmental 
awareness. This research tests these assumptions in the China case, where Chinese 
society’s response to pollution is measured as the numbers of citizen environmental 
complaints. Briefly, the results indicate that the factors mentioned above, when 
combined into one model, have fair explanatory power. They are significant 
explanatory variables, but not in all cases. 
Chapter five examines state-mobilized campaigns to illustrate the range of 
participation in China and to offer a comparative look at state “movements” and 
citizen “movements.” The chapter shows that state-mobilized campaigns still exist in 
China. Today, however, campaigns are depoliticized, institutionalized, routinized, and 
are somewhat more sophisticated than Maoist strategies of mass mobilization. The 
instrumental value of campaigns has become paramount. The political value is 
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secondary which makes them better tools with which to attain policy goals and to 
guide citizen behavior. They are not as politicized because they no longer involve 
personal political struggle and do not function to purge individuals and groups on 
political grounds. 
On a more subtle level, government-mobilized campaigns are a means of 
communication from the state to society. Campaigns signal to the population, which 
issues are priorities and which issues are acceptable and preferable to address. 
Campaigns reflect the state’s environmental protection agenda and are among the 
means by which the government transmits that agenda to citizens. Campaigns steer 
citizen participation toward the achievement of state-d fined policy goals. Through 
campaigns, the state and citizens work together to reach policy goals. In addition, a 
side effect of state-mobilized campaigns has been to promote public participation in 
policy processes outside the campaign structure, although with many of the same 
policy goals. Contrary to earlier beliefs that state-mobilized campaigns displaced other 
forms of participation, today they are a catalyst of them, especially campaigns to 
mobilize youth and women’s groups, which have inspired individuals to establish their 
own environmental social organizations. 
Chapter six examines environmental social organizations and shows that a 
good portion of group participation through these organizations is still state corporatist 
in nature. Some organizations, however, are working outside of a state corporatist 
structure and are in fact practicing “civic politics.”89  These groups work to effect 
social change in society. Chinese initiatives aimed at changing citizen behaviors that 
affect the environment are building momentum in the effort to spread environmental 
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values in China’s largest cities. Select groups act as social movement organizations 
and mobilize citizen participation in a nature and wildlife conservation proto-
movement. Given China’s political and cultural context, select groups act more 
contentiously than previously assumed and have come in conflict with state and other 
social actors.90
Chapter seven, the concluding chapter, examines the few channels of public 
participation that occur during the decision-making phase of the policy process, 
including participation in environmental impact assessment processes, in public 
comment processes, and through informal channels. It brings together the various 
findings regarding each channel of participation, illuminates conditions under which 
participation makes a difference, and discusses the political and policy implications of 
China’s proto nature and wildlife conservation movement and the increasing levels of 
participation through other channels.
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Chapter Two
Participation and Social Movements: The Importance of 
Political Opportunities
Chapter one asserted that public participation in environmental policy 
processes has increased in China and that some of this participation was political in 
nature. This is critical because without political participation, it is unlikely that a 
sustained environmental movement would emerge. It explained that in the absence of 
knowing whether or not an environmental movement was taking root in China, this 
research would focus on the main channels of participation to examine the potential
for such a movement. Theories used by scholars of social movements are then 
appropriate to help explain rising levels of participation and to gauge the possibility of 
the emergence of an environmental movement. 
This chapter takes up where the previous chapter leaves off in discussing the 
scholarly literature on social movements and the theories used by scholars of social 
movements in the effort to identify the elements most likely to influence movement 
emergence in China. The hypothesis is that China’s political opportunity structure is a 
crucial factor in accounting for increases in participation and for determining the 
emergence of an environmental movement. 
Since most of the literature on social movements focuses on western 
democratic countries in North America and Europe, certain political opportunities are 
taken for granted, such as political parties, autonomous non-governmental 
organizations, media freedom, and tolerance for high levels of contention in society. 
The focus then is on changes in the opportunity structure. The China case appears to 
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be different, because most of the traditional political opportunities may not be present. 
If China does not have the traditional political opportunities, does it have other 
structures that open space for movement emergence? To get a better idea of the 
specific political opportunities that operate in non-democratic, non-western contexts, 
this chapter includes a discussion of environmental movements under reforming 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and East Asia in the late 1980s. 
The examination of movements in these countries illustrates that traditional 
political opportunities, such as political parties and independent non-governmental 
organizations, and media freedom are just as important for movement emergence in 
non-western contexts. In Poland, South Korea, the Former Soviet Union (FSU), and 
Taiwan, the emergence of environmental movements was intimately tied to processes 
of democratization and new opportunities for non-governmental groups to operate 
freely. The implication is that this added evidence of the importance of traditional 
political opportunities does not bode well for the emergence of an environmental 
movement in China at this time. The lack of most of the traditional political 
opportunities found in other countries might lead one to expect that one or more 
movements would not emerge in China.
However, there are other opportunity structures in China that could allow for 
movement emergence. There is some room for contention in Chinese society and 
authorities have even sanctioned a certain level of contention by passing the 
Environmental Protection Law and other laws that give citizens the right to accuse 
polluters without repercussions. Other opportunities include the development of some 
autonomous environmental social organizations, the reform of the work unit (da wei) 
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system, the heightened status of the state environmental protection administration, the 
increasing supervisory power of China’s representative bodies, such as the NPC and 
the CPPCC, the continuing support of international actors, and finally, the need for 
participation on the part of authorities. 
The Social movement framework and factors thought to influence the 
emergence of movements are useful to evaluate variation in levels of political 
participation, but they are not the only useful way to examine public participation in 
environmental policy processes in China. There has been plenty of work showing the 
corporatist nature of state-society interaction and these concepts are still useful for 
understanding participation in Chinese society.1
The social movement framework does not fit well when examining the mor
corporatist forms of group participation or citizen involvement with state-mobilized 
campaigns. However, no one theory or model can explain or describe the huge 
variation in modes of participation in China. Theories of corporatism are important in 
discussing group participation in environmental policy processes and are discussed 
thoroughly in chapter six.
Also discussed in chapter six, is the concept of civil society. Although, the 
concepts of civil society and social movements may overlap and compliment each 
other, there are some important distinctions between them. Civil society is typically 
considered to originate within elite spheres, while social movement organizations 
typically have their base in grassroots collective action. Social movement 
organizations are striving for a similar goal, while groups in civil society may not 
necessarily share a common goal. Social movement organizations tend to be engaged 
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in contentious politics, while civil society may not. The presence of civil society 
implies a pluralization or liberalization of policy and political processes. Social 
movements however, do not. While social movements are more likely to materialize in 
democratic societies, this is not a necessary condition. The democracy movement in 
China is one example of a social movement that emerged in China under non-
democratic conditions.2
A Short History of Social Movement Research
The 1800s ushered in research on social movements. This research began with 
studies of the “maddened crowd” and ended with studies on the relationship between 
the structure of society and instances of collective action. Early theorists focused on 
three factors that were the most feared: extremism, deprivation, and violence.3 Later 
on, Karl Marx theorized that social movements were caused by the structure of 
society.4 However, Marx could not explain how workers would overcome the problem 
of collective action, or in other words, how and why should individuals with their own 
interests cooperate in an organized fashion to achieve a common goal? Lenin supplied 
the answer with his solution of the “vanguard,” or a committed group of leaders who 
would organize the workers and sustain the movement. Later, Antonio Gramsci added 
“identity” to the list of factors determining if and when a social movement would 
emerge. He argued that the social structure and organizational leaders were sometimes 
not enough to break through the “false consciousness” of workers, so he concentrated 
on how intellectuals could build the revolutionary spirit in the minds of workers by 
helping develop a working class identity for workers to take on as their own.5
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While, the Marxist theory of social movements could only be applied to the 
phenomenon of class conflict, collective behavior theories of the 1950s and 1960s 
could be applied to many different kinds of behavior. Many of these theories focused 
on how grievances motivated individuals to participate in collective action.6 However, 
by the 1960s, scholars acknowledged that individuals with grievances did not always 
work collectively in groups to find solutions to their problems. 
In 1971, Mancur Olson published his work on “collective action” and focused 
on individuals’ material and personal incentives as motivating factors. A social 
movement requires political participation at the level of the group or society. A 
movement requires more than interest articulation at the individual level; it requires 
interest aggregation, or collective action, at the group level. Therefore, collective 
action is necessary for the emergence of social movements. Collective action can be 
defined as “people’s banding together to act on their shared grievances, hopes and 
interests.”7
It was taken largely for granted that individuals with common interests and 
common identities would work in groups and that these groups would further their 
“group interest,” just as individuals would further their individual interests, until one 
scholar pointed out an important problem of collective action. The problem is that 
“rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests” because if some individuals act out of self-interest, then they will become 
“free riders.”8 Free riders are people who reap the benefits of group action without 
having made some kind of contribution. The free-rider problem is common in larger 
groups because there is no one to make sure that every individual in the group is 
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actively participating. Along with problems of collective action and the free-rider 
problem, other scholars pointed out that structural factors, such as resources, 
organization, and political opportunity might be crucial in determining whether or not 
a movement would emerge. 
Two sociologists John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, agreed with Mancur Olson 
about the problem of collective action. However, they believed that, at least in 
industrialized countries, increased personal and external financial resources and 
increased professionalism helped eliminate the problem of how to support aggregate 
collective behavior. McCarthy and Zald thought “social movement organizations” 
would eliminate the problem of scaling up individual resources to the level of the 
organization. McCarthy and Zald’s resource mobilization theory came under attack 
because it could not explain the small, grass-roots organizations that proliferated in the 
U.S. and Europe in the 1960s. Nor was it sufficient to explain why movements 
emerged at certain times but not at other times. 
Another group of scholars sought to understand the organizational dynamics of 
these smaller-grassroots, “new” social movements by devising a political process 
model, which focused less on large professional social movement organizations and 
more on smaller neighborhood, religious, and friendship networks.9
Other scholars pointed out that what was mi sing from work on social 
movements was attention to cognitive or ideational aspects of collective action. These 
aspects were collectively called framing processes by scholars such as Erving 
Goffman and David Snow. These researchers asserted that “shared meanings and 
definitions” were necessary ingredients for social movement emergence.10 Todd Gitlin 
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and Benedict Anderson added a cultural dimension to framing processes. These 
scholars and others suggested that movements emerged and succeeded when 
movement leaders were able to manipulate cultural symbols and provide individuals 
with meaning and identity.11 However, culturalism and framing processes could not 
predict why movements appear in some periods, so it was useful only to a point.
Scholars then turned toward politics to find the answers to these questions. 
Charles Tilly was one of the first to assert that social movements could not be studied 
apart from politics. The concept of political opportunity structures, borrowed from the 
literature on institutions, linked the emergence of movements to political processes 
within the state.12 By joining the study of politics and movements, it was then possible 
to create a more powerful explanation as to why movements seemed to arise in certain 
periods and not others, and why movements take different forms.
Sidney Tarrow recently synthesized the resource mobilization, framing 
processes, culture and identity, and political opportunity theories into a more holistic 
explanation for the emergence and continuation of social movements. Tarrow defines 
social movements as “collective challenges based on common purposes and social 
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elite opponents, and authorities.”13 Tarrow 
combines four components to build this definition: collective challenge (social 
movements engage in contentious politics14 or protest15), common purposes, solidarity 
and collective identity, and sustained interaction.
Tarrow’s succinct definition of social movements is a valuable starting point 
with which to understand movements in western democratic countries and for social 
movements in general; however, can it be utilized just as well in non-western nations 
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that have different cultural, economic, and political conditions and specifically with 
environmental movements? 
Are Environmental Movements Different?
Environmental movements are often considered “new social movements.”16
Several theories have been used in explaining the rise of these new movements in 
industrialized countries. One such theory, the post-materialist theory, put forth by 
Ingelhart argues environmental movements are linked to a shift in the values of 
individuals once they have taken care of their physical sustenance. Once these needs 
have been met, an individual then turns to concerns related to the quality of life, 
including environmental quality.17 A later article supports these findings. The results 
of surveys done in several developed countries confirms that a value shift occurs in 
“any society that has experienced sufficient economic growth in recent decades so that 
the pre-adult experiences of younger birth cohorts were significantly more secure than 
those of older cohorts.18
There are problems with ascribing post-materialist values to citizens in China, 
given China is still a developing country. Only cities such as Shanghai and Beijing 
have enjoyed higher levels of per capita GDP throughout the 1990s. A few provinces 
showed dramatic increases in per capita GDP, such as Guangdong, which went from a 
per capita GDP of 2,307 Yuan (approx. 268 US dollars) to 11,728 Yuan (1,368 US 
dollars) in 1999. However, most provinces showed slower growth. For example per 
capita GDP in Xiaanxi in 1989 was 1,124 Yuan (130 US dollars) and rose to only 
4,101 Yuan (476 US dollars) in 1999.19
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In addition, China’s Marxist past complicates the evolution of citizens’ values 
from materialist to post-materialist. Under Mao, citizens tended to play down 
materialism and humble backgrounds were an asset. It was not until Deng proclaimed, 
“to get rich is glorious” that materialist values began to be more acceptable. Even in 
China’s richer cities, citizens are still more concerned with their economic well being 
than other post-materialist values, such as environmental quality. According to an 
environmental awareness survey conducted by SEPA in 2000, 45 percent of citizens 
across China would not want to slow economic growth in order to improve 
environmental quality.20
In addition, why have not environmental movements emerged everywhere 
GDP levels have risen and why do some people become environmentalists while 
others do not? As Tarrow points out, the post-materialist theory does not explain when 
a movement will emerge. Finally, the work of Dunlap, Gallup, and others suggests that 
even citizens in less developed countries are concerned about environmental quality.21
The post-materialist thesis does not explain why movements emerge at specific times 
in history and not in others.
Movements Under Reforming Authoritarian Regimes
A great deal of research emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s that examin s 
citizen activism, social protest, and environmental movements in Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, Asia and Africa.22 An examination of movements in all of these 
regions would greatly enhance our understanding of movement emergence from a 
comparative perspective. For brevity’s sake, this section primarily focuses on 
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movements in Eastern Europe, especially the Former Soviet Union and Poland, and 
Asia, especially Taiwan and South Korea. 
Environmental Movements in Asia
There is not one monolithic “Asian environmental movement,” nor is there one 
simple environmental movement in each Asian country. For example, three distinct 
environmental movements can be discerned in Taiwan: the anti-pollution, the nature 
conservation, and the anti-nuclear movements.23 Environmental movements in Asia 
are diverse, some populist,24 some corporatist,25 while others have a post-materialist 
bent.26 The various movements are socially constructed and are culturally 
indigenized.27 In some nations, nongovernmental organizations have played a major 
role in activism to address local, regional, and national issues, such as in South Korea 
and the Philippines. In other countries, environmental activism is strongest at the local 
level, such as Japan.28 While environmental movements in Asia do notlook exactly 
like movements in western Democratic nations, the researchers quoted here consider 
them as cases of the universal phenomenon of social movements. 
As with environmental movements in the West, Asia’s environmental 
movements are inherently political because they are concerned with the unequal 
distribution of the costs and benefits of development.29 The movements in Asia, 
however, often look different from their western counterparts. Asian movements look 
different because original conditions are different, i.e. movements originate in 
different political, economic, cultural, and religious contexts.30 Movements in Asia are 
often less cohesive and alliances are “contingent.”31
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Scholars of environmental movements in Asia argue those movements did 
have some impact in the agenda-setting phase of the policy process, although there 
was limited change in actual policy outcomes. Lee and So argue that environmental 
movements in Asia forced regimes and elites to “adopt a pro-environment discourse.” 
In spite of this discourse, however, pro-growth ideologies were hardly challenged.32 In 
Taiwan, even after the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won 
an overwhelming victory in the 2000 elections, pro-g wth strategies dominated. 
Environmental movements in Taiwan and South Korea did not make much of a 
difference in changing the views of the majority of citizens regarding state 
development strategies, which runs counter to experiences in other countries. In the 
U.S., Japan, and Germany, because of enviro mental movement-induced value shifts, 
a large enough number of citizens questioned the sustainability of pro-growth policies 
to make a difference in policy outcomes.33 The survival of pro-growth sentiments 
through the firestorm of an environmental movement may be unique to developing 
countries in general, simply because a large enough number of citizens may not yet be 
satisfied with their level of economic achievement and therefore side with pro-
development sentiment. This phenomenon is very evident in Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s Environmental Movements
Three distinct environmental movements emerged in Taiwan, the anti-
pollution, the anti-nuclear, and the conservation movements. Of these, the anti-
pollution movement emerged first. There were only a handful of anti-pollution 
demonstrations before the mid-1980s, which can be partially attributed to Taiwan’s 
then authoritarian political system. However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, there 
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was wide public concern regarding environmental issues. In a 1983 poll, citizens 
considered the environment as the island’s sixth worst problem. In the late 1980s, 
more people were acting on this concern by protesting against polluting enterprises 
and nuclear facilities. 
One such protest occurred in Lukang in 1986, one of Taiwan’s primary 
agricultural areas. Residents strongly protested against a proposed new Du Pont 
titanium dioxide plant and were able to prevent its construction.34 A other such protest 
occurred in Linyuan. Residents claimed that a number of livestock deaths in the area 
were due to water pollution from eighteen petrochemical plants and two naphtha 
crackers in a nearby industrial zone. Early protests were met with indifference, so 
some residents broke into the plant itself and began pressing buttons. Luckily, there
were no major repercussions of the break-in. The Ministry of Economic Affairs agreed 
to pay 10 million Taiwan dollars to the affected residents. These are just two examples 
of anti-pollution protests that were becoming common around the island.
In addition to an anti-pollution movement, a distinct anti-nuclear movement 
emerged in Taiwan. Citizen anti-nuclear sentiment started as a trickle and grew into a 
flood by the 1990s. Even prior to the construction of nuclear power plants on the 
island, some scientiss and intellectuals raised objections in the 1960s to the 
nucleariazation of energy resources. Taiwan built its first two nuclear power plants, in 
Chinshan on the island’s northern tip, in the late 1970s, during the global energy crisis, 
and in response to heightened concern over Taiwan’s energy security.35 The third and 
fourth nuclear power plants were built near Kaohsiung in the early 1980s. The fifth 
and sixth plants were built in Manshan, on the Southern tip of the island near Kenting 
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National Park in the mid 1980s. The rapid “nuclearization” of Taiwan created a public 
backlash that was heightened by the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in the U.S. 
in 1979.36
Two minor accidents at Taiwan’s nuclear power plants in the early and mid-
1980s became “focusing events”37 and fueled anti-nuclear concerns. Intense public 
debate arose regarding nuclear power and an organized movement developed.38 The 
horrific nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986 jelled the movement and 
protests marking the one-year anniversary of the Chernobyl accident in 1987 
illustrated how widespread the movement had become. 
Factors Contributing to Movement Emergence and Growth in Taiwan
Theories regarding environmental and social movement emergence are 
relevant to the Taiwan case. The objective presence of pollution and resulting citizen 
grievances is adequate to explain rising anti-pollution protests in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, but it is not enough to explain the rise of Taiwan’s anti-pollution and anti-
nuclear movements in the late 1980s. Political opportunities were crucial to movement 
emergence, especially freedom of the press, democratization and the legalization of 
opposition political parties, and the development of the island’s environmental 
protection apparatus. Powerful mobilizational structures also contributed to movement 
emergence. Finally, a shift in values, a shift to post-ma erialist values, partially 
adopted from environmental movements in the West, enriched the anti-pollu on and 
anti-nuclear movements and a nature conservation movement. 
Democratization and greater political accountability in Taiwan led to several 
changes in Taiwan’s political opportunity structure, which in turn allowed more space 
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for environmental movements to grow. The number of enviro mental protests 
increased dramatically after martial law was lifted in 1986, which reduced the costs of 
participating in such protests as well as the threat of prosecution.39
The dramatic growth of Taiwan’s anti-pollution and anti-nuclear movements in 
the late 1980s can partially be attributed to a freer press. Even before Chiang Ching-
kuo, the then president of Taiwan, lifted martial law in 1987, newspapers and 
television stations began to expand their operations and produce bolder stories.40
Freedom of the press allowed for “focusing events,” to become widely known. For 
example, nuclear accidents at home and abroad, fueled Taiwan citizen anti-nuclear 
sentiment and spurred protests against future development of nuclear power on the 
island.    
Public support for environmental protection was given voice through the press 
and through the opposition political party, the DPP, which became legal in 1986. The 
DPP forced entrenched KMT government authorities to give greater attention to 
environmental issues and to s me degree spurred institutional change in the 
environmental protection sector. The DPP took up the nuclear and other 
environmental issues in its platform, which forced the ruling party, the KMT, to re-
evaluate its position toward environmental problems and provided political 
opportunities to strengthen the anti- uclear movement. 
In 1987, the once ineffectual Bureau of Environmental Protection under the 
Department of Health was elevated to a cabinet level Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). The following year, the provincial and local government 
administrations established their own environmental protection departments. The 
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government set up a couple of corporatist NGOs and authorities stepped up 
environmental education programs and increased the budget for environmental 
protection. The 1990 budget was twenty times larger than that of 1987.41 The stronger 
environmental protection apparatus became a government ally of citizens demanding a 
cleaner environment.
Several social groups and organizations were crucial to movement emergence 
in Taiwan including academics, local activists, and religious ties and temple networks.
Academics have been a main driving force behind Taiwan’s environmental 
movements, creating and operating various social movement organizatio s, i.e. 
environmental non-governmental organizations.42
Also important were local networks of activists. Some organizations had 
academics at the center, but have many local branches coordinated by local activists, 
such as the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union (TEPU). Branches of TEPU grew 
out of specific demonstrations. 
Crucial to some micro-movements in rural areas were religious ties, temple 
networks, and temple funds. When temples could be won over to the 
environmentalists’ side, they were a great source of legitimacy and became powerful 
allies in contentious politics. Deities provided legitimacy and stood as a common 
symbol bringing movement members together. Temples and political factions have 
been a main channel for movement leaders to mobilize citiz ns.43 Also prevalent in 
Taiwanese environmental protests is the role of funeral rituals, symbols, and language. 
Often the polluted river, lake, or land area is referred to as a “dead parent,” for which 
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one should greave. These symbols conjure up “images of the discarded Confucian 
responsibility to the welfare of future generations.”44
Another contributing factor to the rise of Taiwan’s environmental movements 
has been the shift in the way nature is perceived stemming from a new awareness and 
appreciation of nature.45 This new awareness is partially due to the increase in 
information regarding environmental pollution and degradation and their impacts. 
Others have posited that this new appreciation of nature has resulted from the 
processes of modernization. As Taiwan has modernized, life has become more 
industrialized, fast-paced, impersonal, and the cities have become louder, more 
congested, and foul-smelling, citizens have increasingly sought refuge in nature. As a 
result, there has been an increase in nature tourism, nature publishing, and a surge in 
geomancy.46
Many of the members of the various groups upheld a distinctly western view 
regarding the progression of Taiwan’s environmental movements, comparing 
Taiwan’s movement with those in the west. There is borrowing from the west in the 
philosophical roots of the organizations. “The academics in particular have drawn 
directly on western green thinking, which values the environment over economy, 
nature over culture, and equilibrium over transformation.”47 Most of the national-level 
organizations and local branches that engage in contentious politics are men. 
Organizations led by women, however, do not engage in radically contentious 
activities. Instead, they frame their environmentalism within issues of houseld and 
motherhood.
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As the previous paragraphs suggest, several factors contributed to the rise of 
environmental movements in Taiwan including the presence of grievances, increasing 
political opportunities, mobilizational structures, and shifts toward post-materialist 
values. However, increasing political opportunities, due to democratization, have the 
most explanatory power regarding the timing of movement emergence. A similar 
claim could be made regarding environmental movements in South Korea.  
South Korea’s Environmental Movements
There were two main branches to Korea’s environmental movement, an anti-
pollution and an anti-nuclear. Prior to the 1980s, environmental education and 
environmental activism were extremely localized and local churches and universities 
took the lead in such activism. In the early 1980s, some scientists, however, became 
concerned about the effects of rapid economic development on the Korean 
environment and formed the Study Group on Pollution. The group, however, did not 
get involved in environmental protests. As in Taiwan, South Korea’s environmental 
movements took off in the politically liberalizing atmosphere of the late 1980s.
Korea’s anti-pollution movement started slowly in the early 1980s. The first 
group to become active in environmental protests, the Korea Pollution Research 
Institute (KPRI) was established in 1982. Interestingly, its founders were church 
leaders. The group was a uniting force for small isolated groups of individuals who 
were concerned about the environment. KPRI personnel conducted fieldwork in 
polluted neighborhoods to teach locals how to reduce pollution. It also conduced 
education programs and published reports. The group was a major actor in Korea’s 
first major pollution victim case, the “Onsan illness” case. Onsan illness was caused 
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by heavy metal contamination and affected over 1,000 as of the 1990s. In the late 
1980s, KPRI reports and citizen protests forced the government to conduct its own 
epidemiological survey and to relocate residents. In addition to KPRI, a number of 
other environmental groups emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s.48
Korea’s anti-nuclear movement emerged nearly twenty years after the nation’s 
initial development of nuclear energy; protests did not arise earlier primarily because 
of the authoritarian nature of Korea’s political system. In the late 1960s, South Korea 
embarked on an ambitious nuclear energy development program. By the 1980s, 
nuclear sources provided more than fifty percent of Korea’s energy needs. In 1988, 
there were nine power plants in operation and two more in construction. Debate stalled 
the projects still under construction, but not for long. Debate revolved around the 
efficiency of nuclear power and the safety of nuclear plants. Other issues of great 
concern were nuclear waste disposal and nuclear weapons. Citizens did not trust the 
government. Debate on nuclear power did not arise until the 1980s, partly because of 
numerous domestic accidents and because of accidents in other countries. In Korea, 
there were 193 accidents reported before 1990. However, talk regarding improving 
safety dominated the debate, which left little room for talk regarding abandoning 
nuclear power.  
Large protests and other tactics were used by anti-nuclear activists yet, by 
1996, Korea had eleven commercial nuclear power plants in operation, with five other 
plants under various stages of construction. In the late 1990s, South Korea still relied 
on nuclear plants for about 33 percent of its power needs and plans for fourteen power 
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plants to be built by 2000 were on schedule. In addition, 50 more plants are planned 
by the year 2031.49
Does Korea’s continued and planned reliance on nuclear power mean that its 
anti-nuclear movement has failed? If the only goal of the movement was to end the 
nation’s use of nuclear power, then it has failed. If, however, there are other goals, 
such as ensuring human safety and achieving efficient power generation, then perhaps 
the movement has not totally failed.
In South Korea, the main factor contributing to the rise of the anti-pollution 
and anti-nuclear movements was expanding political opportunities, including a general 
wave of contention in the late 1980s, democratization, and expanded media freedom. 
Also crucial to the rise of these movements were “focusing events” and positive media 
“resonance.” Among the focusing events were a number of accidents at nuclear power 
plants in Korea and abroad in the mid-to-late 1980s, and a series of tap water 
contamination incidents in Seoul in 1989 and 1990. Once it was reported that Seoul’s 
tap water was contaminated with cadmium, mercury, and other heavy metals, citizens 
suddenly realized that pollution was their problem and it was happening in their 
backyards. 
From 1987 on, the Korean press was much freer and the number of articles on 
the environment increased dramatically, and environmental protests were given 
positive coverage. The positive and sustained coverage made the emerging 
environmental movement positively resonate with the public. Again, as in Taiwan, 
changes in the political opportunity structure greatly facilitated the development of 
environmental movements in South Korea.
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Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe
In Taiwan and South Korea, the rise of environmental movements were 
intimately linked to broader political and social changes and to strong networks of 
individuals and groups that were able to mobilize resources in support of those 
movements. These factors in combination with an underlying partial shift toward post-
materialist values explain why environmental movements arose when they did. Is the 
story similar in Eastern Europe? A closer look at two countries, Poland and the FSU 
provides an answer to this question.
Poland and the FSU shared similar conditions in the 1970s in that most if not 
all social organizations were corporatist in nature, the media is highly controlled so 
information on environmental harms is suppressed, citizens largely accept pollution as 
an inevitable byproduct of economic development, and any protests are repressed. It is 
not until the 1980s that we see some variance in the factors that eventually give rise to 
environmental movements in each country. 
The best explanatory factors for the differences in the timing of the rise of 
environmental movements in the FSU and Poland in the late 1980s are: one, variance 
in the level of access to resources, especially information and the actors who 
popularized information on environmental harms; and two, differences in the timing 
and scope of new political opportunities. 
In Poland, demands for a cleaner environment were linked to workers demands 
for collective bargaining, representational rights, and greater accountability in 
government, which were voiced by members of Solidarity, an independent trade union 
federation that mobilized protests across Poland in the early 1980s. The political 
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atmosphere was free enough in Poland for Solidarity to exist legally in 1980 and 
1981.50 Solidarity worked to increase information on environmental harms, which in 
turn helped to create a value shift among the population. Even after Solidarity had 
become illegal, its influence lingered. It had forced the state and elite actors to pay 
more attention to environmental protection.
In the FSU, demands for a cleaner environment were linked to the scientific 
political elite, which became more vocal during the ideological thaw in 1983. Also 
important in the FSU was the proliferation of environmental groups after Gobachev 
initiated Perestroika and Glasnost in 1985 and lifted the ban on social organizations in 
1987. Some scholars view the emergence of these grassroots organizations as a cause, 
and not merely the effect of the greater economic and political reforms initiated by 
Gorbachev, and the eventual fall of the Soviet regime.51 While the exact role of 
grassroots environmental organizations in the fall of the FSU and its communist 
satellites is still in debate, it is clear that the associations did proliferate and had some 
impact on the structure of society just before, during, and after 1989.
Poland
In Poland in the 1970s, governmental leaders controlled social behavior 
regarding the environment in two ways. One, Polish censors were to take out any 
information regarding environmental degradation because it would threaten the 
“facade of order” on which the ruling regime based its legitimacy. “Information on 
direct threats to life or health caused by industry or chemical agents used in 
agriculture, or threats to the natural environment in Poland, should be eliminated from 
works on environmental protection.”52 Fisher asserts the main reason for the facade 
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was to confuse. Information on environmental degradation undermined the regime’s 
promise of a good quality of life and hinted that the ideology of unlimited growth had 
its pitfalls. When people did protest pollution or environmental degradation, their 
activities were considered a threat to the system.53 Two, the Polish propaganda 
machine had citizens convinced that “environmental degradation had to be taken in 
stride as the price to be paid for accelerated industrialization if one wanted to reap the 
various benefits of civilization.”54
There were a few quasi-governmental environmental organizations, such as 
The League for the Protection of Nature, the Polish Hunters Association, and the 
Polish Anglers Association, but these organizations merely played lip service to 
protecting the environment; they did not engage in any substantive activities to 
promote environmental protection values.55
During the period from 1980-1981, the situation in Poland began to drastically 
change. In the mid-1980s, workers involved in industrial protests, that spread from the 
Northern industrial cities to the entire country, eventually created an independent trade 
union federation, Solidarity. These workers demanded collective bargaining and 
representational rights. These workers also sought reforms in censorship, 
environmental protection and qualification requirements for officials.56 The fact that 
environmental protection had somehow made it onto the political agenda of the 
Solidarity movement was the key event in accelerating a rise in environmental 
consciousness in the general public and in politicizing pollution problems.
From 1980 to 1981 Solidarity operated legally. This period was marked by 
heightened political participation, a relaxation of censorship, and an increase in 
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underground publications. During this period, Solidarity investigated, compiled 
information and reported on environmental problems and most citizens became aware 
of the environmental problems that plagued Poland. Pro-environmental demands were 
included in Solidarity programs and citizens also started to organize grass-root  
“unofficial” organizations that later procured legal status.57 A newly formed Polish 
Ecological Club (PKE) was successful in closing down part of the Skawina aluminum 
plant, because its fluoride pollution posed a serious health hazard to plant workers and 
neighborhood residents.
The imposition of martial law in 1981 drove environmental and political 
opposition groups underground, but Pandora’s box had already been opened by the 
release of information on environmental problems. Environmental issues became a 
focal point of social dissatisfaction with government institutions. Specialists and 
scientists that became involved in research on the environment during the heyday of 
Solidarity remained active and increased their influence in political policy making 
processes after 1981.
Even after Solidarity and other opposition groups went underground in 1981, 
government institutions, scientists, and the public gradually took environmental 
problems more seriously. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources was elevated to cabinet-level status in 1985.58 The government also 
established quasi-governmental environmental organizations and attempted to co-opt 
the emerging environmental movement.59 In 1987, the Polish Academy of Sciences 
cautioned, “that continued decline of quality of life in Poland brought about by acute 
ecological stress could lead to increasing an unmanageable social discontent.”60  The 
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Communist Party went so far as to declare Poland’s environmental problem as one of 
the country’s most important social problems. The public also took environmental 
problems more seriously. Small, local environmental groups became a fact of life.61
Finally, in 1989, at the “Round Table Talks” between the government and 
Solidarity, a set of guidelines was agreed upon, which opened the way to a more 
sustainable development path. Included in these guidelines was a system whereby 
citizens would have access to information about the environment and would have a 
greater say in decisions regarding the economic development of their area. Following 
the Round Table, many new associations, clubs, and parties were organized, including 
those with an interest in environmental protection.62
The fall of the Soviet Union and rapid political change brought an economic 
recession, which had a dampening effect on the activities of new environmental 
groups. In the past, groups had been distrustful of each other. Unfortunately, this 
distrust lingered during and after Poland’s transition to democracy and had the overall 
effect of weakening the environmental movement.63
The FSU (Russia)
As in Poland, environmental awareness in Russia was very low in the 1970s 
and early 1980s due in part to tight government control over the dissemination of 
information and there were few avenues of public participation in environmental 
policy processes. Unlike Poland, Russia’s scientific organizations played a stronger 
role in making demands for improved environmental quality in the 1980s. New 
political opportunities brought about by Perestroika and Glasnost reforms in the mid to 
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late 1980s paved the way for a plethora of environmental organizations which 
mobilized citizens in anti-pollution and anti-nuclear movements.
In the 1970s, the Soviet government had a variety of ways to ensure 
ideological and political conformity. It controlled information flows. It had a virtual 
monopoly over the development of the education system and mass organizations. It 
had the power to censor publications and the media. The security apparatus was used 
to weed out “different ideas” and often did so by using terror tactics.64 Information 
about environmental problems was restricted, or tightly controlled, for both scientists 
and the general public. Despite tight control over the dissemination of information 
regarding the environment, the Russian government put forth some effort to provide 
environmental education to the public, although its content was superficial. 
These efforts focused on environmental education programs in schools. By the 
end of the 1970s, environmental subject matter had been incorporated into elementary 
and high school curricula. It was also already required in all institutions of higher 
learning. Environmental education programs were also necessary so that the 
government could cultivate a group of future environmental experts. Environmental 
education programs at the elementary school level focused on trash clean up and news 
reports focused on cultivating public awareness of nature. Education programs did not 
tell the whole story, and the general public remained ignorant of the most serious 
environmental problems.65
In the 1970s, the general public became involved in environmental affairs in 
two ways. First, mobilization of the public to take action in environmental matters was 
limited to three highly controlled areas, the workplace, government-sponsored youth 
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organizations, and the local community.66 Citizens could be active in environmental 
mass organizations at work, in their neighborhood, or at school. In residential 
communities, there were various municipal environmental protection subcommittees, 
which organized community activities and recruited citizens to participate in 
community clean-ups or other similar types of activities. 
Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there were 
all sorts of officially sponsored and registered mass activities and organizations, 
sometimes labeled as being “corporatist,”67 that catered to citizens intellectual 
interests.68 Corporatist organizations were the most active under Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev, but there is some evidence that it persisted in the USSR even after 
Gorbachev’s reforms. The role of mass public organizations was to institutionalize 
channels of interest articulation for the benefit of the state.69  Members of state 
corporatist environmental organizations (CEOs) were not allowed to undertake their 
own projects, every activity had to be authorized by the proper authorities. In many 
instances, the members of the group were “volunteered” to be involved.70 Barbara 
Jancar’s research in the early 1980s revealed that any environmental group that was 
not registered was illegal. Any individuals involved in activities counter to 
governmental interests, even by those in legal groups, were subject to losing their 
job.71
Second, citizens could express their desires through “voter’s requests, ” which 
were “write-in petitions addressed to deputies at election time.” A review of these 
requests for Leningrad in 1974 indicated that a high percentage of the requests 
expressed concern with environmental issues.72 The outcome of these requests is not 
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detailed. Jancar asserts there was a large increase in the numbers of environmental 
reports and requests during the 1980s, which shows increased public awareness and 
concern over environmental issues. 
A third non-official channel for citizen involvement in environmental issues 
also existed. This channel was the media. Citizens utilized the media by writing letters 
of complaint directly to newspapers, or by writing letters praising citizen’s 
environmental activism. However, usually only letters written by local government 
officials or scientists would be published.73 Citizens could make complaints directly to 
their local government officials.74 More often, citizens could take their complaints to 
the mass environmental organizations, which would then synthesize requests and re-
channel them to governmental policy making bodies. The mass environmental 
organizations were a useful link between the government and Russian citizens.
In the 1970s, professional research organizations were corporatist just like the 
organizations mentioned above, but scientific organizations probably had much more 
influence in solving environmental problems than did the mass organizations.75 In the 
1980s, some research organizations took a leading role in challenging the government 
on environmental issues. Public knowledge of environmental problems increased 
dramatically under Khrushchev during the “ideological thw,” which began in 1983. 
People were prompted to offer “constructive criticism.” Intellectuals, writers and 
scientists, were the main source of criticism of the manner in which the Soviet leaders 
handled environmental affairs.76
The mid to late 1980s was a turning point for environmental activists who had 
greater political opportunities to mobilize an environmental movement. Accurate 
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information on environmental problems, major environmental accidents, elite reforms 
enacted in the mid-to-late 1980s, and increased political openness caused by those 
reforms were necessary ingredients to build the environmental movement in the 
FSU.77
The nuclear tragedy at Chernobyl added momentum to the movement by 
providing a focus for discontent. The accident made the average citizen aware of 
environmental hazards whether they wanted to be or not. It served as a unifying factor 
by helping to create a “green” identity, or at least an “anti-nuclear” identity among 
citizens that might otherwise not have gotten involved. Nationalism was another factor 
that gave meaning to the environmental movement for people in many of the non-
Russian Soviet Republics. It is argued by some scholars that the environmental 
movement was a “safer” vehicle for protest against the government.
After Gorbachev initiated Perestroika and glasnost in 1985, political 
opportunities for new civil organizations expanded and information regarding 
environmental degradation filtered out into the public domain. Newspapers reported 
the health effects of radiation pois ning, chemical smog, water pollution and overuse 
of pesticides and herbicides in agriculture. 
Authorities began to lose control of media coverage of environmental issues. 
The landslide of information added fuel to the fire of the “green 
movement.”78According to a survey conducted in 1989, 83.5 percent of those polled 
were either “very strongly” or “rather strongly disturbed” by the state of the 
environment in their area. Concern regarding health effects of environmental pollution 
was foremost in people’s minds.79
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Political opportunities for more aggressive citizen action expanded even 
further after Gorbachev initiated glasnost.80 When the ban on unauthorized 
organizations was lifted, it dramatically changed the face of soviet politics. In 1987, 
hundreds of citizens demonstrated outside the pulp mill whose wastes were threats to 
Lake Baikal.81 The fact that official channels for dealing with environmental 
complaints were not well developed also contributed to the numbers of citizens that 
resorted to more destabilizing methods of protest.
The economic and political reforms created the political opportunities for the 
development of increasing numbers of autonomous grassroots environmental 
organizations. These groups challenged authority and by doing so, further expanded 
political opportunities. Overall, there were strong signs of increasing governmental 
acceptance of nongovernmental organizations devoted to improving environmental 
quality.82
Nationalist Forces: Linking the Ecology and Peace Movements
One popular explanation for the rapid proliferation of environmental 
organizations and the subsequent rise of environmental movements in the FSU in the 
late 1980s was that the environmental movement served as a surrogate for a nationalist 
movement. According to this reasoning, it was safer for people to indirectly protest 
against Soviet-backed governments, by complaining about environmental problems, 
than it was to directly attack it.  
In the non-Russian Soviet Republics, before glasnost, complaints against 
environmental degradation were couched in terms of the biosphere or improved 
energy efficiency. After 1986, in many of the Soviet Republics including Lithuania 
85
and Ukraine, environmental protests were linked to nationalist sentiments. Citizens 
would no longer couch their complaints in terms of damage to the biosphere; they 
would couch protests in terms of “our people” or “our republic.” Common complaints 
included claims that Moscow was dumping “dirty industry” into non-Russian areas or 
exploiting local resources for use in other territories. 83
Citizens in non-Russian Republics expanded their political opportunities by 
seizing upon nationalist sentiments and using nationalist frames in mobilizing support 
for environmental protests. Citizens joined environmental organizations as an outlet 
for their anti-Soviet, nationalist leanings, making the environmental movement a 
surrogate for a nationalist movement. The influx of these nationalists- s-
environmentalists effectively swelled the environmental movement to a larger size 
than would have otherwise occurred and provided conditions for the development of 
stronger, more cohesive citizen’s groups. 
Jane Dawson asserts that the anti-nuclear movements in Lithuania, and 
Ukraine were more politically than environmentally motivated.84 Evidence that 
suggests this may be true includes the nationalistic overtones of movement actions and 
the fact that the anti-nuclear movements largely disappeared once the Soviets lost 
control. “With independence, the symbolic function of the anti-nuclear movement 
evaporated, and popular interest in the issue plummeted.85 In other words, this theory 
also explains why the environmental movement diminished after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and many East-Central European states gained their independence from 
Moscow.
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However, this theory cannot explain events in Russia as well as it explains 
events in the non-Russian Republics. In Russia, the situation was a little different. No 
“nationalist” movement ever really developed. Instead, the anti-nuclear movement 
more closely resembled a NIMBY movement (not in my backyard), where individuals 
fight the decision to site environmentally damaging facilities in their own 
neighborhoods. Every nuclear plant became the focal point for local protest, but 
communications between people involved in these protests were loose and infrequent. 
Other types of industrial facilities that were perceived to be hazardous to human health 
also became focal points for protests.86 The Russian anti-nuclear movement did not 
have nationalist overtones, but the movement fueled sentiments in favor of greater 
local control and led to struggles between competing levels of authority.87
Dawson theorizes this is because of the unique position of Russia within the 
USSR. It was the “Russian revolution” that brought the communist party to power in 
the USSR and the Russian and Soviet identities were too intertwined for Russian 
citizens to consider the USSR as an outside enemy. Therefore, the movement became 
a vehicle for local self-rule demands.88
In summary, In the FSU, an environmental movement developed quickly, in 
the span of six years. Citizen demands for a cleaner environment first surfaced from 
within elite-led scientific research organizations. Then the Chernobyl nuclear accident 
provoked fear of environmental hazards and sparked local citizen anti-nuclear protests 
in all of the Russian Republics. Also, nationalists used the environmental movement 
as a surrogate for a nationalist movement in some of the non-Russian Republics. 
However, this explanation does not have much validity in Russia. Finally, 
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Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost reforms paved the way for rapid expansion of 
the numbers of civic organizations concerned with the environment, which were 
important drivers of environmental movements. 
Synthesis: Experience and Theory
Examination of Asian and Eastern European environmental movements 
contributes to ongoing debates regarding definitions of social movements, reasons for 
the emergence of environmental movements, and discussions of the relative 
importance of grievances, resources, and political opportunities in this process. We 
can gain a comparative perspective of movement strategies, the importance of 
leadership, and international alliances for movement success. In addition, we gain an 
expanded perspective of the influence of movements on social, political, and policy 
change.89
What is in a Definition?
Most of the research on environmental movements in Asia and Eastern Europe 
took place before or at the same time as research done by scholars of social 
movements such as Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, 
and Meyer Zald who were undertaking intensive studies on social-movement 
phenomena around the world. As a result, much of the early work on environmental 
movements in Asia and Eastern Europe appears to utilize a different definition of 
social movements than are typically utilized today. One early definition written by 
Rudolf Heberle reads: “social movements are collective, organized attempts to bring 
about change in society and in individuals.”90 Rudolf Heberle distinguishes protest 
movements from social movements, the former having more limited goals.91
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Movements were seen as being “more enduring than mobs or crowds but less 
institutionalized than political parties, interest groups, or bureaucracies.”92 Krauss and 
Simcock recognize that early movements were often primarily concerned with 
financial compensation and that later movements seemed to also have an interest in 
forwarding a broader set of environmental goals and policies. Krauss and Simcock use 
protest movements and social movements interchangeably without drawing a clear 
distinction between them. They argue: 
“Despite differences in the immediate target or problem they 
protested against, most of these local movements and their 
participants shared the general overarching aims of improving the 
quality of life, protecting the environment, changing government 
priorities, and increasing citizen input into local decisions. Thus, if 
citizens’ movements qualify as a social movement, we no longer 
need to treat them as unique aberrations of Japanese culture but can 
view them as a Japanese variant of a universal sociological 
phenomenon.”
While there are some advantages to treating citizens’ movements, or small 
neighborhood and resident protests as social movements,93 there are also 
disadvantages. For one thing, it threatens to erase the distinctiveness of a social 
movement. If small, short-term protests can be a social movement, then nearly 
anything can. What are the exact boundaries of a “social movement”? Are these 
boundaries the same under different political, social, economic, and cultural 
circumstances? It seems reasonable to allow some leeway in defining a social 
movement to allow for variation among original conditions, but what aspects of a 
definition should be “soft”? There is no “right” answer to these questions, but they 
need to be answered. Krauss and Simcock’s answer was to expand the definition of a 
social movement to include the phenomena they studied. 
89
For this dissertation, my answer is to maintain the rather rigid boundaries of 
the social movement definition. My definition of social movements adheres closely to 
Sidney Tarrow’s established definition as stated at the beginning of this chapter. 
However, the social construction of contention should be emphasized.
The concept of political opportunities is a residual category that could be 
disaggregated. Specifically, the concept of legal opportunities should be included as a 
sub-variable because laws frame behavior. While political and legal opportunities are 
closely linked, there may be conditions where they are not. For example social 
organizations in China, theoretically, have enough political space to work with victims 
of pollution, but laws in China dictate that citizens who bring environmental suits 
must be directly harmed by the pollution in question. This limits social organizations’ 
involvement with groups of pollution victims. Another reason to pay special attention 
to legal opportunities is that they seem to be neglected in the literature on 
environmental and social movements in general. 
Social movements involve collective action, although not always overtly 
contentious, which reflect “broad cleavages in society.” When people identify with an 
environmental issue and with each other, wish to bring widespread change, have 
ample political and legal opportunities, and can build “dense social networks and 
connective structures” then these instances of collective action “result in sustained 
interactions with opponents, specifically, in social movements.”
Part of the reason for maintaining a more rigid definition of a social movement 
is that other forms of contentious politics require a lower level of political opportunity 
than a social movement would. Therefore, claiming the existence of a social 
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movement implies a certain level of political opportunity in society. When in reality, 
only a lower level of political opportunity exists.
By adhering to a fairly strict definition of social movements, then it makes
more sense to view environmental activism in China primarily, although not solely 
through the lens of participation. However, the social movement literature does 
provide useful variables for understanding variation in participation levels across 
location and through time. These variables include political opportunity structures, 
grievances, framing, and mobilization structures.
Political Opportunities, Participation, and Movement Emergence
The concept of political opportunity structures is alluded to in the work 
examining the factors that influence participation and was later developed by social 
movement theorists. Milbrath divides the factors correlated with variations in 
participation levels into four categories of sub-variables. These four categories are: the 
larger environment, the immediate environment, life position factors, and the personal 
system. 
Typically, the variables included in the larger environment category include 
the social system and the political setting (including levels of economic and political 
modernization, rules of the game in politics, political institutions, local government 
characteristics, geographical factors, social composition, and social interaction 
patterns). The variables included in the immediate environment include stimuli present 
in the environment including messages from the mass media, campaign literature, 
from meetings, or personal communication. The variables included in the life position 
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category include education, age race, and sex among others. The factors included in 
the personal system category include attitudes, beliefs, and personality traits.94
A lot of the literature examining why people participate focused on behavior 
related to elections and tend to emphasize what Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel label 
“life position variables” and personal system variables.95 However, there are other 
possible variables and underlying conditions that influence variance. Verba, Nie, and 
Kim allude to this in their discussion of the multidimensionality of political 
participation.96 Later, researchers turned to examining the impact of local 
governmental institutional arrangements on participation.97
Tianjin Shi’s work on participation in Beijing focuses on environmental 
variables, as well as life position variables. He operationalizes th  environmental 
condition variable as the influence of institutional settings. She found the institutional 
setting has influence over the stage of the policy process at which people participate, 
on the choice of participation strategies, and on the allocation and mobilization of 
resources.98 He provides a broad overview of the institutional setting in Beijing 
through a discussion of the ways in which the Chinese state communicates with 
citizens, the mechanisms for conflict resolution (purview of the executive branch), and 
work units (which help determine participation strategies and shape the type of 
resources that can be mobilized).99
The specific term political opportunity structure in the context of social 
movements has its origin with the work of Charles Tilly.100 In the 1970s, he looked at 
the conditions that provide opportunities to or threaten potential collective action and 
the factors that facilitate or repress collective action. The basic idea behind the concept 
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is that there is a link between institu onal politics and movement emergence and 
development. Since then, the concept has been clarified, expanded, stretched, and 
shrunk by various scholars who applied it to divergent cases of successful and 
unsuccessful instances and periods of collective action to try to understand how 
political constraints and opportunities shape social movements across time and 
location.101 Researchers in the U.S. wanted to explain the emergence of movements 
based on changes in the “institutional structure or informal power relations of a given 
national political system.” Other researches in Europe have sought to explain the 
“cross-national differences in the structure, extent, and success of comparable 
movements on the basis of differences in the political characteristics of he nation 
states in which they are embedded.”102
Political Opportunity Structure: A Definition
A nation’s political opportunity structure can be defined as being “comprised 
of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical 
precedents for social mobilization.”103 Political opportunity structures have both 
formal and informal dimensions and vary across time and location. Some elements of 
an overarching structure are “political opportunities” while others are “political 
threats.”
Political opportunities exist outside of the groups involved in contentious 
politics or “social movement organizations.” Political opportunities lower the costs of 
collective action, reveal potential allies, show where political opponents are 
vulnerable, or change the overall context of an issue in a direction favorable to 
movement emergence. Examples of political opportunities include adoption of a 
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concern by political parties, dissention among state actors, access to information and 
wide media coverage, preferences of leaders, regulatory changes, or major perception-
shifting events, such as Chernobyl.
Political opportunities alone are only part of the overall political opportunity 
structure; the other part includes “threats.”104 Typically, but not always, threats raise 
the costs of collective action, split allies, make would-be social movement participants 
vulnerable, or change the overall context in a negative way. Examples of political 
threats include repression by authorities, violent action by opponents, uni y of 
authorities, and constricting regulatory changes. 
In short, the sum of political opportunities and threats creates a political 
opportunity structure within which a movement may or may not emerge and flourish. 
As Sidney Tarrow points out, howevr, political opportunity structures are not a model 
for predicting when contentious politics will emerge, but simply are a set of clues. 
Changes in opportunities are important for providing openings for resource-poor 
groups to act collectively for a common purpose. What determines if contentious 
action will expand into a social movement is “how people act collectively and how 
consensus is mobilized around common claims, and the strength and location of 
mobilizing structures.”105
The Importance of the Political Opportunity Structures
In Asia and Eastern Europe, political opportunity structures have been an 
important factor, if not the most important factor, in shaping the emergence of 
environmental movements. Specific political opportunities have included the existence 
of opposition political parties and elections, the presence of democracy or other 
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movements, freedom of the press and specific focusing events, and space for social 
movement organization development. 
Political parties and elections opened political opportunities for movement 
emergence and development in several nations. In Poland, Taiwan, and South Korea 
political parties provided opportunities to disseminate information about 
environmental issues, to politicize environmental protection, and to channel 
grievances about environmental pollution and degradation. In some instances, specific 
candidates in local elections arose through support of environmental movement 
participants. 
In some countries, political opportunities for environmental movements were 
greatly enhanced by democracy and other movements occurring of the 1980s, 
especially in Taiwan, Poland, and the FSU. For example, in Taiwan, the end of martial 
law and social demands for democratization created significant opportunities for 
environmental NGOs to flourish which then linked up previously isolated instances of 
anti-pollution protest and fueled a larger environmental movement.106 In addition, to 
forward other political goals, such as democratization, activists sometimes used 
environmental movements. For example, in the Philippines anti-dam activists hoped to 
use the construction of the Chico River Dam to discredit the Marcos regime’s cozy 
relationship with construction and business interests.107 Resistance organizations have 
emerged from oppositional political movements concerned with democratization, anti-
colonial, national independence, religious, and Marxist or feminist aspirations and 
have contributed to environmental movements.108
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In other words, environmental movements in these cases are part of larger 
social movements opposing authoritarianism and advocating democratization. This 
does not mean that there were no politically neutral groups, because there were some 
groups that tried to stay out of politics.109 It is logical that there was interplay among 
environmental movements with democratization movements because they emerged 
simultaneously in some states. Often, the same actors or organizations participated in 
both types of movements. At least in Poland, Taiwan and South Korea, the oppositi n 
parties that finally came into power kept the progressive environmental positions in 
their political platforms, furthering the environmental protection agenda and widening 
the scope of environmental movements. 
Critical to the emergence of environmental movements in Taiwan, and South 
Korea were freedom of the press and several focusing events. In Taiwan, the lifting of 
martial law and greater freedom of the press were crucial to movement emergence and 
development.110 Freedom of the press allowed for extensive reporting of several 
focusing events that opened political opportunities, maintained the public’s attention 
on environmental issues, and generated anti-pollution and anti-nuclear sentiment. As 
unfortunate as it was, without several horrific pollution and nuclear accidents in the 
1980s, the environmental movements in these countries would not have expanded as 
they did. The plight of victims of environmental accidents resonated with the public, 
stirred up emotions, and brought fears of a similar accident occurring in their 
neighborhood. A relatively free media was able to keep anti-pollution and anti-nuclear 
sentiment alive in the public’s eye and frame them in such a way as to mobilize 
support for environmental movements.
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Grievances, Mobilizing Structures, Movement Strategies, Framing,111 Identity, 
Culture, and Domestic-International Linkages
Political opportunity structures were of primary importance, but other factors 
played a role in movement emergence in Asian and Eastern European nations. Citizen 
environmental grievances and a victim’s consciousness prompted citizens to take 
action against polluters. Other reasons for the increases in citizen activism include 
increases in the objective levels of pollution, strong social movement organizations, 
effective movement strategies and successful “issue framing,” and substantial 
assistance from international actors. 
Some evidence indicates that grievances over environmental degradation 
spawned environmental movements in Asia.112 Research on Taiwan’s environmental 
movements supports the thesis that grievances regarding rising pollution levels were a 
necessary trigger to citizen activism. 
Some authors argue that environmentalism and environmental movements 
arose in Asia due to the efforts of an emerging middle class. It is assumed that more 
educated citizens, growing concern for quality of life, and increased leisure time have 
led to environmental movements in Hong Kong, Thailand, and other Asian 
countries.113
Of critical importance to environmental movements in many Asian nations 
have been strong social movement organizations. For example, crucial to the 
emergence of Taiwan’s environmental movements was the marriage between 
grassroots enthusiasm with NGO organizational and leadership resources.114 Also, 
important were kinship and community religious social networks.
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Movement strategies are critical to success. Strategies of activists and 
environmental groups include such things as methods and approaches to the state and 
to society. Modes of engaging the state as wellas society are important. Examples of 
modes of engaging the state include bypassing, challenging, pressuring, and 
supporting the state.115 Some of these modes also may be utilized, except for support, 
to engage non-government actors that are targets of a movement, such as poachers. 
Also important is the relationship between activist groups and the general public. 
Hong Kong’s experience shows this. Environmental activists there concentrated on 
building up linkages with government actors and neglected to build ties with smaller 
grassroots groups. This strategy weakened the movement in the long run. The focus on 
government lobbying and post-materialist values alienated Hong Kong citizens to the 
point that environmentalists were seen as the “enemy” of the public.116 There is a 
danger that activists in China will focus their energy on establishing linkages with the 
government and neglect to build grassroots support on their own, so Chinese 
environmental groups would be wise to learn from Hong Kong’s experience. 
One of the ways issue framing works it to help build a citizen’s identity in 
relation to pollution and environmental degradation. This framing process became one 
of factors in the rise of environmental movements in Asia. Research on Taiwan’s 
environmental movements indicates that modernization, and collective shift toward 
post-modern values, and an accompanying shift in the way nature is perceived were 
crucial ingredients in the making of Taiwan’s conservation movement. The anti-
pollution movements in Asia were spurred on because citizens’ perceptions of their 
relationship to pollution changed. Originally, pollution was viewed as an inevitable 
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byproduct of development and so was tolerated. Eventually, citizens came to view 
pollution as avoidable. As a result, anti-pollution and anti-nuclear sentiments often 
were framed as being necessary to protect human health. The anti-nuclear theme was 
found to be one of the most potent in Asia’s environmental movements.117 In Taiwan, 
the fact that environmental claims were viewed as apolitical meant there was more 
space for protest.118
This examination of environmental movements in Asia can provide clues 
regarding important factors in movement emergence in China. How important is the 
political opportunity structure compared to other factors? What is the political 
opportunity structure in China that facilitates or hinders the development of 
environmental movements? What political opportunities and threats shape the degree 
and intensity of contention in environmental politics? Are certain political 
opportunities necessary and/or sufficient to enable an environmental movement?
Movement Emergence in China
In theory, grievances, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, movement 
strategies, issue framing and identity formation, culture, and domestic-international 
linkages are all important factors shaping environmental movements. But how will 
these factors manifest themselves in the China case? Which of these factors will be the 
most important? 
This research argues that in the Chinese case, political opportunities, both local 
and national, have been necessary to explain the variation in public participation in 
environmental policy processes. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, state actors largely 
controlled framing processes and resource mobilization by controlling the media, by 
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only slowly recognizing and admitting that environmental protection a fundamental 
policy goal of China, which they did in the mid 1990s, by controlling access to 
mobilizational structures, including the work unit, Street Offices, residence 
committees, and social organizations, and by gradually releasing information 
regarding environmental quality and degradation – thereby structuring citizens’ 
identity in relation to pollution. 
In addition, political opportunities have been important limiting factors in the 
emergence of traditional environmental movements, even in the 1990s. Increases in 
levels of pollution and resulting grievances, increased access to financial and other 
tangible and intangible resources, strong mobilizaational structures, and citizen control 
over framing processes are also necessary for movement emergence, but often come as 
the result of openings in political opportunities in China. 
China’s Political Opportunity Structure or Lack Thereof
In building a picture of the political opportunity structure in China at the 
national level, within which an environmental movement may or may not emerge, the 
most striking feature is the lack of political opportunities often found in other 
countries. In addition, China has many political threats that are not present in other 
countries. The list of missing political opportunities includes opposition political 
parties, the existence of other political movements, access to information and the 
media, and an environment that fosters social movement organization development. 
One of the most important political opportunities missing in China is the 
existence of one or more opposition political parties and elections. When a political 
party takes up a movement’s cause this is a political opportunity for the movement. 
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Once that issue has been included in the political party’s platform, the party becomes a 
mobilizing structure. Political parties lower the costs of collective action and link 
political actors. For example, the Democratic Party in the U.S. provided one important 
platform for the women’s movement.119 China lacks an opposition party or a green 
party that could take up anti-pollution or conservation issues and propel related 
movements forward. 
There are no sustained social movements with which an environmental 
movement could align. While occasionally a group of individuals will attempt to 
register a democratic party, there has not been a sustained democracy movement since 
the late 1980s. During the democracy movement of the 1980s that culminated in the 
Tiananmen massacre, nongovernmental environmental groups were non-existe t and 
democracy movement activists did not forward environmental grievances, except for 
one group that protested the presence of nuclear waste in Tibet. 
Currently, while some environmental activists may support greater human 
rights for China and prefer democratization, these sentiments are typically conjoined 
with some faith in the existing political regime, at least in terms of environmental 
protection. For example, student environmental groups pledge to remain apolitical. 
Many environmental activists believe the government is doing a good job in the 
environmental protection sector.120 The language of environmental activism usually 
spoken in China does not focus on criticizing governmental efforts to promote 
environmental quality and does not include references to regime change. Instead, 
conversations largely focus on what social organizations can do to help the 
government to achieve environmental protection goals.
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Mass media are very important for social movements.121 Typically, the media 
is talked about in terms of “framing” a movement, but this discussion takes place in 
countries that have a high level of freedom of the press.In countries with relatively 
less freedom of the press, the media is not an independent agent in the framing 
process. Nor can nongovernmental actors interact with the press to a very high degree 
to influence the framing process. When a change to a freer press occurs in a country,
this is a political opportunity. As previously mentioned, lifting media restrictions after 
the lifting of martial law in Taiwan provided significant political opportunities for the 
emergence of environmental movements. 
The Chinese media is primarily controlled by the ruling regime, which 
potentially limits opportunities to mobilize citizens by creating “issue resonance” 
regarding “focusing events,” i.e. environmental accidents that could lead to public 
protests. According to one person in the media in Na jing, reporters are not allowed to 
bring to light matters involving authorities at the city level or above because it is 
believed it would bring too much public discontent. “Revealing too much of society’s 
underbelly can be a factor in increasing social instability.”122
While there have been between 1,400 and 3,400 environmental accidents in 
China annually since 1989, none of these accidents has become a symbol to unite 
environmental groups or citizen grassroots activists. A sample survey of students in 
environmental groups showed that none of them could name a single specific 
environmental accident or pollution case in China. 
The timing is important. An anti-nuclear movement may be less likely in China 
given the absence of international “focusing events,” such as Chernobyl. In other 
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words, state control of the media does not allow for widespread awareness of focusing 
events that could unite individuals and small groups with environmental grievances 
into larger groups. State control of the media is a factor that isolates incidences of 
contentious politics and does not allow for the generalization, the spread, of specific 
grievances or “resonant claims”123 to the degree needed for widespread movement 
emergence. None of the environmental accidents has been sensationalized in the 
national media to the point at which they would become “household names” and 
recognized by most people who read newspapers. There have been cases where local 
newspapers, or newspapers connected with the environmental protection apparatus 
have conducted in-depth investigative reporting of environmental accidents. One 
example is the coverage of the horrible pollution problems along the Huai River in 
1994 in the China Environment News. However, the coverage was not meant to reach 
the average citizen and was designed more to motivate environmental protection 
officials at the local level to strengthen enforcement activities. 
Newspapers and television stations are owned by the state. Chinese leaders 
control the “boundaries’ of press coverage by issuing guidelines for reporting, which 
suggest that reporters focus on positive events and outcomes.124  In China’s case, 
citizens do not have as much access to information outside official channels, although 
this is changing as more people have access to the in ernet and environmental social 
organizations have access to the resources to print and distribute their own literature. 
The state-owned press dominates the framing of environmental issues. Media stories 
help to perpetuate the idea that pollution is an unavoidable byproduct of economic 
development and so should be tolerated, despite the costs. The paucity of media 
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freedom and low level of coverage of pollution may very well be the most important 
limiting factor in the spread of environmental movements at the grassroots level in 
China.
Typically, a social movement will depend upon social movement 
organizations, usually environmental NGOs, to act as mobilizing structures to forward 
a movement. The absence of a strong civil society in China’s past works again t the 
development of strong NGOs, or social organizations now. The political culture in 
China, heavily influenced by Confucian and Marxist-Leninist traditions, also inhibits 
strong, independent social organizations. Both traditions support the supreme position 
of the state over society.  The environmental social organizations that could take on 
the role of social movement organizations are generally quite weak, shy away from 
publicly protesting against governmental authorities, and view themselves more as 
having an apolitical educational mandate. “Organized dependence,” which makes 
individuals and social organizations dependent upon the state, fostered through 
socioeconomic structures such as the work unit (danwei) systems, is a strong inhibitor 
of autonomous social organization growth.125 Additionally, there are strict laws that 
limit the establishment and growth of social organizations. Until laws are enacted that 
guarantee the rights of independent organizations, any group can be shut down at any 
time.
The lack of “conventional” political opportunities would seem to indicate an 
environmental movement would not emerge in China. However, we must take a 
deeper look to uncover political opportunities in the China case. 
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Political Opportunities Past and Present
China is not completely devoid of political opportunities for movement 
emergence, and there have been several changes in the opportunity structure since the 
1980s. Opportunities that presently exist include increasing legal protection for 
citizens, institutional changes in government resulting in more broader representation, 
changes in elite attitudes toward environmental protection, more openness in press 
coverage and a governmental mandate to cover environmental issues, an increase in 
the numbers of environmental social organizations, and more opportunities for 
alliances with international actors. 
An extremely important political opportunity that lowered the costs of 
protesting against pollution and environmental degradation has been the development 
of China’s environmental regulatory structure, especially the 1979 Environmental 
Protection Law. Prior to 1979, citizens that took matters into their own hands and 
protested against pollution were most likely arrested and labeled as “counter-
revolutionaries.” The 1979 law offered citizens some measure of legal protection for 
protesting against pollution to secure their legal environmental rights. Unlike Taiwan, 
new environmental laws provided the space for people to take necessary measures to 
protect their environmental rights in China. In Taiwan, anti-pollution and anti-nuclear 
demonstrations occurred before or simultaneously with the rapid development of 
environmental legislation. In China, citizens directly affected by pollution are allowed 
to file class action suits, which could prove to diminish the possibility that citizens 
would use collective protest to obtain relief. On the other hand, the very process of 
mobilizing support for a class action suit could be a vehicle for mobilizing a more 
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contentious approach, especially if the group lost a previous suit and found no relief 
through the court or administrative system.
Institutional changes that may enhance political opportunities include the 
elevation of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) up a notch in 
administrative rank in 1998 and the expanded supervisory role of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC) in the environmental sector. The higher 
ranking for SEPA and expansion of the CPPCC’s role should aid environmental 
protection officials’ efforts in enforcing environmental laws and policies, signal top 
leaders’ intention to make environmental protection a higher priority, and give 
governmental allies of an environmental movement more stature. 
The role of the press in the emergence of environmental movements in China 
has been limited for the reasons discussed in the previous section. The media, 
however, in the 1990s has begun to print more stories of environmental accidents than 
it did in the 1980s and has begun to engage in more “investigative” reporting. This 
trend may continue and serve to “frame” environmental activism in such a way as to 
allow for focusing events to generate issue salience with the public. 
While environmental social organizations in China are relatively weaker than 
their NGO counterparts in other nations, their numbers have been increasing since 
their emergence in the early 1990s. Despite their limitations, social organizations in 
China still work to mobilize collective action to protect theenvironment, spread 
environmental values, and sometimes engage in contentious politics with certain 
groups, although not directly with governmental authorities. 
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International factors are likely to play an increasingly important role in the 
emergence of environmental movements in China. International actors interested in 
China’s impact on the global environment and concern with the relative low level of 
citizen input into China’s domestic and international policymaking processes, may 
work to put pressure on China’s government to be more environmentally progressive. 
International actors are potential allies to environmental activists and social 
organizations in China. There are already international environmental organizations, 
both governmental and nongovernmental that have provided, among other things, 
education materials, financial resources, and mobilization training to environmental 
social organizations in China. Foreign groups have consulted with social organizations 
in China about how to mobilize environmental campaigns and have provided funding 
for operational and campaign expenses. A few foreign nongovernmental 
environmental organizations have been able to establish an office and a consistent 
presence in China including the World Wildlife Fund, the Enrgy Foundation, The 
Nature Conservancy, Friends of the Earth, and The Television Trust for the 
Environment. Other groups, such as Greenpeace, are based outside of China, but 
engage in projects inside the country. There is growing concern on the part of the 
international community over China’s environmental problems and international 
actors are increasingly likely to take action to allay those concerns.
Other Limiting/Supporting Factors
The focus on political opportunity structures does not mean that other facto s 
will not be important for movement emergence in China. Other factors that will be 
important are the availability of tangible and intangible resources, the strength of 
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mobilizational structures, the success of “issue framing,” and of course cultural and 
identity factors. 
As the discussion on the history of social movements illustrated, mobilization 
of resources is a major factor in determining levels of participation and if a social 
movement will emerge and whether or not it will be successful. The China case is no 
different. Typically, social movement organizations are strong mobilizers of resources. 
Previous research showed that mobilization of resources and “organized dependence” 
were limiting factors in the development of China’s environmental social 
organizations.126  If these organizations cannot garner enough resources to establish 
themselves, they will be less likely to be able to mobilize resources to forward an 
environmental movement. Over the last ten years, the structures of “organized 
dependence,” such as the work unit system, have been partially dismantled in most 
large cities. This will undoubtedly have some positive impact on social movement 
organizations and their ability to mobilize resource, but it will take time.
The ability of environmental activists to determine the “framing” of 
environmental issues, environmental accidents, and to sustain a movement is very 
limited in China, because of the regime’s hold on the media and on publishing. The 
ruling regime can frame environmental and relat d issues in ways it deems most 
appropriate for its own goals.127 Since the mid 1990s, environmental social 
organizations, however, do have the opportunity to frame environmental issues in their 
own literature and in their own activities, which will undoubtedly become more 
important in the future. 
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China’s political culture will most likely inhibit movement emergence. While 
the concept of political culture is highly contested and defining China’s political 
culture is fraught with contradictions, the less tangible influence of China’s culture 
needs to be considered. Mao Zedong felt that the Chinese people were too passive and 
promoted “struggle” both to break down class barriers, but also to force Chinese 
citizens to engage in contention. The pinnacle of mobilized struggle occurred during 
the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao 
encouraged contention against “rightists” and certain party members; however, 
contention against the party as China’s ruling body was still off limits. Questioning the 
government too deeply has always been taboo in China, except when Mao Zedong 
directed protest against certain political actors, which has translated into a reluctance 
to engage in contentious action against governmental and party actors. 
If contentious politics were at the heart of a social movement, then Chinese 
citizens’ predisposition toward compliance would make it more likely that citizens’ 
will be satisfied with limited, yet perceptible, government responsiveness to their 
environmental grievances. In addition, part of China’s political culture has been 
citizens’ focus on the family or other social groupings, such as the danwei, and 
relatively less concern for humanity as a whole. People seem more willing to go out 
on a limb for a family member or a co-worker at a danwei than they would for the 
good of humanity as a whole. This seems to be in contradiction with communism’s 
focus on the collective, until one realizes that the term collective does not necessarily 
mean humanity as a whole, but is used more in reference to the local collective, i.e. the 
family or danwei. As a result, citizens are less likely to embark on a quest to secure the 
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betterment of humanity as a whole, as in the case of improving the collective good of 
environmental quality for persons outside their circle. While these barriers may 
prevent a widespread environmental movement from developing, we should not be so 
certain that a movement will not emerge in China.
Conclusion
In conclusion, if there is an environmental movement in China, it should 
conform to the general definition of a social movement. In this dissertation, social 
movements involve collective action, although not always overtly contentious, which 
reflect “broad cleavages in society.” When people identify with an environmental 
issue and with each other, wish to bring widespread change, have ample political and 
legal opportunities, and can build “dense social networks and connective structures” 
then these instances of collective action “result in sustained interactions with 
opponents, specifically, in social movements.” This definition is very similar to 
Sidney Tarrow’s, but it places more emphasis on the social construction of contention 
and adds legal opportunities as a necessary component for movement emergence and 
development. The examination of environmental movements in Asia and in Eastern 
Europe shows that political opportunities were the most important variable in 
determining when an environmental movement emerged, especially the presence of 
political parties and the space for autonomous environmental organizations to develop. 
Given the relative lack of these specific political opportunities in China, one would 
assume that it was unlikely that an environmental movement would emerge. 
However, a closer look at China’s unique political opportunity structure 
reveals that there may be some space for movement type phenomena to arise. 
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Specifically, legal changes, such as the Environmental Protection Law passed in 1979, 
have opened space for higher levels of contention in society. In addition, political 
structures, such as the NPC and the CPPCC, have worked to advance the 
environmental protection agenda and been a conduit for citizen interest articulation in 
environmental affairs. While, this chapter laid out some of the potential political 
opportunity structures that may influence the emergence of one or more environmental 
movements, the following chapters illustrate that while they have encouraged public 
participation more generally, the currently available opportunities fall short in being 
sufficient for the emergence of a traditional environmental movement.
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Chapter Three
Environmental Disputes: Contentious Politics and 
Citizen Access to Justice
Environmental disputes over industrial pollution have been a fact of life in 
China since industrial factories were hastily built during the Great Leap Forward in 
1958 and cities and towns became industrial centers in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1
However, citizen protests against environmental harms occurred even before 
widespread industrialization took place.2 Since the 1970s, the numbers of disputes 
have been increasing.3 Some disputes reach high-levels of violence; others involve 
simpler low-level clashes or fist fights, while others are not violent at all.4 Chinese 
authorities have reason to be concerned about rising citizen anti-pollution protests. 
Such protests formed the supporting pillars of environmental movements in Japan, 
China, and South Korea. Chinese leaders recognize that left unmanaged, this rising 
tide of contention represents a threat to social stability.5
However, while the overall number of disputes has risen in China, these local 
instances of collective action and protest remain isolated and relatively unorganized. 
Added together, these anti-pollution disputes could be construed as an anti-pollution 
movement, but this would be pushing the definition of a social movement.6 Sid 
Tarrow points out that many subjects in contentious politics do not reduce to classical 
social movements. In China, citizen protests may be better understood as instances of 
protest and contentious politics. Contentious politics is defined as “public, collective, 
episodic interactions among makers of claims when a) at least some of the interaction 
adopts non-institutional forms, b) at least one government is a claimant, an object or 
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claims, or a party to the claims, and c) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests 
of at least one of the claimants.”7
The primary reasons why a traditional anti- pollution movement, similar to 
Taiwan’s or South Korea’s, has not yet developed include clear political openings, 
legal barriers; the “ideology” of economic reforms;8 the strict nature of state social 
controls, especially the limitations on media coverage in the state-run media; the 
paucity of linkages between victims of pollution and potential “social movement 
organizations,” such as Chinese environmental social organizations; and the state’s 
efforts to contain and prevent disputes.
This chapter will show that disputes are handled with more sophistication now 
than they were in the late 1970s9 and that the evolution of pollution dispute resolution 
processes are due to broader legal, social, and political changes in China.  While 
authorities have become more responsive to citizen grievances and dispute resolution 
has improved over time, there are still many problems with relevant laws, institutions, 
and processes. 
The chapter begins with an illustrative case of environmental disputes in the 
late 1970s. It then outlines the sources of environmental rights, the laws and 
institutions involved in dispute resolution and well as some of the important legal 
details of dispute resolution. 
Then the chapter provides the results of a rough quantitative analysis of one
hundred and forty five air and water pollution disputes. Data on the disputes was 
found in four casebooks which are described in appendix B. Data collected on each 
dispute includes the type of case, the year the dispute started and the year it ended; th  
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industry involve; whether it took place in a rural or urban setting; if it involved an 
accident or not; the number of channels the victims of pollution utilized to resolve 
their problem; whether there was violence involved; the losses caused by the 
pollution; the amount of compensation paid to the victims; and the amount of fines 
paid to the authorities. 
Throughout the chapter, specific stories of environmental dispute cases that 
occurred at different times in the PRC are illustrated as examples. Some of these cases 
suggest dispute resolution processes have become more sophisticated and 
institutionalized, primarily because of the development of China’s legal system and 
the establishment of legislation, such as the Administrative Litigation Law in 1990,
the Civil Litigation Law in 1991, and the Criminal Law in 1997. In addition, 
resolution processes have become more rational because of the use of scientific 
principles in understanding cause and effect relationships between pollution and 
alleged harms. Science, however, has not become the objective harbinger of truth to 
these processes. Science has been “politicized” in environmental policy and court 
processes in China, just as it has in other countries.10
Other cases illustrate problems in the dispute resolution systems and the wide 
gap between “ideal” dispute resolution and the “nightmare” of non-resolution. Simply 
put, not all disputes are resolved and China has some way to go before its citizens 
have unfettered access to justice. While dispute resolution in China is not perfect, 
disputes do sometimes have a positive impact on policy and project outcomes. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the conditions under which disputes, and 
different dispute methods, make a difference in case and environmental outcomes.
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Protecting one’s Environmental Rights as a Counterrevolutionary Crime
In the spring of 1973, a phosphate fertilizer factory located in 
XX County went into operation. The factory did not operate in 
accordance with the “three simultaneous” policy and therefore, in the 
course of production, the factory emitted large amounts of hazardous 
air pollutants and effluent. Pollutants emitted included hydrogen sulfide 
and excessive amounts of sulfur dioxide. Nearby farm fields of a 
Production Brigade of Dalian Commune were seriously polluted. That 
autumn, 200 mu11 farmed by the Brigade were un-harvestable. Yields 
on an additional 300 mu were decreased by more than seven percent; 
and different levels of decreased yields were reported for other fields. 
In addition, the pollution was harmful to the health of the workers. The 
XX Production Brigade sent people to the factory, the commune, and 
the county to report the harmful situation, but each time they were 
turned away. Numerous attempts by the brigade cadres to r port the 
matter to higher authorities had no effect.
In response, members of the commune roused the public’s 
anger toward the factory. On the evening of April 8, 1978, a crowd 
slowly gathered at the brigade’s gate and demanded that the brigade 
take action. That night, at the urging of the crowd, certain individuals 
went to the phosphate fertilizer plant and disconnected its electricity 
breaker in protest. 
A Special Case Group of the County Party Commission 
apparatus announced that the actions constitute7d a “counter 
revolutionary” act of sabotage. They proceeded to capture all of the 
brigade militia’s weapons. Two people, xx Liu, Secretary of the 
Brigade Party Branch and xx Zhang, Deputy Secretary and Captain of 
the militia, were expelled from the party. They were taken into custody 
and paraded around the entire county for seven days. They were 
separately given prison terms of three and seven years respectively.
Citizens were extremely angry at the County Party Commission’s 
decision. People from the brigade made numerous appeals and 
demanded redress in this wrongful case. The brigade felt that this 
happened because of problems between workers and farmers, which 
constituted a contradiction among the people. The fact that XX 
County Commission managed this incident as a contradiction 
between enemies was just not right. 
The Environmental Leading Group of the State Council issued a 
letter to the Hebei Provincial Environmental Bureau on March 2, 1979, 
requesting the bureau promptly handle the XX Brigade air pollution 
case problem. The letter read “There is an outstanding appeal made by 
the Production Brigade of the Dalian Commune in XX County 
regarding the inappropriate ruling in a case of ‘counter revolutionary 
sabotage.’ In this 1973 case, protesters cut the electricity of a phosphate 
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fertilizer factory. In light of the current situation (post 1976), it merits 
rectification. We are forwarding the relevant materials about the appeal 
to your office. Please take this case to the proper agency to be re-
investigated and appropriately ruled. Without fail, inform us of the 
investigation results.” The provincial environmental bureau thought it 
would be best to conduct an investigation of the XX brigade case as the 
Leading Group Suggested. Personnel from the Heibei Provincial 
Environmental Bureau and the Provincial Court worked jointly with the 
county environmental officials and the county court to organize an 
investigative group. 
After an investigation, they found the “counter revolutionary 
sabotage” ruling in the case against Zhang XX and Liu XX was not 
appropriate. The group decided to recant the ruling and make a public 
announcement that Mr. Zhang and Mr. Liu had committed no crime. 
Both men were reinstated in the party. Because Mr. Zhang and Mr. Liu 
were given work points by the Production Brigade during their 
incarceration, Mr. Zhang was only given 300 yuan and Mr. Liu was 
only given 100 Yuan as compensation for their hardship. However, the 
group highlighted the fact that the methods used to shut down 
production at the factory were wrong. Thus after six years, the 
wrongful case of “counter revolutionary sabotage” was rectified.12
The above story is by no means unique to China in the 1970s. At the time, 
there were numerous environmental disputes where citizens who, after exhausting 
official remedies, took self-help measures to find relief. In some of the cases where 
citizens disrupted production, they were then imprisoned for the crimes of “disturbing 
social order,” “sabotaging production,” or “counterrevolutionary acts.”13  Party and 
governmental authorities at the local level had little sympathy toward people with 
environmental grievances. More often then not, citizens were afraid to voice their 
grievances because the political climate at the time prohibited such protest, especially 
since industries were state owned and industrialization was for the good of the 
whole.14 Since 1979, however, it is no longer a “counterrevolutionary crime” to defend 
one’s legal environmental rights in China and the plight of pollution victims has been 
improving ever since.
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Sources of Environmental Rights and Development of China’s Dispute 
Resolution Systems
Citizens’ rights and state duties toward environmental protection first emerged 
in the late 1970s and authorities strengthened those rights and duties in subsequent 
laws and regulations. The state’s duty to protect the environment first appears in the 
1978 version of the PRC Constitution.15 While the constitution outlined the state’s 
duties, it did not elaborate upon citizens’ rights. The real breakthrough for citizens 
came with the 1979 Environmental Protection Law. 
This law created the right to a clean environment for Chinese citizens. 
Provision two reads “The PRC Environmental Protection Law undertakes to rationally 
utilize the natural environment and control and prevent pollution and damage to the 
ecology so as to crate a clean salubrious environment for people’s life and work, 
protect people’s health, and promote economic growth in the interest of socialist 
modernization.” Provision five states “the State Council and its subordinate 
departments as well as local peoples’ governments at all levels must effectively 
protect the environment.” Provision eight gives citizens the right to legal remedies: 
“All citizens have the right to supervise, inform against, and accuse any departments 
or individuals who pollute or damage the environment; the said departments and 
individuals shall not resort to any retaliation.” Article 17 stipulates, “no enterprise or 
institution that may pollute the environment may be built near living quarters in cities 
and towns….” While the 1979 law did not outline specific procedures to ensure 
environmental rights, many governmental authorities responded differently to citizen 
environmental grievances after the 1979 law became popularized.
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One case in Wuhan illustrates the significance of the 1979 Trial Environmental 
Protection Law.16
This case involved a company responsible for loading coal 
from a pier dock onto ships in the Yangtze River. In this short 
transport process, the company routinely created black soot which 
polluted the air around the pier and beyond with dense, black 
smog. Local residents found the air pollution resulting from the 
coal dust so severe that they could not go outside nor could they 
open their windows, even on the hottest of Wuhan’s notoriously 
hot days. As a result, on one unusually oppressive summer day, 
several residents stormed the pier and destroyed the company’s 
loading equipment. The police responded by seizing the people 
involved and charging them as counterrevolutionaries for 
destroying production equipment. However, the local residents 
resisted, saying that their actions were justified under the new 1979 
Environmental Protection Law. Politburo member Wan Li and 
then Party Chairman Hu Yaobang intervened and upheld the 
citizens’ rights to protest against pollution-related damages and 
suffering. 
This was one of the first cases where China’s highest officials supported the 
right of citizens to protect their environmental rights. 
Why did regime leaders write into law citizens’ environmental rights and begin 
to treat victims of pollution differently at this time? There are a number of different 
contributing factors. First, Chinese scientists and leaders were just beginning to realize 
and acept that China was experiencing environmental pollution and degradation just 
like western nations and that environmental harms were real. As a result, they began to 
see citizen grievances in a new light. Second, the death of Mao and subsequent de-
politicization of Chinese society allowed for broader participation in the law making 
process giving those with expertise in environmental protection a chance to be heard. 
People put in prison were freed thanks to the “rectification” campaigns initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping that helped to right the wrongs perpetuated during the Cultural 
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Revolution.17 Third, environmental movements in Japan and America in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s displayed the power of citizen protests, which drew leaders attention 
to the possibilit es of similar events in China in the future and provided another reason 
to become more responsive. 
Thanks to the promulgation of the Trial Environmental Protection Law, by 
1980, the courts in some areas were accepting environmental dispute cases and 
information regarding environmental harms became more widespread. For example, 
during the “National Environmental Protection Month” (April) the procurator, the 
courts, in conjunction with the EPB investigated environmental cases and released 
information on environmental accidents.18
From the beginning, the complex, technical nature of environmental disputes 
was a challenge for non-specialist judicial and mediation personnel. In the early 
1980s, a Chinese scholar wrote an article in a legal journal urging the government “to 
establish an arbitration agency for environmental protection as quickly as possible...” 
This scholar’s plea for urgency was based on increasing number of clashes between 
“the masses” and factory owners in the late 1970s and early 1980s.19 The author 
preferred an arbitration agency be established within the environmental protection 
departments, precisely because of the complex nature of environmental issues. Other 
scholars in China at the time argued that an independent branch of environmental law 
should be set up, just as there are special criminal and civil law branches. Again, the 
argument for establishing a specialized independent branch is that environmental 
disputes are inherently complex, technical, and require specialized knowledge.20
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While an independent branch of environmental law was never established, 
authorities continued to strengthen environmental legislation and to steer dispute 
resolution toward administrative or other form of mediation. The 1982 Marine 
Environmental Protection Act suggests that people resolve environmental disputes 
through civil procedures: “groups and individuals who suffer from marine 
environmental pollution have the right to demand compensation from polluters. 
Affected agencies will handle the disputes as to respon ibility and determine amounts 
of compensation. If defendants are not happy with the decision, they can resolve the 
issue according to the Law of Civil Procedure of the PRC, or they can bring the case 
directly before the People’s Court.” 
In addition, in 1984 a provision was added regarding damages: “anyone who 
causes water pollution damage will assume the burden of damages and eliminate the 
damage to those groups or individuals who directly suffered the loss…”21
The 1989 Environmental Protection Law further detailed citizens’ 
environmental rights. Article six states “all work units and individuals have 
environmental protection duties and rights. They have the right to make a report, a 
complaint, an accusation, or charge against work units and individuals that pollute or 
degrade the environment.” Article 41 gives citizens the right to compensation for harm 
and further specifies legal remedies citizens may pursue, “units that generate a 
pollution hazard, are responsible for eliminating the hazard and for compensating 
work units or individuals who are directly harmed…” “Victims of pollution can ask 
environmental protection administrative organs and other supervisory organs with 
authority over the environment to handle disputes involving compensation. If the 
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accuser is not satisfied with the outcome, he/she can then file a suit in court. Citizens 
also may directly file a court suit.22
It is important to note that this statute also placed a statute of limitations on 
toxic torts. “The statue of limitations on a lawsuit on environmental pollution damages 
is three years, and it begins from the time that the party knows or should know about 
pollution damage.”23
In 1990, the State Council passed the “Regulation Regarding Administrative 
Reviews.” Before this law passed, ent rprises would sometimes file a civil suit against 
the party who had won a compensation award from an EPB in order to lower the 
award. 
The PRC Civil Law, promulgated in 1991, provides a framework of civil 
liability for environmental harms. Provisions 80and 81 state that “the units which use 
(the land) are under a duty to manage, protect and make reasonable use (of this 
resource).” Article 83 provides that “…all neighbors must … correctly conduct 
neighborhood relationships with respect to water supply, drainage, passage, air, and 
light. A person who with respect to his neighbor causes an obstruction or damage, 
must cease any infringement, eliminate any obstruction, and/or pay damages.” Article 
98 provides that “a citizen enjoys right to life and health.” Article 124 provides that 
“where there is a violation of state provisions for the protection of the environment 
from pollution, and the pollution of the environment causes loss to another, there must 
be civil liability according to law.”24
The category of “environmental crimes” was not firmly established until the 
passage of the Solid Waste Pollution Prevention Law in 1995, and the Criminal Code 
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was revised in 1996. However, under the 1979 PRC Criminal Litigation Law (Xingshi 
Susongfa) a person could be found guilty of “dereliction of duty” or “criminal 
negligence” if that person’s action or inaction led to an accident under articles 114 and 
115. The revised PRC Criminal Code (1997), Article 31, provides that if criminal 
behavior brings about economic losses to victims, then the criminal, in addition to 
serving time for the crime, is also liable to compensate the victim’s losses. Article 32 
further provides that even in cases where a criminal does not serve time, he is still 
liable to pay compensation to victims.25  Compensation, however, is not always 
forthcoming as will be described later in this chapter. Each of the laws mentioned 
codified three main types of disputes, civil, criminal, and administrative for which 
there are distinct channels and procedures of dispute resolution. 
Channels of Dispute Resolution 
Despite early pleas for “specialized” channels to resolve disputes and 
strengthened legal protection, environmental disputes continued to be resolved by 
conventional means. Lester Ross found that in China in the 1980s, most environmental 
disputes were still handled by informal mechanisms and solutions were more likely to 
be determined by economic practices, social custom, and law rather than by strict 
definitions of liability, damages, and rights. It was not until the 1990s that channels of 
dispute resolution became standardized. Civil disputes are the most common form of 
dispute. 
Civil Dispute Resolution Procedures
“Civil disputes” occur when one “unit” or individual infringes on the 
environmental rights of another “unit” or individual. In civil cases, there are several 
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ways to resolve the problem. One, the problem can be resolved among the parties 
involved. Two, sometimes it is resolved when pollution victims utilize other means on 
their own to protect their legal rights. Three, the problem can be resolved through 
mediation. Four, it can be resolved by administrative measures. Five, it can be 
resolved by arbitration. Six, it can be resolved by filing a lawsuit. 
Most disputes were and still are resolved through mediation. China developed 
a system of mediation very early on and mediation is typically the “first stop” for 
disputes. The party began to develop regulations regarding dispute mediation in the 
1940s and 1950s, but the mediation system got a boost with the promulgation of the 
Regulations Regarding People’s Mediation Committee Organizations (Re min 
Tiaojie Weiyuanhui Zhuzhi Tiaoli). In relation to environmental disputes, the party 
sees mediation system as lessening citizens’ hardships, building social unity, and 
ensuring social stability. It is seen to improve the relationship between factories and 
citizens as well as promoting both industrial and agricultural production. Finally, it is 
seen as a vehicle to educate citizens about environmental protection and the legal 
system.26
Dispute mediation occurs when both parties agree to allow a third party to 
become involved in the mediation process. Mediation can be divided into four broad 
categories, popular mediation, administrative mediation, judicial mediation, and mixed 
mediation.
The first category is popular mediation. In popular dispute mediation, the third 
party is anyone or any organization that has the right to resolve disputes, excluding 
organizations with administrative or judicial status. This form of mediation is used for 
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disputes at the village, township, and street level, private zuofang, disputes among 
individuals, and street vendors. There are three subcategories of popular dispute 
resolution, self-mediation, mediation through a lawyer, o  people’s mediation 
committee. In the 1970s and 1980s, a popular channel to resolve other types of 
disputes was also employed in environmental disputes, the peoples mediation 
committees. However, EPB officials complained to me in interviews that mediation 
through these committees rarely works. Committee members sometimes do not want 
to get involved in this type of dispute because of the complex and technical nature of 
environmental disputes.27
The second category is administrative mediation. During the lae 1980s and 
1990s, most environmental disputes were mediated by EPBs.28 Mediation services can 
be requested from the Environmental Protection Bureau, the enterprises supervisory 
government department, or another administrative governmental bureau. EPB 
personnel have the specialized knowledge needed to understand the complex nature of 
environmental cause and effect relationships, so are in a natural position to become the 
main vehicle of environmental dispute resolution. 
The third category is judicial mediat on, which has legal authority, unlike 
administrative mediation. If a party files a suit, it becomes and environmental case and 
the People’s Court may mediate the suit according to the Civil Litigation Law (Minshi 
Susongfa). Some judicial mediation cases are settled in civil court and others are 
settled in economic court. Disputes among individuals, between individuals and work 
units are settled in civil court. The main difference between judicial mediation and 
other types of mediation is the legal status of the document. 
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The fourth category is mixed mediation. This type of mediation is when two or 
more different work bureaus or unit organizations work together to bring about an 
agreement through a variety of mediation channels. 
Even in the late 1980s, the environmental mediation system had several 
shortcomings. The system was incomplete, mediators were sometimes unprofessional, 
and the laws and regulations guiding mediation were meager. Three areas were 
targeted for improvement. 1) Buildup mediation struc ures at the city and county 
levels and provide more training and oversight from basic level People’s Courts, 
Procurator, and environmental protection authorities. 2) Provide more training to 
mediators regarding environmental science, environmental law, and law in general. 3) 
Establish a more comprehensive regulatory framework for mediation.29 Despite these 
deficiencies, in theory, mediation is an effective, cheap, peaceful way to resolve 
disputes and contributes to social unity.
While arbitration is an option, mediation is more common. Like mediation, 
arbitration is voluntary; all the parties need to do is find a respected third party to act 
as an arbitrator. The 1994 China Arbitration Law stipulates that individuals or legal 
persons of equal rank can use arbitration. There are few references to arbitration in 
environmental protection laws. An exception is the Ocean Pollution Prevention Law. 
The law set up a specific Ocean Affairs Arbitration Committee to which citizens may 
request assistance. 
Evidence indicates that after failed mediation efforts, some cases did end up in 
the courts in the 1980s, although only a small number. Only two or three-dozen cases 
out of 1,600 were resolved through the courts.30 Most cases involved parties who were 
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not happy with the compensation award or some other civil matter. It is significant that 
these cases helped to determine the principles of conflict resolution to be used in the 
future, “such as rules governing the admissibility of evidence regarding emissions.”31
In China, individuals and legal persons, such as work units, can file civil suits 
in court. The person or organization that files a suit must be directly harmed by the 
defendant’s actions (or inactions). China allows class action suits, which greatly 
facilitates the legal process. Plaintiffs (complaints) typically have one or more of the 
following demands. 1) Halting polluting activities that are causing harm; 2) entirely 
eliminating the harm (but not necessarily halting pollution emission; 3) diminishing 
the danger; 4) restoring the environment to its original condition; and 5) compensating 
victims for harm and losses. Victims need to be sure to file suit within the statute of 
limitations, which is three years as stated in the 1989 Environmental Protection Law. 
According to the General Principals of Civil Law (passed in 1987), a court case can 
last for up to twenty years, from the time that pollution was discovered. In 
environmental legislation, this can be important because suits sometimes take a long 
time to be resolved. In ordinary civil law cases, it is up to the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant broke the law. The plaintiff also has to prove damages as well as prove the 
cause and effect between the defendant’s acts and the damages suffered by the 
plaintiff. In the 1980s, scholars argued that in environmental disputes, the rules of 
evidence should be loosened.32 Finally, In 1991, the Supreme Court in the Suggestions 
on Several Problems in Applying the “Law of Civil Procedure of the People’s 
Republic of China,” Article 74, stipulated a system that assigned the burden of proof 
to the defendant, but only under specific conditions, should be enacted for 
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environmental disputes. On occasion, a single pollution incident will give rise to both 
criminal and civil suits. There are different procedures and rules of evidence for 
criminal cases.33
Criminal Cases
Criminal cases usually involve a dispute between individuals or work units and 
one or more enterprises, but only state judiciary bodies, such as the public security 
authorities, the People’s Procuratorate, or the People’s court, can file criminal charges. 
Common types of criminal cases involve land disputes, environmental accidents, and 
poaching.  In each type of case, perpetrators must break one or more provisions of a 
variety of relevant laws and regulations. Criminal cases are typically more serious and 
often involve a pollution problem that has been causing problems for many years. 
Before 1997, the original PRC Criminal Code was silent regarding victim 
compensation. While, the court sometimes mandated that the defendant had to pay 
compensation to victims of pollution, most of the time, citizens had to file a separate 
civil suit or request mediation in order to obtain compensation. After 1997, individuals 
that have been harmed by the criminal acts of others are dependent upon the criminal 
court to assess compensation. If the court fails to do so, or if victims of pollution are 
not satisfied with the amount, then again, they must file a civil suit or request 
mediation in order to obtain compensation.34
Administrative Disputes
There are three types of administrative cases, administrative penalties, 
administrative reviews, and administrative court cases. Administrative penalties are 
one avenue for EPBs and other government bodies to enforce environmental laws and 
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policies. Penalties include warnings, criticism, fines, and restrictions on activities, 
among others. EPBs and other administrative organs may only bring a penalty against 
an enterprise or organization of a lower administrative level. Meaning, a city level 
EPB may only fine enterprises at the district and county level or below. EPBs often 
impose administrative penalties after routine inspections or when investigating citizen 
complaints.
Of special note is that until the passage of the 1989 EPL, environmental 
protection bureaus or offices could only fine units in violation of specific 
environmental laws, regulations, and standards, after it had been approved by the 
People’s Government at the same administrative level.35
Administrative reviews and court cases occur when citizens, legal entities, or 
other organizations believe specific behavior of environmental protection or other 
governmental departments with regard to an environmental question is illegal or 
negligent. The party bringing up the case files a request for an administrative review 
with the administrative organ one level above the offender’s. If the party bringing up 
the case is not satisfied with the administrative review, they have fifteen days to file an 
appeal to the court.
These three main types of disputes and related channels for resolution only 
came about in the 1990s. In the 1980s, disputes were divided into two categories, 
those resolved through administrative means and those resolved in court. Some 
scholars say China’s provisions for managing environmental disputes are still very 
simple. “There are no special provisions on plaintiff qualification, evidence collection, 
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confirming causality, calculating damages, determining measures to stop 
environmental damage, and the legal assistance for poor victims of pollution.”36
While it is true that measures for dealing specifically with environmental 
disputes and compensation issues have not developed as fast as basic environmental 
legislation designed to prevent pollution, but there has been some sophistication since 
the 1970s. As Chinese leaders developed the legal system and created legislation, 
environmental dispute resolution methods became more standardized and citizens’ 
legal rights were strengthened. Some advancement has been made to clarify the 
legalities involved in disputes such as the burden of proof and the legality of utilizing 
self-help measures.   
Essential Legal Details in Dispute Resolution Processes
The Right to Environmental “Self-Defense”
Legal scholars in China recognize that in some cases, victims of pollution can 
take action on their own to protect their legal rights. This occurs when the victims of 
pollution do not have access to the other forms of justice. This type of behavior is 
sometimes called “exercising one’s right to environmental self-d ense.” The right to 
one’s “environmental self-defense” is not directly protected in Environmental 
Protection Laws, but “environmental self-defense can be considered an extension of 
the “right of self-defense” protected by the Civil and Criminal codes of law. Basically, 
the right of self-defense means that when one’s own, another person’s, or society’s 
interests and rights are violated, appropriate means may be used to defend those 
interests and rights.37 A plea of “environmental self-defense allows individuals to take 
“emergency action in order to prevent a worse act from taking place.”38
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To invoke the “right of self-defense” in environmental cases, several 
conditions must be met. One, there must be polluting behavior or environmental 
damage that is in violation of legal environmental laws. Two, the influence of the 
pollution or damages must be beyond what is considered tolerable. Three, the 
pollution or damaging behavior must be occurring at the time of citizen action. Four, it 
can only be invoked when the party in violation cannot be dissuaded from stopping the 
behavior and is unwilling to utilize normal channels of dispute resolution. When 
exercising one’s right to “environmental self-defense,” certain guidelines should be 
respected. One, exercising this right should be a last resort when all other channels of 
stopping the polluting or damaging behavior have been tried. Two, the actions taken 
cannot harm a third party or be directed toward anything that has nothing to do with 
the violator. Third, the actions taken cannot be in excess of what is absolutely 
necessary or cause other damages.39
Burden of Proof
Environmental disputes involve immensely technical issues, so under the best 
of circumstances, its difficult to prove causality and to determine which party should 
be responsible for providing proof of causality. It is expensive and requires technical 
knowledge to undertake the needed research to discover the cause and affect 
relationship between pollution and economic damages or physical harm. In China, the 
responsibility for the burden of proof varies in criminal, administrative, and civil suits. 
For example, in criminal suits, the plaintiff is responsible for the burden of proof.40 In 
civil suits, the responsibility for the burden of proof is assigned in a more complex 
manner.
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In civil suits, assigning the burden of proof to the plaintiffs (victims of 
pollution) or to the defendants (polluters) was not undertaken until 1991 and since 
then the system is not always adhered to. In 1991, the Supreme Court in the 
Suggestions on Several Problems in Applying the “Law of Civil Procedure of the 
People’s Republic of China,” Article 74, stipulated a system that assigned the burden 
of proof to the defendant, but only under a specific condition; “if the defendant denies 
the tort claimed by the plaintiff, then it is the defendant that should assume the burden 
of proof.”41 This means that it is then up to the defendant to prove the damages 
resulted from other causes than their pollution discharges. This is sometimes referred 
to as a “constructive” method to confirm causation. One example of a case where the 
defendant was asked to provide evidence that an environmental harm was caused by 
other sources was a water pollution case in Pizhou, Jiangsu Province.42 In reality, 
many judges do not use the system and do not believe enterprises (usually the 
defendants), are able to provide proof. Therefore, in actual cases, the judge sitting on 
the bench decides who should be respon ible for the burden of proof. It also is 
common for the judge or the defendant to request that the plaintiff provide evidence of 
causality.43
Strict Liability
The notion of “strict liability” and the rights of citizens to bring suits against 
governmental organizations received quite a bit of support among legal scholars in the 
late 1980s. The doctrine of “strict liability” or “no-fault liability” dictates that if a 
person is not found liable or negligent, he is still liable to pay compensation to 
pollution victims. Cheng Zhengkang, a Chinese legal scholar, wrote a paper exploring 
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an individual’s rights to sue in foreign countries and advocated broader rights to sue in 
China. He also supported the practice of strict liability and looser evidentiary 
procedures. Cheng understood that the expansion of the right to sue increases the 
probability that polluters will abide by environmental regulations.44 He called for 
clarification of procedures for citizens to sue government bodies for violations of 
environmental aws.45 Cheng also called for separate laws regarding presumption of 
cause (in fact) for environmental suits because of the special difficulties in discerning 
causal pathways in environmental processes.46 To some degree, Cheng got what he 
wished for. As described above, the burden of proof in environmental cases is partially 
transferred to the defendant. In addition, the principle of no-fault liability has become 
more widely used.
In theory, the doctrine of no-fault liability can be applied in civil cases of 
environmental harm. This doctrine applies to environmental disputes because of the 
complexities of establishing cause and effect relationships between pollution and 
objective harms, especially considering the level of technological development in 
China. In addition, the doctrine applies because there is a direct link between polluting 
behavior and harm to victims. Some harm is done when people have not take pollution 
control measures or were unaware of the possible damages that could result. 
Enterprises that pollute are engaged in “for profit” activities and should therefore they 
should be liable for the social costs of their behavior. In China, several conditions 
should be met in order to utilize the doctrine of no-fault liability. 1) There must be 
some sort of pollution or environmental degradation. 2) The objective reality of harm 
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should be established. 3) There should be objective evidence of the cause and effect 
relationship between the pollution and the alleged harms.47
Despite the development of these legal principles in practice in environmental 
disputes in China, each of the channels of dispute resolution still suffers from 
numerous problems that impede citizen access to justice. 
Dispute Survey Results
This section discusses the results of a rough quantitative analysis of over 125 
disputes over about a thirty-year period. The results of the analysis are not 
generalizable to China as a whole primarily because of the nature of the data sources 
and because it is not clear if all information on each casew s included in the case 
reports. 
As mentioned in appendix D, which discusses the four casebooks from which 
most of the cases were taken, the disputes were chosen as a teaching tool for students 
of environmental policy. This could mean that the cases choen were bias to show the 
involved EPB in a favorable light. 
It is unclear if all the data on a case is included in its record. For instance, it 
seemed that in some cases citizens might have reacted violently but the report did not 
say explicitly what action they took; it only implied violence. There were many times 
when citizens involved in a dispute “reacted strongly” (qianlie fanying) or the 
“contradictions among the people was intense” (chunzhong maodun feichang jianrui) 
in a case or that “citizens had strong opinions” (chunzhong yijian henda), or that they 
“made a fuss and a fight” (dajia, chaonao). Therefore, it is very difficult to say with 
any certainty the percentage of cases that involved violence. 
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Other categories of analysis also suffer from incomplete information. One area 
relates to the specific loses cataloged for a case. The reports often just say “some crops 
were destroyed” or “crop yields decreased” or “many fish were killed” or “people 
were poisoned.” Therefore it was difficult to analyze the ratio of loses to 
compensation given to victims of pollution. Another area relates to the number of 
channels citizens used to get their problem solved. Sometimes the report indicated that 
citizens complained to authorities at a higher administrative level without telling us if 
they had tried to get their problem solved at the local level first. 
Overall, administrative penalty disputes were resolved within one or two years, 
while administrative mediation and civil suits took three or more years. A few cases 
took more than ten years to resolve. The industries involved in disputes are the usual 
suspects with the highest numbers of disputes occurring in the following industries:  
chemical, steel smelters and rolling plants, shipping, fertilizer, paper, power plants, 
mining, electroplating, gas & oil, alcohol, plastic, solvent, and pesticide industries. 
The number of channels used by citizens to get their problem resolved varied 
from one to four, with the average being two channels. It counted as two channels if 
the citizens went to the EPB and to governmental, ministry, or party organizations, but 
only one if the EPB brought in the other actors. Most of the administrative penalty 
disputes involved only one or two channels, but the EPB always brought in ot er 
actors until the late 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, the government at the administrative 
level decided if a company should pay a fine or if other action should be taken, but 
upon the suggestion of EPB personnel (if such an office existed). The media did not 
become involved in many cases until the 1990s, although a handful of the reports 
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mentioned that one to two stories had run in the media or that the enterprise had been 
criticized in the media. 
About eighty percent of the cases occurred in urban areas. Nearly all the 
disputes involved an accident of some type and approximately fifteen percent of those 
cases involved multiple accidents. 
Administrative Resolution vs. Court Suits
When do citizens take their complaints and administrative suits to the next 
level, i.e. when do they file a court suit? In reviewing cases, a number of trends 
become clear. Many cases appear to be instances wherein victims of pollution are 
awarded compensation after going through an administrative mediation process, but 
who are not paid by enterprises, so they turn to the courts to enforce an administrative 
decision. In addition, some court cases are instances when citizens are not satisfied 
with a government or EPB mandated compensation award, so they take the next step 
and gamble that they will receive a higher award through the courts. In most all cases 
listed in the casebooks, the compensation award citizens received was lower than the 
amount they requested. Many civil cases involve a polluting enterprise that signs an 
agreement to clean-up pollution and take steps to prevent further pollution, but fails to 
implement these measures. Court cases are more likely to involve situations when an 
environmental accident is clearly the responsibility of one or more persons, but is not 
severe enough to be considered a criminal case.  Even in the mid-1980s one starts to 
see cases where the polluting enterprise that is fined or ordered to pay a certain 
amount of compensation, files a court suit contesting the amount it should pay. The 
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court began to accept these types of cases before the State Council passed the 
“Regulation Regarding Administrative Reviews” in 1990. 
Problems With Dispute Resolution Systems
While laws and regulations increasingly offer citizens legal protection against 
polluting behavior and have clarified dispute resolution systems, there still are 
numerous problems with environmental dispute resolution systems in China, problems 
that are not easily resolved. One of the most important problems is the lack of 
systematic methods to determine compensation to victims of pollution. Government 
intervention in court cases is still a nuisance and usually has a negative impact on 
victims. Courts have the power to decide if they will accept a lawsuit and have the 
power to split clas-action suits, which provides benefits to the court, but is a 
tremendous burden for plaintiffs. There are numerous problems associated with the 
administrative mediation of civil cases. Finally, court, government, and enterprise 
inaction regarding citizen environmental grievances has been and continues to be a 
problem that can have disastrous consequences. 
Compensation Issues
Systems of compensation to victims of pollution are critical to the satisfactory 
resolution of environmental disputes, to strengthening enforcement of environmental 
protection laws and politics, and to encourage social consciousness; unfortunately, 
however, China has not yet institutionalized such systems. Examples of victim 
compensation schemes in other countries demonstrate their necssity and serve as 
examples for China.
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When polluting enterprises are liable for paying compensation to victims of 
pollution, it encourages them to abide by environmental laws because the costs of 
illegal activity become higher. Financial compensation to victims of pollution 
represents an acknowledgment of the negative externalities caused by pollution. 
Compensation internalizes these negative externalities or social costs and clarifies the 
true costs associated with pollution. Compensation represents the effort to bring 
fairness to an otherwise inequitable situation. Without compensation, the costs and 
benefits of economic development are out of balance. Specific individuals or units 
reap most of the benefits of production while others absorb most of the costs; this is a 
transfer of risk. When enterprise owners pay compensation to victims of pollution, it is 
an acknowledgement of the damages their pollution can cause to citizens and the 
willingness to re-introduce equity into society. This increases social cohesion and 
social consciousness. 
Japan has one of the most institutionalized compensation systems and Chinese 
scholars and officials could use its system as a model for a Chinese system. In 1968, 
the Japanese government formally admitted that industrial pollution was causing 
damages to human health and in 1969, the government passed the Law for Special 
Measures for the Relief of the Pollution-related Patients.48 A few years later, the 
government took even stronger steps to ensure victims of pollution were compensated. 
The Japanese Cabinet passed the Pollution-Related Health Damage Compensation 
Law in 1973, which pooled monies for polluting industries to provide for a national 
compensation system for certified victims of pollution.49 In addition, in 1975, Japan 
passed the Pollution Control Public Works Cost Allocation Law, which was applied to 
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instances of agricultural pollution and established the framework for paying for 
restoration of contaminated land. Costs for restoration projects are borne by polluting
enterprises according to their contribution to pollution. Through these laws, Japan has 
instituted the “polluter pays” principle. Payouts for compensation have been 
significant. By 1980, the government had certified more than 80,000 victims and paid 
out over eighty five billion yen (about four hundred and twenty five million U.S. 
dollars).50
Japanese scholars found that it would have been more economical for the 
government to take preventative measures toward pollution than it was to pollute first 
and clean up later.51 However, the idea that prevention would be the least expensive 
option only came after the fact. While it was acknowledged that financial 
compensation would not bring back people’s health, which is invaluable, Japan’s 
compensation systems did help to ease the pain of victims of pollution and their 
families.
China has few formal laws and regulations guiding victim compensation. 
China has yet to formally codify the “polluter pays” principle, although the “spirit” of 
the principle was included in the 1979 Environmental Protection Law, “shei wuran 
shei zhili de yuanzi” (whom ever pollutes shall be responsible for cleanup). The 1989 
EPL is more explicit about the polluter pays and compensation to victims of pollution. 
As previous mentioned, it stipulates: “those that cause harm to the environment are 
responsible for eliminating that harm and for compensating those individuals or units 
that are directly harmed”52 There are, however, no regulations stipulating how to 
determine compensation to victims of pllution or that lay out how much 
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compensation should be forthcoming.53 The EPL only stipulates that compensation 
should be given in accordance with the wishes of the parties involved and can be 
managed by the relevant environmental protection or other agency.54 I deed, in 
practice, the relevant EPB typically manages issues of compensation in environmental 
accidents and disputes, except for those that end up in formal litigation.55 The revised 
PRC Criminal Law (1997) does stipulate that those causing economic or other losses 
should compensate victims, but the law does not set out a compensation scheme. In 
addition, criminal court judges sometimes suggest that plaintiffs take their 
compensation requests to civil court. In China, compensation for victims of pollution 
is generally considered a civil matter.56  In administrative reviews and lawsuits, the 
National Compensation Law stipulates that when a governmental agency causes harm 
to individuals or legal persons, then the government is liable for compensation. The
National Compensation Law is very explicit regarding when and how to calculate 
compensation in administrative suits.57 If it is so clear in administrative law, why does 
civil law lag so far behind, especially considering administrative law is a much more 
recent development in China? 
In practice, in some areas of China, there are informal guidelines available for 
determining compensation amounts to victims of pollution in civil mediation cases. A 
manual regarding administrative enforcement of environmental law edited by officials 
from Shanxi outlines some specific guidelines. The manual states that compensation 
should be given in cases of economic harm and in cases where human health was 
harmed. It should cover direct and indirect losses. In cases of harm to  person’s 
health, compensation should be given to cover the costs of medicine, hospital stays, 
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funds to compensate for the loss of time at work, living costs, and transportation costs. 
In cases of death, compensation should cover any medical costs incurred before death, 
funeral expenses, and the cost of taking care of the decedent’s family. The manual 
goes into more elaborate compensation schemes for determining compensation for 
economic losses and uses the example of fish killed by polluted effluent. In general, it 
suggests compensation for dead fish for 40 to 60 percent of the worth of the adult 
fish.58 Citizens rarely ask for or receive compensation equivalent to the losses they 
have suffered because of pollution.59
It is important to note that, over time, the amount of compensation paid out to 
victims of pollution has decreased when aggregated annually at the national level. This 
is paradoxical because the number of disputes has increased each year (see appendix 
C). In 1986, polluters paid out 52,650,000 Yuan (for 128,823 disputes) in 
compensation and in 1990, they paid out 97,430,000 (for 131,851 disputes). In 
contrast, they paid out only 21,160,000 Yuan in 1999 (for 252,398 disputes). It 
appears as though victims of pollution are being paid less compensation over time. 
However, another explanation could be that the severity of the disputes has decreased 
which would mean that the damages caused by pollution in each dispute decreased 
over time, so the amount of compensation also decreased. Without a detailed an ysis 
of damages vs. compensation for each dispute over the last ten years, it will be 
difficult to assess why compensation amounts have been decreasing. 
One problem with the data on compensation for disputes is that it matches 
exactly the data on compensation for environmental accidents each year.60 In theory, it 
is difficult to understand how these amounts could be the same. Not all disputes arise 
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because of environmental accidents. The amount of compensation for disputes should 
total more than the amount for accidents. However, the fact that the data matches may 
explain why the amount of compensation decreases over time. The number of 
accidents each year has decreased over time and numerous provinces failed to provide 
data on accidents after 1995.61
If absolute amounts of compensation are decreasing, despite similar damages, 
then citizen disputes and court cases are less likely to act as a deterrent for polluting 
enterprises to operate within the law. Also, disputes are less likely to influence siting 
choices for polluting enterprises because amounts paid out in compensation are so 
small that enterprises may continue to establish plants in residential areas. 
A few Chinese scholars support a more stringent victims compensation system 
and are working to get a better system written into law. Wang Canfa, of the Center for 
Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims at the China University of Political Science and 
Law, is one such scholar. He works closely with the State Environmental Protection 
Administration and is currently gathering information regarding compensation laws in 
a large variety of countries in Asia, Europe, and North America. Wang Canfa became 
interested in fighting for victims’ rights after he witnessed the abysmal compensation 
awarded to victims of pollution. It is his intention to draft workable legislation that 
will improve victim compensation. It will probably be some time, however, before 
China enacts regulations guiding victim compensation that are stringent enough to 
influence the implementation of environmental laws and to justly compensate victims 
of pollution.
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Government Intervention in Court Cases
Early on in a dispute, sometimes the intervention of specific high level 
government or party leaders helps victims of pollution in getting attention to their 
problem, but once a case reaches the courts, government intervention tends to hurt the 
plaintiff. Often, such intervention puts a cap on compensation amounts paid out to 
victims of pollution.62 Chinese scholars have found that the local government has a 
tendency to interfere in environmental lawsuits.63 According to Wang Canfa, the way 
the court is set up in relation to local governments enables government leaders to 
intervene. Since local government and party leaders appoint court presidents and 
judges, judges are more likely to rule in such a way as to ensure their reappointment. 
In addition, the government controls the budgets of local courts, so the court is held 
hostage. Officials have been known to prohibit an EPB from divulging pollution data 
to lawyers and to courts. Another major reason why local governmental and party 
officials will interfere in pollution cases is that officials are judged primarily on if they 
can bring economic development and growth to an administrative area. Environmental 
protection achievements are secondary. In addition, polluting enterprises provide a 
large portion of the tax and other revenue for local governments, so officials are loath 
to close off these sources of revenue because of pollution.64 A other possible reason 
for government intervention is clientelist ties between enterprises and governmental 
officials. 
Greed of the Courts: Splitting Class-Action Suits
While Chinese law allows for class action suits, the court has the power to not 
accept such suits and to demand that each individual claimant file a separate suit. 
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Chinese scholars have found that this occurs in a large number of cases.65 Wang Canfa 
provides several reasons why the courts have chosen to do this. First, the court can 
increase its revenue by requiring each individual file a separate suit with a separate 
filing fee. Second, judges are assessed partially by the number of suits they try, so by 
splitting one class action suit into many, a judge looks better on paper. Third, breaking 
up large groups involved in class actions suits can theoretically prevent social 
disruption.66 Another reason why the courts divide class actions suits is to deter 
lawyers from taking on such suits. Splitting a class action suit into many requires a 
whole lot more paperwork on the part of the lawyer representing the cases. 
Problems with Administrative Mediation in Civil Cases
There are other problems specific to the administrative mediation of civil 
disputes. One is that administrative agencies like the EPB do not have the authority or 
power to enforce mediation decisions. EPB decisions do not carry the weight of law. If 
for example, an EPB mediated a dispute and suggested that the polluting enterprise 
pay compensation to victims of pollution, but the enterprise refused to pay, then the 
EPB could do little to compel the enterprise to fork over the award for damages. 
Second, from a cynical point of view, EPBs are vulnerable and highly susceptible to 
corruption. Victims of pollution have little recourse if the local EPB personnel in 
charge of mediating disputes are persuaded to rule against the complainant because 
they were offered a fat red envelope. In addition, an EPB does not have to accept a 
mediation case. Again, this puts the victim of pollution at the mercy of the particular 
individual or individuals in charge of mediation at a particular EPB. Alternatively, 
because the EPB is not completely independent from the government, the government 
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may pressure an EPB not to mediate a certain dispute or interfere by refusing to allow 
the EPB to make data on pollution available. Finally, because of the voluntary nature 
of administrative mediation and the difficulty in reconciling claims by victims of 
pollution and enterprises, the success rate of administrative mediation is relatively low 
and the enforcement rate is low.67
Enterprise and Governmental Inaction in All Types of Cases
In many cases, enterprise and government inaction caused victims of pollution 
to repeatedly voice their complaints, to take matters into their own hands, and made 
some pollution cases drag on for a decade or more. Government and enterprise 
inaction can often force citizens to take matter into their own hands. While citizens are 
no longer charged with counterrevolution crimes, however, it is important to note that 
in the 21st century, citizens still are sometimes imprisoned for protecting their 
environmental rights through self-help measures.68 There are countless examples of 
pollution problems that went on for a decade or more, despite citizen pleas to the 
enterprise in question and relevant governmental bodies, before being resolved. One 
such case, the “Long-Term Pollution Problem Exacerbates A Conflict Between an 
Enterprise and the Community” case can be found in Appendix D. It is important to 
note that many disputes are never really settled and victims of pollution suffer in 
silence.69
“Ideal” Resolution vs. “Nightmare” Non-resolution
Pursuing the resolution of a dispute using the complaint system and each of the 
dispute resolution channels to the utmost are expensive, time consuming, and 
emotionally taxing, which is why many victims suffer in silence. If citizens are willing 
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to fight for their rights and can somehow find the resources to pursue their grievances, 
then they can gain some measure of satisfaction. There are, however, cases that “fall 
through the cracks” and are never resolved.70 In other words, some cases are resolved, 
but others are not. Below is just one example of a pair of cases that are similar, but one 
ends “ideally” and the other one ends in a “nightmare.”
Pollution from Old Power Plants: Similar Stories, Two Different Outcomes
The “Ideal Outcome”
The dispute that illustrates the “ideal” case came from a casebook used to train 
environmental protection officials. The narrative describes in detail the events leading 
up to, the investigation of, and the resolution of a dispute in Pixin City of Liaoning 
province where water and air pollution from an old coal-fired power plant built in the 
1960s proved to be harmful to the health of nearby residents and destroyed their crops.
In May of 1989, Mr. Xie, the head of a Village Committee in 
Pinxin city, made a formal request of the city EPB to mediate the 
dispute over the continuing water and air pollution problems. The plant, 
built in 1969, a dinosaur that should have already been 
decommissioned, was spewing effluent thick with ash into underwater 
aquifers that had long been used by nearby residents for drinking water. 
The residents suffered serious health problems because of the water 
pollution. In addition, coal ash from the huge mounds of coal used by 
the plant blackened everything within a certain radius. Citizens could 
not open their windows, even in the spring and summer, could not hand 
their clothes outside, or avoid ash-covered crops. Citizens suffered 
from silicosis and other respiratory diseases. Citizens asked for 
compensation for health problems (1,829,952 Yuan), and for decreased 
crop yields (1,167,488 Yuan) to cover the period from 1969 to 1989. 
Officials from the EPB observed that residents in the nearby 
village used plastic sheets to cover their windows, but a think layer of 
dust still formed on the panes. There was soot everywhere. The fields 
were nearly dry with a thick layer of soot. The EPB officials approved 
an investigation by officials from the Environmental Monitoring 
Station, who collected relevant samples of air and water pollution. 
Officials gathered 297 samples from 11 different wells used by 
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residents. Results indicated that the quality of drinking water was far 
below standard and contained various pollutants in excess of relevant 
standards. Analysis of air samples indicated that air quality was far 
below standard with concentrations of particles in excess of air 
pollution standards. 
Officials gathered other types of relevant evidence from 
historical records regarding effluent and emissions and previous 
governmental decisions regarding the plant. Officials also worked with 
relevant personnel from various fields including agriculture, forestry, 
water management, and judicial organs to fully understand the 
economic and technical evidence. 
 After a thorough investigation, EPB officials worked with both 
parties to draft a compensation agreement. According to the agreement, 
it was agreed that 1,059 people had been affected by pollution as well 
as a total of 724 mu of orchards and crops had been harmed. Both 
parties agreed that the power plant should pay the village residents 
compensation in the amount of 195,005.48 Yuan (about 10% of the 
total economic loses). 
Even though both parties signed the agreement, the power plant 
later did not pay compensation to the villagers. The EPB then issued a 
“Decision Disposition” stating the same contents as the earlier 
compensation agreement. In addition, the disposition provided that if
the power plant did not wish to comply, it would have to file a suit in 
the People’s Court within 15 days to fight the matter.71
The “Nightmare”72
A case in Taiyuan, Shanxi province has a similar beginning as the dispute in 
Liaoning, but it has a different outcome. A large group of farmers in Taiyuan City, 
Shanxi Province have been involved in an environmental dispute since the mid-1980s 
over air and water pollution from coal dust generated by the Number Two Thermal 
Power Plant, just north of the inner city. 
The Taiyuan farmers claim that piles of coal dumped by power 
plant workers end up in a river, which eventually contaminates their 
crop fields. In addition, they claim that air pollution emissions have 
killed or damaged hundreds of mu of crops. The plant was built in the 
early 1960s and has been the source of pollution for decades. Since the 
1970s, the farmers complained about the pollution to the city EPB and 
other government organizations. At one point, the authorities cleaned 
up the river, but the plant did not pay any compensation to the farmers. 
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Continuing air pollution problems raised tensions over the plant and in 
1998, the farmers requested that the provincial EPB mediate the 
dispute. The provincial EPB tried to mediate the dispute, but the effort
fell apart after the power plant refused to pay compensation to the 
farmers. The plant claimed it did not have the money to pay 
compensation. To this day, the Taiyuan Number Two Thermal Power 
Plant dispute remains unresolved, but the farmers continue to request 
help from the provincial EPB. The EPB representative says there is 
“meiyou banfa” (nothing that can be done), particularly since the plant 
is not a “zhongdian” (a priority) with the provincial government. The 
farmers have few options left to settle the problem through mediation 
or administrative means. The next step would be for them to complain 
to the provincial level People’s Congress or to the State Environmental 
Protection Bureau in Beijing. The courts offer another option, but the 
farmers say they do not have enough money to file a lawsuit.73
To this day, the farmers in Taiyuan have not gotten their demands met and 
have not mustard the resources to take their case to court. The area around the power 
plant continues to look like a war zone where nothing can grow and where no one has 
made any effort to clean up. 
Given the continued rise of pollution problems in China and the numerous 
problems with dispute resolution processes discussed above, why do citizens rarely 
organize environmental protests on a wide scale to forward their common interests? 
One explanation could be that the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime may 
prohibit widespread collective action. While it may be convenient to simply say it is 
the political system in China to blame, the explanation for the unorganized citizen 
response to pollution is more complicated. It is therefore useful to discuss the possible 
emergence of an anti-pollution movement in China in terms of political constraints 
and opportunities. 
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Citizen Disputes as the Foundation for an Anti-Pollution Movement?
In this chapter, we are more concerned with political constraints, although the 
opportunities for an environmental movement to emerge in China have changed over 
the last twenty years.The political constraints to a wider anti-pollution movement in 
China are numerous. 
Legal barriers exist and work to limit widespread collective action. Eligibility 
criteria for bringing civil suits constitute a major barrier in widening the scope of 
actors in China’s “would be” anti-pollution movement. The eligibility criteria for 
bringing civil suits restricts wider public participation in asserting environmental 
rights. According to China’s Civil Litigation Law (Article 108), only those individuals 
or units directly harmed are able to file suit. Individuals and organizations may only 
file suits to protect their own environmental rights, not the rights of citizens in general. 
In other words, an environmental social organization in Beijing could not file a suit on 
behalf of pollution victims in Guizhou. One legal scholar argues this restricts the 
ability of civil law to protect citizens’ environmental rights.74 Of note however, is that 
the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) provides the right of anyone to “make 
accusations” (konggao) against polluters and that the right to file suit (q su) could be 
covered by this provision. In addition, there are provisions in the Civil Litigation Law 
that allow class action and “representation” suits (one legal entity can represent 
another in bringing suit) allow more leeway in the criteria. However, instances 
whereby interested third parties sue a polluting enterprise or a government agency 
based on the general provisions in the EPL or the Civil Litigation Law have not 
occurred.
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Another factor that inhibits a wider anti-pollution movement is the “ideology 
of economic development.” Abigail Jahiel found that the economic reforms in China 
create a policy context prone to cripple environmental policy implementation efforts. 
Both the ideology and the structural characteristics of the economic reform setting 
have shaped the way in which environmental policy is enforced.75 The belief that 
economic development is primary and that China should pollute first and clean up 
later is pervasive among the population as well as some environmental protection 
officials. This belief has also shaped public education toward the environment. In the 
early 1990s, when officials stepped up efforts to educate the general public, the 
content of education programs did not include information on the hazards of industrial 
pollution. School children are taught to pick up trash and to care about cute animals, 
not about the health hazards of mercury, which may be in the effluent of a nearby 
factory. The belief that economic development is primary inhibits collective action to 
halt pollution. Citizens that file a suit must first overcome this belief and the attending 
guilt for not supporting unfettered economic development.
The most important barrier to a “would-be” anti-pollution movement in China 
is state control of the media and the media’s treatment of environmental accidents and 
disputes. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were stories in the state run media about 
environmental issues, but coverage focused on tree planting and trash cle nup 
campaigns. There was little coverage of China’s multiple environmental ills. In the 
mid-1980s, the media carried stories about Greenpeace,76 not because the government 
approved of its views toward the environment, but because Greenpeace often protested 
against the activities of the U.S. and other Western countries. The government wanted 
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to show that even U.S. citizens disapproved of the U.S. government’s activities.77
State run media outlets occasionally ran stories of environmental accidents in 
foreign countries and educational materials highlighted the world’s largest 
environmental accidents in other countries. News stories on environmental accidents 
in China, however, were rarely seen in the provincial or national media during the 
1980s. Starting in the 1990s, some newspapers did cover pollution accidents, but the 
coverage was extremely superficial. Even into the 21st century, newspaper articles on 
pollution accidents are superficial. They mainly just describe how an accident 
occurred. They rarely follow up with stories about why the accident occurred and what 
was done about it. Although rare, there are some stories about pollution victims’ 
efforts to obtain justice, but again the stories are still superficial and reporters rarely 
follow up on them.
A survey of university students in environmental groups showed that students 
could name large environmental accidents in foreign countries, but not any in China.78
China’s environmental accidents and disputes do not “stick in people’s psyche.” Part 
of the reason for this is the superficial exposure they receive in the media. Therefore, 
people cannot sympathize with victims of pollution and environmental accidents have 
not become unifying symbols around which collective action against pollution 
develops.
Another barrier to a traditional widespread anti-pollution movement in China 
is the paucity of linkages between victims of pollution and potential “social movement 
organizations,” such as Chinese environmental social organizations. While The Center 
for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims offers free legal advice and even takes on a 
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few dispute cases a year, it does not organize citizens. Its leaders do not consider the 
organization as a social movement organization. Another environmental social 
organization, Friends of Nature, occasionally publishes stories of pollution and the 
people that it harms, but the organization does not follow up on the stories nor does it 
organize citizens to support victims of pollution. 
Student groups in China have not become involved in anti-pollution protests 
for a number of reasons. They consider it a politically dangerous activity, given the 
state’s primary goal is economic development. In addition, students would rather 
escape the trappings of modernity by retreating to nature, hence these groups focus on 
nature and biodiversity conservation. 
Without the support of social movement organizations, the isolated instances 
of contentious politics in China will remain isolated. In Japan and Taiwan, dense 
social networks organized people to support victims of pollution and to support 
improved environmental legislation to prevent industrial pollution thereby creating an 
anti-pollution movement While these instances represent the building blocks of an 
anti-pollution movement, they will remain as single ingredients in a proto-anti-
pollution movement until someone can stir them together.
The final barrier to a traditional anti-pollution movement is the fact that the Chinese 
state has moved to head off disputes by being more responsive to environmental 
grievances early on through the complaint system and by passing legislation to prevent 
pollution. The state has cultivated an image of a regime that is doing its best to fight 
the inevitable pollution associated with economic development and citizens have 
accepted this image.
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Because of all of these barriers, it is hard to say that a traditional anti-pollution 
movement has emerged in China. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that the number 
of disputes has been increasing and that authorities have been challenged to come up 
with ways to manage them. Authorities have done their best to prevent disputes by 
establishing environmental hot lines in the major cities and by institutionalizing 
measures to deal with environmental complaints early on.79
The Sophistication and The Rationalization of Environmental Dispute Resolution 
Processes
In addition to the state’s efforts to create legislation to prevent pollution, and to 
head off disputes early through the complaint system, one of the ways in which the 
state has become more sophisticated in managing disputes has been the 
“rationalization” of dispute processes. In the late 1970s and the 1980s, science and 
“liability” did not play a huge role in determining the outcome of environmental 
disputes. The case of the phosphate fertilizer factory in Heibei, related at the 
beginning, of this chapter makes no mention of an investigation into the claims of 
environmental harm by the farmers. Nor did it outline the basis for the “burden of 
proof.”
Questions regarding the use of scientific knowledge in dispute cases are 
intimately tied with the assignment of the “burden of proof” in such cases. In 
accordance with general understanding, typically the complainant has the 
responsibility to “prove” the damages suffered, the cause and effect relationship of 
pollution and the damages. One legal scholar points out that there are several reasons 
why it was more difficult to come up with the “proof” that damages were caused by 
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specific pollution incidents in the 1970s and 1980s. One, Chinese enterprise owners 
and managers may not have been aware of the potential for pollution from new 
advanced technology to cause harm, much less, ordinary citizens. In China in the late 
1970s and 1980s, new advanced technology was used in China for the first time, 
mainly in china’s coastal Special Economic Zones. Knowledge of the ill effects of 
some of this industrial technology was unknown to Chinese at the time, precluding the 
possibility of an ordinary citizen “proving” the cause an effect of pollution created by 
this technology and their physical or economic damages.80 Two, specific production 
techniques are often protected by patents, so it is difficult for the public, which has no 
access to the details of production techniques, to completely understand such 
processes and if pollution is an effect of such processes.81
The approach taken by Chinese courts in the 1980s to alleviate problem of 
establishing cause and effect was to loosen ever so slightly the ‘burden of proof’ rules. 
The proof that he factory in question was indeed producing pollution as measured by 
the Environmental protection monitoring station and other relevant personnel and the 
proof of harm on the part of the complainant together were sufficient. However, the 
court was the entity to engage relevant “expert” personnel, not the plaintiff and the 
defendant. In the 1970s and 1980s, the court would typically request help from expert 
organizations, which would then form a single “investigative team” to examine 
conditions at the enterprise. The team would then come to some agreement as to the 
presence of pollution and the cause and effect relationship between the pollution and 
the harm claimed. 
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Civil suits that go through the courts are more likely to see a variety of 
“experts” weigh in on establishing “burden of proof” than those that are resolved 
through popular or administrative mitigation or arbitration. The 1991 Law Regarding 
Civil Lawsuits, Article 63 stipulates that “When The People’s Court needs to make 
decisions regarding specialized questions, related departments have the duty to heed 
the People’s Court notice to send people with professional knowledge to conduct an 
examination and an expert determination.” 
When disputes are resolved through EPBs, authorities must act in acord nce 
with the National Environmental Protection Administration Regulation Regarding 
Environmental Protection Administrative Penalties (Guojia Huanjing Baohuju 
Guanyu Huanjing Baohu Xingzheng Chufa Banfa). While potential administrative 
penalty cases must be investigated and then undergo a process of review and approval 
before a fine is levied, typically, outside experts are not engaged. However, the EPB 
personnel must prove the dispute meets specific conditions: that there was illegal 
behavior and/or harmful results, that an administrative penalty is the appropriate 
response, and that the EPB has the authority to impose a penalty.82
Use of “Experts” and the “Politicization” of Science in Environmental 
Disputes
With Deng Xiaoping’s support of Zhou Enlai’s “Four Modernizations” policy 
in the late 1970s, science and technology became a much more important part of 
China’s policy goals.83 Scientists could once again practice their art. However, even 
during the Deng period in China, the state assumed that scienti ts would work 
according to the goals of the state, and there was a conflict between the scientific 
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community and the state over autonomy and intellectual pluralism in science and 
society. A few months after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the party attacked the 
idea of pluralism in science and asserted the need for Marxism’s “guiding role” over 
all intellectual inquiry.84 Does the state’s “guiding role” extend to the use of scientific 
knowledge? Since the court is the actor to call on “experts” to weigh in on 
environmental disputes heard in court, does the state’s “guiding role” extend to cover 
scientific evidence used in court cases? 
According to an examination of environmental dispute cases in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, it was typical to have the court form an investigative group of 
representatives of relevant ministries, universities, and research institutes, which then 
conducts a joint investigation and makes a report to the court. As the number of more 
quasi-governmental research institutes begins to increase in the late 1980s, these 
institutes are seen increasingly often as part of these investigative groups. 
By the 1990s, you begin to see a more “competitive” approach to the use of 
scientific evidence in court cases. Instead of one investigative team called in by the 
court, you begin to see other actors, such as the media, calling on “experts” to give 
their opinion regarding alleged damages due to pollution. One current case, which 
now is going through the first appeals process, involves an orchard farmer from Inner 
Mongolia illustrates the “politicization” of scientific evidence in the courtroom.
Copper Smelter Pollution in Inner Mongolia
The farmer, Mr. Han, first called the Center for Legal 
Assistance for Pollution Victims (CLAPV), a relatively autonomous 
“social organization” (shetuan) that provides free legal assistance to 
victims of pollution, complaining that his apple and pear trees had been 
killed in June of 1998 because of an air pollution accident at an upwind 
copper refinery in Kalaxin Qi in Chifeng, Inner Mongolia. The 
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desulfurization equipment at the refinery broke down, but the enterprise 
continued production for several days, which allowed a large amount of 
smoke and ash emissions containing extremely high levels of sulfur 
dioxide, as much as 46 times the regulatory standard, to disperse over 
several farms and orchards in the area. The local city government 
ordered an investigation into the accident. The environmental 
monitoring station confirmed that the levels of sulfur dioxide in the 
refinery’s emissions exceeded standards, even when the desulfurization 
equipment was functioning properly. The investigators confirmed acute 
sulfur dioxide pollution damage at two of the closest orchards. 
However, investigators could not confirm that the trees in Mr. Han’s 
orchard died because of the pollution. Mr. Zhang, the managing 
director of the polluting enterprise, therefore refused to take 
responsibility for the death of Mr. Han’s trees or to pay him any 
compensation because Mr. Han’s orchard was three kilometers away 
from the refinery, further than any of the other affected orchards. 
In December of 1998, the copper refinery restarted operations, 
but another sulfur dioxide pollution incident promptly closed it down 
again. This second accident compelled Mr. Han to contact the China 
Forestry Science Institute and ask resident experts to examine the 
orchard to find out what had really killed his trees. The resulting report 
supported the theory that sulfur dioxide, arsenic, and lead had caused 
Mr. Han’s trees to die. However, Mr. Zhang still refused to take 
responsibility or pay compensation. Therefore, Mr. Han, with the 
assistance of the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims filed 
a lawsuit in his city’s Middle People’s Court.
The ensuing court battle grew in scope and became more 
complicated as time went on. By the time court actually convened in 
August of 2000, four different “expert examinations” of the damages to 
Mr. Han’s orchard had been conducted. Two of the evaluations 
concluded that there was a cause and effect relationship between the 
pollution and the death of Mr. Han’s trees. 
The other two evaluations concluded that the refinery was not 
responsible for the damage and therefore under no obligation to 
compensate Mr. Han. The last evaluation, which took place two years 
after the initial pollution accident in July of 2000, was requested by the 
city’s Middle People’s Court and concluded that pollution had not 
caused the death and other damages to Mr. Han’s trees. This last 
evaluation, conducted by the Center for Fruit and Nursery Stock 
Quality Supervision Tests (of the Agricultural Dept.) attributed the 
death of the trees to bad management, fertilizer and water deficiencies, 
weak trees, insect infestations, dry rot and other diseases. Largely 
because of this evaluation, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, Mr. 
Zhang. In an unusual judgment, the court ruled that Mr. Han had to pay 
all of the court and expert evaluation costs. 
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Mr. Han, with the help of CLAPV, appealed this case to the Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture People’s High Court. Mr. Han’s 
lawyer claims that the middle court acted improperly by dismissing 
the Forestry Science Institute’s expert evaluation, which held that 
there was a cause and effect relationship between the pollution 
accidents and the death of Mr. Han’s trees. Also, he claims that the 
evaluation requested by the Middle Court, completed by the Center 
for Fruit and Nursery Stock Quality Supervision Tests was full of 
inconsistencies and that the Middle Court is biased in favor of the 
defendant. Among other problems, Wang Canfa pointed out that the 
investigators signed the report before it had been completed, that the 
investigators did not conduct any quantitative analysis, nor did they 
make inquiries into the management practices of Mr. Han. The High 
People’s Court of Inner Mongolia accepted the case and heard it in 
public in January of 2001.Unfortunately, the court could not make a 
decision. The court initiated conciliation proceedings, but the two 
parties could not reach an agreement, so the court adjourned.85
In the end, the residents lost this case.86
The case does illustrate several interesting facets of Chinese environmental 
dispute resolution processes more generally. It is important that both partieswere 
compelled to back up their claims with scientific evidence. Each party provided the 
court with scientific evidence in equal amounts. Specifically, each provided two 
expert evaluations. The case, however, also illustrates that science is not always the 
objective bringer of truth. Scientific evidence provided by each party led to different 
conclusions used by each “side” to bolter their positions; their power in the 
courtroom. Despite the “messiness” the politicization of science brings to 
environmental egal cases, it will force the sophistication of scientific methods at the 
local level. The case illustrates the expanding “monitoring” role of the media. Also 
important in this case, is the fact that a non-profit organization located in Beijing is 
involved in a local case in Inner Mongolia. It signals a strengthening of non-
governmental participation in Chinese society and non-governmental oversight of 
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local governments; it also marks the birth of public service environmental law in 
China.
Conclusion
To get someone to pay attention to their problem, citizens still do demonstrate 
against polluting enterprises, they may kidnap an enterprise owner, or cut electrical 
lines into the factory. These instances of protest attest to the fact that contentious 
politics is alive and well in the PRC. 
However, a review of dispute cases at different periods indicates that citizens 
resorted to disruptive tactics to get their demands met only after exhausting authorized 
channels of complaint resolution.87 While laws and regulations increasingly offer 
citizens legal protection against polluting behavior and have clarified dispute 
resolution systems, there are still numerous problems with environmental dispute 
resolution systems in China, which forces citizens to resort to more cont ntious 
methods. 
What problems with the authorized channels of complaint resolution push 
citizens to utilize extra-institutional and more disruptive methods to remedy their 
plight? There are numerous problems. Dispute resolution processes lack systematic 
methods to determine compensation to victims. Government intervention in court 
cases is still rampant and usually has a negative impact on victims. Courts have the 
power to decide if they will accept a lawsuit and have the power to split class-action 
suits, which provides benefits to the court, but is a tremendous burden for plaintiffs. 
There are numerous problems associated with the administrative mediation of civil 
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cases. Finally, court, government, and enterprise inaction regarding citizen 
environmental grievances has been and continues to be a major problem.
The role of governmental officials in disputes is not always clear-cut and one 
sided. At times, government and party officials are guilty of inaction, which drags out 
pollution disputes. In addition, environmental protection and public security officials 
still represses direct citizen action and suppresses news stories of such action. On 
occasion, citizens still are imprisoned for protecting their environmental rights through 
self-help measures and must file an administrative suit to get out of jail. On the other 
hand, environmental protection and other authorities often do all they can to assist 
victims of pollution in getting compensation and in stopping polluting behavior. 
Sometimes authorities have ended up in jail for their actions to assist pollution 
victims.88
In China, we do see increasing numbers of isolated instances of contentious 
politics, but unlike China’s neighbors, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, we have not seen the 
emergence of an anti-pollution movement. There are several reasons for this. China’s 
pollution victims focus not on environmental pollution per se, but on how it threatens 
their material interests. Citizens protest against the immediate circumstances in which 
they find themselves when pollution has harmed their health or their livelihood, and 
seek remedies for their problems. The isolated instances of contentious politics do not 
focus so much on the moral significance of pollution. They do not complain from a 
sense of unfairness or of being victimized by powerful interests. People do not 
complain or act in the name of social equity or environmental justice. They complain, 
protest, and/or sue because their personal health or material interests have been 
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directly harmed. Thus, victims of pollution frame pollution problems as local, isolated 
and in terms of their own personal interests. 
Framing pollution problems in terms of personal inhibits collective action that 
would focus more generally on policies that affect the population as a whole. As a 
result, we do not see victims of pollution banding together to fight for pollution 
victims’ rights everywhere. What we see in China are building blocks to an anti-
pollution movement, but they remain isolated instances of contentious politics. 
There is no guarantee that these instances of contentious politics will develop 
into a traditional environmental movement, because of political threats, citizens frame 
their actions primarily at the personal level, mobilizing structures are not “movement 
oriented,” and the geographical distances between victims decrease communication 
and action opportunities. The threat of a prison term for those who band together, take 
matters into their own hands, and behave in a disruptive manner, even though the 
likelihood of such an occurrence has decreased since the early 1980s. This political 
threat increases the costs of collective, disruptive action. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, citizens frame pollution problems to be local, isolated problems and are not
as concerned with changing the system as a whole. The mobilizing structures that 
sometimes help individual citizens to band together to collectively contend with 
enterprises or officials are often the affected work unit, residents committees or other 
local party organizations, and local EPBs. These structures are all linked to the state or 
party to some degree and must deal with the dual goals of representing victims’ 
interests while protecting themselves from the wrath of higher-level organs or 
retribution from enterprises or officials on the defensive. Work unit leaders and part 
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secretaries at the local level might help to get residents’ legal environmental demands 
heard, but one would not typically view them as being “movement oriented.” Finally, 
geographical distance and the lack of communication among pollution victims from 
different cities make collective action difficult to mobilize. While the Internet is 
increasingly becoming available to most people in large cities, fewer rural dwellers 
have access to this tool that breaks down geographical and communication barriers.
If a movement were to emerge, it would likely speed up the progress toward 
establishing environmental rights and a more rational system of victim compensation. 
A movement would create momentum toward desired environmental protection policy 
goals. A movement would put pressure on authorities to expand citizen access to 
justice.
In the absence of the momentum a movement could potentially create, Chinese 
legal and environmental scholars will continue to make incremental advances in 
resolving the problems inherent in dispute resolution laws, institutions, and processes. 
At the forefront of these efforts are the scholars that work with Wang Canfa at the 
China University of Political Science and Law. The suggestions they have made in 
scholarly writings include the following. 1) Promulgate clear regulations regarding the 
administrative resolution of civil disputes. 2) Establish standardized procedures for 
administrative resolution of civil disputes for EPBs to follow. 3) Establish a high-level 
committee that would have the authority to hear, investigate, and mediate 
environmental disputes. This committee would have legal authority. It could be 
modeled after the Japanese national committee established in 1970. 4) Strengthen 
China’s existing complaint process, so people to deal with their grievances at the 
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lowest possible level and keep them out of court, especially grievances dealing with 
noise pollution.89
Despite existing problems in dispute resolution laws, institutions, and 
procedures, sometimes, environmental disputes do make a difference. What does 
making a difference mean? Utilizing this channel, citizens’ can make a difference 
through dispute outcomes. Some of these outcomes include getting a polluting 
enterprise moved, getting an enterprise to install pollution prevention equipment that 
will reduce pollution levels, getting residents moved away from a pollution problem, 
getting an enterprise to produce different products, and getting adequate compensation 
for harms. Under what conditions can citizen participation make a difference by taking 
matters into their hands or by utilizing environmental dispute resolution channels? 
Following is a list of these conditions. 
1) When the pollution problem in question is clearly illegal. When the 
pollution is not considered illegal by decision-makers, then victims of pollution are 
less likely to get their demands met.90
2) When the pollution problem is acute and visible, i.e. when there is an 
environmental accident. When a pollution problem is less visible and the 
consequences of that pollution are slow to appear, such as cancers or other diseases 
that only appear years after prolonged exposure, then authorities are less concerned 
and react more slowly.91
3) When victims of pollution are willing to go to court, authorities take their 
problems more seriously.92
176
4) When a large number of victims of pollution are involved in a dispute it 
makes it harder for authorities to ignore it.  
5) When environmental protection and other authorities are not involved in 
corruption and are not on the take, citizen grievances are more likely to be resolved. 
6) When activist environmental protection officials go to bat for citizens, their 
grievances are more likely to be addressed. When representatives of the local or 
National People’s Congress, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, or 
State Council become involved in a dispute, it is more likely to be resolved in the 
favor of complainants.93
7) In some cases, moral suasion and shame tactics have made the difference in 
getting a pollution problem resolved. A well-p aced media story has more than once 
been the straw that breaks the camels back, or in these cases, the polluter’s back.94
8) Some evidence indicates that when victims of pollution take matters into 
their own hands and utilize self-help measures, which are disruptive, they can make a 
difference in the outcome of a dispute.95
9) When citizens are willing to accept lower rates of compensation, a dispute 
will be more easily resolved.96
10) The attitudes of polluting enterprise managers and owners are of critical 
importance. 
None of these results is surprising and they are generally true everywhere, i.e. 
China is not unique. Despite the problems remaining in dispute processes, it is clear 
that when compared to the 1970s, dispute resolution processes are more rational. 
Dispute resolution processes have become more “rational” and institutionalized, 
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primarily because of the greater understanding of cause and effect r lationship 
between pollution and apparent harms, and the increasingly “contentious” nature of 
the use of science in environmental court cases. Science, however, has by no means 
become the objective harbinger of truth to these processes. Science has been
‘politicized” in China, just as it has in other countries. 
Over time, authorities have become more sophisticated in preventing and 
managing environmental disputes. The constitution and various environmental laws 
promulgated by Chinese authorities have, in theory at least, provided citizens with the 
right to complain about pollution, to act in their “environmental self-d fense,” to file 
civil suits through the court system, and to receive compensation for demonstrable 
harms. In addition, Chinese authorities have become more sophisticated in managing 
disputes by trying to prevent them before they occur by instituting a complaint system.  
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Chapter Four
Environmental Complaints: Variations in Chinese Society’s Response to 
Rising Pollution Levels 1990-2000
The Chinese state prefers certain channels of participation to others and one 
such channel is the environmental complaint system (huanjing baohu xinfang zhidu).1
Citizens file complaints (xinfang) for simple problems like a neighbor’s smoky coal 
furnace to the most complex of problems, some of which have defied resolution in the 
courts and may involve death or total destruction of livelihoods. The complaint system 
is preferred over other channels of participation because it provides benefits to the 
state. The complaint system allows party and government leaders to channel 
grievances by people who might otherwise choose other less desirable paths to resolve 
their pollution problem such as initiating a dispute, protesting, going on strike, or other 
such disruptive behavior. In other words, the complaint system is used by the state to 
prevent environmental disputes and uncontrolled citizen protests. 
It also benefits the state because it reinforces the continuation of “top-down” 
supervision of governmental activities. Officials utilize the complaint system to help 
them implement environmental laws and policies. Citizens act as the eyes and the ears 
of environmental officials and are the “ground troops” in the battle to get enterprises 
to comply with environmental laws and policies. 
Citizens also prefer the complaint system compared to other less sanctioned 
channels of interest articulation such as initiating various forms of protest. There are 
specific benefits from utilizing the complaint system. As Tianjian Shi points out there 
are both expressive and instrumental benefits associated with making complaints.2
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From an instrumental perspective, the complaint system benefits citizens because they 
can utilize it to try to avoid environmental harms. Expressive benefits include the 
satisfaction of voicing a grievance and/or the fulfillment of doing their civic duty in 
reporting polluters. 
In addition, relatively less initiative is required of people who file complaints,3
so it is easy to do, at least at the administrative level where the citizen lives. Making 
complaints requires relatively fewer resources than mustering a collective protest of 
some sort. However, the economic calculus becomes more complicated when citizens 
must take their complaint to higher-level authorities. 
Complaining, is a relatively safe activity because the right to complain is 
sanctioned by authorities. While complaining is not risk free, it is less politically 
dangerous than confronting enterprises and authorities throug  more contentious 
means, such as striking, surrounding a factory, or disrupting production.
There is increasing evidence that local authorities are becoming responsive to 
complaints, leading to increased efficacy of the complaint system and increasing
confidence of residents in the system. In Guangzhou, as early as 1991, local 
government officials addressed residents’ complaints regarding street food stalls 
through stricter regulations. Citizen complaints regarding noise and air pollution were 
also addressed through strengthened enforcement efforts.4 One district level official 
declared “higher management cares about complaints now more than they used to, so 
they are easier to resolve.”5
There are several reasons why officials have become more responsive. First, 
there is greater understanding on the part of officials about the hazards and unintended 
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consequences of industrial pollution. Second, officials have realized the benefits that 
the citizen complaint system can bring to their danwei and environmental protection 
efforts. Third, there is political pressure from the top to become more responsive to 
citizens. 
While there is greater accountability in the complaint system than in the past, it 
does not mean that the state as a whole is accountable to its citizens.6 The state is 
merely becoming more responsive to citizens regarding environmental pollution. Over 
time, however, citizens may come to expect officials to be more responsive, even 
regarding other issues, and therefore demand greater and greater accountability.
The evolution of the complaint system represents a “sophistication” of state-
society relations in China. Briefly, the “sophistication” of state-society relations means 
that they are more complex, increasingly based on rationality, and informed by 
experience. However, this sophistication does not mean that there has been a 
fundamental change in the cardinal principles guiding politics and policy in China. 
Deng Xiaoping established these principles in the 1982 constitution and they are 1) 
adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought, 2) adherence to socialism, 3) adherence 
to the people’s democratic dictatorship, and 4) adherence to Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership.7
While the results of the quantitative survey included in this chapter show that 
participation in the environmental complaint system has increased at the national level 
over time, they also show that there is wide variation in the use of the complaint 
system by citizens from different provinces. 
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What explains the variations in citizen use of the system across location and 
time? This research examines two of the four main categories of variables thought to 
affect participation,8 stimuli present in the “immediate environment,” such as catalysts 
in the microenvironment that can be specific to the type of participation and the type 
of policy in question, and “life position factors” including education, age, race, sex, 
etc…
Other variables, which may have an influence on variations in the numbers of 
complaints, including those variables related to the psychological characteristics of 
individuals and those of the “larger environment” including the social and political 
settings, or contexts, will not be examined in this research. As the quantitative element 
of this research seeks to get a broad overview at the national and provincial levels, the 
national and provincial political and legal contexts are assumed constant.9
Previous research suggests that the three most important factors to shape the 
public’s response to increasing pollution, given constant political and legal contexts, 
include two immediate or “micro” environmental variables and one “life position 
variable.” The micro environmental variables are the levels of  “pollution density”10
and the levels of citizen environmental awareness. An important “life position factor” 
to shape participation in general is the socioeconomic status, i.e. level of education 
and economic development, of citizens.11
Tianjian Shi found that levels of education are more important than economic 
development in determining the participation of citizens in Beijing in both voting and 
in making appeals. Evidence from the western literature on participation indicates that 
economic levels are influential factors in determining participation levels, however, 
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some evidence indicates that “personalized contacting” does not follow this pattern.12
This research tests these patterns in the environment sector. 
This chapter examines the correlation of levels of pollution, economic 
development, and environmental education with levels of participation in the China 
case. Briefly, the quantitative survey results indicate that when combined in a model, 
levels of pollution, economic development, and environmental awareness are 
significant in explaining variations in the numbers of environmental complaints across 
provinces and across time. The most important variable in determining participation is 
the level of pollution, which lends credence to grievance based models predicting 
higher levels of participation or the emergence of social movements occurs when 
citizens have a genuine grievance.13 The “social density of pollution” measure is the 
best predictor of variations in complaints compared with several other ways to 
measure pollution levels.  
The chapter begins by describing the development and the nature of the 
environmental complaint system in China, highlighting structural aspects of the 
system that enhance or restrict accountability. It then outlines the results of a 
quantitative survey that seeks to answer the core question of why there is wide 
variation in citizen participation in the complaint system across location and time.
The Development of China’s Complaint System
The practice of filing complaints with local authorities has existed in China 
since ancient history. Since the founding of the People’s Republic, the complaint 
system, in theory, has ideally functioned to enhance relations among the party, the 
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government, and the people.14  However, the right to complain was not enshrined in 
law until the passage of the 1982 constitution. 
According to the Chinese constitution of 1982, “Chinese citizens have the right 
to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary. Citizens have the 
right to make to relevant state organ complaints or charges against, or exposur s of, 
any state organ or functionary for violation of the law or dereliction of duty; but 
fabrication or distortion of facts for purposes of libel or false incrimination is 
prohibited. The state organ concerned must deal with complaints, charges or exposur s 
made by citizens in a responsible manner after ascertaining the facts. No one may 
suppress such complaints, charges and exposures or retaliate against the citizens 
making them. Citizens who have suffered losses as a result of infringement of their 
civic rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in 
accordance with the law.”15 Some ministries began to collect complaints starting in 
1983, but it was more in an ad hoc manner. It was not until the 1990s, that the 
complaint system was seriously institutionalized.
In 1992, Chinese leaders held the first “National Complaint Working Meeting” 
(diyi chuanguo xinfang gongzuo huiyi). Even by that time, however, besides the 
constitution, there were no major laws or regulations guiding the complaint process. 
The State Council “xinfang tiaoli” did not go into effect until 1996. In the early 1990s, 
the guiding policy principles for the complaint process were the “three services” 
(sange fuwu; 1) wei dang de zhongxin gongzou fuwu, 2) wei chunzhong fuwu, 3) wei 
lingdao gongzuo fuwu).16
193
By 1992, Chinese bureaucrats had laid out a general framework for managing 
citizen complaints in all sectors, which was disseminated through literature on 
administrative management.17 However, there were no national level laws or 
regulations guiding the process.  
By 1992, it was stressed that each party, government, and enterprise organ 
should have procedures for managing citizen complaints. All of the following from the 
highest levels to the lowest levels are required to establish the appropriate level office 
to manage complaints: Central Committee of the Communist Party (Zhonggong 
Zhongyang); Standing Committee of the National People Congress (Chuanguo Renda 
Changweihui); the State Council (Guowuyuan);18 Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (Zhongyang Jilu Jiancha Weiyuanhui); and The Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan). 
Accordingly, all party and government bodies at the national level, below these 
top echelon bodies, must also establish complaint offices or bureaus (or assign 
responsible personnel) including all of the Party, People’s Congress, and State Council 
offices/departments, ministries, committees/commissions, banks, and administrations 
(Guowuyuan bangongting, bu, wei, hang, shu),19 and directly affiliated organizations 
(zhishujigou), and units (zhishu shiye danwei). Finally, all Party, People’s Congress 
and governmental bodies at the provincial, municipal, autonomous region, city, 
prefecture,20 and county levels are to establish offices (or assign personnel) to manage 
complaints. It is interesting that even county party and government bodies are to have 
people responsible for complaints.21
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Most often, the complaint office (section or personnel) is associated with the 
general affairs or the secretary’s office of an organization. An administrative 
management manual from the early 1990s clearly designates which ministries are 
responsible for which type of complaints. Responsibility for managing complaints was 
clearly categorized as “professional” work.22
According to a handbook on administrative procedures published in 1992, 
filing complaints is a type of “mass political work” (chunzhongxing zhengzhi 
gongzuo), and so serves the party. It is an important channel of communication 
between citizens and party and government leaders at all levels, and so serves 
administrative officials. Finally, it is one way that citizens can exercise their 
democratic rights and supervise the work of leading officials, and so serves citizens.23
This cursory examination of the national complaint system suggests that 
officials developed the system slowly but, at certain periods, stronger measures were 
enacted to standardize, institutionalize, and regulate the system. The foundation for the 
right of citizens to complain was explicitly stated in the 1982 constitution, and basic 
policy guidelines were established by 1992, but regulations guiding the complaint 
process were not enacted until 1996. Officials boosted the system at these times in 
response to different stimuli. 
In the 1980s, officials sanctioned citizen complaints to avoid the re-occurrence 
of policy failures such as the Great Leap Forward. In the early 1990s, 
institutionalization of the complaint system was a response to citizen demands for 
reform that culminated in the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. In the 1990s, the state 
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established regulatory guidelines for the complaint process and conducted location-
specific surveys to assess the state of complaints.24
Of importance is that environmental protection officials developed, 
institutionalized, and issued regulations guiding the environmental complaint system 
before the national system was developed. This suggests that the environmental 
complaint system became a “test case” in the process of learning how todevel p a 
national complaint system. 
Development of the Environmental Complaint System: Laws and Regulations
In the environmental sector, evidence indicates that nearly every province and 
major city has seen an increase in the numbers of complaints since the 1980s. Even 
relatively smaller cities, like Xuzhou, have experienced a rise. A Xuzhou 
Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) official remarked that in 1980, there were 
about 100 complaints made annually to his office, but by 1994, there were 300.25
Several locations kept records of the numbers of environmental complaints 
starting in 1983, including EPBs in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, 
Chongqing, and Changchun) and one province (Sichuan).26 However, there were no 
regulations guiding the process.
In 1988, after national administrative reforms took place and SEPA became 
independent of the Ministry of Construction, and under the direct jurisdiction of the 
State Council, it began to directly address environmental cases and complaints raised 
by the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Consultative Congress. 
Before 1988, the Ministry of Construction was responsible for managing complaints.
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In the late 1980s, some lower level EPBs faced with complaints drew up in-
house procedures to deal with them, even though there had not yet been a directive 
from a higher-level authority to do so.27
In 1989, a few EPBs at the provincial and city levels established offices or 
“lead working groups” to handle citizen environmental complaints and establish 
complaint systems as “test cases.”28 The responsibilities of these offices or groups 
were to analyze, judge, and manage environmental complaints and disputes within and 
among work units, within and among enterprises, between enterprises and 
administrative departments, between individuals and corporations, and between 
provinces. 
In addition, in 1989, officials from the State Environmental Protection Office 
and other relevant personnel began drafting a regulation designed to standardize and 
institutionalize the environmental complaint system on a national scale.  In December 
of 1990, the National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA) passed the 
“Huanjing Baohu Xinfang Guanli Banfa” (Regulation Concerning the Management of 
Environmental Protection Complaints), which went into effect in February of 1991. 
The administrative regulation outlines the bare framework of the system and 
stipulates the duties of EPBs at each administrative level. It includes requirements to 
set up a system for managing complaints and calls for each EPB to establish relevant 
training and exchange programs. EPBs are responsible for handling all complaints 
from citizens in the EPB’s administrative area and either have the EPB staff respond 
to the complaint or for directing citizens to the appropriate authority. In addition, 
EPBs must investigate cases passed on to them from higher level EPBs. EPBs are 
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required to cooperate with other governmental ministries to manage complaints that 
involve more than one agency. 
Each EPB is responsible for reporting certain types of complaints to their 
immediate supervisory agency including those that involve more than one 
administrative area or have the potential to disrupt society. Officials are required to 
take citizen complaints seriously.  If a complaint is not easily resolved or is 
unreasonable, officials are required to be patient and educate citizens. If citizens file 
an administrative or civil suit, and the court accepts the case, and the citizens continue 
to file complaints with the EPB, then EPB officials are no longer required to deal with 
the complaints. 
As with the national complaint system, the environmental complaint system is 
a tool used to educate citizens about environmental protection and to teach citizens 
how to correctly utilize their “democratic rights,” to aid sector officials, and the 
party.29 In addition, it can be inferred that Chinese leaders made these initial efforts to 
institutionalize the environmental complaint system in order to protect public stability 
and order, and maintain “social unity” by avoiding environmental disputes. 
There were several problems with the complaint system in 1991. One, there 
were too few personnel available. Many who worked in the complaint managing 
offices were holding two positions concurrently, so the structural organization and 
mechanisms for handling complaints was incomplete. Two, the regulatory framework 
guiding the complaint processes was incomplete. Three, there was no provincial or 
national level forums within which experiences could be shared or learning could take 
place regarding managing complaints. Four, many officials did not take complaints 
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seriously, so it was difficult to bring worthwhile disputes to the attention of leaders 
and decision-making departments in a timely manner.30 Despite the etchings of a basic 
regulatory framework and central level support, in the early 1990s, citizen complaints 
were not a priority for most EPBs. Personnel who managed complaints often had 
difficulty in garnering the support of office or bureau leadrs for victims of pollution 
and it took time and pressure from above and below to compel local authorities to 
make them a higher priority.31
Over time, NEPA and other governmental agencies strengthened the complaint 
system regulatory framework. In 1992, NEPA implemented the “Huanjing Xinfang 
Gongzuo Youguan Guiding” (Rules Regarding Environment Complaint Work) to 
strengthen and clarify the administrative regulation passed in 1990. It also began to 
convene an annual National Complaint Working Meeting in 1992 so official could 
share their experiences managing complaints.32 These annual working meetings also 
served as forums to train and criticize officials on their management of environmental 
complaints and enforcement practices. In 1994, representatives from 10 provinces, 
autonomous zones, and municipalities attended the working meeting including Hebei, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Shandong, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan.33
The standardization of the complaint system proceeded haltingly and unevenly 
across China, but got a definite boost in 1994 when Chinese leaders drafted China’s 
version of Agenda 21. In 1994, in the Chinese Agenda 21,34 Chinese leaders declared 
their commitment “to improve the system for making and investigating 
(environmental) complaints, and expand the public’s role in the enforcement of 
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sustainable development laws so as to ensure that individuals, groups and 
organizations with legal standing have reliable channels for participating in the 
enforcement process to protect their lgal rights and public interests.” 
Throughout the 1990s, officials have continued to standardize and improve the 
environmental complaint system, as well as the complaint systems in other sectors. In 
1995, the State Council issued the “Xinfang Tiaoli” (Regulation Regarding 
Complaints), which went into effect in January of 1996. This regulation was relevant 
to all types of complaints, including environmental complaints. The State Council 
regulation outlined the basic rights and responsibilities of citizens as well as 
governmental authorities responsible for managing complaints.35
In the late 1990s, NEPA further strengthened the environmental complaint 
system. In 1997, NEPA passed the revised “Huanjing Xinfang Banfa,” (Regulation 
Regarding Environmental Complaints), which replaced the 1990 regulation of the 
same name. The regulation mirrored the State Council’s 1995 regulations in that it 
outlined similar rights and responsibilities both of citizens who complain and of 
government authorities charged with managig complaints. It mandated concrete time 
limits for resolving various types of complaints. It further stipulated that if a citizen 
“skipped” an administrative level by going over the heads of the authorities charged 
with managing complaints in that particular administrative area, then officials at the 
higher level could send the citizen back down to the lower level agency. The 
authorities at the higher level could also agree to manage directly the complaint if they 
so desired (provision 18).36
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By 2001, Chinese leaders and environmental officials had strengthened the 
environmental complaint system by clearly indicating the rights and responsibilities of 
citizens who complain and the authorities charged with managing complaints. The 
regulations are intended toprotect both the citizens that complain and the authorities 
that manage the complaints by outlining restricted behaviors. In theory, even local-
level EPBs in remote areas should have established regulations and procedures 
guiding complaint processes. 
Complaint regulations allow for group complaints, but seek to control 
collective action by the group. The regulations do this by only allowing for five people 
at a time to represent a group when visiting the complaint office.37 While it frequently 
happens that more than one person files a complaint regarding one specific incident, 
not all of these are “group” complaints. A group complaint is when individuals get 
together and decide to file a complaint as a group. It is not when a number of people 
individually decide to call the EPB to complain. Because of this distinction, given the 
statistical data available, it is impossible to know just how many group complaints 
there are. 
In conclusion, the environmental complaint system was established before the 
national complaint system and may have been a “test case” for development of the 
larger system. In 1996, the NEPA complaint office was recognized by the central 
government for its “outstanding” complaint work and heralded as a model for other 
sectors.38
The environmental complaint system is tied to the national complaint system 
as are systems in other sectors, but statistics on environmental complaints are kept 
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separately. In the Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), 
environmental complaints are either not included in the totals or are included, but 
belong to a larger category of complaints. There is not a separate category for 
environmental complaints. National, provincial, municipal, and some city EPBs must 
send representatives to the national annul meeting on complaints held by central level 
authorities and are now bound by the same laws and regulations as complaint 
management in other sectors.
The various regulations regarding complaints forced government ministries 
and other agencies to respond to citizen’s environmental complaints, but they left 
loopholes large enough to allow arbitrary decisions on the part of authorities. 
Therefore, while regulations did structure some accountability into the complaint 
system, they also left open the possibility for arbitrary “rule by authority.” 
Environmental protection officials took complaints more seriously than they did in 
1991, but the system itself still had faults. The regulations allow officials the option to 
decline to investigate a complaint, which was first filed at a lower level administrative 
authority. 
The Complaint System and Procedures
The procedures for filing environmental complaints and for managing them are 
straightforward. If a citizen has a complaint, suggestion, criticism, or request that has 
anything to do with pollution or the behavior of environmental protection officials, 
they can write, call, or visit the environmental protection bureau in charge of that 
administrative area. They also may take their complaint to a number of other 
government or party organizations. The other authorities to which people often direct 
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complaints include local party organizations (resident’s committees, unit 
representatives, or the relevant level of the party secretary’s office); community 
leaders; local government; local People’s Congress members; local People’s 
Consultative Congress members; unit leaders; the polluting enterprise or the 
enterprise’s supervisory agency; and newspapers, television, or other media 
organizations. However, these various organiz tions rarely directly handle 
environmental complaints. It is more likely that the citizen will be directed to take 
their complaint to the environmental protection authorities at the appropriate 
administrative level. 
An EPB will respond to those complaints within its jurisdiction, but it can be 
confusing as to which bureau has jurisdiction. For example, noise pollution problems 
are the responsibility of the EPBs, except if the noise pollution is occurring in “public 
areas” in which case, the Public Security Bureau must respond to the complaint. One 
district-level EPB official had underlined those sentences in copies of environmental 
laws that enabled her to determine which bureau had jurisdiction. Determining who is 
responsible for a complaint can be a complex issue, and can lead to certain cases 
“falling through the cracks.”39 If there is any confusion regarding jurisdiction, a 
complaint is more likely to fall through the cracks and citizens’ voices will be left 
unheard. 
The status of the enterprise can make  difference in who has authority to 
investigate a complaint. If a complaint is against a provincial level state-own d 
enterprise, then a provincial level or higher EPB must investigate the complaint and 
assess any penalties. The city or district EPB does not really have jurisdiction over the 
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enterprise. A person who complains to a city EPB about a provincial enterprise will be 
directed to seek out the provincial level EPB.40
Citizens sometimes take complaints to authorities at a higher administrative 
level. There are numerous reasons why they do this. The enterprise that is the target of 
the complaint could be a higher-l vel enterprise. They could be dissatisfied with the 
action taken by a lower level EPB or they believe the lower level EPB is corrupt. They 
could decide to take their complaint to the highest level possible because they believe 
it will be more effective; or they could have personal connections. However, EPBs 
rarely handle complaints in lower level administrative areas directly. In most case,
the higher-level EPB will not look into a complaint at a lower level and will direct 
citizens to take their complaints to the EPB in their district or city. This can lead 
citizens on a wild goose chase to find the appropriate level authorities to whom to 
complain. 
Most EPBs have similar procedures for managing complaints, although there is 
some variation from place to place and from one administrative level to the next.41
EPB officials charged with managing complaints are usually part of the 
Administrative Affairs Division/Section of an EPB, but various other 
divisions/sections become involved in handling complaints. EPBs are equipped to take 
complaints 24 hours a day. Typically, during the day, staff in the Administrative 
Affairs Division takes care of phone calls, letters, and visitors. At night, specified EPB 
staff answer the phones. Many EPBs instituted a “rotation system” whereby the entire 
staff of an EPB would rotate taking night shifts to answer phone calls. In EPBs that 
instituted the rotation system, an official may have to work overtime (zhiban) once a 
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month or more. Other EPBs hired workers specifically to stay at the EPB all night to 
answer phones and record complaints.
After “registering” the complaint, personnel in the General Affairs Division 
pass the complaint on to the appropriate division, which then investigates the 
complaint and reports the results to the citizens who complained. For example, the 
Pollution Control Division or the Division of Science, Technology and Industry will 
investigate air and water pollution complaints. The Development and Construction 
Project Management Division (kaifa ke) investigates complaints about construction 
projects. The exact title of each division and the exact division of labor vary from 
place to place and from one administrative level to the next. In general, the higher 
level of the EPB, the more specialized the divisions become, meaning at the district 
level, a division will have a broader range of responsibilities than the corresponding 
division at the city level. The division that investigates the complaint also is 
responsible for contacting the citizens who complained if there is no immediate 
resolution to the problem. In some administrative areas in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the director of the EPB signed off on the complaints and assigned their 
management to specific divisions. 
Currently, the director is only notified about problems that involve other 
administrative areas, are extremely serious, or are likely to cause social unrest.42 Thus, 
one of the conditions under which complaints make officials take notice is when there 
is the threat of social instability.
Occasionally, the citizens who complain will wait at the polluting enterprise 
for the EPB investigator and will accompany them into the ent rprise. Sometimes, the 
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resident’s committee representative also will tag along. Typically, the investigator will 
not notify the main person responsible for complaints in the General Affairs Division 
regarding the outcome of a complaint, unless it cannot be resolved or there are other 
special conditions.
Starting around 1997, SEPA, and subsequently lower level EPBs, instituted 
procedural changes in order to reduce the opportunities for corruption in the complaint 
process. Two or more investigators are supposed to check out the complaint and if the 
enterprise is in violation of an environmental regulation, then the investigators must 
contact the Policy and Law Division at the EPB to request legal recourse or asses fines 
against the enterprise. It has not always been that way. Before 1997, in most areas, one 
person could investigate a complaint. It was not always necessary for investigators to 
go through the Policy and Law Division to assess fines against an enterprise. In 
addition, enterprises no longer pay fines or compensation directly to EPB officials. 
They must send such payments directly to the EPB’s bank account.43
In general, complaints to EPBs from members of the media, governmental 
officials, NPC and CPCC representatives, and other VIPs are taken mor  seriously and 
the main person responsible for complaints in an EPB will handle these as “special 
cases.” EPBs keep separate records for complaints they receive from the NPC and 
CPCC members, but do not do this for complaints they receive from local government 
or party agencies, work units, or ministries or offices under the State Council. Each 
year, the Steering Committee of the People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s 
Consultative Congress review the complaints they receive and deliberate to decide on
which complaints they will follow up.44 Complaints by NPC and members of the 
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Chinese People’s Consultative Congress to EPBs are often complex and involve more 
than one incident. An NPC representative may ask the EPB to resolve large-sc le 
problems or multiple problems.45 It should be kept in mind that not all administrative 
areas are eligible to have their own People’s Congress or CPCC organizations. 
The timeline for investigating and resolving complaints varies according to the 
type and severity of the grievance. If a complaint is extremely serious and acute, say 
someone reports an explosion at a chemical plant, and then the person manning the 
phones is responsible for sending a team out to investigate the problem immediately, 
no matter the time of day. Otherwise, complaints are recorded and dealt with when 
possible, usually within one or two days. Regulations stipulate that EPB staff members 
must complete an initial investigation of every complaint within two days. One of the 
central districts in Beijing even set out a regulation that required EPB officials to go 
out to investigate within three hours of receiving a complaint.46 Usually, a complaint is 
resolved within 15 days. The regulations stipulate that complaints must be resolved 
within 30 days and the person who complained must be notified of the results. The 
time limit for more complex problems is flexible. Complaints passed down from a 
higher administrative level do not have to be resolved for 90 days.47
Upper-level EPBs and other relevant governmental agencies supervise the 
complaint management work of lower-l vel EPBs in a variety of ways. Lower-level 
EPBs must file brief reports regarding complaints every three months and reports that 
are more detailed once a year. If lower-level EPBs do not submit required reports, then 
part of their funding could be withheld.48 In recent years, there has been considerable 
emphasis placed on managing complaints at the lowest possible administrative level. 
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Upper-level EPBs hold training programs for complaint system staff from lower-level 
EPBs. Typically, if a higher-level EPB receives a large number of complaints from 
citizens from a lower level administrative area, the EPB will call in representatives 
from the lower-level EPB for “training.” The EPBs that are unable to resolve 
complaints at their own administrative level are often “criticized.” However, the lack 
of authority of EBPs impedes the hierarchical supervisory process. In some cases, 
provincial EPBs may not have the authority to require city EPB officials to attend 
training.49
At the national level, there is little or no oversight, because there is no higher-
level environmental protection authority than SEPA. There was only one official 
working in the complaint office full time until late in the 1990s. The SEPA complaint 
office in Beijing receives complaint letters from all over the country. These complaints 
are typically those that have not been resolved at the local level, and are therefore 
extremely serious. However, the number of complaints directly received at the 
national level was not included in the total number of complaints reported in the China 
Environment Yearbook until the 1999 edition, making them impervious to oversight 
until 1998.50 One official who spent time in the national level complaint office
reported that no one kept track of the complaints coming in and there were “complaint 
letters all over the floor.” Not all complaints fell through the cracks at the national 
level, however; many were resolved, but usually only after a long period of time.51
Citizen access to complaint data and other information is determined by who 
you are. There were times that I was denied access to data at the city level and below, 
because I was a foreigner.52 Other times, the data was freely available. Sometimes, 
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data from previous years was unavailable because at the time in question, the EPB was 
not completely independent of the Chengjianju or the Chengjianwei (Ministry or 
Commission of Construction, previously known as the Ministry or Commission of 
Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection.) 53 Apparently, when a 
local EPB became independent of the Chengjianju, not all records were handed over 
or the Chengjianju did not keep records of environmental complaints. Sometimes, data 
was “lost” when a new person became responsible for complaints. Complaint data for 
consecutive years at the city level is difficult to find. Data can be found in the China 
Environment Yearbook, for selected cities, but not every year is listed. There are 
enormous gaps in the data from year to year. The SEPA complaint office director 
indicated that I would need approval from the international office of SEPA before he 
could talk to me; I was unable to get approval.54
Topics of Citizen Grievances
Citizens from the general population call the EPB to complain about a wide 
variety of issues, some of which are more easily resolved than others. In recent years, 
noise pollution has been the subject of the greatest number of complaints, both at the 
national and local levels. The complaints about air pollution have increased 
continually at the national and provincial levels. In contrast, the number of complaints 
about water pollution has declined, at least at the national level. In general, people 
complain about everything from annoying issues, such as their neighbor’s air 
conditioner being too loud, to more serious issues, such the death of livestock or crops 
that appears to be a result of pollution. People complain most frequently about the 
cement, paper, power, steel, aluminum, chemical, and fertiliz r industries.55
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Some complaints are resolved easily, while others are extremely difficult to 
resolve. Often, the inspector from the EPB will be able to immediately figure out and 
resolve the problem on the spot, such as varying the rate at which coal is fed into a 
boiler. The hardest type of complaint to resolve are those in which an enterprise is 
polluting within the set limits of the law, but citizens still feel as though they are being 
wronged and continue to complain. One official said that in these cases, after citizens 
contact him a couple of times, he ceases to pay attention to complaints.56
Some complaints are never resolved. For example, there is a large group of 
farmers in Taiyuan City, Shanxi Province that have been involved in an environmental 
dispute since the mid-1980s over air and water pollution from coal dust generated by 
the Number 2 Thermal Power Plant.57 The Taiyuan farmers claim that the power plant 
dumped piles of coal dust next to a river, which eventually contaminated the river 
water and subsequently their crop fields. They also claim that air pollution emissions 
have killed or damaged scores of crops. For years, the farmers complained about the 
pollution to the city EPB and other government organizations. The authorities cleaned 
up the river, but the plant leaders did not pay any compensation to the farmers. 
Continuing air pollution problems raised tensions over the plant and in 1998, the 
farmers requested that the provincial EPB mediate the dispute. The provincial EPB 
tried to mediate the dispute, but the effort fell apart after the power plant refused to 
pay compensation to the farmers. The plant claimed it did not have the money to pay 
compensation. To this day, the Taiyuan Number 2 thermal power plant dispute 
remains unresolved, but the farmers continue to request help from the provincial EPB. 
The EPB representative says there is “meiyou banfa” (nothing that can be done), 
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particularly since the plant is not a “zhongdian” (a priority) with the provincial 
government. 
For the farmers, there are few administrative options left with which to settle 
the problem. The next step would be for them to complain to the provincial level 
People’s Congress or to the State Environmental Protection Bureau in Beijing. The 
courts offer another option, but the farmers say they do not have enough money to file 
a lawsuit. As this case demonstrates, citizens often lack the understanding of the court 
system, hesitate to utilize the courts for cultural reasons, or lack the financial resources 
to sue an offending industry, so the courts are not always a feasible last resort.  
Weaknesses in the Complaint System
In practice, the complaint system is far from perfect. The Taiyuan story 
illustrates the barriers governmental economic priorities pose for environmental 
protection efforts. At the local level, citizens and EPB authorities often do not have the 
resources or the authority to compel polluting enterprises to adhere to the “polluter 
pays” principle. Sometimes the only way a local area will be cleaned up is if the 
central government “plans” and helps to fund such a cleanup. 
Beyond not being a key concern of officials, there are other factors 
contributing to the quandary of the Taiyuan case. Two other factors that act as barriers 
are the economic hardship tha would be faced by the power plant if it were to 
compensate the citizens and the importance of the industry to the area. Economic 
hardship is often used as an excuse for failing to implement environmental protection 
measures or for refusing to provide compensation to victims of pollution. Nor could 
the power plant simply shut down. It provides an essential service to the community 
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and it would be more expensive to the city as a whole to withdraw the electricity 
source for other factories and homes. These and other factors will be further discussed 
in the chapter on environmental disputes. 
One official said the common attitude was that if the citizen does not sue, it is 
not necessary to take the complaint seriously (“bugao, buli”).58 The fact that EPB 
officials have dismissed citizen complaints because they do not think the citizens will 
sue indicates that either there is a lack of concern among EPB officials for legal 
infractions and/or they feel that they have no authority to resolve problems that 
involve other sectors of government or industry. Either way, adopting an attitude of 
“bugao, buli” indicates that there is not enough accountability built into the complaint 
system at the local level. Citizens must be willing to take their complaint to a higher 
level of government, which usually requires a great deal of effort on the part of the 
citizen. It often will take days to reach a location where the next highest level of 
government agency can be found. Citizens may write letters, but they have to be 
convincing enough to motivate higher-level authorities to take action directly, 
otherwise the complaint will be transferred to the EPB or other governmental organ at 
the lower administrative level. 
The citizen complaint system can only work if citizens utilize it to its fullest 
and the structure of the system itself may hinder its effective use. At this point, the 
complaint system has insufficient citizen oversight “built in” at the local level and the 
oversight coming from higher-level authorities is spotty and inconsistent. 
What factors explain variations in the numbers of citizen environmental 
complaints from one location to another? Some of the factors are specific to the sector 
212
in question, whether it is within the environmental sector or the tax revenue sector.
Other factors consistently influence participation across sectors.
Participation in the Citizen Environmental Complaint System
The sector specific and the non-sector specific factors that have some power in 
explaining the rise and variations in the number of environmental complaints include 
the following. One, pollution levels have continued to increase in most locations and 
more people are being affected by pollution. Two, citizen levels of environmental 
awareness have increased and more citizens have com to believe that pollution 
damages are wrong and avoidable. Three, China has experienced high levels of 
economic growth since the late 1970s, so in general, people have higher income levels 
and can turn their attention from survival needs to other issues of well-being. Four, the 
national level legal and political contexts59 have improved. The 1979 trial 
Environmental Protection Law, and many more recent laws in the environmental and 
other sectors, have legitimized enforcement actions and provided more legal 
protection to citizens who make complaints or file law suites. The party standardized 
and institutionalized the complaint system and created complaint departments in both 
party and governmental organs, making public access to the complaint system more 
widespread. In addition, attitudes of many officials have changed making it more 
feasible for citizens to complain to authorities. This opened up more political 
opportunities for citizens to act and lessened citizen’s fear of reprisal by the state and 
enterprises. 
Each of these factors is thought to be associated with variations in the number 
of citizen environmental complaints, or use of the complaint system in general, but 
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there has been scant empirical evidence to support or deny these assumptions, or to 
tease out which of these factors is more important. 
This research includes a quantitative survey exploring the correlations between 
the pollution density, the social density of pollution,60 the annual amount of pollution 
times the population density, and the level of environmental awareness with the 
number of citizen complaints to environmental authorities in all provinces and selected 
cities in China for a ten-year period. For the purposes of this research, the legal and 
political contexts are assumed equivalent throughout China. This analysis will focus 
on indicators for both air and water pollution and will answer the core question of 
which specific factors are driving Chinese society’s response to pollution.
The numbers of complaints listed in the environmental yearbook only reflect 
the environmental complaints that were handled by various levels of the 
environmental protection apparatus. All the “environmental” complaints that are made 
to other ministries, local governments and NPCs are not included.
Pollution Problems as a Necessary Trigger
Without a pollution problem, there is no concrete grievance about which to 
complain. There is evidence that environmental grievances trigger citizen action to 
protect the environment.61 However, is it the “pollution density,”62 i.e. the objective 
levels of increasingly severe pollution that prompts a society’s response to pollution?  
Alternatively, is it the “social density of pollution,” i.e. the sheer number of people 
affected by pollution that is more important in shaping a society’s response? Research 
has shown that the social density of pollution was more important in triggering 
Japanese society’s response to its air pollution problems.63 This research will test these 
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assumptions in the China case. The answers to these questions should help policy-
makers to determine which pollution problems are the highest priority, those with the 
absolute highest pollution levels or those in more densely populated areas. 
The indicators for pollution levels include emissions of industrial sulfur 
dioxide and industrial water pollution effluent.64 Because complaints are specific to a 
certain type of pollution, sulfur dioxide levels will be paired with citizen’s complaints 
about air pollution, and wastewater discharge data will be paird with citizen 
complaints regarding water pollution. This paring gives a more accurate measurement 
of the association between pollution levels and citizen complaints. 
Do Only the Well-off Make Environmental Complaints?
There are really two questions relat d to the relationship between economic 
well-being and filing complaints: is the demand for environmental quality depended 
upon income and does the practice of filing a complaint in general depend upon 
income levels? The former question will be addressed first. Evidence is mixed as to 
whether environmental quality is a luxury good and only sought after by those who 
have reached a certain level of economic development.65
One explanation asserts that environmental quality is a luxury good and will 
not be of concern to citizens who are worried about food, shelter, and economic 
survival. People will only begin to make environmental complaints once a certain 
level of economic development is reached.66 In contrast, some research has found that 
citizens of both poor and rich nations are concerned about environmental quality.67
The evidence exploring the relationship between income levels and filing 
complaints more generally is also mixed. Previous research suggests that levels of 
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economic development will be correlated with variations in citizen participation - in 
this case - the demand for environmental quality.68 One explanation asserts that 
economic development changes patterns of socialization and collective action leading 
to greater participation. Another explanation asserts that economic development 
increases the contacts between citizens and the government, which leads to greater 
participation - in this case, to increasing numbers of environmental complaints. 
On the other hand, some scholars argue that theoretically, lower-income 
citizens will turn to contacting officials because it requires fewer resources and 
because it represents the “most clear, direct, and immediate link between action and 
results.”69 In addition, previous research in Beijing suggests that economic status is 
not a significant factor in determining participation in China’s complaint system.70
There are many ways to measure economic development, but per capita gross 
domestic product is an appropriate measure in this research because it reflects
economic differences at the level of the individual. Therefore, in this research, the 
indicator of economic development is per capita gross domestic product (GDP). If 
levels of development are correlated with a social response to pollution, then, in those
provinces of China that are more developed, we should see higher numbers of 
complaints than in those provinces that are less developed (when controlling for 
pollution levels). In other words, if the decision to complain is partly based upon a 
citizen’s per capita GDP, and a citizen would not complain if he/she had other 
concerns, then only those citizens with higher per capita GDP would complain.
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Environmental Awareness and Participation in the Complaint System
It is logical to attribute the rise in the numbers of citizen environmental 
complaints to higher levels of citizen environmental awareness.71 Many environmental 
protection officials in China believe that as environmental education programs 
expanded in China, citizens developed higher environmental awareness and began to 
participate in the environmental complaint system. Officials and many citizens believe 
the lack of environmental awareness is one of the main reasons for China’s pollution 
problems. A survey conducted by SEPA in 2000 found that 67 percent of those polled 
thought awareness was the main problem.72 While there is some logic to this 
reasoning, the correlation between changes in the levels of environmental awareness 
and changes in environmental complaints is far from clear. Primary among these is the 
evidence that environmental awareness and concern for the environmental do not 
necessarily translate into action to protect the environment.73
There are instances when citizens have a high level of environmental 
awareness, but will refrain from aking complaints.74 One study in Guangzhou 
showed that despite high levels of environmental concern, only 7.8 percent of those 
surveyed submitted an environmental complaint on one occasion and only 4.3 percent 
did more than once.75 In addition, there are instances wherein citizens complain about 
a pollution problem, but may not have a high level of “environmental awareness.”76
There are many ways to measure environmental awareness. Surveys at the 
local level that poll the population within a restricted administrative area are probably 
the most accurate indicator.77 However, conducting this type of research on a national 
or provincial scale in a nation of over a billion people, where information is not easy 
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to obtain, is impractical given the restrictions of this study. Sufficient data on public 
environmental awareness within specified administrative boundaries does not yet 
exist. Therefore, this research uses a proxy measure of environmental awareness, 
exposure to environmental information through various forms of mass media 
including television and radio programs in a specific administrative area. Mass media 
is one of the major ways people in China are exposed to environmental issues.78 Until 
the mid 1990s, there were few “unofficial” channels through which people could hear 
about environmental issues, except word of mouth.79 The drawback of using the 
number of media programs as the indicator is that it does not directly measure 
environmental awareness; instead, it measures the po ential of environmental 
awarenes. An even better indicator than just a simple count of media programs is the 
three-year cumulative total of media programs regarding the environment. The 
cumulative total is a better indicator than the number of programs in just one year 
because it reflects the cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition and knowledge 
retention over time. 
Survey Results
The analysis of the variance in environmental complaints across China over a 
ten-year period revealed some very interesting patterns and relationships. This ection 
will explore these patterns. First, it gives a general description of the overall variations 
in the national and provincial level data regarding environmental accidents, pollution 
levels, education programs and complaints. This is followed by a discussion of the 
correlations among the number of environmental complaints, per capita GDP, 
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industrial effluent and SO2, and the cumulative number of state environmental media 
programs in China. 
Accidents
There is wide variation in the data associated with environmental accidents. 
The total number of environmental accidents peaked somewhere between 1985 and 
1990.80 In 1985, there were 2,716 accidents and in 1990, there were 3,462 
environmental accidents, approximately 120 of these were teda or zhongda. Each year 
at the national level, the number of water pollution accidents was greater than the 
number of air pollution accidents. Data on accidents can be seen in the table below.












1990 3,462 10,000 4
1991 3,038
1992 2,667
1993 2,761 1,431 888 1,436 12
1994 3,001 1,617 986 4,668 3
1995 1,966 1,022 732 42,765 5
1996 1,446 677 585 33 1
1997 1,992 986 752 188 1
1998 1,422 788 464 152 6
1999 1,614 888 582 261 2
The data shows a gradual decline in the number of total accidents from 1990 to 
1992 and a slight increase from 1992 to 1994. The number of zhongda and teda81
accidents is one of the 13 indicators used to rank the environmental performance of 
the 32 primary cities in China, which was first instituted in 1990.82 This policy creates 
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an incentive for local governments to undercount the number of zhongda and teda
accidents within its administrative area. However, the decrease in the number of 
accidents between 1990 and 1992 was not necessarily the result of policy incentives or 
underreporting of accidents by environmental officials. The data indicates that while 
there was a 40 percent drop in the number of teda accidents between 1990 and 1991 
there was a 77 percent increase in the number of zhongda accidents. There is not an 
obvious indication that this policy is correlated with the overall drop in the total 
number of acidents. There could be a number of other reasons for the decline in 
accidents, such as changes in safety regulations that triggered more enterprise 
responsibility, hence fewer accidents; changes in industrial practices due to 
technological innovations, and omission of data. 
Until 1995, trends in the number of complaints seemed to mirror trends in the 
number of environmental accidents. After that year, the number of accidents began to 
decrease while the number of complaints continued to rise. An examination of he data 
reveals that it is the number of accidents that dropped dramatically between 1994 and 
1995 that accounts for the uncoupling. We are left with the puzzle of why 
environmental accidents decreased dramatically between 1994 and 1995. 
The answer to this puzzle can only be found by examining the provincial-level 
data. The provincial-level data shows that an extraordinary number of provinces did 
not submit data on accidents in 1995. That year, nine provinces failed to submit data 
including Shanxi, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi, Hainan, Yunnan, Gansu, and 
Ningxia. Similarly, eight provinces failed to submit data in 1996 and six did not in 
1998. The omission of data alone could account for the dramatic decrease in the total 
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number of accidents between 1994 and 1995, and subsequent years. This is an 
interesting question that could be addressed in future research. 
Of note should be that if environmental officials were working off the same 
data that is made public then all the omissions would make it hard for them to tell the 
impacts of specific technologies or policies on the number of accidents. This severely 
limits their ability to decide which measures or technologies have been successful. 
The state keeps records of financial consequences of accidents including the 
amounts of economic losses from accidents, compensation, and fines that were paid 
because of environmental accidents. Economic losses from air pollution accidents 
totaled more than the losses due to water pollution accidents, except in 1998. The total 
amount paid out to citizens annually decreased dramatically over time. In 1990, the 
state recorded payments of 97,430,000 Yuan in compensation to victims of pollution, 
while in 1998, only 18,520,000 was paid out. 
There was wide variance over the ten-year period in the number of people 
injured in environmental accidents annually. In 1990, 10,000 people sustained injuries, 
but only 33 people sustained injuries in 1996 and 152 in 1998. One dramatic finding 
was that 42,765 people were injured in 1995 in a national total of only 1,966 
accidents. There were a few accidents in Inner Mongolia that accounted for a large 
portion of the injured that year. The highest number of deaths associated with 
accidents occurred in 1993. That year 12 people died. In comparison, there were four 
deaths in 1990 and six deaths in 1998. 
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Pollution Levels
Pollution can be measured in a number of ways, and how it is measured in 
relation to the population and the size of a province significantly influences the results 
of which provinces are the “most polluted.” In this research, sulfur dioxide emissions 
were measured in four different ways: one, total industrial SO2 emissions for the 
province; two, per capita industrial emissions; three, the natural density of industrial 
emissions (total emissions / land area); and three, the social density of industrial 
emissions (total emissions X population density). It makes a difference how emissions 
are measured in relation to the province’s size and population. For example, in 1991, 
Shandong had the highest total industrial SO2 emissions, but it was 5
th for per capita 
emissions. That same year, Ningxia had the highest per capita emissions, but it was 
not even in the top five if measured in any of the other three ways. Liaoning is the 
only province that consistently appears in the top five regardless of the method of 
measurement. 
The provinces with the highest per capita SO2 emissions are Ningxia, 
Liaoning, Neimenggu, Shandong, Shanxi, Xiaanxi, and Guizhou. At some point in 
time between 1991 and 1999, they all appear on the list of the top five for per capita 
emissions. Why are per capita emissions in these provinces higher than in other 
provinces? One reason is that the climate in these provinces is generally colder than in 
other provinces, except for Guizhou. However, if this were the sole reason, why are 
not Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Xizang, and Qinghai provinces on the list? Another factor 
that contributes to the higher levels of per capita SO2 emissions is the inefficient use of 
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energy. Climate and energy efficiency are factors determining which provinces have 
higher per capita emissions. 
Are there any other factors? If China still clung to some form of central 
planning, would not this also have a role in determining emissions level ? If a 
province was a “low environmental priority” or a province was slated for the 
development of those industries, which have higher SO2 emissions, then it would have 
higher emissions. The problem then becomes determining if a province’s development 
and environmental protection development paths were “caused” by central planning or 
by other factors, such as climate, historical industrial trends or the type of natural 
resources found in that province. In reality, it is probably some combination of these 
factors. Take Shanxi for example, which is a primary coal-producing province in 
China, so the abundance of coal and coal-related industries would contribute to higher 
SO2 emissions. However, if it were high on the environmental protection priority list, 
then maybe its per capita emissions would not be so high. The interesting case is 
Guizhou. It is in southern China, so it does not have a cold climate. It is however, one 
of the provinces that receives the least number of sunny days in a year. It does not 
have much coal, oil, or other fossil fuels, nor is it an industrial center. It is generally 
one of the poorest provinces. It is not a province that has higher levels of overall 
emissions, natural or social density of SO2 emissions. We can deduce then, that it 
either has a very low level of energy efficiency and/or is not an area of priority in 
environmental protection. 
The provinces with the highest levels of per capita industrial effluent include 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Jilin, Hunan, and Zhejiang. All of these are on 
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the list of the top five provinces with the highest levels of industrial effluent for one or 
more years from 1989 to 1999. Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Hubei tie for being on the list 
for the most years. Jilin only appears on the list for one year. Liaoning, Jiangsu, and 
Hubei all appear on the list of those provinces that higher overall levels of effluent, as 
well on the list of those with higher natural densities of effluent. However, Liaoning 
and Hubei are not on the list of those with high social densities of effluent while 
Jiangsu is. 
Bivariate regression analysis of the complaint data as the dependent variable 
with the various measures of pollution as independent variables shows that the 
variable “social density of air pollution” is the most correlated with air pollution 
complaints, while the variable “total industrial effluent” is the most correlated with 
water pollution complaints. More accurately, the log of each of the above variables 
yields the highest correlations.
In summary, the way effluent and emissions are measured could definitely 
make a difference in determining the relationship between pollution levels and 
environmental complaints. At the most fundamental level, each method of 
measurement leads to somewhat different lists of the most polluted provinces. To 
some degree, this is obvious, but what is important is that when comparing locations 
within China or locations around the world, the way pollution is measured leads to 
different conclusions about which locations are most polluted. This is sometimes 
overlooked. In addition, these findings provide clues about efficient strategies of 
environmental management, given specific goals
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Media Programs
The number of media programs on the environment increased slowly in certain 
periods, and rapidly in others. There were 15,482 environmental programs (sponsored 
by the state) in the media in 1992, but by 1997, there were 61,622 programs. The 
number of programs did not grow steadily, instead, there was a rapid increase in the 
number of programs in 1995, and i.e. there were nearly twice as many programs in 
1995 than there were in 1994.83
Complaints
As for environmental complaints, overall, at the national level, the number of 
complaints increased over time for all types of pollution. Air pollution complaints 
steadily increased. While the number of water pollution complaints in 1999 was higher 
than the number in 1990, complaints decreased significantly during the mid 1990s. 
However, they began to increase slowly in 1997. 
Fig. 4.1





































Total Complaints (Letters + Visits)
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Complaints are counted in two different ways: by the number of people that 
complain and by the number of incidents people complain about. For example, 20 
people may go to the EPB to complain about one single incident and the two different 
counting methods captures both realities.84 At the national level, the total number of 
complainants went from 140,681 in 1990 to 241,321 in 1998, or nearly double. The 
total number of incidents also rose annually. Of significant note, there was a 36% 
increase in the number of complaints (people) from 1997 to 1998, which was the 
single largest increase in the number of complaints in a one-year period. In 1996, there 
was a large jump in the number of incidents about which people complained (1995-
109,650 incidents; 1996-162,696 incidents, or a 48% jump). That year, officials only 
resolved 66 percent of the total number of complaints they received. Comparatively, 
they resolved 88 percent in 1992 and 95 percent in 1998. The sudden 48% increase in 
the number of incidents may have posed a challenge for EPB officials, resulting in a 
dramatic drop in the number of incidents they could resolve that year. 
The percentage of newspaper articles regarding citizen complaints (sent to the 
newspaper) increased during the 1990s. The following list outlines the year-to-year 
percent change of articles in newspaper around the whole nation.85
• 1995 - 3.2 percent
• 1996 - 3.7 percent
• 1997 - 6.3 percent
• 1998 - 2.79 percent
• 1999 - 5.1 percent
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There were consistently more articles based on citizen complaint letters in 
local, evening, city, and special area newspapers. There were fewer articles in national 
and youth papers.
At the national level, the number of complaints regarding water pollution 
actually decreased during the mid 1990s, but then began to increase in 1997.86 In 
contrast, over the ten-year period, air pollution complaints steadily increased from 
48,878 in 1990 to 63,739 in 1998 (or about 30%), which corresponds to about a 37 
percent increase in industrial SO2 emissions. 
Fig. 4.2 









































































Industrial SO2 Emissions (100s tons)
To put the number of environmental complaints in better perspective, we can 
figure out how many people out of 10,000 made complaints. In 1992, approximately 
1.23 people out of 10,000 made a complaint. In 1998, about 1.93 people out of 10,000 
made a complaint. This indicates that the rising number of complaints is not merely a 
result of the increase in the population.
When the total number of complaints is adjusted to account for differences in 
population among provinces, we find that those provinces with the absolute highest 
number of complaints do not always correspond to those that have the highest number 
of per capita complaints. In some instances, provinces with relatively lower number of 
total complaints actually have a higher number of per capita complaints, meaning 
more people complained relative to the province’s population. 
Several provinces are consistently in the top ten for both absolute number of 
complaints and for complaints per capita. The top ten are as follows:
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Table 4.2 Top Ten Provinces for Absolute and Per Capita Total Complaints
1. Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu6. Jilin, Henan
2. Liaoning, Guangxi 7. Shanxi, Hainan
3. Shandong 8. Ningxia
4. Hunan, Sichuan 9. Fujian, Hubei
5. Heilongjiang, Hebei 10. Qinghai
If the data were not adjusted to count those provinces with higher per capita 
complaint rates, then several provinces would not even get on the radar for having a 
large number of complaints in relation to the population including Jilin, Hainan, 
Ningxia, and Qinghai. 
The provincial level data reveals the complexity in assessing changes in 
number of complaints at a more detailed level. The national level data indicates that 
there was a gradual increase in the number of complaints. However, the provincial-
level data indicates that this gradual increase did not occur in every province. 
In some provinces, the total number of complaints decreased as time went on 
or rose and then fell. For example, in Liaoning province, the total number of 
complaints in 1989 was 7,845 while it was only 1,852 in 1999. However, in Liaoning, 
the number of complaints increased before they decreased; the number of complaints 
peaked in 1997 at 16,216. Hunan is another province that showed an overall decline in 
the number of complaints (1989 – 8,671; 1999 – 3,338). One strange pattern is that in 
1993 almost all provinces showed a double-digit percentage drop in the total number 
of complaints. That year only three of the 28 provinces showed increases. 
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In other provinces, there are dramatic increases or decreases from year to year. 
For example, in Yunnan in 1998, there were 56 complaints, while in 1999 there were 
4,191 (an increase of over 7,000%). In Ningxia, there were 75 complaints in 1989, 
while in 1990 there were 841 (an increase of over 1,000%). In Shanxi in 1998 there 
were 6,031 complaints, while in 1999, there were 24,409 complaints (an increase of 
over 300%). In Qinghai, there were 2,139 complaints in 1990, while ther were only 
64 in 1991 (a decrease of 97%). There are a number of these inconsistencies or 
“outliers.” There were many more dramatic increases than there were sudden 
decreases; there were 21 dramatic increases of over 100% from one year to the next. 
What explains the data from individual provinces that run counter to overall trends? 
What explains the dramatic increases and decreases from year to year in a single 
province?87
There are a number of explanations that come to mind immediately, which 
explain inconsistencies, outliers, and dramatic changes from year to year in the 
provincial level data. The reasons fall into three categories: clerical errors, data 
availability, and changes in substantive causal factors. One type of clerical error could 
be that the data published in the Environment Yearbook is a misprint. One type of data 
availability explanation is that the data from one or more specific cities could have 
been left out of a provincial total for one or more years. 
The last reason for dramatic changes in the number of complaints is related to 
variations in causal or correlated factors and not just administrative error or 
negligence.88 One type of substantive causal factor explanation could be that there was 
a dramatic rise in the amount of pollution (or other correlated factor) in a specific 
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province that would explain the higher number of complaints. To understand the 
sustentative reasons for variations in the number of complaints we have to 
disaggregate the data by province, by type of complaint, either water, air, solid waste, 
noise pollution, and “suggestions.”89 In addition, we would have to have disaggregated 
data for cities and counties within each province.
However, it is not worth examining each outlier unless we have complete 
knowledge of which cities did or did not submit data. This is true even if we know the 
one or more specific categories in which the number of complaints rose. It would be 
interesting if variations in the number of complaints were due to changes in only one 
category of complaints, such as water pollution complaints. We can work out one 
example to see where the differences could potentially be. Liaoning is one specific 
example of a case that had rising complaints that suddenly dropped off in 1998 and 
1999. In Liaoning, there was a rapid decrease in the number of total complaints from 
1998 to 1999 (10,594 to 1,852). Data for Liaoning indicates that the largest decrease in 
the number of complaints from 1997 to 1998 was primarily due to the decrease in the 
number of air pollution complaints. The second largest decrease came in the noise 
pollution category.  From 1998 to 1999, relatively large decreases came in several 
categories including water, air, solid waste, and noise pollution. However, this is all 
we can learn by further disaggregating the data, unless we know if certain 
administrative areas did not submit data. Without data disaggregated at the city or 
lower levels, we cannot tell if the variations in the data are the result of one or more 
cities failing to submit data.
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Eyeballing the Correlations
In appendix F there is a table that lists the provinces with the highest levels of 
air- pollution complaints to those with the highest pollution levels, those with higher 
per capita GDP, and those with higher numbers of cumulative media programs. While 
eyeballing the associations is not as scientific as regression analysis, it can give some 
idea of the relationships among SO2 emissions, per capita GDP, cumulative media 
programs with the number of air pollution complaints.
The five provinces that have the highest SO2 emissions are often the provinces 
with the most air pollution complaints. There is some relationship because of the 
overlap. Along the same vein, a number of provinces that have the highest levels of 
per capita income also have a higher number of complaints. In contrast, those 
provinces with the highest number of cumulative media programs do not often have a 
higher number of complaints; while there is some overlap, there is less than in the 
other categories. While eyeballing the correlations is useful, it can only go so far in 
telling us if the relationships between the dependent and independent variables are 
significant. To see definitively if the relationships are significant, more stringent 
statistical methods need to be used. 
Multiple Regression Analysis: Putting it all Together 
The purpose of doing regression analysis of the complaint data is to determine 
if there really is some association between the dependent variable, variations in the 
number of different types of environmental complaints and the independent variables, 
levels of pollution, economic development, and environmental awareness. We can 
discover if there is a positive or negative relationship between the dependent and 
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independent variables. In addition, statistical analysis can provide some information 
about how well the independent variables account for values of the dependent 
variables. It can help to establish which of the independent variables is most important 
in explaining variations in the number of complaints. Finally, it can help to tell us how 
much the dependent variable changes if there are changes in the values of the 
independent variables. However, predicting the magnitude of changes in the 
dependent variable based on changes in the independent variables can be tricky.90
Regression analysis was done separately on the data aggregated at the national 
level and the data aggregated at the provincial level and each analysis yielded 
divergent results. Overall, the data aggregated at the national level showed very little 
significance between the number of complaints with variations in levels of pollution, 
economic development, and environmental awareness. In contrast, the data aggregated 
at the provincial level showed much stronger correlations. Analysis at both levels is 
valuable and each will be discussed in the paragraphs below.91
In the end, the results based on the data aggregated at the provincial level are 
more reliable and useful. It showed that there were significant relationships between 
the dependent variables, variations in number of environmental complaints, and three 
independent variables, levels of pollution, economic development, and environmental 
awareness.
National Level Data
The results of the regression analysis on the national level data are somewhat 
ambiguous and are not particularly reliable because of the limited number of cases, i.e. 
years.92 In general, the independent variables (levels of pollution, per capita GDP, and 
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cumulative number of media programs) appear to have some relation to the variation 
in the number of complaints, but they are not significantly correlated, except when 
they are considered together in a model that tries to explain variations in the total 
number of complaints. Taken together, they are not significant n explaining variations 
in the number of pollution stream specific complaints, i.e. water pollution complaints 
and air pollution complaints. 
The statistical analysis of the water pollution case shows that the model 
including the independent variables water pollution levels, per capita GDP, and 
number of cumulative media programs, is not particularly good at explaining variance 
in the number of water pollution complaints. The model is not a significant predictor 
and cannot explain even half the variance in the dependent variable. In the bivariate 
analysis, none of the independent variables taken separately has a statistically 
significant relationship. 
With the data regarding air pollution, we see some slight significance between 
the independent and dependet variables when taken individually. When the variables 
are taken together in one model, however, they are not significant at the 0.05 level. 
The model is fairly weak in trying to explain variance in the number of air pollution 
complaints. The data indicates that all three variables in one model can explain about 
45% of the variance in the dependent variable - the number of air pollution 
complaints. However, because of the relatively low R2 (.45 or 45%) and because the t 
ratios and the F statistics are not significant at the .05 level, we can conclude that the 
model may not be as good as it appears in providing an explanation for the variation in 
the number of air pollution complaints. However, it must be noted that the national-
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level data had an uncorrectable multicollinearity problem, which would increase the 
likelihood that we would mistakenly conclude that there was no significant correlation 
when there really was.
Provincial Level Data
The analysis of the provincial level data shows very different results. The 
provincial level data indicate that there are very significant relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables. It shows that pollution levels are the most 
important factor in determining the variance in the number of complaints when tak  
alone. Per capita GDP is the least important variable. Per capita GDP was the only 
variable found to be not significant in bivariate regressions with water pollution 
complaints. It also yielded very low r2 in regressions with both air pollution 
complaints and with total complaints. This means that per capita GDP is probably not 
as important a factor in determining when citizens will or will not make environmental 
complaints. It means that citizens with lower incomes also make environmental 
complaints, and/or that citizens with higher income levels may not be more prone to 
make environmental complaints. 
The results tell us that the model with three independent variables is better at 
explaining variations in the number of complaints than any single variable taken alone. 
In addition, to use models with variables that measure air pollution differently 
influences the results. The bivariate results indicate that the social density of SO2 is 
the measurement of pollution that is most correlated with the number of air pollution 
complaints when taken alone. This means that the best single predictor of variations in 
air pollution complains is the social density of SO2 i.e. it can “explain” 66% of the 
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variation. However, this does not necessarily mean that more complaints will always
be more likely in densely populated areas. Alternatively, if there are two identical land 
areas, with the same levels of pollution, there will always be more complaints in the 
area with the higher population density. 
It is more valuable to use a model with three variables to explain variations in 
both air and water pollution complaints. In the air pollution case, the multiple 
regression results show that the model containing the variables log total industrial SO2 
emissions, log cumulative media programs, and log per capita GDP is the preferred 
model. It can explain the most variation in the number of air pollution complaints, i.e. 
it explains over 79% of the variation. In the water pollution case, the model with the 
variables log industrial wastewater effluent, log media programs, and log GDP explain 
about 82% of the variation. These results, if taken alone, show that the model is 
reasonably good at explaining variations in the number of complaints. 
However, the problems of data omissions probably have some effect on this 
result. Do the data omission problems inflate the explanatory value of the model or do 
they deflate the value? Logically, it could be either way, depending upon the values of 
the missing data. Unless we know the values of the missing data, we will be unable to 
determine the actual impact of data omission. 
While the research answers some questions regarding the conditions under 
which citizens make environmental complaints, it also raises other questions. Why 
were there many instances that ran counter to the general trend? If these results are 
correct, does this mean that the number of air pollution complaints should begin to 
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decrease in those areas of China that have recently seen a decrease in levels of air 
pollution, such as Beijing? 
While the model explains more than three-fourths of the variation in the 
number of complaints, what can account for the rest of the variation? What factors are 
not included in the model? In this research, legal and political contexts were assumed 
constant, but given the importance of location-specific variables the statistical 
explanation for the variation in number of complaints may be overly optimistic. The 
national legal and political contexts are naturally equivalent and changes in these 
contexts are taken into consideration over time, the variations across location are not 
taken into consideration. The local legal and political contexts may be radically 
different across location and influencing variations in the number of complaints. 
Another unanswered question is the overall effect of omitted data; it could increase or 
decrease the explanatory power of the model. Given the nature of the data and the 
level of analysis, some questions must remain unanswered. 
It is difficult to answer such broad questions in just one chapter, so there are 
several areas of potential future research. One avenue of future research might 
examine the local legal and political contexts (local laws, attitudes of officials, 
historical experiences with pollution etc…) in a limited geographic area to lend an 
even greater understanding into why and when people complain about pollution and 
other social ills. No matter at which analysis is undertaken, every effort should be 




There are factors external to the structure and effectiveness of the complaint 
system itself that influence levels of citizen participation in the system, specifically 
levels of pollution, economic development, and environmental awareness (measured 
by looking at the cumulative number of media programs about the environment). 
However, the relative importance of these factors varies depending upon the level of 
analysis, national or provincial. 
At the national level, the model with the independent variables (levels of 
pollution, per capita GDP, and cumulative number of media programs) is significantly 
correlated to the variations in the total number of complaints. However, the model is 
not significantly correlated to variations in the number of pollution stream specific 
complaints, i.e. water pollution complaints and air pollution complaints. It must be 
noted that the national level data has an uncorrectable multicollinearity problem, 
which would increase the likelihood that we would mistakenly conclude that there was 
no significant correlation when there really was. The national level data also has an 
autocorrelation problem because dummy variables could not be included. If they had 
been, then the number of independent variables would have exceeded the number of 
cases (years), which would invalidate the calculation. Therefore, overall, the national 
level data is not that helpful. It is a different story with the provincial level data, which 
is much more reliable. 
The provincial level data supports the assertion that when taken together, the 
social density of pollution affecting citizens, the level of economic development 
attained by those citizens, and the level of environmental awareness of those ciizens 
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are all significantly correlated with the number of citizen complaints. The most 
important of these independent variables, in both the air and water pollution cases, is 
the level of pollution, which was significantly correlated in bivariate analysis when 
controlled for levels of GDP, lending credibility to theories that grievances are 
important in determining participation levels. In bivariate analysis, the independent 
variables of per capita GDP and number of media programs were not significantly 
correlated with variations in complaints.  This indicates that income levels are not a 
good indicator of when people participate. This finding is consistent with some 
previous evidence that in the US, that contacting officials has little to do with socio-
economic status.93
How levels of pollution are measured makes a difference in the degree of 
association between pollution levels and complaints. The data shows that in the water 
pollution case, the total amount of industrial effluent is more correlated with the 
number of citizen complaints about water pollution than the social intensity of 
effluent. The data shows that in the air pollution case, the social density of SO2 is
more correlated with the number of air pollution complaints if taken alone, but in the 
three-variable model, total SO2 is more correlated. 
While some level of environmental awareness, or environmental education, 
appears related to participation in the complaint system, levels of pollution in relation 
to the population density in an area are more important in determining when people 
will participate. The fact that per capita GDP is not correlated with the number of 
complaints confirm that participation in the complaint system is a relatively “easy” 
channel of participation in China and that it does not require high levels of income. 
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One downside to the use of the simple measure of per capita GDP is that it 
does not capture the complex nature of tangible and intangible resources, which may 
influence a citizen’s capacity and proclivity to participate. Tangible resources include 
such things as scientific expertise, meeting space, funds, and communication 
technology. Intangible resources include such as, information, social networks, 
political connections, organizational skills, and legal protection.94 An individual or 
group’s access to a resources differs according to the resources in question, the 
individuals or groups involved, the time period, and the other resources one already 
has access to. An interesting question to explore is if the relationship between 
complaining and level of income still hold true for instances when citizens must take 
their complaint to authorities at higher administrative levels. 
While income levels and number of media programs are not highly correlated 
with the probabilty that a citizen will complain (articulate his/her interest), the fact 
that individual complainants or groups filing petitions have not acted collectively in a 
sustained manner to try to mobilize broad support for wide-reaching policy changes 
indicates that there may be other types of resources needed to transform citizens’ 
perception of their pollution problems from a personal problem to a societal problem –
one toward which they can make a difference, and to aggregate interests through 
mobilizational structures. In other words, there are missing catalysts to an anti-
pollution movement in China. 
Using complaints as a means of interest articulation and expressing grievances 
is not new in China. However, the way complaints are framed and dealt with has 
changed significantly. In imperial times, citizens tried to resolve their complaints 
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through their guanxi ties, their relationships with those of higher moral or political 
authority. During the Mao period, complaining to those in authority or even to friends 
took on new risks. Citizens who complained faced the risk of being persecuted if their 
complaints were not in line with Communist Party policy. In other words, during the 
Mao period, complaining was a political act. After Deng Xiaoping took power and 
began to rectify the wrongs perpetrated during the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, citizen complaints were viewed differently. Deng instituted 
measures to “de-politicize” relationships in China, and as a result, the act of 
complaining also became less political. Citizen complaints were “re-f amed,” they 
became more permissible, and environmental protection officials viewed them as a 
way to expand their monitoring capabilities. Finally, in 1982 the revised constitution 
granted citizens the right to criticize and make suggestions to authorities, without 
reprisal. However, it was not until the early 1990s, that the national complaint system 
became institutionalized.
The environmental complaint system was institutionalized and regulated 
before the efforts were made to standardize, institutionalize, and regulate the nation-
wide and sector-wide system of managing complaints. Chinese officials began the 
process of standardizing and institutionalizing the environmental complaint system in 
1989, while the first national level complaint working meeting was not held until the 
early 1990s. It is critical to note that an informal environmental complaint system had 
already evolved in certain administrative areas in response to increasing number of 
complaints before officials initiated formal institutionalization measures. The 
environmental complaint system has been showcased as a “model” for other sectors.
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Environmental complaints are rife with technical complexities and 
uncertainties and “traditional” channels of complaint resolution, party committees and 
residents committees were not very helpful in resolving environmental complaints. 
Technical administration control over the complaint process made more sense. 
In general, the environmental system is becoming more-well established at all 
administrative levels across China. Provincial EPBs around the country are acquiring 
the authority to directly “bring in” local EPB officials for criticism and training 
regarding excessive complaints that must be resolved at a higher level. In urban areas, 
EPBs are equipped to accept citizen complaints 24 hrs a day and there are well-
publicized time limits for resolving complaints.
The complaint process includes some “checks and balances,” but the system is 
very hierarchical and still contains structural loopholes that allow for random abuses 
of power and arbitrary rule by authority. There is some indication that a lower number 
of complaints are reported by EPBs to their superiors than actually occur. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that while most complaints are relatively easy to fix, some are 
extremely difficult or take a long time to resolve. Others are never resolved. In 
addition, the exclusion of national level complaints in the reports, until very recently, 
indicates that some extremely serious complaints have probably fallen through the 
cracks in the system.
The complaint system is far from perfect. The system still allows individual 
authorities wide discretion in how to follow up on certain types of complaints, so there 
is the potential for abuses of power. The complaint system addresses problems after 
they have already occurred and rarely is used in a preventive manner, which means 
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harms are not avoided. 
While the system itself has structural loopholes, it is overall, a product f and 
conducive to increased state responsiveness to citizen grievances. The complaint 
system allows the controlled venting of citizen grievances. On one hand, citizen 
environmental complaints have become one form of regime “proscribed” political 
participation, because authorities want people to report pollution problems. On the 
other hand, it also remains a “tolerated” form of political participation.95 It become a 
tolerated form of participation when authorities are challenged to respond to large 
groups of citizens, when official capacity to manage the number of complaints is 
stretched, and when higher-l vel officials apply pressure to become more responsive 
to citizens’ grievances. Through the complaint process, citizens have a channel 
through which to voice their grievances, and to articulate their interests, which may 
otherwise be articulated in a more disruptive manner such as initiating a dispute or 
participating in some form of protest. When citizens file complaints, they are helping 
environmental officials do their jobs; citizens act as the eyes and the ears of 
environmental officials in the community and help them to locate problems. To this 
end, officials have presented the complaint system to citizens as a sanctioned channel 
of participation that urns citizens and officials into partners in environmental 
protection efforts. 
The complaint system links citizen interest articulation with environmental 
policy outcomes. Authorities consider citizen complaints when they determine priority 
enterprises to clean up as well as utilize citizen complaints as a mechanism for finding 
polluting and illegal enterprises. Of course, government officials must care about 
243
environmental protection and have some concern for citizens to act upon citizen 
complaints. As more officials are trained to understand the negative externalities of 
pollution and it has become clearer that central level party and governmental leaders 
consider environmental protection a basic national policy, they have become more 
responsive to citizen grievances. It has helped that there is pressure from higher-level 
officials on those at lower levels to respond to citizen complaints and to resolve 
potential disputes at the lowest level possible. Over time, citizen complaints have 
become a form of public pressure on environmental protection officials to crack down 
on polluters. In turn, citizen complaints justify official enforcement efforts to those in 
the relevant polluting enterprises.
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Footnotes to Chapter Four
1 The term xingfang is extremely broad. Tianjian Shi makes the distinction between 
“appeals” and “adversarial activities,’ in his discussion of participation as “contacting 
authorities.” The difference being the attitude of the citizen in their approach to 
authorities and the level of government, or other organization, to which a citizen 
appeals. The formal Chinese term xinfang includes both the less risky appeal and the 
more risky adversarial activities. This is what makes the term xinfang so complex. 
Xinfang is therefore an extremely broad term that encompasses conciliatory and more 
adversarial appeals. 
2 Shi, Political Participation In Beijing, pp. 229-230.
3 Shi found that people made appeals through the bureaucratic hierarchy more often 
than they used personal connections (guanxi) to get what they wanted.Shi, Political 
Participation In Beijing, p. 94.
4 Wing-Hung Lo and Wing Leung Sai, "Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in 
Guangzhou: The Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance,"p. 
699. 
5 Interview #21, Fall 1999.
6 It is assumed that an accountable state is one in which officials are elected and can be 
removed from office by the vote of the people.
7 These principles are strikingly familiar to those cardinal principles set by Mao 
Zedong. James Townsend points out that during the Mao period, the concept of 
participation was based on the following principles: the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
the supremacy of the collective interest; Party leadership; the mass line; activism and 
political consciousness; and socialist democracy. Townsend, Political Participation in 
Communist China, p. 65.
8 Lester Milbrath and M. L. Goel provide a map of the categories of factors that affect 
participation in general. The categories are 1) variables in the larger environment, such 
as the social system, the political system, political culture, etc… 2) variables in the 
immediate environment, i.e. stimuli in the microenvironment that can be specific to 
the type of participation and the type of policy in question. 3) “life position factor” 
including education, age, race, sex, etc…. 4) variables internal to an individual, 
including attitudes, beliefs, personality traits etc…. See Milbrath, Political 
Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? pp. 24-34.
9 The level of analysis for the quantitative survey analysis in this research is the macro 
level, the national and provincial levels in China. Because of this approach, it is more 
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realistic and logical to focus on factors affecting participation that are external to 
individuals, and those “known” variables specific to the immediate environment in an 
administrative area.
10 The pollution density is the amount of annual SO2 emissions divided by the relevant 
land area. This concept is similar to Jeffery Broadbent’s “natural intensity” of 
pollution. The “social Density” of pollution is similar to Broadbent’s concept of 
“social intensity” of pollution. See Broadbent, Environmental Politics in Japan.
11 Other ‘life position variables” may also influence participation as is shown by Shi 
Tianjian in his work on participation in Beijing (some of these variables include 
education, age, sex etc…). Tianjian Shi found that there was little relationship between 
survey respondents “subjective evaluation of their economic status” and participation 
in the appeals process in Beijing. He found that the relationship between participation 
in voting and “educational achievements” in Beijing was curvilinear. He also found a 
curvilinear relationship between levels of education and participation in the complaint 
system. People with ten to twelve years of education were more likely to participate. 
Shi, Political Participation In Beijing, pp. 145, 213-214. 
12 Verba, Nie and Kim, as well as a number of other researchers, found that the 
relationship between higher levls of participation and socioeconomic status were the 
strongest influencing variable in shaping participation, especially in the U.S. see 
Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality, p. 63. 
Although, they do point out that engaging in particularized contacts, activities aimed 
at benefiting one’s private interests, do not conform to these assumptions. They 
conclude that “not only does particularized contacting produce different benefits, it 
derives from a process quite different from the one that leads to other activities.” See 
Verba and Nie, Participation in America: Social Equality and Political Democracy.
Also, other research points out “socioeconomic status and political activity show 
different levels of correlation from nation to nation.” Milbrath, Political Participation: 
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16 Sun Weiben, People's Republic of China Administrative Management Encyclopedia.
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within the State Council that manages citizen complaints. Within this Office, there is a 
special department devoted to managing complaints called the “Zhong Ban Guo Ban 
Xinfangju” It answers to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee General 
(Administrative) Affairs Office (Zhongguo Gongchandang  Zhongyang Weiyuanhui 
Bangongting or Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Bangongting) and the State Council 
General (Administrative) Affairs Office. It manages citizen letters and visits. It passes 
on important information about citizen contacts to the Party Central Committee and 
the leaders of the State Council. It takes care of any complaint affairs requested by the 
leaders of the Central Committee or leaders of the State council. It offers guidance 
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21 Sun Weiben, People's Republic of China Administrative Management Encyclopedia.
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22 Sun Weiben, People's Republic of China Administrative Management Encyclopedia, 
p. 256-266.
23 Sun Weiben, People's Republic of China Administrative Management Encyclopedia, 
p. 256-266.
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34 China’s Agenda 21 is the White Paper on China’s Population, Environment, and 
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Campaigns Without Struggle: Volunteerism and Public Participation in 
The Environmental Sector
“Without mass voluntarism, nothing can achieve results, or, if 
achieving results, cannot be consolidated….”The key to inducing 
‘volunteerism’ among the masses is to have them motivated by 
some degree of acceptance of Communist ideology.1
“We need to expand environmental education and strengthen the 
environmental awareness of the broader population. To date, we 
have already come a long way in raising environmental awareness 
by mobilizing and educating the passive public and by citizen 
activists taking the initiative to participate in environmental 
protection activities. Raising the public’s environmental values 
requires active participation. To be the most effective, citizens must 
consciously and actively participate in environmental protection 
activities.” (Xie Zhenhua, speech on Earth Day, April 22, 1995)
During the Mao era in China, campaigns (yundong) were a “fundamental 
political institution.” Today, they are a fundamental policy institution. The Chinese 
campaign nearly disappeared as a subject of political inquiry after 1978, but there is 
still value in examining campaigns.2 Campaigns are a channel of public participation 
in implementation processes and remain a primary vehicle used by the government to 
achieve policy goals, including environmental protection goals. 
Environmental campaigns today are depoliticized, institutionalized, routinized, 
and are somewhat more sophisticated than Maoist strategies of mass mobilization. The
instrumental value of campaigns has become paramount. The “political” value is 
secondary which makes them better tools with which to attain policy goals and to 
“guide” citizen behavior. They are not as political because they no longer involve 
personal political “struggle” and do not function to purge individuals and groups on 
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political grounds. In addition, campaigns have achieved a higher level of 
volunteerism. Today, citizens are more likely to participate because they support the 
policy goal and governmental efforts to reach that goal, not because they have to.
Party, government, and environmental protection officials mobilize direct 
participation of the public in campaigns at the national, provincial, city, and county 
levels. Authorities mobilize participation through local EPBs, Street Offices or 
residence committees (hequ jianshe), schools, and social organizations such as the 
Young Pioneers. Some campaigns involve promoting mass actions needed to achieve 
certain environmental goals such as preventing sand storms by planting trees, or 
modifying the environment by cleaning up trash or filling in swamps. Some 
campaigns have educational goals such as popularizing environmental laws or 
introducing new environmental products. 
Campaigns are more than a tool f direct mobilization, education, and means 
to a policy end; on a more subtle level, they are a means of communication between 
the state and society. Campaigns “signal” to the population those issues which are 
priorities and which issues are appropriate to address. Campaigns reflect the state’s 
environmental protection agenda and are among the means by which the government 
transmits that agenda to citizens. Campaigns steer citizen participation toward the 
achievement of state-defined policy goals. Through campaigns, the state and citizens 
work together to reach policy goals. In addition, a side effect of state-mobilized 
campaigns has been to encourage public participation in policy processes outside the 
campaign structure, although with many of the same policy goals. Today, campaigns 
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have the effect of encouraging participation not displacing it. However, they do help to 
“frame” participation by guiding it toward certain policy ends. 
This chapter shows how environmental campaigns have evolved since the Mao
era and have become less politicized, more institutionalized and routinized, and a little 
more sophisticated. It describes how campaigns are carried out and illustrates some of 
the main campaigns at the national and city level (in Beijing, Taiyuan, and Chengdu.) 
Finally, the chapter discusses the significance of campaigns for state-society relations 
and explains why campaigns are still being used as a policy implementation tool.
Mass Mobilization and Ecological Construction Projects In Imperial China
Many large-scale ecological construction projects were built during Imperial 
China (221 BC to 1911 AD) that took scores of peasants, slaves, and workers. Some 
of these projects were built by the people of China against their will, sometimes under 
the threat of death. The building of the great wall is one example. When Emperor Qin 
Shi Huangdi unified China in 221 BC, he decided to link all of the shorter walls built 
along China’s northern border since 600 BC. The wall was built to keep the barbarians 
in the north from descending upon China. The emperor's soldiers grabbed criminals, 
troublemakers, musicians, teachers, writers, artists, and humble peasants to help build 
the Great Wall. In all, about one million people marched north to build the Great Wall.
Workers who complained or who tried to run away were buried alive. Many Chinese 
spent the rest of their life building the Great Wall. Many times, dead Chinese were 
buried in the wall. The Great Wall is sometimes called the "Long Graveyard" because 
so many people died while building the wall. 
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Many large projects were part of imperial state-building efforts and as Mark 
Elvin points out, growth and development are often taken beyond what is sustainable 
in order to acquire political, economic, and military power.3 China’s many water 
projects are an example of this. 
Imperial China is famous for its huge water projects, especially flood control 
works, irrigation systems, and canals. While many of these large projects were part of 
China’s state building efforts and brought in revenue (in the form of rice), China itself 
was never a “hydraulic society.” In such a society, water management required 
substantial and centralized control; the central state monopolized political power and 
dominated the economy, resulting in an absolute despotic state. As Wittfogel points 
out, China was too large and too complex to be completely dominated for long.4
Many people were forced to labor on huge water projects and the Grand Canal 
is one example. The building of the canal began in 486 B.C. during the Zhou Dynasty. 
It was extended during the Qi Dynasty, and later by Emperor Yangdi of the Sui 
Dynasty during six years of rapid construction from 605- 10 A.D. About half of the 
six million people drafted to build the canal died in the process. There was an 
explosive economic boom because of the increased trade and development associated 
with the canal. 
While millions of Chinese were mobilized to work on huge ecological projects 
during the imperial period, the concepts of volunteerism and campaigns (yundong) are 
typically associated with Mao Zedong. 
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Roots of Yundong: Definitions and Typologies
When we think of Mao’s yundong, we immediately think of the devastating 
Cultural Revolution and The Great Leap Forward, both of which had practical as well
as political goals. During Mao’s reign, there were tens of other large and small-scale 
campaigns; campaigns were a daily staple. Everybody, from schoolteachers to janitors, 
would spend about an hour a day in study sessions linked with a campaign.5 People 
would think of reading the newspaper and wall posters announcing new tasks; 
attending study sessions and meetings to plan local implementation; recruiting 
“activists”; and making self criticisms of their shortcomings.6 All campaigns had 
slogans. The slogans are a reflection of the values, attitudes, and goals held by those in 
power.7 Citizens knew the slogans by heart and would repeat them often.
Semantic differences make it necessary to explain the relationship between the 
Chinese word “yundong” and the equivalent English translations - campaign, drive, 
crusade, or movement. Gordon Bennett’s early definition of yundong is “a 
government-sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but vulnerable 
barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass mobilization of active 
personal commitment.”8
The word “yundong” and Gordon’s definition are specific to China’s 
economic/political system. The English equivalents however, are not. In addition, the 
English equivalents do not capture the idea that campaigns and movements are 
initiated by the state. With the English words, governments or other types of 
organizations can play the role of initiator.9
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In this chapter, however, the words yundong, campaign, drive, and crusade will 
be used interchangeably and have meanings specific to the Chinese political system. A 
campaign is a “government-sponsored effort to forward socialism and attain specific 
policy goals through intensive mass mobilization and cultivation of active 
volunteerism.” Yundong will not be translated to mean “movement” which has a 
narrower definition.10
Typologies, Mechanics, and Phases of Mao Period Yundong
Various scholars have determined different typologies with which to classify 
campaigns.11 Gordon Bennett’s typology is particularly useful. He divides campaigns 
into seven overlapping groups based on their function. Mobilized campaigns are 
meant to: 1) implement existing policy; 2) emulate model experience or 
demonstration; 3) introduce and popularize a new policy; 4) correct deviations from 
public norms; 5) rectify leadership malpractices among responsible cadres or 
organizations; 6) purge individuals or groups whose political opposition is excessive; 
and 7) effect enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social institutions.12
In the Mao period, there were several ways that authorities conducted 
campaigns. One way was to have “work teams “ (gongzuo dui), who are already 
versed in a campaign, physically move on to another area to initiate the same 
campaign. Another way is to have officials at the national level designate certain 
provinces to become “trial cases” (hidian). These provinces would then designate 
shidian at the next lower administrative level. This process continues until there are 
shidian for a specific campaign atll administrative levels of government.13
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Bennett offers other useful insights into the nature of campaigns. He delineates 
the common stages of campaigns. In general the phases are: 1) designate tasks & 
organize campaign; 2) emphasize study and investigation (familiarize people with 
“tasks” and recruit “activist” (jjiji fenzi) and “principle” (gugan fenzi) elements; 3) 
summing up of campaign (evaluate, punish offenders, and reward activists).14 The 
phases in a campaign to introduce a new policy would look slightly different from 
campaigns meant to purge certain individuals.
The first, organizational, phase of a campaign represents the initial trial of new 
policy ideas in one area. Next, a few zhongdian (key points) are distilled from the 
experience for the purposes of popularizing the policy and to simplify education of 
cadres. Authorities then try to apply the zhongdian on a wider scale, in  “dianxing 
anzi” (classic cases that illustrate the problems or issues of interest). 
In the second phase of a campaign, during the mobilizational phase, individual 
trial areas begin to implement the campaign by recruiting activists and principles, 
familiarizing the population with the campaign, and collect data on campaign-relevant 
issues specific to that area.15 The last part of this phase often entails public struggle 
sessions and denunciations, especially in cases where a yundong aims to eliminate or 
support specific behaviors. 
In the third phase of a campaign, during the completion phase, the 
effectiveness of the campaign is evaluated. Sometimes if the campaign in a specific 
area is seen as a failure by higher-level authorities, then the whole process is repeated. 
In Maoist China, there were often deadlines by which campaigns should be complete 
at each successive administrative level of government.16 However, interviewees from 
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China in the 1950s and 1960s reported that often there is no formal end to a campaign. 
The Chinese lump small to large yundong together under one category, despite the fact 
that some campaigns do not have all the characteristics of other campaigns.17
Environmental Campaigns During the Mao Period18
In hindsight, Chinese leaders and outside observers admit that while some of 
Mao’s yundong were successful in mobilizing collective action and often met their
stated goals, the underlying values and misguided goals of many campaigns, however, 
did more harm than good to the environment.19
In her book entitled Mao’s War Against Nature, Judith Shapiro examines how 
state-led campaigns had consequences for the natural environment during the Mao 
period.20 She uses four themes (& campaigns) to organize her book and the 
man/nature relationships during the Mao period: 1) political repression (anti-rightist 
campaign), 2) utopian urgency (Great Leap Forward), 3) dogmatic uniformity (Learn 
from Dazhai), and 4) state-ordered relocations (war preparation campaign). She 
explains some of the major environmental campaigns in relation to other political 
currents and campaigns of the period. She chronicles how “Maoist values came to 
dominate and govern the human-nature relationship, and about what happened as a 
result” Mass environmental campaigns during the Mao period were not based on an 
underlying value of protecting the environment. Instead, they were based on the idea 
that man must conquer nature. She provides numerous examples of how Mao’s 
campaigns led to environmental degradation at the local level. She argues that they did 
more harm to the environment than they did good, were applied without concern for 
local conditions, and were willfully carried out by a submissive population and 
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crushed intellectual freedom. Mass campaigns and attending slogans were meant to 
“unleash energy, build support, convey leaders’ expectations, create conformity, and 
discourage doubt and resistance.”21
The Great Leap Forward
One of the most devastating campaigns was The Great Leap Forward.22 The 
Chinese admit that during the Great Leap Forward people caused massive 
environmental destruction and deterioration in the attempt to speed up economic 
growth. Concern for the environment was cast aside and pollution prevention 
management was in disarray. One slogan of the time was “the work of 20 years will be 
done in one day” (“yitian dengyu ershinian”).23
During the Great Leap, authorities wanted to make each village self-sufficient 
by producing its own steel. Across the country, citizens’ built more than 600,000 iron 
furnaces, 59,000 coking plants, 4,000 small power plants, and 9,000 cement plants. 
This “Dalian Gangtie” campaign had enormous environmental consequences as 
citizens cleared the hillsides to obtain fuel and built shoddy steel making facilities that 
spewed black smoke into the air and poisonous effluent into the waterways. The mass 
mobilization campaign also cleared the land of its mineral resources, which had the 
effect of destroying the landscape and appearance of many areas. Agricultural 
production dropped to dangerous levels as citizens abandoned the fields for the 
furnaces.24
Mao himself admitted later that the Great Leap Forward had largely ben a 
mistake. There are physical consequences when the objective laws of nature and 
science are violated. The Great Leap Forward is perhaps one of the most devastating 
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instances of the consequences of man’s irrationality, wishful thinking, and power run 
amuck. 
Just after the Great Leap, authorities took legislative action and initiated 
counter campaigns to protect resources, encourage agriculture, and rectify industrial 
policy. The State Council passed two important regulations: “Regulations Regarding 
Protection of Forests” (Linsen Baohu Tiaoli) and “Regulations Regarding the 
Protection of Mineral Resources” (Kuangchan Ziyuan Baohu Tiaoli). Mao initiated a 
campaign called “open the wilderness to plant grain” (kaihuang zhong liangshi) to 
prevent further famine.25 Authorities closed, stopped production, merged, and altered 
factories that had been built within city limits without concern for the environment. 
Industrial policy was easy to remedy. In contrast, the damages wrought to ecosystems 
was much more difficult to repair. Even in the 1990s, some of the harm done to the 
natural environment during the Great Leap has not been healed.26
The 1960s: “Learn From Dazhai” and Preparations for War
In the 1960’s, Mao launched the “Learn From Dazhai” {Xuexi Dazhai) 
campaign. This campaign was based on the experience of one production brigade at 
Dazhai People’s Commune that overcame the effects of disastrous floods through self-
reliance.27 In 1964, Mao promoted Dazhai as a model for the rest of the country to 
follow. He also used the model to promote extensive terracing and filling in of rivers 
and lakes to make crop fields. In short, Mao used the Dazhai model to prove that man 
could conquer nature through hard work and ideas. A common slogan was “if people 
listen to Chairman Mao, the land will listen to them.”28
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The Dazhai model was known across China and Dazhai became a “pilgrimage” 
destination for young communists imbued with revolutionary vigor and the “Dazhai 
spirit.” Units based on the Dazhai model were built in every province, every county, 
and in people’s communes. This dogmatic conformity led to destruction of countless 
forests and lakes, desperate attempts to grow grain in unsuitable areas, untold human 
suffering, and great waste. The Dazhai model remained intact until 1978 when Deng 
Xiaoping wrested power from Hua Guofeng, Mao’s successor. Hua supported the 
Dazhai campaign and when he was purged, the campaign lost its momentum.29
In the late 1960s to the early 1970s, Mao linked the “Learn from Dazhai” 
campaign to a campaign to prepare the people for war. At the time, border skirmishes 
with the Soviet Union had reached a peak and China had not yet begun rapprochement 
with the United States, so tensions were high. In the effort to prepare for war, massive 
relocation programs took place under the “Third Front” (sanxian) campaign30 and the 
“educated youth movement” (zhiqing yundong)31 to “open up” wastelands near the 
Soviet border (Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang), and to remake the 
mountainous interior in china’s Southwest and western provinces (Yunnan, Guizhou, 
and Sichuan). These campaigns were intended to reduce the risk of famine and to 
build up an inland industrial base as a fallback in case of war. A common slogan was 
“prepare for war, prepare for famine, for the sake of the people’ (bei zhan, bei huang, 
wei renmin). These campaigns were diluted during the Great Cultural Revolution, but 
were strengthened in 1968.
In agricultural production in some provinces, the guiding principle became 
“take grain as the key link” (yi liang wei gang).32  In others on the southern borders, it 
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became “everything must yield to rubber” (yiqie wei xiangjiao rang lu).33 One slogan 
encouraged people to farm on steep mountains: “zhongtian zhongdao shanding, 
chouzhong choudao huxin” (plant fields to the pinnacle of mountaintops).34 Another 
slogan encouraged people to destroy bodies of water to create fields: “weihai zaotian” 
(fill in the seas and create fields) and “xiang canghai yao liang” (seek grain from the 
blue seas).35 During this period, leaders forcibly relocated hundreds of thousands of 
urban youth to remake the wastelands into arable land and to build up an inland 
military industrial base. Leaders sought to avoid famine, but ended up destroying acres 
and acres of forests and grasslands to make marginal croplands.36
The “Third Front” campaign dominated the third five-y ar economic plan. In 
preparation for war, increasing production was stressed and industry and mining 
operations were moved to China’s interior. Roads and railroads were built into 
previously pristine wilderness areas. Heavily polluting enterprises were moved to 
remote mountain valleys in accordance with the guiding principle  “kaoshan, fensan, 
jindong” (scatter and move near mountains and in caves). Sometimes whole fact ries 
were moved, other times, enterprises were built from scratch. It was impossible to 
build “industrial zones” with pollution prevention equipment in these remote areas and 
the environment suffered. In the cities, industry became the most important priority. 
Xianshengchan hou shenghuo” (produce first and live second) became the guiding 
principle. One slogan was “turn consuming cities into producing cities” (bian xiaofei 
chengshi wei shengchan chengshi).37 In keeping with this principle, many of China’s
culturally rich cities were turned into polluted industrial centers. 
268
Today’s environmental authorities still blame many of China’s environmental 
problems on decisions made between 1949 and 1976.38 Campaigns associated with the 
Great Leap Forward and preparations for war in the 1950s and 1960s reshaped the 
Chinese landscape by opening wild lands for agriculture, terracing on steep mountain 
slopes, “moving mountains,” triggering massive soil erosion, filling in lakes and 
rivers, destroying forests, decimating wild fauna and flora and bringing many rare 
animals close to extinction.39
During the Mao period, the Chinese campaign tactic was honed, but the 
methods and results of campaigns are controversial. Campaigns, in general, were seen 
by some as “effective vehicles for political participation” and that they contributed 
more toward meeting economic goals than they did not.40 Not all Chinese scholars, 
however, were this optimistic. Even during the high tide of mass yundong during the 
1960s, there was a debate among Chinese leaders as to the usefulness of yundong. 
Some saw campaigns being less and less effective as time went on.41 In ther cases, 
scholars questioned the goals of campaigns. There are several cases in which Chinese 
scholars and scientists warned of the dangers that would result from yundong, but their 
warnings were disregarded and sometimes they were persecuted for being counter 
revolutionary.42
Some argue that the campaign method was the only feasible choice for Chinese 
leaders at the time to accomplish the gargantuan task of developing China. China was 
not rich in financial resources but had a vast reservoir of human capital. The need for 
self-reliance was another argument that supported the use of the campaign method. 
Despite the controversies surrounding the campaign method, some scholars believed 
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that the general Chinese style of mass campaigns, distinct from other communist 
states, would continue after Mao.43 There is evidence to suggest that authorities have 
continued to utilize the campaign method t  achieve policy goals, although specific 
campaign goals and procedures have changed. 
Changing State Values and The Evolution of Campaigns
Beginning after the fall of Mao in 1976 and the rise of Deng Xiaoping to 
power in the late 1970s and early 1980s, campaigns began to change. These changes 
reflect the overall political, social, and economic shifts that took place at the time. 
Campaign retain some of the previous functions of the Mao campaign, but have 
become less political. Overall, they became less political because of Deng Xiaoping’s 
focus on “practical” matters, the shift of campaigns toward “rational” goals based on 
scientific research, the separation of party and state organs and the resulting partial 
shift in organizational responsibility for running campaigns from the party to the 
government. In addition, the gradual reliance on laws and regulations to shape 
behavior instead of ideology has altered campaigns. These changes have made 
campaigns more sophisticated. Campaigns still seek to unleash civil energy, build 
public support for governmental goals, convey leaders’ expectations, and create 
conformity. In the environmental sector, broad campaign goals show some continuity 
with earlier periods. Campaigns continue to be used to implement existing pol cies, 
promote emulation of model experiences, introduce and popularize new laws and 
policies, establish public norms, and encourage enduring changes in both individual 
attitudes and social institutions. 
270
Campaigns During the 1980s
“Environmental Protection Month”
In the 1980s, environmental education campaigns for general citizens were 
much more sporadic and there were few operating agencies at the local level to 
implement campaigns. One example is the “National Environmental Protection 
Education Month” sponsored by the State Council Environmental Protection Leading 
Small Group. The impetus for this campaign was the promulgation of China’s first 
environmental protection law in 1979. In 1980 and 1981, in accordance with the 
Environmental Protection Law, the national education campaign sponsored by the 
State Council Environmental Protection Leading Small Group, and the propaganda 
department of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee focused on popularizing the 1979 Trial Environmental Protection Law and 
basic environmental science knowledge in order to raise citizen’s environmental 
awareness. 
Most provinces, municipalities, and large cities held a large-scale meeting at 
which authorities broadcasted the need for each department, industry, and mine to 
enact environmental protection measures. For example, in Heilongjiang, over 100,000 
people attended such a meeting. All television, news, and education units were called 
upon to participate in various activities, as were the natio ’s unions, science societies, 
Youth Leagues, and Women’s Federations. Activities included shows, plays, literature 
and art, and street propaganda activities. Local party authorities utilized neighborhood 
billboards and blackboards to display environmental protection slogans. The campaign 
encouraged the further development of citizen environmental monitoring groups 
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through Street and Residence Committees in select cities including Shanghai, Beijing, 
Xian, and Jinan. 
According to environmental protection authorities, the Environmental 
Protection Month Drive also helped build support for the development of local 
environmental regulations in several areas including Shanxi, Hebei, Gansu, Yunnan, 
and a number of large cities. Some areas collected environmental dispute cases and 
worked to reveal environmental harms. In addition, the Drive helped promote the 
“three simultaneous policy.” The army stepped up its efforts to clean up water 
pollution from hospitals. Soldiers had already cleaned up 45 hospitals and were
determined to finish the other 170 by the end of the year. Overall, the month-long 
drive heightened enthusiasm on the part of environmental protection authorities in 
selected locations. Yet, the lack of environmental protection apparatus personnel at the 
local level severely hampered the campaign.44
For example, in Chengdu, there was no Environmental Protection Commission 
until 1984 and there were no “environmental education months” or weeks until the 
1990s. Starting in 1990, the Environmental Education Center coordinated an 
“environmental protection education week” (xuanchuan zhou) during which time the 
Environmental Protection Law was popularized through a number of activities. 
Taiyuan had a mere shadow of an “environmental education month” campaign and 
drew little attention in 1990. 
Later “environmental education week or month” campaigns simply became 
campaigns to popularize environmental laws and occurred every time a new national 
or local law was promulgated. In Taiyuan, in the early 1990s and each year thereafter, 
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popularizing new environmental policies, laws, and regulations became the focus of 
campaigns for environmental protection workers and the general population. In 1990, 
alone, specific education campaigns included those to popularize the “Environmental 
Protection Law” and the “Shanxi Provincial Regulations Regarding the Prevention of 
Pollution in the Fen River.” 
Another focus of “Environmental Month” campaigns was to popularize the 
policies or the “spirit” of the National and provincial Environmental Protection 
Working Meetings into city educational activities. EPB officials “studied” and 
“educated” the “Gujiao Spirit” (Gujiao Jingshen)45 and the “Lishuangliang Spirit” 
(Shuangliang Jingshen or Shuangliang Daolu).46
Compulsory Forestry Campaign
Another early major national campaign, the “zhishu zaolin” (plant trees and 
create forests),47 got its start in 1981 and is still going on today.48 This campaign is 
unique in that it is compulsory. In 1981, the National People’s Congress under the 
direction of Deng Xiaoping passed the “Decision Regarding Development of a 
National Compulsory Tree Planting Campaign.” Subsequent legislation established the 
“Luhua Weiyuanhui” (Greening Committee) under the State Council and strengthened 
the massive tree planting campaign.49
The Regulations required all citizens of the PRC between the ages of 11 and 55 
(60 for men) to plant three to five trees a year, excluding the infirm or weak. Central 
authorities determined priority areas for planting. The campaign was coordinated 
through work units. Unit leaders requisitioned the appropriate number of saplings 
from the local ”Luhua Weiyuanhui” (Greening Committee). The China Greening 
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Foundation was established to collect donations, help determine priorities, train 
experts, and engae in educational activities. Donations were collected from domestic 
sources including individuals, collectives, enterprises, businesses, agencies, social 
organizations, and work units. In addition, donations were collected from foreign 
individuals and groups.50
Authorities harnessed the energy of the public to plant state-own d and 
collective forests, green urban areas, beautify enterprises, and green and protect rural 
areas.51 Officially, the goals of the campaign were to utilize people power to green the 
nation, to raise the public’s awareness of the need to plant trees, and to instill the 
understanding that each person is responsible for greening the nation (luhua zhuguo 
renren you ze). Authorities hoped to instill “green values” and to gain experience in 
organizing such massive campaigns.52 Periodically officials would boost the 
campaign. In 1987, party and government leaders encouraged the masses to “zhishu 
zhongcao, luhua zaolin” “plant trees and grow grass, green things and create 
forests.”53 The national compulsory tree planting campaign is not only to mobilize the 
public to plant trees, it is also to instill love of one’s country, promote the socialist 
spiritual culture, and mold a spiritually rich movement.54
The Spirit of Gujiao Campaign
Yet, another early campaign, the “Gujiao Jingshen” (Spirit of Gujiao), 
ironically, emerged from one of the most polluted areas in China, Taiyuan in Shanxi 
province. This famous, although not highly successful, campaign began the mid-
1980s. To this day, officials in various parts of China invoke the “Gujiao Jingshen” 
slogan to encourage emulation of Gujiao and to promote respect for and adherence to 
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environmental laws and policies. The “Gujiao Jingshen” model is based on coal 
mining operations in the city of Gujiao, which is part of the Taiyuan administrative 
area. Starting in 1984, the Provincial People’s Congress, the Taiyuan City People’s 
Congress, and provincial and city environmental protection agencies requested that 
environmental protection be taken into consideration when developing this important 
mining area. Involved actors apparently did a good job in adhering to existing 
environmental laws in both the design and building phases, because Li Peng praised 
the project in a speech in 1985. Li Peng applauded the environmental protection 
efforts, dubbed them the “Gujiao Jingshen,” and extolled the nation to incorporate the 
“Gujiao Jingshen” into similar projects.55 However, the “Gujiao Jingshen” also refers 
to the structure of the mining industry in Gujiao, where state enterprises took the lead 
in mining operations and smaller collective enterprises filled in the holes. The 
“miracle” of Gujiao was accomplished with financial and technical support from 
foreign sources. The Gujiao Spirit has since become a popular slogan used by 
government and environmental officials to promote environmental protection goals in 
all of Shanxi province and even nationally. On the 10th anniversary of the campaign in 
1995, authorities held an expert workshop extolling the utility of the Gujiao model f r 
the future.56
Institutionalization of the National Environmental Protection Administration, 
Environmental Education and Campaigns
Since the 1980s, environmental campaign mobilization has been closely linked 
with education efforts. Typically, the “mobilizers” are the first targets of educational 
training, so that they in turn can educate and mobilize the wider population. Therefore, 
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the first targets of environmental education training were “specialists,” government 
and party leaders, enterprise lead rs, and teachers.
Between 1985 and 1992, environmental education and campaigns increasingly 
came under the supervision of the growing environmental protection apparatus. The 
four main targets for environmental training and education efforts led by the 
Environmental Protection Commission and the National Environmental Protection 
Bureau focused on improving professional programs in schools, educating 
environmental protection officials, governmental officials, workers in polluting 
enterprises, and primary and secondary school teachers. Teachers in turn educated 
students about the environment in the classroom and in extracurricular activities. In 
Chengdu test cases, it is estimated that by the end of 1990, over 30,000 Jr. high school 
students had received some environmental education.57
The National Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA) began to take 
primary responsibility for implementing many environmental education campaigns 
after its establishment in 1988. NEPA called the first National Environmental 
Protection Education Work Meeting in 1990. At that time, environmental education 
could be characterized as being “closed” (fengbi). It was not until the second National 
Environmental Protection Education Work Meeting in 1991 that environmental 
education became “open” (kaifang). In essence, this means that before the second 
meeting, education efforts focused on environmental protection apparatus personnel. 
After the meeting, NEPA opened up environmental education to all and environmental 
education became a part of “cultural education” in every sector.58 At the meeting, the 
director of NEPA’s Propaganda and Education Department, Qu Geping, NEPA’s 
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director, discussed the uses of environmental education. He stressed that education 
was to provide guidance. In addition, it must provide the foundation for understanding. 
It serves to mobilize and to promote monitoring.59
Therefore, beginning in 1992 and 1993, SEPA put more effort into providing 
environmental education for the masses, although most education efforts remained 
focused mainly on the four established education targets.60 Throughout the 1990s, as 
the new environmental protection apparatus grew, environmental laws were put in 
place, and scores of educators, enterprise workers, and officials were introduced to 
environmental protection concepts, environmental campaigns became more complex 
and varied.
National and Local Environmental Protection Campaigns in the 1990s
Since 1988, SEPA, the Ministry of Forestry, and other government 
environmental protection organizations work in tandem with education, propaganda, 
television and broadcast organizations to initiate and organize campaigns that focus on 
priority issues (zhongdian), which change over time. National level campaigns and 
mobilization efforts include those meant to shape citizen’s values and those meant to 
mobilize citizens to act. Specific goals of campaigns include reforestation and 
afforestation, pollution control, elimination of pests, trash collection, popularization of 
laws, improvement of compliance, cultivation of environmental values, improvement 
of environmental awareness by celebrating annual commemorative days (such as 
Earth Day and World Environment Day), protection of endangered species, and 
preparation for major events, such as the Olympics. Smaller campaigns are simply 
labeled “lusi xingdong” (green actions) and focus on similar issues as national 
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campaigns. The following section outlines some of the larger environmental 
campaigns. It is not meant to be a comprehensive examination of environmental 
campaigns in the post 1949 period.
Earth Day & World Environment Day
Since 1989, environmental protection authorities worked hard to promote both 
environmental values and citizen action on an annual basis for the “two days” 
(liangri), Earth Day (Diqiu Ri) on April 22nd and World Environment Day (Huanjing 
Ri) on June 5th. In the following paragraphs, the inner workings of World Environment 
Day are explored, but many of the same procedures and activities are similar for Earth 
Day. During the early years, the Propaganda and Education Division of NEPA would 
issue a notice requesting the education department or education center in each 
province, municipality, and independent city to develop plans for World Environment 
Day. Included in the notice were examples of activities scheduled at the national level 
and those scheduled in Beijing. Education personnel around the country were expected 
to notify NEPA of their activity schedule.61 NEPA would also issue a notice providing 
information about available education materials in order to get the most use of the 
materials and to avoid duplication of work to create materials. Provincial, municipal 
and city EPBs could choose to purchase materials that suited their needs from the 
issued “catalog.”  
Activities held on World Environment Day include, youth painting, 
calligraphy, and writing contests, stamp, poster, and book displays, “green product” 
displays, environmental question and answer challenges, talent shows, news 
conferences, talks, lectures and workshops, public ceremonies with speeches and 
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reports, award ceremonies, television and radio programs, trash cleanups, recycling 
drives, public pledges,62 high level meetings, announcements of new policies, student 
manned “information” tables in the community, handing out environmental education 
materials, and neighborhood “rallies” and gatherings. 
In each of the three case cities, Earth Day and World Environment Day 
activities varied greatly. Beijing was the first city to celebrate World Environment 
Day, which it did in 1985.63 Each year throughout the 1990s, city environmental 
protection officials, volunteers, and politicians participated in special Earth Day and 
World Environment Day activities. In 1995, on World Environment Day, the city 
invited outstanding environmental educators and unit representatives to participate in a 
conference about how best to raise the environmental awareness of China’s youth.64
Elementary and secondary schools held writing and painting competitions. Among the 
popular slogans that year were “I love science, I love nature” (wo ai kexue, wo ai 
daziran) and “I need the earth and the earth needs me” (wo xuyao diqiu, diqiu xuyao 
wo).65 More than 600 people participated in summer environment camps, and several 
governmental agencies worked together to produce a movie to educate citizens about 
automobile pollution.
In Chengdu, each year environmental protection authorities, in conjunction 
with other governmental organs, especially the Education Commission, to sponsor 
events, contests, and clean-up drives to commemorate Earth Day, World Environment 
Day and number of other anniversaries. For example, in 1992, to commemorate World 
Environment Day and the 20-year anniversary of the Declaration on the Human 
Environment, city and provincial leaders and more than 1,400 citizens gathered for a 
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ceremony. Other educational activities took place including an environmental science 
book display, a writing contest, and a painting contest.66 In the early months of 1997, 
the media started carrying stories about the background of Earth Day and giving some 
background about Chengdu’s environmental history. The city held a contest 
commemorating the panda bear. The EPB and the city Education Commission worked 
with a university in Japan to put on a painting contest for children in which more than 
10,000 students participated. For World Environment Day, leaders from every 
administrative level joined in a workshop with special guests invited from abroad. The 
TV news did in-depth coverage of the workshop. The Mayor wrote a famous editorial 
calling for the beautification of Chengdu in the Chengdu Evening News. Canada and 
the city Education Commission worked together on a project to provide children less 
than 15 years of age with environmental education and with opportunities to plan  
trees.67
In Taiyuan, Earth Day and World Environment Day were paltry affairs 
compared to Beijing and Chengdu. Because the EPB did not have an independent 
education division, no one was responsible for the work of organizing these annual 
one-day campaigns. For example, in 1998, the city combined activities for Earth Day 
and World Environment Day. The theme for World Environment Day was “rise for 
the environment at the millennium” (2000 – huanjing qiannian, xingdong qilai). At a 
public event to celebrate World Environment Day, provincial and city authorities gave 
speeches and they honored the 28 elementary schools and 10 kindergartens that had 
been granted “green school” status. Then the Yingxe district EPB and others 
participated in an environmental protection activity.68 Another slogan that was touted 
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this year was “it begins with me, and from now on we are going to protect our 
environment that gives life.” The EPB concentrated on putting on a huge “public 
event” for 6/5. The city EPB worked together with the provincial EPB. At this event, 
there was a desk set up at which people could ask questions related to the environment 
(paper/plastic etc…) The desk also featured a person to handle people’s complaints 
right on the spot. There was also a “wenda” activity, wherein the master of ceremonies 
would ask the crowd a question and whoever could answer it, would win a prize. 
There was also a display of different “environmental products” including “phosphate 
free detergent” and environmental protection equipment. The participating enterprises 
had heard (through the Banshichu) about the planned display and volunteered to 
display their products. At the “event,” governmental leaders signed a “year 2000 
pledge banner” promising to protect the environment.
At the national evel and in some cities, in the early 1990s, state environmental 
protection organs, schools, relevant work units, and quasi-governmental organizations, 
such as the Young Pioneers, at all levels took responsibility for organizing most of the 
activities and mobilizing participants. As time went on, more groups became involved 
in activities and participation became increasingly an expression of volunteerism. In 
the later 1990s, university student groups, new quasi-governmental environmental 
foundations and organizations, and more autonomous, popular, nongovernmental 
social organizations, if present, took on more responsibility for organizing activities 
and mobilizing participation. 
Environmental protection authorities and Chinese leaders utilized Earth Day 
and World Environment Day as symbols of the need for everyone to become involved 
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in environmental protection and utilized the symbols to generate increasing levels of 
volunteerism among citizens.
“Huanjing Bei” Campaigns
In addition, in the early 1990s, environmental protection officials launched a 
targeted campaign to encourage increased media coverage of environmental issues and 
to signal “appropriate” environmental stories by rewarding those that met specific 
criteria. NEPA opened the “Huanjing Bei” (The Environment Cup) contest in 1990 
and sponsored the contest off and on for the next few years. Judges would make 
awards to media outlets and individuals for the best stories on the environment. NEPA 
defined the scope of story contents to include those that focus on new achievements, 
new developments, new trends, innovative environmental management methods, new 
experiences, new models, outstanding enterprises or individuals to emulate, issues 
which impact our lives but of which we are unaware, the concerns of vari us sectors 
of society regarding environmental issues, suggestions, and disclosing and criticizing 
behavior that degrades the environment.69
At the local level, cities initiated their own versions of “environmental cups”. 
In Chengdu, the city EPB and the Chengdu Evening News worked together to hold the 
“Environmental Protection Cup,” a drive to popularize science and environmental 
protection. The Cup was in celebration of the ten-y ar anniversary of the PRC 
Environmental Protection Law.70 The EPB worked with the Electronic Education 
Department at Sichuan Normal University to produce several TV shows including two 
on water pollution. The EPB worked with Chengdu’s Broadcasting Station to produce 
other environmental programs. The EPB worked with Sichuan Television Station to 
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produce a program on controlling air pollution. The EPB also produced a short video 
about the advances made in protecting Chengdu’s environment. There were at least 24 
news articles regarding environmental protection. Many education activities were 
coordinated to popularize the new Chengdu Noise Pollution Regulation.  
Since 1989, in conjunction with Chengdu Evening News, The Environmental 
Education Center sponsored an “art contest” called “the environmental cup” (huanjing 
bei) to challenge peoples’ environmental knowledge. Students sent in poems, stories, 
and comics related to science, as well as paintings and pictures that promote 
environmental awareness. Over 400 students entered the first contest. The top 15 
contestants were eligible to enter the nation wide contest.71
China Century Environmental Protection Drive (Zhonghua Huanbao 
Shijixing)
The national Century Environmental Protection Drive was probably the most 
important campaign in China in the mid 1990s. The campaign began in 1993 signaling 
the start of a new emphasis on implementation and enforcement. The recently 
established NPC Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Committee teamed 
up with the Central Party Department of Propaganda, Ministry of Radio, Film, and 
Television, the National Environmental Protection Administration, the Communist 
Youth League and other ministries and organizations to issue a notice requiring 
China’s news media organizations to step up their environmental education efforts and 
to expand their monitoring of environmental compliance. The notice outlined an 
annual environmental education drive called the China Century Environmental 
Protection Drive. During this annual drive, led by the NPC Environmental Protection 
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and Natural Resources Committee, high level officials and representatives of the 
media engage in supervisory activities on a national scale. Each year, the campaign 
has a different theme.72 The goals of the annual drive are to raise everyone’s 
environmental awareness and their respect for envi o mental laws.73 Newspaper 
stories target specific polluting enterprises for criticism; educate the public on the last 
20 years of environmental protection; raise awareness of environmental laws; and 
bring violations of environmental laws and classic environmental disputes to light. 
The campaign provided the opportunity for national authorities to supervise 
environmental protection work at the local level. The annual drive proved to be a 
useful tool to motivate local areas to devise their own “century drive” activities. In 
addition, the annual drive greatly expanded the media’s role in supervising 
environmental protection activities and in forging ties between the media and People’s 
Congress members. Each year, authorities issued notices outlining the priority topics 
and the priority locations for the Century Drive. For example in 1994, the topics about 
which articles should be written included:
• articles to provide good and bad examples, but emphasize the good 
examples
• deforestation and grassland degradation in select areas and related 
economic losses and possible solutions
• soil erosion and resulting damages
• desertification – highlighting successes
• China’s endangered plants and animals, the reasons for their peril and 
suggestions about how to protect them
• urban and industrial pollution problems and environmental problems in the 
countryside, especially the ecological damage caused by pollution from 
village and township enterprises 
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The notice provided a list of guiding principles and examples of specific activities 
that were to begin in April and finish in June. One of the guidelines requested that for 
those instances of serious pollution for which there was no quick financial or technical 
fix, participating organizations should solve those problems internally and not report 
them in public.74
In 1994, at the national level, over 100 reporters split into seven teams and 
visited at least 11 provinces and autonomous zones. At the local level, 26 provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous zones organized their own Environmental Century 
Drives. Over 1,000 local reporters participated and wrote over 2,000 media reports on 
environmental issues.75 That year, the Environment and Natural Resources Committee 
of the NPC focused on 10 provinces and autonomous zones during the annual
environmental law compliance inspections. The inspection teams concentrated on 
assessing compliance to seven major laws including the Environmental Protection 
Law, the Forestry Law, the Law Protecting Wild Animals, and the Water and Soil 
Conservation Law. During the team’s inspections, they discovered several cases where 
citizens had serious complaints about pollution and environmental degradation 
problems. The teams investigated these cases and found violations of environmental 
and natural resources protection laws.76
In 1995, The NPC Environment and Natural Resources Committee designated 
55 education topics within the context of the overall theme. Five groups of reporters 
went to eight provinces, Heilongjiang Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
Guizhou and Shanxi. Central TV sent seven reporters and cameramen to join the 
groups.77
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In 1996, the theme for the NPC “China Environmental Protection Century 
Drive” was “protect life giving water.” This year the NPC organized over 100 
personnel in 10 media teams and six television crews. The teams visited 13 provinces, 
autonomous zones and municipalities. During the drive, media outlets produced over 
300 articles or TV and radio broadcasts.78 The drive focused on the cleanup of the 
“three rivers and lakes,” and on implementing the environmental protection goals of 
the 9th 5-yr plan. According to records, more that 30 provinces and cities organized 
“century drive” activities to fit their particular circumstances. Even some counties and 
enterprises organized some type of “century drive.” Across the country, more than 
2,000 reporters participated in this year’s drive by visiting more that 3,000 townships 
and enterprises. Reporters wrote nearly 20,000 articles, which benefited environmental 
protection work by offering guidance and monitoring.79
In 1997, the theme for the NPC China Environment Century Drive was 
“protect our natural resources and use them sustainably” (baohu ziyuan, yongxu 
liyong). This year, 117 reporters at the national level formed 10 groups and visited 11 
provinces and wrote over 300 articles. The groups were particularly interested in the 
implementation of the Forest Law and Grasslands Law. The groups visited the Li and 
Huai River areas to check up on clean-up efforts. They also visited Shenhua Collective 
Shenfu Dongsheng Meikuang (coal mine). According to preliminary statistics, 212 
cities and prefectures initiated their own version of the China Environment Century 
Drive.
In 1998, the theme for the China Environment Century Drive was “protect and 
develop the oceans” (baohu haiyang, kaifa haiyang). The NPC Environment 
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Committee sponsored an education activity called “build a cultivated shoreline of ten 
thousand li.” The education campaign lasted three and a half months. Twenty- two 
media outlets sent representatives on visits along the coastline from the northern tip of 
China to the southern tip. The groups visited 11 provinces, autonomous zones, and 
municipalities; 54 cities; and 210 harbors, enterprises, and townships. They wrote over 
800 articles about what they saw. The articles praised the accomplishments of Dalian, 
Qingdao, Caizhou, Xiamen, and Shenzhen. They also disclosed illegal polluting 
activities in Huanbohai, a mine in Zhejiang, Guangdong Nanou Island, and Xiao 
DongJiang. The campaign helped to end 20 years of polluting behavior (polluted water 
being put directly into the Bohai Sea) by Sandong Longkou paper factory.80
The 1999 China Environment Century Drive was conducted with 14 Central 
government and State Council Ministries and Commissions. The themes this year 
were “declare a propaganda war on air pollution” (xiang daqi wuran xunzhan) and 
“Love our Yellow River” (ai wo huanghe). Targets of the drive included Lanzhou, 
Taiyuan, Yinzhou, Xining and other highly polluted cities. For the “ai wo Huang
River, the NPC worked with the Ministry of water Resources formed 20 reporters 
from central media work units. Reporters visited eight provinces and areas along the 
Huang River. This year the drive focused on the three provinces Shandong, Hebei, and 
Henan, along the Hai and Huai Rivers where there had been some serious pollution 
disputes. They reported on pollution problems in Guangdong’s Nanao, Zhejiang’s 
Fanshan, Shandong’s Longkou. Reporters also covered the drinking water problems in 
two counties in Shandong’s Bingzhou prefecture (Wudi, and Zhanhua). By the end of 
1999, the dirty water problem faced by 800,000 citizens.81
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Cities across China initiated their own century environment drives to coincide 
with the national drive. In Beijing, the drive was called the “Greater Capital City 
Environmental Protection Drive” (Jingdu Dadi Huanbao Xing). Each year, 
representatives from the City Party Commission, the People’s Congress, the city 
government, and numerous media outlets visited work unitsin specific counties to 
examine environmental conditions. The specific theme of local drives was not always 
identical to the theme in the national drive. For example, the theme during the 1997 
“Greater Beijing Environmental Protection Tour (Drive)” was “treasure water 
resources and protect our lifeline” (zhenxi shuiziyuan, baohu shengmingxian).82 At the 
national level, there was a different theme for 1997. However, the national theme for 
1996 was “protect life giving water”.
In Taiyuan, starting in 1994, and every year thereafter, authorities focused 
education efforts on the national “Zhonghua huanbao shijixing” and the related 
provincial “Sanpu huanbaoxing,” or “Bingzhou huanbao xing” drives. National 
representatives from SEPA, the NPC, and media outlets worked with local officials 
and reporters to conduct inspections of polluting enterprises, help to raise 
environmental awareness, and promote improved implementation and enforcement. 
During these annual campaigns, local media outlets increased the number of stories on 
environmental protection. Individual districts would hold special environmental 
education activities. In 1994, Hexi District put on three activities, the “optimum boiler 
room,” the “environmental street,” and the “smokeless street” to get work units to be 
on their best behavior. Beicheng District showed off three exhibition boiler rooms. 
Nancheng District held the “wenming guolufang” (cultured boiler) contest.
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Eliminate the Four Pests
Authorities in various cities continued on an ongoing basis the “Eliminate the 
Four Pests” (Chu Si Hai) campaign. The “Eliminate the Four Pests” campaign was 
first mobilized during Mao’s reign. A poster exhorting citizens to “get rid of the four 
pests” was hanging on the wall of the Southwest Agricultural University in 1998. The 
campaign gave time limits by when citizens were to have eliminated a percentage of 
the pests. A similar poster was noticed in Beijing in 1998.83 Now the four pests are 
flies, rats, mosquitoes, and roaches.
Eliminate White Trash Campaigns
In 1994 and subsequent years, the transportation sector initiated a nation wide 
campaign to clean up trash alongside highways and railroad tracks. The scope of the 
“eliminate white trash campaigns” expanded to include entire cities in the later 1990s. 
In 1994, the Ministry of Railroads established the “love your country’s sanitation 
movement committee” (aiguo wesheng yundong weyuanhui) and helped to organize 
over 956,941 railroad and highway workers and passengers to clean up trash. “The 
first year’s activities were largely successful, some railroad workers and passengers, 
however, ignored rules regarding littering.”84 In 1995, the Ministry of Railroads 
concentrated on raising awareness and solving the problem of “white trash” (b ise 
laji) along the nations railroad tracks by initiating a month long campaign. More than 
400 volunteers from the Communist Youth League attended a ceremony 
commemorating the opening of the activity on World Environment Day. Over the 
course of the day in various locations around China, over 20,000 volunteers gathered 
at more than 500 train stations to pick up litter along railroad tracks. According to 
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reports, this year’s activities were particularly successful because: 1) the activity 
organizers and activity audiences worked together to pick up trash; 2) education was 
mixed with taking action; 3) state priorities and citizen concerns about cleaning up 
trash along railroad tracks converged.85
In 1997, eliminating “white trash” became even a higher priority for authorities 
and they initiated a nation wide campaign to forward the work. Authorities took a 
three-pronged approach, increasing newspaper articles, television programs, and 
sponsoring “eliminate white trash month” activities. Newspaper were to increase the 
number of stories regarding the Central government and the Beijing government 
encouraged newspapers to increase the number of stories regarding the problem of 
white trash, the relevant regulations, and examples of successes in eliminating white 
trash. The “eliminate white trash month” activities took place around World 
Environment Day. Companies producing biodegradable plastic bags and other 
environmental products put up displays. The China Environmental Protection 
Foundation, the Pollution Control Division of SEPA, and Dongcheng District 
representatives sponsored a “eliminating white trash begins with me” cleanup activity 
at Beijing Railway Station.86
Chengdu also emphasized cleaning up the city’s “white trash” as early as 
1992.87 In 1995, the Ministry of Railroads, EPB personnel, and local leaders 
ceremoniously picked up “white trash” along Chengdu’s railways.88
San Hu, San He Campaign (Three Lakes and Three Rivers)89
This targeted pollution cleanup campaign began as early as 1994 and focused 
on the Huai, Hai, and Liao Rivers, and the Tai, Chao, and Zhenchi Lakes. One of the 
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main catalysts of this campaign was the horrific environmental conditions along the 
Huai River that reached their peak in 1994. By May of that year, the pollution 
problems along the Huai River had become a priority. A that time, several provincial 
representatives from Anwei, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Sichuan attended an 
enforcement meeting. Xie Zhenhua, Songjian, and Wang Yangzhu represented the 
State Council and SEPA at the meeting. Various State Council officials at the
provincial level also attended the meeting. The participants decided to make the 
cleanup of the Huai River by the end of the century a priority. 
The clean up was to proceed in three stages. During the first phase, heavily 
polluting, economically inefficient, and enterprises with hard to solve environmental 
problems were to be closed, shut down, merged with other enterprises, or converted to 
less polluting production. During the second phase, other pollution sources were to be 
cleaned up and wastewater treatment plants were to be built. The third phase would 
see the clean up of the river complete.90
In July, a number of large environmental accidents occurred along the lower 
Huai River. The State Council became involved in the ensuing investigations. The 
State Council Environmental Protection commission followed the progress of the Huai 
River clean up, particularly during 1994 and 1995. The commission heard a report on 
the “Temporary Regulations Regarding Pollution Prevention in the Huai River 
Watershed” The Commission worked with the four provinces in the Huai River 
watershed (Henan, Anwei, Shandong and Jiangsu) and with the relevant ministries 
under the State Council to strictly follow cleanup orders. Efforts focused on cleaning 
up pollution problems to ensure high quality drinking water for residents. The Council 
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leaders were determined to clean up the Huai River even at the cost of slowing down 
economic development. Authorities planned to clean up the Huai River by the year 
2000.91  At the 7th meeting of the 3rd Plenum of the State Council Environmental 
Protection Commission, members listed to a report on plans to clean up the Huai River 
watershed. Throughout 1995, pollution problems along the river continued to worsen 
and seriously affected the development of agricultural along the river. The 
Commission pushed stronger measures to clean up the river. Newspapers carried 
stories of the problems along the Huai River and of the successes in cleaning up 
massive amounts of pollution. Citizens were encouraged to monitor their 
neighborhoods for illegal industrial activity and to report it immediately. Cities at the 
county level and above were required to build wastewater treatment plants and were 
forbidden to let untreated water into the Huai River. Leaders were determined to make 
the Huai River cleanup a model (Huai He Moshi) for the rest of the country to 
follow.92
By 1999, work on the first phase on Dian Lake was achieved. In addition, 44% 
and 54% of the enterprises along the Hai and Liao Rivers have reached standard. 
Work on Huai River and Tai Lake continued and thousands of inspection visits to 
enterprises along the river and lake showed that 90% of operations were within 
standard. Authorities stepped up pollution prevention efforts along the Bohai Sea.93
Other reports are not so optimistic about the success of the campaign to clean 
up Dian Lake. EPB officials in the area have lamented that the sheer size of the 
pollution problem has slowed progress and they complain that it is difficult to get 
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polluters to quit polluting activities or to install the proper pollution prevention 
equipment.94
“15 Smalls” Campaign (Shiwu Shao)
This campaign began in 1996 and focused on locating and closing certain 
kinds of small, inefficient, backward, and local enterprises. Many of these enterprises 
were located along the three rivers or near the three lakes that remained priorities. Of 
the 70,754 enterprises slated to be closed under the “15 smalls” decision, by 
December, 57,430 of these or 81% were closed. Xie Zhenhua boasted that China’s
progress at closing these small enterprises in such a short amount of time, was 
unprecedented in the developing world, and would have been impossible in western 
developed countries.95 The campaign was a priority in 1997 as well. In 1998, 
reportedly 15% of the enterprises that had been shut down under this campaign had re-
opened and were still operating illegally.96
“Zero (tolerance) Drive” (Lingdian Xingdong)
The “15 Smalls” campaign and the cleanup along the Huai River were linked 
to another enforcement publicity campaign called the “Lingdian Xingdong” which 
began in 1997. The campaign focused on the NEPA organized enforcement 
inspections along the Huai River towards the end of the year and the government’s 
successes in cleaning up pollution along the rivr over the last three years. Media 
enterprises were heavily involved with the campaign and had the duty to publicize 
government laws and policies, educate the public, mobilize public support for the 
campaign, assist in monitoring activities, and reveal and criticize lawbreakers. The 
campaign brought attention to the government’s efforts to cleanup pollution problems 
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and was more of a public publicity campaign than anything else, although media 
articles urged citizens to report illegal behavior. In all, sixty reporters wrote nearly 300 
news articles covering the campaign.97 Again, as in most enforcement campaigns, 
enterprises re-open after the campaign passes through their administrative area.
“One Control, Two Targets” Campaign
The “one control, two targets” (yikong shuangdabiao)98 is a national campaign 
that began in 1998 and was linked with the State Council Decisions Regarding Some 
Environmental Protection Problems” (Guowuyuan guanyu huanjing baohu ruogan 
wenti de jueding). The goal of this campaign was to implement the directive in the 
Decisions to bring all enterprises into compliance with either national or local 
environmental standards (air and water) by the end of 2000.99 The campaign’s second 
goal was to make economic structural adjustments in order to advance economic 
growth. In 1998, 35% of China’s enterprises did not comply with water pollution 
standards, and 50% of the industrial furnaces did not comply with air pollution 
standards.100 By the end of the year, 13 cities complied with air quality standards, nd 
18 cities complied with water quality standards. Six cities managed to comply with 
both air and water standards.101
In 1999, state leaders emphasized their sincerity about closing enterprises that 
were unable to meet pollution standards by the end of the “yikong shuang dabio” drive 
at the end of this year. EPB directors sometimes went to investigate problems in 
enterprises that had been unable to meet requirements. By the end of November, 56% 
of China’s heavily polluting enterprises and 74% of all other industrial polluting 
enterprises had met standards. Five provinces in the Eastern region got 80% of their 
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enterprises to standard. In the three provinces and cities in the Midwest region got 
70% of their enterprises to standard. 28 cities got their surface water to standard and 
nine cities got their air pollution down to standard.102
“Tui Geng, Huan Lin” Campaign
The “tui geng, huan lin” (converting farmland to forest -and grasslands) 
campaign, primarily run by the Nation Forestry Bureau, began with two demonstration 
areas, the upper reaches of the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers, near the end of 1999. 
The campaign encouraged people to plant trees or grass in recovered crop or barren 
lands. The goals of the campaign included decreasing soil erosion, improving the 
ecological health of the Yangtze and Yellow River Watersheds, and restoring 
grassland and man-made forests to approximately 432,000 hectares of land. The 
campaign involved activities in 13 provinces and over 772 counties. In 1999, 25.87% 
of the land in these areas was forested (or grasslands). The goal of the campaign was 
to increase this area to 38.21% by 2010. The first phase of the project will run from 
2000-2005.  After two years of work, more than 18,670,000 Mu of land had been 
planted with trees or grass in those two areas. In 2002, the campaign was adopted on a 
broader scale. The goal for 2002 was to convert 30 million mu of land. Half of that 
was completed by May of 2002.103
City-Specific Campaigns: Three Case Cities Compared104
Campaigns, or the lack thereof, helped to shape the environmental history of 
each city. As late as 1998, Taiyuan officials had not yet recognized the value of 
encouraging public participation. One enforcement official that wrote a book on the 
issue only mentioned the two GONGOs, Huanjing Baohu Xiehui and the Xuehui, as 
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being non-governmental groups that the EPB could work with to improve 
implementation of environmental law and policy.105 In comparison, officials in 
Chengdu and Beijing recognized the role of public participation in environmental 
protection in the early 1990s. Also, in contrast with Chengdu and Beijing, officials in 
the education section of the EPB in Taiyuan did not directly communicate with quasi-
governmental and student nongovernmental social organizations, such a  the 
Communist Youth League (gongqingtuan), the Young Pioneers (haogongwei), The 
Women’s Federation, and university student environmental groups. Instead, they 
communicated through the official Taiyuan branch of the China Society for 
Environmental Science.106 The personnel in the education section could not remember 
specific activities initiated by the student groups.
It wasn’t until 1999 and 2000 that the number, variety, and depth of education 
programs in Taiyuan began to catch up to those in Chengdu and Beijing in the early to 
mid 1990s. 1999 was the first year that Taiyuan participated in the “green school 
program.” There was environmental curriculum in schools before this program, but 
nothing close to what Chengdu had developed. Taiyuan’s “green school program” 
evolved out of the “special school” program started in 1997. For World Environment 
Day this year, there was an event where school representatives shared their 
experiences in becoming a “green school.”
Beijing’s environmental history has been influenced heavily by the wishes of 
high-level central government and party leaders and because the city is the capital and 
the location for major national events. Because of these conditions, there have been a 
high number of environmental campaigns in Beijing. The campaigns in turn have 
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influenced the level and intensity of public participation, in all forms, in the city. The 
primary environmental campaigns in Beijing have been related to highly visible 
national celebrations and events, including the Asian G mes in 1990, The World 
Women’s Conference in 1995, the return of Hong Kong and the unsuccessful bid for 
the Olympics in 1997, the return of Macao, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 1999, and China’s successful bid in 2002 for the 2008 Olympics. 
Other campaigns in Beijing were similar to those in other cities around the 
country such as the annual campaigns for Earth Day and World Environment Day, 
drives to popularize specific environmental laws and policies, and the “one control t  
meet two targets” (yi kong shuang dabiao) campaign. The campaigns linked to 
Beijing’s status as the nation’s capital and the location for highly visible regional and 
world events have been crucial in shaping Beijing’s environmental history and in 
determining the level and intensity of public participation in the city.
Campaigns not only have directly influenced the level of participation in 
environmental protection activities, they have also indirectly shaped participation by 
“signaling” the population that participation was acceptable and even encouraged in 
the environment sector. Campaigns helped to highlight the specific environmental 
issues that should be addressed by the public and to inform the public which channels 
of participation, such as complaints against illegal polluters, were acceptable or even a 
citizen’s duty. 
Chengdu seemed to focus less on mobilizing citizens through Street 
Committees and encouraging neighborhood monitoring activities and more on 
providing an environmental education and mobilizing citizens through schools. Even 
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before formal arrangements were made between environmental and education 
authorities in 1994 and 1995,107 school officials took it upon themselves to provide 
environmental science and environmental protection education to students and 
mobilize students to participate in “after school” environmental protection activities. 
It is easy to see that Taiyuan has been the least successful in sophisticating 
state-mobilized campaigns. Both a consequence and a cause for this was the fact that 
there was no independent environmental propaganda and education section in the 
Taiyuan city EBP until 1998, and even then, the section was not very proactive. 
Between 1986 and 1998, responsibility for city education tasks fell upon those in the 
Personnel Section.108 At one point, in 1990, there was an education “center,” but it 
was disbanded very early. In contrast, the Chengdu city EPB’s education division was 
established in 1995 and Beijing’s in 1989, and both cities have had an Environmental 
Education Center. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the lack of an education section at the 
Taiyuan EPB did not mean the city EPB did not have any education campaigns at all, 
it did. The city government and environmental protection officials fai ed to make 
environmental education a priority, so the number, scope, and breadth of 
environmental campaigns in Taiyuan were paltry in comparison with other cities. The 
campaigns undertaken by Taiyuan authorities were largely initiated at the national and 
provincial levels and not with activist city EPB officials. Most campaigns began and 
ended with environmental protection personnel and did not filter down into the general 
population through Street Committees or schools. Environmental protection officials 
missed the opportunity to make environmental protection a salient issue, so 
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implementation of environmental laws and policies, advancement of sound 
environmental management, and promotion of social development in Taiyuan suffered 
as a result.
Campaign Mechanics and Mobilizing Structures
Environmental protection officials work with a variety of actors in carrying out 
environmental protection campaigns including national, provincial, city, and street 
party and government organizations. They work with:
• numerous governmental ministries and commissions 
• work units 
• street and village and township offices 
• resident’s committees 
• quasi-governmental organizations 
The list of the other governmental and quasi-governmental organizations that 
work with environmental protection officials to provide environmental education and 
sponsor campaigns has grown longer over time. Some ministries work with SEPA 
because they share jurisdiction over various physical aspects of the environment and 
must work together to implement specific laws and regulations. Others work with 
SEPA because they have access to resources required by SEPA, such as mass media 
outlets. 
EPB and Street Level Participation
Officials in local EPBs responsible for environmental education are the 
liaisons with local village and township committees, work units, and urban street 
offices or wards (banshichu) to bring environmental education down to the people at 
the most basic level in urban areas and to mobilize support of environmental 
protection activities. EPB officials work with specific individuals in the street office or 
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residents’ committee that are responsible for environmental activities. Such volunteers 
or employees of a street office then work with the multitude of residents’ committees 
in urban areas. Carlos Wing-Hung Lo went so far as to say the environmental 
protection representatives with the street offices and residents’ committees were the 
“basic units for the entire mechanism of administration of rules and regulations [in the 
environment sector].109
Wards and residents’ committees are quasi-official state organizations at the 
most grassroots level in Chinese urban areas. These “party-backed” grassroots 
organizations, while being primarily subject to state imperatives, also stimulate 
voluntary citizen participation and gather citizen input into local matters.110 They also 
respond to citizens’ grievances and occasionally still act as mediators in local disputes. 
According to Benjamin Read, the raison d’etre of these organizations is to assist in 
governance and policy implementation at the street level. In the environmental 
protection sector, these committees help to mobilize residents to participate in 
campaigns and to monitor polluting enterprises. The state has worked to strengthen the 
wards and residents’ committees over the past 15 years because of the demand for 
increased social services and the declining responsibility of the work unit to provide 
them. In theory, people in their neighborhood elect committee members, however, the 
street offices typically choose them. Usually, there are no more candidates than there 
are positions to be filled.111
The committees are involved in mobilization and “governance” in a variety of 
ways. “The committees work to diffuse information about laws, policies, campaigns, 
and initiatives to individual constituents.” In addition to just disseminating 
300
information, they also drum up support for state goals and generate and coordinate 
active and passive participation in activities designed to meet these goals, including 
environmental protection goals.112
In campaign style, EPBs work with street offices and residents’ committees at 
various times of the year to popularize environmental laws, garner support for 
environmental protection goals, monitor polluting enterprises, and organize events. In 
Guangdong, residents committees form “small environmental supervision groups 
(huanbao jiandu xiaozu) with “street environmental committees” (jiedao huan wehui) 
under the guidance of district environmental committees and district EPBs, to monitor 
polluting enterprises. In 1991, the supervision groups were involved in 1,400 instances 
of monitoring pollution and discovered 137 problem cases and dealt with 280 
complaints.113
In both Beijing and Taiyuan, at least twice a year, the committees work to 
organize environmental protection activities on Earth Day and World Environment 
Day. For example, in Beijing in 1992, Street Committees and work units hung more 
than 3,000 character posters and banners promoting environmental protection. In 
addition, they hung over 100,000 blackboard newspapers and announcements.114
Responsible parties at the street office and/or residents’ committees organize 
dancers, singers, and other entertainers to participate in activities. They organize 
volunteers to blow up balloons, build props, and create character posters and cloth 
banners for the activity. They mobilize residents to attend activities. They inform the 
local work units of the planned activity, which may then decide to contribute in some 
way. Often companies that manufacture environmental products will display their 
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goods. One official boasted that in the last few years, it has become much easier to 
find volunteers to attend events. Businesses see it as a marketing opportunity.115
Taiyuan EPBs, street offices, and resident’s committees are typically less 
active and have not formed supervision groups. In a rare burst of activism, a 
particularly enthusiastic inner district EPB director went beyond the mandated chore 
of mobilizing volunteers for Earth Day and World Environment Day. He worked with 
street committees quite closely in the late 1990s to gauge resident’s environmental 
knowledge and promote awareness. 
Street committee staff charged with environmental protection duties and EPB 
staff worked together to complete a survey on environmental awareness in his district. 
The street office chose six resident committees to participate in the survey and act as 
liaisons with area residents. EPB officials and committee members visited households, 
leaving a questionnaire, a stamped return addressed envelope, and a small reward for 
participating in the survey, such as a fruit basket. 
This EPB director reviewed the surveys and found some of the individuals in 
his district to have particularly germane comments; so, he asked these people to 
become his special “contacts” in the district. In essence, these individuals became 
special honorary “jiandu yuan” “inspectors or supervisors” for local EPBs. In these 
cases, the individuals not only are a source of information for officials, they 
themselves benefit from the relationship. They receive both instrumental and 
expressive benefits. They help to reduce pollution in their neighborhoods and derive a 
sense of satisfaction because they voiced their support for a cleaner environment. They 
fulfilled their civic duty by reporting potential violations of the law. These individuals 
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operate outside of the formal complaint system, often reporting directly to higher-level 
officials in the EPB.116
The “street-level” environmental protection activist network is highly 
developed in Beijing, more so than in Chengdu or Taiyuan.  The Beijing “network” 
has had far more opportunities to be activated and cultivated. This is because of 
Beijing’s status as the national capital and because it is often the location of national 
ceremonies or events, such as the Asian Games, the 50th Anniversary of the People’s 
Republic, ceremonies for the return of Hong Kong and Macao, and the upcoming 2008 
Olympics.
Quasi-Party Organizations: Turning Environmental Volunteers into Activists
Youth Mobilization 
In the early1990s, NEPA officials stepped up cooperation with quasi-
governmental youth organizations including the Communist Youth League and the 
Young Pioneers to mobilize China’s youth to participate in environmental protection 
campaigns. Top Chinese leaders, including Li Peng showed interest in mobilizing 
China’s youth to participate in environmental protection efforts. In a speech at a 
provincial meeting of the Young Pioneers, Li Peng expressed his wish that people 
should work together to improve environmental protection “from an early age” (yao 
cong xiao zuoqi). He hoped tomorrow’s youth could make China’s “skies bluer, 
ground greener, and water clearer” (tian geng lan, di geng lu, shui geng qing).117
These early education activities probably sought to educate the leaders and activists in 
communist youth organizations in China’s larger cities, so they in turn could begin to 
mobilize the public.
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In January of 1991, Qu Geping from NEPA and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Youth League held a press conference announcing a new nation-wide 
environmental education drive that would last one year.118 In 1992, NEPA and the 
Youth League embarked a related 2-year long national environmental education drive 
to spread environmental values among the nation’s youth. The Youth League 
sponsored propaganda activities to study environmental protection laws and 
environmental knowledge. At the closing of the drive two years later in 1994, youth in 
nearly 100 work units and over 700 individuals were awarded for being progressive 
units and individuals and for their contributions to the drive.119
In some cities, the Youth League would actively participate in other 
environmental campaigns such as those for Earth Day and World Environment Day. In 
Beijing in 1992, environmental education activities flourished in the city because it 
was the 20th anniversary of the UN Declaration on the Human Environment signed at 
Stockholm. 15,000 students signed an “earth pledge.” Young Pioneer Environmental 
Protection Brigades (Honglingbu Huanjing Baohu Dadui) from eight districts and 
counties held a large education activity in Beihai Park.120
At the national level, in 1993, the first “China Youth Environmental Forum” 
took place.121 Top leaders in SEPA, the National People’s Congress Communist 
Youth League made speeches at the forum. The World Bank, the China Trade Union, 
the All Women’s Federation, and the China Science and Technology society extended 
their congratulations via telephone. Three documents were drafted and made public, 
the “China Youth Green Pledge” (Zhongguo Qingnian Luse Yiyan), the “The 21st
Century China Youth Environment Drive” (21 Shiji Zhongguo Qingnian Huanjing 
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Xingdong), and “Recommendations for Environmental Protection Policies in China’s 
Market Economy” (Shichang Jingji Xia Huianjing Baohu de Zhengce Jianyishu). The 
goals of the drive were to motivate youth all over China to become involved in 
environmental protection efforts, to become “pioneers” in these efforts. China’s youth 
were enlisted to help raise everyone’s environmental awareness, to control 
environmental pollution, improve environmental quality and to contribute to the 
realization of efforts to reconcile environmental protection and economic growth.122
The mobilization of youth slowly trickled down to the city level. In Beijing in 
1995 for example, Communist Youth league members planted grass and thousands of 
trees and flowers. League volunteers established 350 “green earth protection 
responsibility Zones” (ludi baohu zirenchu).123 In Chengdu, in 1997, the Communist 
Youth League organized 43 groups of “League Volunteers” (qingnian ziyuanzhe” to 
work on the Funan River cleanup and “greening” campaign.124 I  Taiyuan, it was only 
in the late 1990s that League members were mobilized en masse. In 1998, they were 
mobilized to participate in a massive cleanup of the Fen River, which ran through the 
middle of the city. One collaborative project between the Jiaowei, the League, and the 
EPB was a “Green Drive” (luse xingdong) to plant trees. Specific classes or work units 
took responsibility for the care of individual trees. There was even a sign posted in 
front of each tree indicating which unit had responsibility for its care. That same year, 
the Taiyuan Ministry of Construction worked with the Communist Youth League to 
organize activities for the “make the world a cleaner place” (shi shijie qingjie qilai) 
activity. This world event seeks to get people to be more environmentally aware and to 
clean up their surroundings. The theme for the holiday at the international level was 
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“think of the whole world, but it begins with me” (xinxiang quanqiu congwozuozi). 
The theme in at the national level in China was different; it was “everybody work 
together and clean up the city” (renren dongshou, qingjie chengshi).125
In Taiyuan, in the late 1990s, the EPBs did not work directly with 
nongovernmental organizations. Instead, the EPB worked with the Huanjing Dexue 
Xuehui, a GONGO, which then contacted other GONGOs such as the Women’s’ 
Federation and student environmental groups. At some time, three universities, 
Taiyuan Industrial University, Shanxi University, and the University of Television and 
Broadcasting had some form of an environmental group. A group of students in 
Shanxi University’s Student Union (xueshenghui) formed the Student Union 
Environmental Club to popularize environmental protection on campus. The 
Communist Youth League ran the group at the University of Television and 
Broadcasting (Dianshi Guangbo Daxue), called the “Qing Qing Huanbao She.”126
While these particular groups have disbanded, since September of 2003, students at 
Shanxi University in Taiyuan have become active in holding “green camps” 
(luseying).
In each of the three case cities, at the very least, the Youth League and the 
Young Pioneers became important channels of mobilization for all sorts of 
environmental campaigns throughout the 1990s, including those focused on recycling, 
cleaning up “white trash,” preparing for China’s Olympic bids, improving water and 
energy conservation, and policy enforcement.127
The mobilization efforts of NEPA, the Youth League, and the Young Pioneers 
predate the formation of student environmental groups that are now prolific across the 
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country. Activists that took part in these early youth education drives participated in 
the creation of university student environmental groups and became some of the first 
young members of popular social organizations such as Friends of the Earth.128 These 
early mobilization efforts were successful in training highly motivated activists. 
The Role of Women’s Organizations in Environmental Protection
The All China Women’s Federation involvement in mobilization campaigns 
was less “enthusiastic” than and came later in time than did the various youth groups, 
but it also played an important role in creating environmental “activists” that would 
continue to advance China’s environmental protection goals long after the original 
Federation campaigns ended. 
The Women’s Federation stepped up its involvement with environmental 
protection efforts around 1992. It worked with the State Science and Technology 
Commission, with the support of the UN Economic and Social Council, to put on a 
workshop called “The International Workshop on the role of Women in Environment 
and Sustainable Development” (Funu zai Huanjing He Chixu Fazhanzhong de 
Zuoyung Guoji Yantaohui). 45 representatives from China attended the meeting. Later 
in 1994, At the bequest of the China Delegation to the 4th World Women’s Conference 
Organizing Committee and NEPA, the China Environmental Science Society 
organized a “women and the environment” forum, which took place on 6/5. The main 
topic of the forum was the “role of women in protecting the environment.” Sub-topics 
included “women in environmental management and policy,” “the environment for 
women in enterprises,” “raising environmental awareness at home,” “women and 
green products,” and “ecological degradation and poverty.” In addition, that year, the 
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NPC Central Committee, the CPPCC, the State Council, and NEPA honored 100 
women involved in environmental protection work.129
In 1995, the China Environmental Science Society and the Federation 
sponsored a meeting in Beijing called “Women and the Environment.” The groups 
invited 40 experts, officials, and workers from, enterprises, research institutes, 
vocational schools, universities, ecological and agricultural trial work units, social 
organizations and governmental agencies to the meeting to discuss ways in which 
women could contribute to environmental protection efforts. Also present at the 
meeting were representatives from several foreign organizations including the UN 
Women’s Development Foundation, the Canadian Embassy, and the Ford 
Foundation.130
The Women’s Federation received a donation of 10,000,000 Yuan from the 
Maifu Company for environmental education purposes. It was used to organize a 
large-scale education program in conjunction with the All China Women’s Federation 
that lasted from October 1997 to June 1998. The program was called “women, the 
home, and the environment.” 2,000,000 women from around the nation (20 provinces) 
participated. Over 700,000 women competed in an environmental knowledge contest 
and participated in a lecture series and other activities. An accompanying slogan was 
“environmental protection, each person is respon ible, every household participates.” 
On World Environment Day, 100 prominent women were given awards for their 
environmental protection work connected to the campaign.131
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Local Women’s Federation Activities
The Women’s Federation worked to promote the participation of women in 
environmental protection efforts at the local level across China, although women’s 
groups were more active in some areas. 
Women’s groups were active in Beijing in the early 1990s. In 1992, the 
Women’s Federation mobilized 2,324 “green management protection teams” (luuse 
guanhu dui), in which more than 16,225 people participated. The teams put on the 
“March 8th, Green Program” (Sanba Lusi Gongcheng). Over 620,000 women from all 
over the city participated in tree planting and beautification projects. They cleaned up 
thousands of balconies and courtyards and planted more than 5,500,000 trees.132
In Chengdu, women’s groups began to participate later in the decade. The EPB 
worked with the All Women’s Federation to sponsor a workshop to discus “family, 
infrastructure, and the environment” (jiayuan, jianshe, huanjing). Participants 
included women experts and academics. Topics of discussion included sustainable 
development in Chengdu. Participants put forth a number of suggestions and 
comments, which garnered the attention of the city Party Standing Committee and the 
city government.133
In Taiyuan, during the late 1990s, there was some effort on the part of 
authorities to involve government organized social organizations, such as the All 
Women’s Federation, and the general public in environmental campaigns. There was a 
large drive to clean up the Fen River, which runs through the city. Over 40,000 people 
including Federation members participated in efforts to mitigate soil erosion problems, 
plant grasses, and pick up trash.134 In 1998, the city EPB worked with the Women’s’ 
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Federation to put on educational activities called the “Bingzhou Funu ‘Aiwojiayuan” 
(love my planet). They organized “weming” families from 10 districts, counties, and 
small cities in Taiyuan. They went onto every major street to hold the “Saturday 
environmental protection volunteer family activities.” They introduced they concept of 
recycling, introduced household sanitation, they planted trees and flowers, picked up 
trash in parks and along the river. More than 8,000 households participated in this 
particular activity. In the Wanbolin district alone, over 1200 families worked together 
to clean up over a hundred dead fish, 3,000 tons of trash, clean up ponds and plant 
trees and flowers. In Xianghualing, the Women’s’ Federation and the EPB organized 
more than 500 households to clean up plastic bags and trash along the Beishao 
River.135
As the previous paragraphs suggest, in some areas, women started very early 
and made longer-term commitments to promoting environmental protection. In other 
areas, women did not become active in environmental protection activities until the 
late 1990s and did not continue their environmental protection work after the end of 
national campaigns. In Xian, the Women’s Federation continued with local 
environmental protection activities. Women there created a quasi non-governmental 
group under the auspicious of the Women’s Federation, devoted to supporting 
environmental protection efforts. In contrast, the Women’s Federation in Taiyuan did 
not continue their environmental education activities after the national drive 
concluded. The mobilization of women’s groups was not as successful as mobilization 
efforts with youth groups, if success is measured by how proactive these groups 
became once nationally mobilized campaigns ended.
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Conclusion
“Mass campaign-like” mobilization efforts still exist in China. These efforts, 
however, are not as political or as disruptive to daily life as their Mao period 
predecessors. Campaigns involve less “struggle” both among the people and between 
man and nature, although individuals and organizations may be “criticized” for 
sluggish implementation or failure to attain campaign goals. In addition, there are 
fewer, if any, campaigns meant to purge individuals or groups on political grounds. 
Part of the reason for this is the general overall decline of the use of Maoist ideology 
to justify state policies. In addition, the main responsibility for mobilization has 
shifted from party apparatus to governmental bodies. Propaganda campaigns have 
became less a function of political education and more a function of general 
educational goals. However, authorities motivate participation by appealing to 
citizens’ link to the collective good. Action campaigns, while still working to instill 
group unity, “socialist spiritual values,” nationalism, and raise citizen awareness, are 
focused on achieving concrete policy goals such as reforestation. 
As the political functions of campaigns have been downplayed nd state-
society “cooperation” has been emphasized, how has this affected the function, 
structure, mechanics and phases of environmental protection campaigns?Patterns 
across campaigns show that many of the original functions of campaigns have 
endured, as have some campaign stages and processes. However, the political function 
of campaigns is attenuated and campaigns are much less coercive. Modern campaigns 
are meant to achieve specific policy goals, but also to instill love of one’s country, to 
promote the socialist spiritual culture, and to mold a spiritually rich movement.136
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Campaigns have served to help strengthen implementation efforts. When 
officials responsible for carrying out policies approach enterprises, they justify their 
demands by spouting the current campaign slogans and guiding principles. In other 
words, campaigns are still used as justification for action in conjunction with the law.
An examination of the various campaigns illustrates various patterns across 
campaigns. Campaigns in the environment sector still work to accomplish a variety of 
goals including 1) implement existing policy; 2) emulate model experience or 
demonstration; 3) introduce and popularize a new policy; 4) correct deviations from 
public norms 5) rectify leadership malpractices among responsible cadres or 
organizations; and 6) effect enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social 
institutions. There are still large-scale, national level campaigns as well as more 
localized campaigns. 
All sorts of issues are the subjects of campaigns, but the three main areas 
covered in campaigns are education, enforcement, and issues that require mass action, 
like tree planting. Campaigns usually accompany the promulgation of new policies 
and laws, especially major laws and unpopular enforcement policies, such as the order 
to close down small-scale factories. Some campaigns mobilize citizens to take action, 
such as the tree planting and trash clean-up campaigns. Other campaigns praise 
outstanding behavior, while educating the target population. 
Most campaign goals are determined at higher levels of government. In other 
words, provinces will be responsible for implementing campaigns initiated at the 
national level. Some provinces devise their own priorities and campaigns as well as
implement national goals. Likewise, cities will be responsible for implementing the 
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provincial agenda at the city level, as well as devise their own priorities. This 
delegation of responsibility also happens at the district and county levels. For 
example, the early “Environmental Education Month” campaign was initiated by the 
State Council Environmental Protection Leading Small Group, and the propaganda 
department of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee at the national lev l and was implemented by party apparatus at lower 
administrative levels. After new environmental laws are passed at the national level, 
lower administrative levels organize “study sessions” to popularize the laws at the 
local level. Likewise, authorities take the China Century Environmental Protection 
Drive, which started as a nation level campaign, and replicate it at lower 
administrative levels through the local People’s Congresses and media outlets.
Today, campaigns involve “truer” volunteerism than they ave been in the 
past. Environmental protection officials boasted that they only had to announce they 
were looking for enterprises and units to participate in World Environment Day 
activities to receive a number of volunteers. In addition, many of the mobilized 
groups, especially youth group went on to mobilize their own activities. A new 
volunteerist spirit has taken root; Mao would be proud. However, he might not be so 
happy about the lack of struggle in modern day campaigns. 
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Chapter 6
Diversity Among Environmental Social Organizations: 
Corporatist Actors and Chinese Activists
“Citizens are environmental protection’s primary soldiers. If there 
is no public support and participation, even the best policies will be 
useless. After there is more widespread public participation in managing 
environmental quality, then we can create an atmosphere that supports 
environmental protection. Consequently, we can advance our 
environmental objectives.” (Xie Zhenhua’s speech at the 1995 celebration 
commemorating World Environment Day.)1
This chapter focuses on China’s environmental social organizations (ESOs) 
(huanjing baohu shehuituanti or huanbao shetuan for short), the groups in China 
closest to environmental nongovernmental organizations common in the West. It 
examines ESOs theoretically and answers the question of why these groups emerged 
when they did. Issues concerning ESOs to be analyzed include: their development 
over time, their relationship with governmental and party actors, their agendas, and the 
factors contributing to, or hindering, their further expansion. Further, this chapter 
examines the role of ESOs in China’s potential environmental movements and their 
efforts to influence policy outcomes.
Why not call Chinese environmental groups nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)?2 Part of the reason why is because they are not called NGOs in the Chinese 
language. In addition, not all Chinese environmental groups are independent from the 
government. 
In China, authorities group all of the non-profit organizations, foundations, 
GONGOs, popular ESOs, and citizen non-profit enterprises, together in one category 
called social organizations, or shetuan. However, it is theoretically useful and practical 
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to spit the category of shetuan into separate distinct subgroups. There are six different 
types of ESOs, categorized based on their relationship to the state. 
• GONGOs: these are government organized nongovernmental organizations
that deal directly with the general public and have a public service orientation, 
but maintain a very close relationship to the state.
• Professional GONGOs: organizations established by the government that are 
structured and act like trade, business, or professional associations.
• Popular social organizations (minjian zuzhi): these are more autonomous 
environmental organizations created by one or more motivated individuals.
• Citizen non-profit enterprises:3 these are popular organizations, unable or 
chose not to register with the government, instead register as enterprises, even 
though they do not usually engage in for-profit activities. 
• Informal networks: these are informal, unregistered organizations, or more 
correctly, loose networks of volunteers, some of which are web-based. 
• Student groups: these groups are founded and run by students, usually at the 
university level. 
While corporatism usually refers to business organizations, the concepts and 
models can be applied just as easily to the non-pr fit sector. In this chapter, 
corporatism in the non-profit sector is called “civic corporatism.”4 While the popular 
ESOs are still tethered to the state because of legal and bureaucratic controls, they can 
be construed as members of a very tenuous civil society, and at times, as social 
movement organizations. 
As in other countries where environmental nongovernmental organizations 
have played critical roles in creating environmental movements, Chinese ESOs have 
been crucial to the emergence of China’s first environmental proto-m vements. ESOs 
act as social movement organizations i  China’s emerging nature and wildlife 
conservation proto-movement. This chapter explains why ESOs have been very active 
in the wildlife conservation proto-movements and in “green-life” activism but have 
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not been as active in an anti-pollution movement, as one would expect given the 
experiences of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.5
Some professional government-organized nongovernmental organizations 
(GONGOs) appeared in the late 1970s and 1980s, but most appeared in the 1990s. All 
of the popular ESOs (minjian zuzhi) appeared in the 1990s.6 The numbers of each type 
of ESO are increasing at a gradual pace, except for student organizations, which are 
proliferating rapidly. Part of the reason for this is the legal framework guiding ESO 
development.
There is a weak legal framework to support the long-term development of the 
ESO sector, and without this legal foundation, the ability of ESOs to mobilize 
resources, to increase their capacity, and to network will remain limited. The citizen 
non-profit enterprises, the informal networks, and the student groups are not subject to 
the same laws as the registered social organizations, so it is likely they will proliferate 
more rapidly, but their fate is just as tenuous as registered organizations. Student 
groups can be shut down by schools and non-profit enterprises can be shut down by 
their supervisory government organ. 
While Chinese ESOs are not structured like NGOs in Western nations, they do 
fulfill some of the functions usually attributed to NGOs in other countries. They 
provide environmental education to the public and often mobilize the public to 
participate in environmental protection activities. They legitimize the state’s 
environmental protection efforts, and some of them provide scientific, economic, or 
legal expertise to society and to governmental actors.
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Theoretically Re-Conceptualizing Chinese Social Organizations
How should we view China’s ESOs theoretically? Theoretically, China’s 
social organizations fit into more than one conceptual category, depending upo  the 
group in question. Several different models and theories are “tried on” to see which 
best fits the emerging groups in China. The first theoretical framework to be applied 
considers Chinese ESOs to be corporatist structures, the second regards ESOs a social
movement organizations (SMOs), and the third views them as components of civil 
society.
ESOs as Corporatist Structures
The concept of corporatism is broad and in many cases, not well defined. 
There are three main conceptualizations of corporatism:7 Some see it as a system of 
political economy distinct from capitalism and socialism;8 Others view it as a form of 
the state within a capitalist society;9 Finally, some consider it as a system of interest 
representation.10  In this research, corporatism is seen as the latter - a system of 
interest representation.11
Phillippe Schimitter’s definition of corporatism as interest representation is 
adopted in this research because it best describes the empirical reality in China. His 
definition is as follows:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation12 in 
which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and 
supports.13
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Schmitter’s definition outlines the fundamental belief underlying a corporatist 
system; primarily, the unity of fractured interests in society can be achieved through 
authoritarian guidance by the state.14 Schmitter’s definition has been widely utilized 
and is still the most useful.
State and social corporatism are two of the main types of corporatism.15 In 
state corporatism, organizational or institutional interests are included in the policy 
process because they ultimately help the state. Social corporatism, on the other hand, 
describes the process whereby groups in society develop autonomously to better 
facilitate interest articulation from social groups. 
Typically, corporatist models have only applied to economic and occupational 
interests. The focus of these studies has been on the relationship between the state and 
associations with organized interests, such as labor unions and business associations, 
regarding the issues of capital and labor. The studies of corporatist structures in China 
also focused on economic-corporate groups and their role in the political system.16
However, as Nedelmann and Meier point out, Schmitter’s definition can be 
applied more broadly.17 Nedelmann and Meier assert that if one wants to generalize 
about state-society relations as a whole, then one must also examine other types of 
interests and social groups outside of the economic realm. Therefore, applying 
corporatist models to non-profit organizations has some historical justification. To 
distinguish corporatism in the non-profit sector, in this research, corporatism will be 
called “civic-corporatism.” 
To see if the state civic- orporatist model is useful, we must first outline what 
ESOs would look like if they were corporatist. If Chinese ESOs are corporatist 
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structures, then their leaders are approved or appointed by the state. Some may even 
be established by the state itself. The state may also have some control over the 
organizations’ agendas. In return, the ESO would have a “representative monopoly” in 
its respective realm. For example, a research organization may have a monopoly on 
supplying the state with certain kinds of data. A corporatist organization may have 
some autonomy, but its recognized interests will generally be in line with those of the 
state. 
ESOs as Social Movement Organizations
The second theoretical model to be applied is that of social movement 
organizations. Social movement theories were already discussed in chapter two of this 
dissertation, so they will not be repeated here; but it is useful, however to take a clos r 
look at social movement organizations (SMOs), which are crucial for the emergence 
and development of a social movement. 
While SMOs help create political opportunities for a movement to emerge and 
they help shape the nature of a movement, these organizatio s themselves are 
influenced by the political context within which they emerge, in turn influencing their 
role in social movements. In other words, “external opportunities impact movement 
structures, which in turn influence the kind and level of mobilization.”18 It should be 
pointed out that China’s ESOs may not look or act exactly like SMOs in other 
countries simply because of the unique political opportunities in China that shape the 
development of ESOs. For example, in China, political opportunities for direct, 
flamboyant protest against governmental and party authorities are minimal. So, unlike 
SMOs in the U.S. and South Korea, Chinese SMOs may not directly engage in what 
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Americans would consider overtly contentious politics with the state, such as 
organizing protests to surround Zhongnanhai to demand higher compensation for 
victims of pollution. This raises an important point: If contentious politics is at the 
heart of a social movement, does this mean that SMOs in China must engage in 
contentious or disruptive tactics?
A specific action, such as writing a book criticizing the construction of the 
Three Gorges Dam, may not be controversial in the U.S. or Western Europe, but it 
could be considered contentious within China’s political context. It is arguable that 
contention itself is socially constructed. If citizens must utilize extra-institutional 
channels and that if citizens and authorities believe they are in contention with each 
other, then they are. 
The definition of contention therefore is society specific. This approach is 
more closely associated with the culturally oriented scholars such as John Foran and 
Hank Johnston.19 Again, the political opportunities that shape the structure of China’s 
ESOs also shapes their activities. A letter campaign or student “gatherings” to try to 
stop logging in Yunnan province in order to save habitat for the Golden Monkey or 
writing a book opposing the Three Gorges Dam is contentious within the Chinese 
context. However, if Chinese ESOs do not act in a contentious manner nd they do not 
mobilize dense social networks toward reaching a common goal, then the SMO model 
would not be quit appropriate. 
If Chinese ESOs were SMOs, then they would bring people together into 
strong social networks, bound by “inherited cultural symbols,” that would engage in 
sustained collective, contentious politics with elite opponents and/or authorities.20
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ESOs as SMOs would be grassroots organizations that mobilize individuals and 
groups to start and sustain movements. They not only mobilize participants, they also 
disseminate information, help to forge a collective identity, and even satisfy the 
interests of their leaders.21 In this case, another model would be necessary. One 
possible model is civil society. 
The Search for Civil Society in China: A Historical Perspective
Previous scholars have found the term “civil society”22 problematic in the 
Chinese context. The concept of civil society was created in the West, so one cannot 
expect to find exactly the same phenomenon in the East. One popular Western 
definition of civil society is as follows: “civil society is that arena of social 
engagement existing above the individual yet below the state. It is a complex network 
of economic, cultural, and social practices based on friendship, custom, the market, 
and voluntary affiliation. It consists of structures that shape public affairs.”23
In the Chinese language, “civil society” is not directly translatable. The Chinese 
terms closest in meaning are w nming shehui (cultural society) and “the public 
sphere.” A definition of the public sphere in the Chinese context is “ an arena of 
nonstate activity at the local level that contributes to the supply of services and 
resources to the public good.”24 Wakeman’s definition is narrow and excludes 
anything about civil society shaping public affairs.25
During the imperial and republican periods, the public sphere in China was much 
smaller and more commercial in its orientation than the civil society found in the 
West, and at no time was it strong enough to influence the state on a large scale. In 
China, the public sphere relied on elite public participation and was centered on 
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groups and localities instead of on individuals and private property.26  Scholars 
categorize trends in the development of China’s public sphere into four periods: the 
Imperial period (221 B.C. to 1911),27 the Republican period (1912 to 1949), the 
Communist period (1949 to 1978), and the Post-Deng period (1978-present). 
Organizations that developed in the late Qing Dynasty probably come the closest to 
resembling civil society. There was a general weakening of the state due to a 
succession of weak emperors, rebellion, encroachment from the West, and the advent 
of nationalism.28 National issues interrupted local life and public opinion about 
national issues emerged. Officials were criticized and eventually national reforms 
were carried out.29
During the Mao period from 1949 to 1978, philanthropic and religious 
activities were discouraged vigorously; civil organizations and the government 
monopolized mobilization structures and resources.Few, if any, independent non-
governmental organizations conducted activities. The “political space” for non-
governmental organizations essentially did not exist during this period due to the 
extensive power and control of the state.
A civil society needs the consent of the state to function properly and this 
consent did not really ever exist under Chinese imperial rule, in Confucian traditions, 
or under Mao Zedong’s communist system. However, an elite public sphere, vaguely 
resembling civil society, did form during certain periods in China’s history and might 
again in the future. 
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Re-emergence of Social Organizations in China in the Post-Mao Period: The 
Importance of Political Opportunities
After 1978, the political and economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping paved the 
way for the re-emergence of a private economy and of semi-autonomous civic 
organizations. Some of these groups were active in policy research and advocacy, but 
these organizations were shut down or forced to temporarily suspend their activities 
due to the political clampdown after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989; thus marking a 
break in the development of quasi-nongovernmental groups. 
After Tiananmen, these groups proliferated rapidly in the 1990s.  The old 
Confucian traditions of philanthropy also re-emerged, as businessmen turned to 
charity as an alternative to being taxed and as a way to improve their social standing.30
The semi-autonomous relief and educational organizations that began to re-emerge 
were even welcomed by a government that found itself increasingly unable to stretch 
its resources to provide adequate social services. The recognition by the Chinese state 
that it needed social groups to assist with meeting the needs of China’s population 
created space for this re-emergence. In the 1990s, it became possible to speak of social 
organizations in terms of providing an alternative or a supplement to the government 
supply of goods and services.31
The term “non-governmental organization” became more commonplace after 
the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women was held in the PRC;32 but in 1996, it 
was still not possible to think of social organizations in terms of fostering the 
development of pluralism, though the central government did acknowledge there were 
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some functions outside its control. According to the Vice Premier of the State Council: 
“The use of social organizations is to concentrate capital and to meet needs that the 
government is unable to meet. We support their legal status. As to foundations, they 
are to pool funds from citizens, officials and organizations. We rely mainly on state 
funds, but a country so large cannot do everything.”33 Chinese leaders were heartened 
by international praise for emerging social organizations in China and by those who
said the emergence of these groups signaled that China was now a “modern” country. 
The acknowledgement by Chinese leaders and government officials that the 
state could not “do everything” represents a shift to a more rational view of state-
society relations and a sophistication of the state’s approach to those relations. 
However, it is important to note that the state still has a large role in shaping the 
number, nature, and activities of social organizations. It keeps them tethered to the 
state through regulatory measures, as will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
The Rise of Environmental Social Organizations
There are five main reasons why environmental social organizations began to 
appear in the early 1990s and each of these reasons represents a change in the 
opportunity structure shaping participation. First, as noted above, Deng’s reforms 
essentially created the initial opening for major forces to begin working in favor of 
ESO development in China and the establishment of social organizatio s in other 
sectors in the late 1980s helped make space for ESOs to emerge. Second, the global 
expansion of environmental NGOs and other international pressures helped to 
determine when ESOs emerged in China. In addition, China needed organizations that 
could interface with foreign nongovernmental organizations and could help draw in 
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financial and other resources. Third, authorities encouraged the creation of ESOs. 
Environmental protection officials realized they needed the public’s assistance in 
optimizing the enforcement of environmental laws and policies at the local level. 
Fourth, local EPBs began to expand environmental education programs to the broader 
public, so more citizens became concerned with pollution and environmental 
deterioration. Fifth, individuals began to take more initiative to promote wider public 
participation in the environmental protection sector.  
Liberalization of the Economy and Governmental Decentralization 
Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping initiated the “open door” policy, China as 
revived the private economic sphere and has also become increasingly integrated into 
the international system. Contact with international environmental institutions has 
probably influenced the strategies China adopts in addressing environmental 
problems. China’s push for economic development has spawned horrific 
environmental degradation, but also has generated the wealth necessary to address 
environmental problems with modern technologies. China has instituted economic 
reforms, encouraged private business, begun to decentralize the economy, privatized 
some government industries, established a stock market, and consistently wooed 
foreign investment. China’s growth rate has been in double-digit figures for several 
years in a row. This high growth rate has also brought inflation, corruption, 
unemployment, crime, social instability, and high expectations. The dismantling of the 
centrally controlled economy has started to alter the social system, and the government 
has encouraged some economic self- uf iciency. According to the National 
Committee’s interpretation, China’s economic goals have been to encourage growth in 
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the non-state industries, commerce, and the service sector so that the economy will be 
able to employ the growing work force.34
Global Expansion of Environmental NGOs and other International 
Pressures
The proliferation of environmental NGOs around the globe has put pressure on 
Chinese leaders to establish governmental ESOs (GONGOs) and to allow more 
independent groups to form. The prominence that some international environmental 
NGOs have gained through media exposure may have contributed to the spread of the 
ESO concept in the PRC. Increasingly Chinese students have studied abroad in the 
US, Britain, Australia, Germany, and Japan since the late 1970s and have been 
exposed to environmental NGOs. Some of these people helped to spread the ESO 
concept within academic circles upon their return to China. 
In addition, Agenda 2135, which was signed at the Rio Conference in 1992, 
includes a chapter calling for an expanded role for ESOs in environmental protection. 
“Governments should involve non-governmental organizations in sustainable 
development plans, making the best use of their abilities in such areas as education, 
alleviation of poverty and environmental protection and rehabilitation...”36 The rather 
sudden expansion of GONGOs in 1994 corresponds with the implementation of 
Agenda 21. 
The environmental NGO networks that have built up in many countries, and 
across boarders, have become more complex, increased their resources and have much 
to offer in the way of scientific knowledge and contacts. China’s leaders do not want 
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to “miss out” on these resources, and will be motivated to support an expanding ESO 
sector that can participate in these networks. 
The Chinese government has set up ESOs in order to be eligible for financial 
and capacity building opportunities with foreign organizations. Some U.S. grant-
making organizations do not normally fund governmental organizations in foreign 
countries (although some do). To be eligible for grant funds from these organizations, 
the Chinese government may have set up, quasi-autonomous NGOs (GONGOs) to 
serve as “front organizations.” In China, agreements must be set up by “like 
organizations,” so a Chinese governmental agency cannot sign a formal agreement 
with a US NGO. The Chinese government has been known to set up a “front 
organization” in this type of situation as well, so that agreements can be carried out. 
This occurred when the National Committee on US-China Relations, a non-profit 
organization in the US, set up the Ussuri Watershed Land Use Planning Project. The 
non-governmental organization that was set up by the Chinese government that 
eventually worked with the National Committee consisted of the sam scientists and 
policy makers that were previously employed by the government agencies in the area. 
The organization was “non-governmental” in name only.37 The trilateral project was 
“designed to form a team of American, Chinese, and Russian natural scientists, social 
scientists, and public policy specialists who undertake activities aimed at sustainable 
development in the 20,000,000 hectare Ussuri River watershed.”38
Chinese ESOs also have contact with foreign and international environmental 
and other organizations, which will help to build Chinese ESO capacity. From the 
early 1990s, ESOs like FON and others forged relationships with environmental 
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groups from Hong Kong, such as Friends of the Earth, as well as groups in India and 
South Korea.39
Encouragement and Support from Officials
Opportunities for public participation expanded due to increased 
encouragement by authorities. Some of this encouragement was informal and some 
was in the form of formal declarations. Evidence of formal support can be found in the 
Chinese Agenda 21. In Agenda 21, state leaders declared their commitment “to 
improve the system for making and investigating complaints, and expand the public’s 
role in the enforcement of sustainable development laws so as to ensure that 
individuals, groups and organizations with legal standing have reliable channels for 
participating in the enforcement process to protect their legal rights and public 
interests.”40
Environmental protection officials began to recognize that it was “only through 
participation by the public and support from citizens could the implementation of 
government environmental protection measures and policies be improved;  “we need 
environmental social organizations.”41 By the early 1990s, the environmental 
protection apparatus had begun to be more assertive, giving concerned citizens 
stronger allies in the government. The founders of the first registered Chinese ESO, 
Friends of Nature, FON, made the move to establish a group after receiving 
encouragement to do so by a high level environmental protection official.42  In 1995, 
the State Council issued a decision that encouraged local governments and ministries 
to establish opportunities and systems to promote public participation and to “bring 
social organizations into play.” They emphasized that public participation in 
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environmental protection work was useful in bringing up and revealing unlawful 
behaviors.43
Allies in the government helped to provide political opportunities for ESOs to 
become established and have directly encouraged and supported ESO activities. One 
example of this support is the encouragement given to FON and others in their 
campaign to save the Golden Monkey and its habitat in Yunnan. The campaign 
received support from some local party and governmental officials as well as from 
national-level party and governmental officials.44 High-level authorities recognize that 
the government needs citizen participation in order to implement environmental laws 
and policies and that it cannot achieve environmental protection goals without public 
involvement.45
Deterioration of China’s Environmental Quality and Rising Environmental 
Consciousness
Widespread environmental degradation in China and rising environmental 
awareness are forces for the development of environmental ESOs.  ESOs began to 
appear at the same time environmental protection authorities began to expand 
environmental education campaigns to the general public,46 which is not a 
coincidence. Before the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmental education efforts 
focused on educating environmental protection officials, governmental officials, 
workers in polluting enterprises, primary and secondary school teachers.47 Starting in 
the early 1990s, authorities expanded education activities to include more ordinary 
citizens. These education efforts helped citizens began to see that pollution might not 
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be inevitable. Citizens became more aware of China’s multiple environmental 
problems. 
The list of China’s environmental problems is long. According to the 1995 
Report on the State of the Environment in China, issued by the National 
Environmental Protection Agency, the seven major environmental problems in China 
are: water pollution (70 percent of the nation’s rivers are polluted and forty one of the 
forty four major cities have groundwater contamination problems); urban air pollution, 
(respiratory disease rate is extremely high); industrial toxic and hazardous solid wastes 
and urban refuse; comparative shortage of surface water resources in the Northern 
regions and shortages in many cities (ground subsidence in at least five major cities 
exists because of over pumping aquifers); serious soil erosion; deforestation and 
serious grassland degeneration; and reduction of habitat.
There is evidence of a growing environmental consciousness. One survey, 
done in the early 1990s, found that 99 percent of the respondents felt environmental 
pollution and ecological destruction in China were “serious” or “fairly serious” 
matters and 95 percent of them were worried that environmental pollution might 
damage their health.48 The former director of the Institute of Environment and 
Development said she started the ESO because she felt that environmental pollution in 
China was a big problem and that people should not just depend on the government to 
solve the problem.49 Governmental education efforts helped to raise citizens’ 
environmental awareness and concern. They helped citizens to see environmental 
protection as not only the purview of experts, but as a responsibility of each 
individual.
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Individual Initiative as a Factor
Finally, individual citizens took more initiative to expand public participation. 
Citizens concerned with environmental quality were hearted by the Chinese state’s 
efforts at environmental protection and took up the call for citizen participation in the 
environment sector. On prominent example of individual initiative is Liang Congjie, 
the founder of FON. He took to heart the part of the Environmental Protection Law 
that calls on the public to take action to protect the environment. He feels it is the duty 
of ordinary citizens to work with the government to improve environmental quality. In 
the early 1990s, he felt he had the responsibility to mobilize and motivate people to 
understand that diminished environmental quality should not be the price of 
development. Further, he wanted to educate the public about endangered species and 
motivate others to help preserve the environment for future generations.50
Laws Regulating ESO Expansion 
In China, all of the different types of organizations that remotely resemble 
social groups, including associations, foundations,51 research institutes, and other 
groups, fall under the official heading of social organizations. There has been a broad, 
general framework regarding social organizations since the 1950s. Registration of 
associations used to be handled by the now-defunct Ministry of Internal Affairs based 
on the regulation “Provisional Measures Regarding the Registration of Social 
Organizations.” At this point in time, the term social organizations referred to the 
quasi-governmental organizations such as the Communist Youth League, the All 
Women’s Federation, and the Young Pioneers. In 1988, responsibility for managing 
social organizations was handed over to the newly created Social Organizations 
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Department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs; in 1989, state leaders promulgated a new 
regulation, “Measures on the Registration of Social Organizations”52
Starting in 1995, there was a two-year moratorium on the registration of social 
organizations until three new regulations were promulgated in October of 1998. At 
that time, the Department of Civic Organization Management was established within 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs to manage registration activities. The new regulations are: 
1) Regulations Concerning the Registration and Management of Social Organizations 
(Shehui tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli);53 2) Provisional Regulations Concerning the 
Registration and Management of Civil Non-profit Enterprises, (Minban Feiqiye 
Danwei Dengji Guanli Zhanxing Tiaoli); and 3) Provisional Regulations Concerning 
the Registration and Management of Institutions (Shiye Danwei Dengji Guanli 
Zhanxing Tiaoli), this type of organization would typically be concerned with 
research.
According to these new laws, social organizations and civil non-profit 
enterprises still require the review and approval of two governmental agencies: the 
appropriate professional supervisory agency and the Bureau or Ministry of Civil 
Affairs at the same administrative level as the applying organization. Getting approv l 
from the professional supervisory agency is the most difficult part of getting 
registered. For example, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
would have to review and approve any national-level organization applying to conduct 
activities related to environmental protection and the Beijing Municipal 
Environmental Protection Bureau would have to approve of any Beijing-based 
organization. The professional supervisory agency is called the guakao (“mother-in-
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law”) unit and vouches for and takes responsibility for the organization seeking 
registration. While it is unclear what would happen to the sponsoring agency if a 
social organization steps out of bounds, being saddled with such a responsibility is 
enough to discourage governmental agencies from granting approval lightly.
The social organization measure outlines other strict requirements. Provision 
ten requires that a social organization have at least fifty members. It may be difficult 
for an organization to get this many members when it is in its infancy. It may lead 
organizations to remain unregistered in their initial phase of development. The same 
provision dictates that national level organizations have 100,000 yuan in assets and 
funding and a local organization have 30,000 yuan. Social organizations are allowed 
to be legal entities and can establish branch organizations, but civil non-profit 
enterprises may not. 
If a social organization already exists whose activities are the same or similar 
to the organization registering, then there is “no need” to establish another one.54 On 
this basis alone, an organization could be denied first-tier social organization status. 
This provision helps to set up the corporatist relationship between the state and social 
organizations. It gives an organization a representational monopoly in its respective 
category. 
This restriction does not apply to civil non-profit enterprises and institutions. 
Institutions, however, can only be established by governmental agencies or by other 
organizations using governmental funds. While there are fewer restrictions regarding 
the establishment of civic non-profit enterprises, it still may be difficult for this type of 
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not-for-profit organization to obtain the approval of their appropriate “professional” 
supervisory agency. 
Some social organizations evaded state control by taking a different route to 
obtain legal status, such as Beijing Global Village. These organizations have 
registered as for-profit enterprises. In some respects, this is an easier route, but the for-
profit status may make some potential donors stay away. Other groups have avoided 
getting registered at all, such as Beijing’s Green Earth Volunteers. These groups get 
together on an ad hoc basis, but they still are able to mobilize a large number of 
people. Again, potential donors may shy way from these organizations. 
In summary, the main impediments to the establishment of more social 
organizations are the requirement to get approval of a supporting professional 
supervisory government agency and the limit of one representative organization in an 
administrative area. The rapid increase in the number of student organizations shows 
that when there are not regulations limiting their development, organizations will 
proliferate. 
While the three new laws have h lped to clarify the legal status of social 
organizations, they do not make it any easier for citizens to establish a social 
organization or even a civic non-profit enterprise. The laws help to clarify who can 
establish a social organization and how, thus making establishing an ESO legal. On 
the other hand, the laws severely inhibit wider proliferation of ESOs because it is so 
hard to get approval form a guakao organization. Along with legal restrictions, 
numerous other factors inhibit the rapid expansion of ESOs in China. 
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Barriers to ESO Expansion
Earlier work on ESOs in China suggests that the two factors most important in 
shaping ESO development have been the “greening” of the central state and the 
government’s “alternating politics of tolerance and strict control of civil 
organizations.”55 While both of these are important, other factors are also important 
including cultural tendencies and the “socioeconomic dependency’ structures unique 
to China.
Cultural and Political Constraints
A political culture largely shaped by Confucian and Marxist-Leninist 
traditions, and the current political, social, and economic structures will all work 
against the development of independent social organizations in China. Lucian Pye 
maintains that political culture is important when trying to understand political 
developments in China.56 Below is a somewhat simplified argument as to why 
political culture is extremely important for understanding state-society relations and 
the nature of social organizations in China.
According to some, Chinese political culture is fraught with dualism, but 
Lucian Pye isolates Confucianist Leninism as a dominant thread that continues to 
influence Chinese politics. He points out that the interactions of the two have 
produced tensions, but have also accentuated the following psycho-cultural factors: 
• the continuing practice of teaching people how to behave; everyone is 
trained as to what constitutes correct behavior. 
• the idea of conformity is pervasive and shapes behavior. 
• the moral behavior of individuals is framed in the context of the 
collective, which produces considerable attention to superior-
subordinate relationships. 
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These traditions create a “marked instinct for hierarchy” and respect for 
authority.57 These psycho-cultural factors help to shape state-society relations and 
have tended to create a dualistic cycle of behavior that Pye calls protesting 
mistreatment and stoic fatalism. People will tend to tolerate a situation until something 
causes a sudden protest. People tend to complain yet will continue to endure a 
situation indefinitely. All these factors increase the “costs” of collective action, forcing 
a type of “assurance game,”58 that is, there will be no collective action unless enough 
people are willing to join in. The Chinese did not abandon their Confucian traditions 
before adopting Communism and both these traditions have sought to restrict social 
dissent.59
The Marxist-Leninist traditions adopted, modified, and instituted by Mao 
Zedong denies legitimacy to civil society because of its association with the 
bourgeoisie. 60  “Social movements” were initiated by the state in the form of mass 
movements. After 1978, the state loosened control over some aspects of civil 
organizations, but the party still maintains supreme authority and “individualism” is 
repressed. The good of the group comes before the good of the individual. The 
government also proclaims that social and economic rights are prior to political and 
civil rights.61 Currently, people cannot participate in completely independent 
environmental non-governmental organizations without facing political and economic 
risk. Because of this risk, the “pay-off” for participating in unsanctioned non-
governmental organizations is lower than the cost, which discourages collective action 
and the development of social movements. The foreign and domestic women’s groups 
that participated in the NGO Forum alongside the International Women’s Conference 
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in Beijing in 1995 were harassed and at times prevented from meeting with foreign 
counterparts during the conference.62 Dai Qing, a journalist who wrote the book 
“Yangtze, Yangtze,” was imprisoned for a period of time because of her public 
criticism of the Three Gorges Dam Project. 
Socioeconomic “Dependency Structures”: Barriers to ESO Development
During the 1980s and 1990s, for citizens concerned with environmental quality 
or environmental activism in China, there were very practical reasons why it is 
difficult to sustain ESOs because of the guakao (“mother-in-law”) and danwei
systems. To have an independent ESO, people must be able to have the time, the 
money and other resources to manage it. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, and in some areas even after the turn of the 
century, life in China revolved around the work unit, the danwei, which usually refers 
to the place where a person works, studies, or conducts research. A unit is not an 
independent organization; it is the lowest level of the state apparatus (in state 
companies or organizations). Most people received a salary, obtained housing, health 
care, schooling for children, and coupons for cloths, food, and furniture through the 
work unit. The danwei administered the birth-control program, mediated marriage 
disputes, and provided pensions and burial funds. When a worker wanted to get 
married, get a divorce, move, or change jobs he/she had to get the danwei’s
permission. People also looked to their unit for recreation opportunities. 
Andrew Walder beautifully captured the relationship between citizens and the 
state with the concept of “organized dependence,” which refers to the “extent to 
which, and ways in which, workers are dependent economically on their enterprises, 
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politically on the party and management, and personally on supervisors.”63 These 
dependency structures made it very difficult for citizens to work full time at an 
autonomous ESO, unless it was also their work unit. Even if funding is obtained from 
a foundation from abroad for a couple of projects not sanctioned by the work unit, 
other survival needs would not be met, such as a housing allotment. A person would 
have to quit their work unit, to be available to work at an “unofficial” ESO full time, 
but in doing so, they would have to give up their housing and all of the other benefits. 
This made it very difficult for people to work at ESOs fulltime.64
In the 21st century, the “dependency structure” of the danwei is starting to 
break down. However, the same cannot be said about the guakao system. Starting in 
the late 1990s, danwei control over urban housing began to weaken as it became legal 
to buy and sell lease rights to houses and apartments. The danw i could still block 
such transactions. However, in September of 2003 a new policy bans employers from 
blocking owners of state-assigned housing form selling their properties. Other new 
policies regarding the danwei have recently been passed. As of October 2003, people 
will no longer need permission to get married or divorced. In addition, citizens will no 
longer need to go through the danwei to get a passport.65 These changes will help to 
create socioeconomic structures that nourish the growth of social organizations, but 
until such reforms are made to the guakao system, environmental activists will have to 
come up with new and better ways to negotiate with the state and evade state control. 
Herein lies the crux of the problem. Until legal and socioeconomic structures 
that support a permanent non-profit sector or a “civil society,” are in place, there is no 
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guarantee of any stability in the development of such a sector. Civil society or a non-
profit sector needs the consent of the state to operate on an on-going basis.
Environmental Social Organizations: Empirical Evidence66
As described earlier, there are six types of ESOs in China: GONGOs, 
professional GONGOs; “popular social organizations” (minjian zuzhi), or popular 
ESOs; citizen non-profit enterprises; informal networks; and student groups. Profiles 
of each type of these groups are very revealing - much of the recent scholarly work on 
environmental social organizations is in a profile format, some more in-depth than 
others.67 Because of the existing dearth of research based on profiles, this research 
takes a different approach by aggregating data on the different types of ESOs. The 
main goal of this section is to illustrate the similarities and differences among 
GONGOs, professional GONGOs, autonomous ESOs, and informal volunteer 
networks in terms of their group structures, funding, and functions, or group agendas. 
In addition, this section examines student environmental groups as a distinct category. 
Structure
Most of China’s professional and other GONGOs are affiliated with central, 
provincial, or local governments, ministries, research organizations, educational 
institutions, or well-established state social organizations. Many of these organizatio s 
proclaim themselves to be non-governmental organizations but they are not 
independent of their state sponsor. The leaders of professional and other GONGOs are 
appointed by their sponsoring organization and many of them have dual positions in 
the governmental organization and the GONGO. Although the leaders of some 
GONGOs are retired from their professional careers, such as Shen Yimin, the 
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president of China Population and Environment Society who used to work at the State 
Statistical Bureau in the Population Statistics Department. Many GONGOs have 
regular full-time staff. 
Some examples of national level professional GONGOs include the China 
Environmental Science Society and the China’s Environmental Protection Industrial 
Association. These and other professional GONGOs have provincial and local 
branches. Examples of GONGOs associated with SEPA are the China Environmental 
Protection Foundation and the China Society for the Advancement of Environmental 
Culture. 
Popular ESOs, citizen non-profit enterprises, informal networks, and student 
groups are established by individuals and are usually run by a small, part-time, unpaid 
staff.68 These “grassroots” organizations are highly dependent upon the individual or 
individuals who established them. Some of the founders have good connections with 
government or party leaders. Several popular ESOs were started by individuals 
connected to the Chinese media, such as Wen Bo, who used to work with the China 
Environment News and was one of the founders of the University Students Green 
Forum. The continued survival of an ESO after the departure of its founder or 
founders is a problem some ESO founders are aware of and are trying to remedy. 
Membership structure is a factor that distinguishes GONGOs and professional 
GONGOs from popular organizations. GONGOs are specialist or elitist organizations 
that do not have dues-paying “members”. Some popular ESOs, on the other hand, are 
membership organizations, like Friends of Nature (FON). The unregistered and 
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Internet groups also can be considered membership groups, although their members 
are volunteers and do not pay dues. 
Funding
Funding sources for GONGOs and ESOs that are more autonomous are quite 
similar, although organizations that are more autonomous have not received much 
funding from the state environmental protection apparatus. The GONGOs that perform 
social services, such as the China Environmental Protection Foundation, and popular 
ESOs have a large variety of funding sources. Funding sources for the groups include 
the PRC government – especially provincial and municipal EPBs; international 
governmental organizations (UNEP and UNDP); U.S. and European foundations; 
foreign NGOs; foreign government departments; foreign companies; domestic 
companies and membership dues. 
More and more domestic companies are funding specific education projects, 
both through GONGOs and popular ESOs. One such project makes it possible for 
groups of youths to volunteer at Keke Xili, the monitoring station on the Qinghai-
Tibetan plateau set up by the government in conjunction with several ESOs and 
individuals. 
The main difference in funding sources between popular ESOs and GONGOs 
is that popular ESOs do not receive much, if any, financial support from EPBs at the 
national, provincial, or local level. It should be noted, however, that they often receive 
other kinds of support such as information, data, and materials.
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Comparing Agendas and Activities
Comparing GONGO and ESO activities also sheds light on the similarities and 
differences between these types of groups. Both types of groups share some similar 
activities, including: public education; scientific or economic research; publishing and 
dissemination of information; academic exchanges; acting as a liaison with foreign 
NGOs; policy research; coordination of volunteer activities; and cooperating with the 
government. 
The groups that engage in public education activities work to initiate social 
change. They seek to change people’s attitudes and behavior toward the environment. 
For example, groups use a variety of means to discourage littering, to promote 
recycling, and to advise people on inappropriate actions harmful to the environment, 
such as picking bamboo in the panda forest (disrupting an ecosystem). 
The main difference among the various groups is how activities are carried out. 
For GONGOs, activities that involve larger numbers of citizens, whether trash 
collection activities or youth painting contests, can be implemented through China’s 
education system, through corporatist organizations such as the Communist Youth 
League, or through governmental structures such as local EPBs and Street 
Committees. These mobilization structures enhance the repertoire of involvement 
strategies GONGOs can use, beyond use of the media, the Internet and/or other means 
of communication. For autonomous ESOs and informal networks of volunteers, the 
“state-linked” mobilization structures are largely unavailable. Generally, these groups 
must rely more on word of mouth, the Internet, the media, hanging posters, other ESO 
groups, and the contact lists from other groups. However, when ESOs and informal 
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networks team up with GONGOs or government actors, additional mobilization 
structures and techniques are available. 
When working with party and governmental organizations, popular ESOs and 
informal networks are forced to utilize different channels of influence than are 
available to GONGOs. The research-oriented groups that were established by the 
government, or by government research institutes, use normal governmental channels
to funnel their research findings to those in authority, thereby possibly influencing the 
decision-making process. Researchers try to get their superiors to pay attention to their 
suggestions - if leaders of GONGOs believe an article written by a researchr is 
important, they may pass it on to NPC members or more likely to officials in the State 
Council. Members of popular ESOs and informal networks, on the other hand, do not 
generally have these internal connections through which they can forward ideas to
China’s leaders, though there are a couple of exceptions to this, such as Liang Congjie, 
a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Members of 
popular ESOs will sometimes utilize the media to get the attention of top leaders. 
In general, China’s GONGOs, popular ESOs, informal networks, and student 
groups do not mobilize local anti-pollution protests, which is a major difference 
between Chinese groups and their other Asian and western counterparts. However, 
there are a handful of organizations that have begun to discuss the plight of pollution 
victims and are working to expand access to justice in China. 
Starting in February of 2001, FON began to print letters from citizens 
regarding pollution and environmental degradation, which elped to bring to light the 
stories of the victims of pollution.69 FON may have been willing to begin discussing 
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pollution victims because of the emergence of a couple of groups that act as advocates 
for victims’ rights and who, so far, have operated withou  the interference of 
government or party officials. 
One such group is called The Center for Legal Assistance for Pollution 
Victims (CLAPV), associated with the Environmental and Natural Resource Law 
Research and Service Center at the China University of Politics and Law, which was 
established by a lawyer and professor named Wang Canfa. Dr. Wang gives free legal 
advice or helps in finding legal council for victims of pollution who have been unable 
to get their complaints resolved through their local EPB. Dr. Wang is motivated to 
find a way to help the increasing numbers of citizens harmed by pollution receive 
adequate compensation for their losses.  Dr. Wang wants to intensify the pressure on 
enterprises to take the safety of their communities and environmental laws more 
seriously; however, Dr. Wang does not mobilize victims of pollution to form groups or 
act collectively to try to press their demands to governmental actors.
In summary, popular ESOs, and even GONGOs, are subject to the same laws 
regarding social organizations. GONGOs have direct corporatist links to state 
organizations, while popular ESOs have indirect links to the state through their guakao
organization. Only the popular ESOs, informal networks, and student groups are 
membership organizations and receive some of their funding through their 
membership. The other funding sources for GONGOs and popular ESOs are quite 
similar, except popular ESOs receive little, if any, funding from Chinese governmental 
organizations. 
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GONGOs, popular ESOs, and informal volunteer networksengage in activities 
that mobilize individuals to participate in environmental protection activities, such as 
picking up trash, as well as in educational activities designed to change citizens’ 
attitudes and behaviors. In essenc , these efforts can be called “civic politics.”70  As 
described by Paul Wapner, actors engaged in civic politics are practicing politics in an 
attempt to instill new values and to change the behaviors of large numbers of people. 
The primary differences between the activities of GONGOs and popular ESOs are the 
means by which the groups reach the public and the channels through which they try 
to influence governmental actions and policies. GONGOs have access to internal 
channels through which to funnel suggestions, while popular ESOs generally must 
resort to letter campaigns or the media to get governmental actors to pay attention to 
their demands. Student groups have not been included in the previous discussion 
simply because they are not subject to the same l ws and regulations as the GONGOs 
and other ESOs. However, given the rapid increase in the numbers of these student 
organizations, they need to be discussed. 
Student groups
Student groups should be discussed separately because they are not subject to 
the laws and regulations of registered ESOs, therefore it is easier for them to be 
established. As Lu Hongyan writes: “… since 1990, Chinese university student 
environmental associations have sprouted quickly, like bamboo shoots after a big 
rainstorm.”71 Why did these groups multiply so quickly, what is their relationship to 
ESOs, what have they accomplished, and what do they indicate about state-socie y 
relations? These are the questions explored in this section.
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There are several reasons why student groups are now proliferating on college 
campuses across China. According to Lu Hongyan, students became involved in 
student environmental groups because of increasing pollution problems. Many 
students from rural areas, who come to universities in urban areas, are exposed to 
pollution and the relationships among “industry, government, and communities in 
creating environmental problems” for the first time.72
Even more generally, the reason why political space opened up for the creation 
of student groups was because Chinese authorities mobilized youth to become active 
in environmental protection and have encouraged the development of the groups. 
Before 1993, top Chinese leaders, including Li Peng showed interest in mobilizing 
China’s youth to participate in environmental protection efforts. In a speech at a 
provincial meeting of the Young Pioneers, Li Peng expressed his wish that people 
should work together to improve environmental protection “from an early age” (yao 
cong xiao zuoqi). He hoped tomorrow’s youth could make China’s “skies bluer, 
ground greener, and water clearer” (tian geng lan, di geng lu, shui geng qing).73
At the national level, in 1993, top Chinese officials organized the first “China 
Youth Environmental Forum.”74 The goals of the forum were to motivate youth all 
over China to become involved in environmental protection efforts, to become 
“pioneers” in these efforts. China’s youth were enlisted to help raise everyone’s 
environmental awareness, to control environmental pollution, to improve 
environmental quality and to contribute to the realization of efforts to reconcile 
environmental protection and economic growth.75
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The mobilization efforts of NEPA, the Youth League, and the Young Pioneers 
predate the formation of student environmental groups that now proliferate across the 
country. Activists that took part in these early youth education drives participated in 
the creation of university student environmental groups and became some of the first 
young members of popular social organizations. Interview and survey data on student 
environmental groups indicate that some of the school environmental groups were 
initiated by the Youth League and the Student Union, the same groups that took part in 
early youth environmental education drives and who were other groups started by 
motivated individuals. As of 2001, individuals had established eighty-eight percent of 
the groups and only seven percent were established by school organizations.76
An excellent statistical study of university groups conducted by Lu Hongyan 
divides the development of these groups into three periods: 1) 1990-1995 – during this 
phase twelve groups were established and students conducted activities on campus in 
isolation from other groups; 2) 1996-1997 – during this phase ten groups were 
established and students began to expand activities to off campus venues. 3) 1998-
2002 – the number of student groups exploded from 22 to 150 and students created 
several umbrella organizations linking separate groups.77
Lu Hongyan’s survey also revealed that most groups have twenty to one 
hundred members. Funding for these groups primarily comes from member fees, 
university grants (from specific departments or schools, the Student Union, and the 
Youth League), and donations form businesses. Of the number of activities conducted 
by these groups, fifty-eight percent center on providing environmental education, 
thirty-two percent involve some sort of direct action (like going on site to pick up 
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trash), and ten percent involve conducting surveys, field research, or writing 
suggestions for local decision-makers. In 2001, the issues of most concern for these 
groups include desertification (especially sandstorms), water pollution and shortages, 
non-biodegradable trash, air pollution, global warming, and ozone depletion. It should 
be noted that the issues toward which the students are most concerned may not 
correspond to the specific activities conduced by the groups. 
The groups interact with a variety of actors off-campus. Of the ninety-four 
groups surveyed, sixty-two have contact with local government officials (with local 
EPBs, most likely), fifty-five have links with registered and unregistered ESOs, fifty-
four maintain contact with local news media, forty-two have links to local businesses, 
and fifteen have a relationship with international environmental NGOs.78
Most of the groups must be approved by the school Communist Youth League 
Committee (xiaotuanwei). In addition, some groups must get all of their activities 
approved by the xiaotuanwei. On occasion, an activity will be disallowed because of 
liability issues, if the activity is too large, or if it is “not appropriate.”79
The mission statements of some of the groups and of the umbrella group Green 
Students Forum in Beijing emphasize that the work of the groups is apoltical. This is 
to protect themselves both from being co-opted by students with ulterior motivations 
and from the suspicions of authorities.
The relationships among student groups developed slowly with much 
apprehension at first, but exploded after 1998; and will no doubt to continue to 
expand. In 1997, students in the newly established Green Students Forum in Beijing 
were unsure how authorities would receive their “collectivization”. One student even 
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remarked that teachers had warned students that forming an umbrella group was 
illegal.80 Today, there are at least eight umbrella groups across China, with the Green 
Student Forum (Beijing), Green Stone (Jiangsu), Green SOS (Western China, and 
SEA Union (Chongqing) being the most active. The Beijing umbrella group plays 
something of an informal leadership role.81
The relationships student groups forge with local EPB personnel are worth 
examination. These early relationships help to form youths’ opinions of governmental 
personnel that persist into adulthood. In Chengdu and Beijing, student groups reached 
out to officials. Some officials responded enthusiastically to the students. In Chengdu, 
EPB education officials and even EPB leaders attended large-scal  education events 
put on by the students. Some officials didtheir best to educate youth about the EPB’s 
work, but one official commented that it was sometimes difficult work because youth 
“naturally distrust governmental officials.”82
The relationships between student groups and regular registered and 
unregistered ESOs, and international environmental groups are important. Student 
groups, as a unit, are members of select ESOs, which helps to forge a solid link 
between the two types of groups. The student groups have participated in ESO 
campaigns and there are strong feelings of solidarity with ESOs. Student groups in 
Beijing also took up Hong Kong’s Friend’s of the Earth’s campaign to save trees by 
cutting down the number of holiday greeting cards, which was called the “Less Cards, 
More Trees” (Cut Cards, Not Trees).83 Students from seventeen environmental groups 
in Beijing expressed their solidarity with FON, Green Plateau, and Green River and 
the Keke Xili anti-poaching teams through a letter written after Zaba Duojie was killed 
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while trying to protect Tibetan Antelope. The student groups took up the Tibetan 
Antelope, or Chiru, issue and even reached out to foreign students and student 
organizations to boycott shatoosh fabrics that come for the antelope and to shame 
people who purchase the fabric. 
The groups must get their activities approved, however, when the group, or the 
individuals in the group, participate in an activity sponsored by an ESO off campus, 
they do not need approval. Therefore, students have been quite active in ESO 
activities, both non-contentious and contentious.
ESOs: Relationships With the State, Contentious Politics, and Proto-movements
This section explains that most ESOs engage in non-contentious activities and 
often cooperate with local and national government actors. In addition, it explores
cases when ESOs have employed more contentious approaches. It describes the first 
two campaigns in China’s emerging nature and wildlife conservation proto-m vement. 
Finally, it illustrates an interesting phenomenon where ESOs have taken on the role of 
peacemakers in situations that would otherwise erupt into environmental disputes.
When and Why ESOs Choose Non-Contentious Strategies
Overall, most of the groups appear to be willing to work with the government 
and not in opposition to it. They have a much less contentious relationship with the 
government than Western NGOs. For example, Liang Congjie from the onset stated 
that FON was dedicated to working with the government.84 Liao Xiaoyi, one of the 
founders of Beijing Global Village, also has stated that se i  committed to working in 
cooperation with the government and not complain against it.85
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This non-contentious approach to dealing with governmental authorities 
probably helped to create governmental acceptance of ESOs. It not only helped to 
create official acceptance, it also helped to make these new ESOs more palatable by 
ordinary citizens. A non-contentious approach has allowed ESOs to sustain themselves 
and survive. Also, in China where personal relationships, or guanxi, are still extremely 
important in everyday life, friendly relations with governmental or party actors could 
prove to be extremely valuable in achieving ESO goals.
One example of ESOs utilizing their position vis-à-vis the government 
occurred when FON and Liang Congjie worked to get a steel factory in Beijing 
relocated outside of the city. ESO leaders sat down with Beijing EPB officials to 
discuss the problem of Beigang and although no changes came out of the meeting, the 
fact that there was a meeting at all is significant. It is unclear why EPB officials 
decided to meet with FON leaders, but it is significant because the discussions 
represent a link between state and society through which citizens were free to 
articulate their interests regarding a specific pollution problem.
While most environmentalists lament the environmental pollution and 
degradation wrought partially due to rapid economic development, few question 
China’s development path or the state’s emphasis on economic development. Some 
recognize that development comes first and e vironmental protection comes second in 
China’s coastal provinces, but argue that it would be a mistake to continue this trend 
in developing China’s West. However, China’s environmental groups do not include 
information on the deleterious effects of industrial pollution in their education 
agendas. One reason for this may be because economic development is the state’s 
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primary goal and groups do no want to question it for fear of being put down by the 
government.
While most ESOs have a less contentious relationship with state actors than 
many groups in the U.S., Taiwan, Poland, and other nations, but they have, on 
occasion criticized government authorities. For example, Liang Congjie criticized 
officials that forsake environmental protection for the sake of their own personal 
economic gain. He also lamented China’s implementation record and called for 
increased investment in environmental protection.86
Instances of Contention, Conservation Campaigns and the Growth of a 
Proto-movement
While Liang Congjie stated that he wanted to work with the government in the 
1994 interview, he later describes the work FON engages in as a “battlefield.” In a 
later interview he says, “we have a battlefield here saving the antelopes (in Qinghai), 
another battlefield there saving the golden monkey and still another in Sichuan saving 
the forests. We’re very busy.”87 While FON and other groups do not directly engage in 
what westerners consider contentious politics with governmental authorities, they do 
become embroiled in contentious politics with some sectors in society. Over the last 
seven years, a handful of ESOs and student groups have come into conflict with local 
government officials, loggers, and poachers by participating in campaigns to preserve 
specific species. These campaigns constitute a proto-movement. 
Golden Monkey Campaign
In 1995, environmental activist, Xi Zhinong held a workshop to discuss the 
plight of the Golden Monkey (also called the snub-nose monkey) and its habitat in 
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Deqing county Yunnan. Road building and illegal logging was a threat to the already 
endangered species. Xi Zhinong, had been taking pictures of the monkeys since 1992. 
Liang Congjie, of FON, attended the workshop and afterwards wrote a letter to the 
then Vice Premier to request that a moratorium on road building and logging be 
implemented in Deqing County. When Song Jian, who holds Liang Congjie in high 
regard received a letter from FON regarding the logging threat to Golden Monkey 
habitat, he immediately contacted the Ministry of Forestry and send an investigative 
team to Yunnan to examine the situation. Newly established student groups in Beijing 
joined in on the efforts to preserve the monkey habitat. Students at the Forestry 
Academy and other campuses held candlelight vigils to garner attention to he plight 
of the monkeys. Tony Saich argues that it was the threat of social unrest on college 
campuses that influenced the government’s decision to ban logging in Golden Monkey 
habitat.88
Central level forestry authorities ordered a halt to the road buil ing. However, 
local authorities and construction workers ignored the orders. Journalists working with 
FON and Xi Zhinong captured footage of the bulldozers digging the road, so locals 
were caught red-handed. Supposedly, Zhu Rongji viewed the tape and declared a ban 
on logging. Over ninety percent of the revenue for the Deqing government was 
derived from logging, so it was determined to continue building roads into the area so 
that logging could continue, even after central level forestry officials banned logging 
in the area.89 Local officials resisted abandoning the logging and challenged FON to 
help them find another source of revenue for Deqing County, which faced a million 
dollar budget deficit.90 The investigative work of Xi Zhinong, FON, and others was a 
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catalyst to widespread support for protecting the monkey habitat and helped to ensure 
the survival of the Golden Monkey and to protect the forest and the minority groups 
that lived there.91
Tibetan Antelope Campaign
The Tibetan antelope, or Chiru, is found in western China and in 1979 it was 
included on a list of endangered species. Therefore its trade is strictly forbidden under 
the CITES treaty. It became very fashionable to have fur coats made from the fur on 
the back of the neck of the Chiru, which made trade of the animal’s fur very lucrative. 
In 1992, officials of Zhiduo Prefecture, of which Keke Xili is a part, 
established an informal, non-official, anti-poaching team. The leader of the anti-
poaching team was killed in 1994 while chasing poachers. His brother-in-law, Zhawa 
Dorje, took up the mission and expanded the successes of the anti-po ching team, the 
“Wild Yak Brigade.” In 1998, Liang Congjie sent a letter to Tony Blair, Prime 
Minister of Great Britain, requesting his help to end the illegal trade of Tibetan 
Antelope. Tony Blair wrote back that he would do his utmost to end the trade. In 1998, 
Zaba Duojie came to Beijing and visited the Ministry of Forestry, SEPA, and other 
government agencies. He also gave a talk that was well attended by several tudent 
groups who all warmly welcomed him. Afterwards, some of the student groups took 
up the cause of the Tibetan Antelope 
Zaba Duojie, was killed in November of 1998.92 This event catapulted the 
Tibetan Antelope issue to the forefront of many ESOs and student groups. Seventeen 
student groups sent a letter of support to the team and to FON. FON and other groups 
raised enough money to purchase modern high tech jeeps for the Wild Yak Brigade to 
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use. FON also wrote a letter to SEPA and the Forestry Ministry, which suggested a 
massive three-province crackdown on the poachers. The government headed the 
suggestions and initiated a secret anti-poaching effort, which was very successful. 
The central government established the Hoh Xil Nature Preserve in which 
poaching of the Tibetan antelope was banned. Construction on the Qinghai-Tibet 
railway is to be stopped when the antelope are migrating. So far, the number of 
Tibetan antelopes as climbed to 80,000 up from 70,000 in 1997.93
The fate of the anti-poaching team, however, is in question because the 
Qinghai provincial government announced plans to disband the teams and replace 
them with an “official” squad, which may negate many of the progress achieved by the 
Wild Yak Brigade.94
Illegal Logging in Sichuan Province
Xi Zhinong, once a member of FON, who founded his own ESO called Green 
Plateau, discovered large-scale logging in Hongya County, Yunnan, after top leaders 
had ordered the halt of all logging because of the floods on the Yangtze in 1998. Xi 
Zhinong helped a camera crew from China Central Television (CCTV) film a story on 
the logging. Local authorities tried to block the filming footage of felled trees and 
rolling timber. A FON member took the video back, which aired on "Economic Half-
Hour" on September 29 1998. Afterwards, a local FON a member got anonymous 
phone calls threatening his life.95
In each of these campaigns, China’s ESOs utilized established networks with 
other registered groups and student groups to engage in a variety of activities, some 
contentious and some not, to achieve their common goal of protecting China’s forest 
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habitat and endangered species. Investigative teams from Green Plateau and FON 
digging up illegal activities of loggers is reminiscent of the investigative work of 
Greenpeace and other groups. While the ESOs are not in direct confrontation with 
central level authorities, they have engaged in contentious politics with local 
authorities and other social groups. 
Role as Peacemaker
On a couple of occasions, FON has taken on the role as a peacemaker to 
prevent a dispute form escalating. One of these instances involved brokering a dispute 
between scientists and poachers in Northwestern China. In one dramatic episode, Xi 
Zhinong received news of a scientific expedition team, who had stumbled upon a 
group of poachers killing endangered animals in Xinjiang, that was being held 
hostage. He immediately related the news to Liang Congjie who then made several 
phone calls to save the scientists. First, he tried to find the State Council emergency 
number, but the number was a “secret.” He then called the State Council Complaint 
Office, but was told to call the Public Security Bureau. He called the Public Security 
Bureau’s Complaint Office, but was told to call the Public Security Office and the 
Ministry of Forestry in Xinjiang. Liang Congjie called a FON member in Urumchi 
who then called the proper Xinjiang authorities. Officials from the Public Security 
Office and the Ministry of Forestry called Liang Congjie back and asked for the 
specific location of the scientists. The officials sent a team out to the location, but it 
would take time, as the scientists were 600 miles away. In the mean time, the scientists 
were negotiating with their captors. The scientists released the poachers they had 
captured and then the poachers released the scientists. Of interest is that officials from 
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the EPB in the Aherjinshan protected area did not allow the story of the scientists to be 
released. Instances of poaching had occurred in the last few years in the area, but each 
time authorities did not release the news.96 FON utilized its network to get the news 
out and to drum up support for protection of endangered animals in Xinjiang. FON 
also sent a letter with suggestions regarding protecting the Tibetan Antelope in the 
Keke Xili regions to the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and 
the Ministry of Forestry asking officials to get together and figure out the next steps in 
protecting the antelope and coordinate enforcement between Qinghai, Tibet, and 
Xinjiang. 
Another example of ESOs working as peacemakers occurred in Yunnan. When 
minority groups in Yunnan were up in arms about Japanese climbing expeditions 
coming to Yunnan to climb Zuomeilixue Mountain, a sacred mountain, Xi Zhinong 
called Liang Congjie who then wrote a letter to the United Front Work Department of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party warning of the likely event of protest 
and requesting help to resolve the situation.97 Liang’s letter helped to diffuse the 
tension and helped to protect the interests of minority groups in Yunnan, after the Vice 
Director of the department got in touch with the appropriate departments in Yunnan.98
This example of a success story for the student groups illustrates that when the 
students are persistent, when they offer compelling arguments in favor of a specific 
action, and are backed up by environmental laws and regulations, they can make a 
difference. In addition, the specter of protesting youth on Beijing’s campuses helped 
to convince national level authorities to support a ban on road building in Yunnan 
province and protect the Golden monkey habitat from logging.99
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How ESOs matter
There are a number of conditions under which ESOs tend to make a difference 
in policy outcomes, including when ESO agendas are aligned with central government 
objectives, when ESO leaders are socially prominent individuals, or if the ESO is in a 
position to utilize institutionalized channels as GONGOs often do.  
When ESOs undertake environmental campaigns that seek to change behavior 
and are supported by governmental laws or regulations that prohibit specific behaviors 
or suggest a specific course of action, then the group will be more successful. An 
example of this situation is when Beijing University students worked to get the 
school’s cafeterias to use biodegradable containers. 
Starting in 1998, Beijing University’s student environmental groups100
contested the school’s continued use of non-biodegradable disposable food containers 
and endeavored to convince the food service department to change their practices. The 
students put together a report and presented it to the manager of the university’s five 
cafeterias that contained a student issue-awareness survey, an economic survey of the 
students’ willingness to pay for different materials, and information about substitute 
products. The students continually reminded the manager that Beijing municipal 
government prohibited the use of non-biodegradable disposable food containers. The 
manager was not convinced. The students then took their report to the “head” of 
student life at the university, but to no avail. After a year of effort, the students 
convinced the food service manger to use substitute containers for one day, Earth Day, 
that year. On Earth Day, the students invited two newspaper reporters to come to the 
university, who then wrote moving articles about the students’ efforts. Finally, in 
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1999, after over a year of student activism, the manager relented and started using a 
more environmentally friendly product in all the university’s cafeterias.101
Most of the groups examined were involved in some type of public education 
activity, meaning these ESOs work to raise public awareness and concern over 
environmental problems, enhancing governmental efforts or providing a service the 
government was unable or had not yet been provided. One extremely important 
example is FON’s efforts to extend environmental education to young students in rural 
areas of China. FON developed a program called “Green Hope” (Luse Xiwang) which 
first brought together volunteers from around China, provided them with training, and 
arranged for them to travel to schools across China to provide environmental 
education to children that might not otherwise be exposed to such education. It is hard 
to gauge the influence of The Green Hope program and other education efforts, but 
simply looking at the thank you letters sent by people educated by FON volunteers 
gives some measure of the results of FON’s education efforts. Some letters expressed 
thanks for opening up new worlds, others showed that people had taken action as a 
result of one of FON’s programs by donating money to green causes or by becoming 
more involved in local environmental activities. Education efforts are raising 
consciousness and promoting green action one person at a time. 
Both an individual’s stature (position in society) and personalistic ties are 
important and have provided a channel of ESO influence in policy decisions. 
Respected members of ESOs have acted as articulate representatives of citizens in 
favor of more progressive environmental approaches and advocated actions regarding 
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specific issues, such as Liang Congjie’s influential letters to Song Jian, once a Vice 
Premier, and Liang’s actions through the CPPCC on a number of issues.  
Institutionalized official channels are still important, in both new and old ways, 
as an avenue of ESO influence. ESOs, especially GONGOs, have been included in 
policymaking processes. It is reported that some NGOs were involved in deliberations 
just before the writing of the draft Environmental Impact Assessment Law that passed 
the National People’s Congress in October of 2002 and went into effect in September 
2003. Some of these organizations have close ties to SEPA, while others receive some 
foreign funding.102
Conclusion
When discussing environmental social organizations in the People’s Republic 
of China, the label “non-governmental organization” is problematic because most, if 
not all, of the groups are structured such that they are still “tethered” to the state 
through guakao, “mother-in-law” supervisory organs. To avoid conceptual confusion, 
it is best to call these organizations what they are called in China, that is “social 
organizations.” These social organizations occupy a space where the official (guan),
public (gong), and private (si) realms overlap. There are several types of social 
organizations that can be categorized based on their relationship to the state. At one 
end of the spectrum are GONGOs, which are closely associated with the state. At the 
other end are popular social organizations, informal unregistered networks, and 
student organizations.
The landscape of social organizations in China has been very fluid over time 
and the political and legal foundation supporting ESOs is relatively weak. All of the 
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social organizations in China must be affiliated with a “step-mother,” guakao, 
governmental organization that provides protection and legitimacy and the 
government could, theoretically and legally, shut down ESOs and GONGOs at any 
time. Several social science policy research institutes were shut down after the 
Tiananmen massacre in 1989. Unregistered, totally independent ESOs must operate 
completely underground, and involvement with such organizations poses political and 
economic risks for individuals. The government is much more tolerant of 
organizations involved in relief, education, or charity world.103
There are significant barriers to the expansion of popular ESOs across China. 
The absence of a strong civil society in China’s past works against the development of 
such a sector now. The political culture in China, heavily influenced by Confucian and 
Marxist-Leninist, traditions also inhibit strong, independent social organizations. Both 
traditions support the supreme position of the state over society. F nally, “organized 
dependence,” fostered through socioeconomic structures such as the guakao and the 
danwei systems, is a strong inhibitor of autonomous ESO growth. Additionally, until 
laws are enacted that guarantee the rights of independent organizations, ny group can 
be shut down at any time. 
It should be noted that if the regulations hampering the expansion of the 
number of regular ESOs were lifted, then we would probably see dramatic jumps in 
the numbers of groups, much like what happened after 1998 to student groups. The 
study of student groups could take up volumes and should be an area further explored 
in future studies.
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Some of the forces that are encouraging the development of ESOs include 
international pressures, increasing economic liberalization, governmental 
decentralization, the deterioration of China’s environment, and a rising awareness of 
environmental problems by the public. ESOs have helped to locate and collect 
resources that would not otherwise be available to China. Many foreign non-
governmental groups do not provide money directly to governmental organizations. 
There is some evidence that ESOs have been set up by the government merely as 
“front operations,” so that agreements with non-governmental organizations in other 
countries can be carried out. Behind these “NGO fronts”, the same old state apparatus 
goes about its business. The growth of international NGOs and the rapid increase in 
the capacity and expertise of environmental NGO networks may motivate China’s 
leaders to create organizations that can participate in those networks, but the autonomy 
of these groups will not be guaranteed. 
Despite the organizational and financial ties to government bodies, the 
GONGOs and ESOs in China are dynamic and groups have begun to network. In 
September of 1999, the first “Non-governmental Organization Forum on US-China 
Environmental Cooperation” brought together over 60 organizations, many from 
China. At the forum, participants attended panels on topics related to the creation and 
development of ESOs. Participants shared their knowledge about how to create an 
enabling environment for ESOs, how to obtain funding, how to strengthen 
administrative capacity, and how to promote successful educational outreach 
activities.
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It is not enough to examine the structure of ESOs, because China’s ESOs are 
not structurally similar to ESOs in other countries, but are, in some ways, functionally 
equivalent. In other words, even if Chinese ESOs, including GONGOs, may look 
different, and operate in a different political and legal context, they could still have the 
same beneficial effects on environmental protection efforts. Therefore, it also is 
important to examine China’s ESOs from a functional perspective. 
For example, while it appears that most of China’s GON s cannot be 
considered independent, they still are initiators of social change, because of their 
involvement with environmental education activities. They do practice civic politics, 
in the way that Wapner describes: “groups work through social, economic, and 
cultural networks to affect change.”104 Popular ESOs are engaged in civic politics to 
an even greater degree. While the concept of “civil society” may not be quite 
appropriate in discussing environmental social organizations in China, these groups do 
practice civic politics. Both GONGOs and popular ESOs are involved in initiatives 
aimed at changing citizen behaviors that affect the environment are building 
momentum in the effort to spread environmental values in China’s largest cities.
Civil society is the least useful model for understanding ESOs in China. 
Historically, China has had either a weak or non-existent civil society, in the Western 
sense of the word. China has had a small scale “public sphere,” that was more 
economic or managerial in nature. The closest Chinese society came to exhibiting a 
civil society was during the late Qing dynasty and early Republican period. The 
reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping after 1978, opened up more political space for 
people to form quasi-or semi-governmental social organizations in many sectors of 
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society, but it is doubtful that these groups can be considered components of civil 
society because of their close connections with central governmental bodies. Only two 
or three groups resemble anything close to a non-economic civil society.
Most of the groups described above do not adhere to the Western definition of 
a civil society and do not even really fit Wakeman’s definition of the public sphere 
because of the organizational proximity to central government bodies. A dozen or 
more of the groups were set up by individuals in elite circles outside the government, 
and contribute to the supply of services to the public good. However, even these 
groups must have a “mother-in-law” organization that will ultimately take 
responsibility for the group’s actions. 
The corporatist model is still a very useful tool for understanding China’s 
ESOs and their relationship to the state, but it is not the only model that depicts 
observations of ESOs and their role in society. Considering ESOs as social movement 
organizations has some utility, but it is limited to the popular ESOs. Least useful is the 
model of civil society. 
In the past, the concept of corporatism has been reserved for organizations in 
the economic sphere. However, the concept of corporatism as a model for interest 
articulation is extremely helpful in understanding professional  and other GONGOs. 
To distinguish corporatism in the non-profit sector from other forms of corporatism, it 
can be called “civic-corporatism.”
There is some utility in viewing ESOs as social movement organizations. 
Some members and leaders of popular ESOs view themselves as being involved in 
China’s nascent environmental movement.105 While ESOs generally cooperate with 
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the state, they have since the late 1990s become engaged in contentious politics with 
local-level authorities and specific groups of social actors. Numerous ESOs have 
teamed up in campaigns to protect China’s endangered species. These actions can be 
considered a nature and wildlife conservation proto-movement because this 
networking has become quite dense, because the groups have sustained their activism 
over time (and location), and because they have engaged in contentious politics with 
local governmental authorities and other social actors (loggers and poachers), and 
because they employed the symbols of heroism. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Volunteerism, Political Participation, and
Environmental Proto-Movements in China
Pollution problems in China are among the worst in the world. Chinese leaders 
recognize this and have already taken steps to establish a national regulatory 
framework to manage the problems. This legal framework has legitimized the 
environmental enforcement activities of local EPBs. Despit these steps, however, 
implementation problems are cited as one of the most formidable barriers facing the 
Chinese in their attempts to advance air pollution reduction and other environmental 
protection goals. Implementation is a critical component of a successful regulatory 
system. One of the reasons for inconsistent implementation has been the low level of 
public participation, broadly defined in environmental policy processes.
Since the early 1990s, however, there has been a change in the levels of 
participation. Participation in all of the main channels has increased, although not in 
every province or city. Currently, the dominant modes of participation include direct 
citizen protests, disputes, and complaints; state-mobilized public campaigns; 
environmental social organizations; environmental impact assessment processes; and 
public comment processes.
Participation in each of the channels has increased in the 1990s. Overall, at the 
national level, the total number of complaints (people) and disputes went from 
140,681 in 1990 to 241,321 in 1998, or nearly double. Another way to view this 
increase is on a per capita basis. In 1990, 1.23 people in 10,000 filed a complaint, 
while in 1998, 1.93 people in 10,000 filed a complaint. At the provincial level the 
386
picture is much more complicated. In some provinces, there are dramatic increases 
from year to year. For example, in Yunnan in 1998, there were 56 complaints, while in 
1999 there were 4,191 (an increase of over 7,000%). In a couple of provinces, 
however, the numbers of complaints and disputes have decreased overall. There is a 
major problem with the complaint and dispute data. Data omissions due to non-
reporting seem to be extremely high, so the actual number of complaints and disputes 
each year is most likely higher.
The number of environmental social organizations has also increased in the 
1990s. For example, there were only two registered, autonomous ESOs in Beijing in 
1992, but in 1996, there were nineteen.1 Nationally, there were no student groups in 
1990, but by 2002, there were 150.2 In 1990, there was no public input in 
environmental impact assessment processes, but by the mid-1990s, it was required by 
law in major national level projects, especially those with foreign donors. 1999 was 
the first year there was a public comment process for a national environmental law 
(the Land Law).  Data from this and other research is clear: public participation in 
environmental policy processes has increased throughout the 1990s.
The Politics of Public Participation
Previous research, conducted in western countries, indicates that citizen 
attitudes and participation in environmental protection makes a difference to policies 
and policy outcomes. China is no different. What is unique to China is the political 
tension between the need for public participation and the need to control it. Although 
there have been significant economic reforms and much larger “zones of 
indifference,” areas in which “political power on its own volition does not try to 
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penetrate or control,”3 China is still an authoritarian country. The characterization of 
China as an authoritarian state alone explains why increasing participation and citizen 
input in policy processes would need to be controlled.
Political Opportunities and Constraints: The Need for Participation and the Need 
to Control It
Environmental officials and some government leaders recognize that 
individual citizen participation at local levels is necessary to improve implementation 
and to achieve environmental protection goals. On the ot r hand, Chinese leaders and 
environmental officials seek to channel rising environmental awareness, effectively 
handle the inevitable complaints about pollution, and manage environmental disputes 
carefully to prevent social instability, economic disruptions, and a profusion of 
criticism aimed at the state. This has been a delicate balancing act for the Chinese 
regime. Some Chinese leaders and environmental protection officials have encouraged 
participation in order to strengthen enforcement efforts and this encouragement has 
been an important opportunity for the growth of activism. At the same time, 
authorities have tried to shape, channel, and control participation.
The Need for Participation - Education
The development of environmental education programs in China illustrates the 
regime’s need to involve the public in environmental protection as well as the need to 
control it. Environmental education in schools began to increase in the 1980s, 
although mainly in pilot programs in secondary schools. It was not until the 1990s that 
environmental education curriculum was a staple in both primary and secondary 
schools and the number of articles regarding the environment increased in the media. 
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There were 15,482 environmental programs (sponsored by the state) in th  media in 
1992, but by 1997, there were 61,622 programs. There were nearly twice as many 
programs in 1995 as there were in 1994 and a gradual increase annually thereafter. 
Part of the reason for slow increases in environmental education programs and media 
stories in the early 1990s was undoubtedly due to capacity issues within EPBs.
However, another reason has been the desire to control information flows 
regarding environmental pollution and degradation in China. The first national 
working meeting on education was not held until 1992, which marks the start of 
greater emphasis on public education. The 1992 United National Conference on 
Environment and Development likely spurred a greater interest in supporting 
education programs. In 1993, the National Peopl ’s Congress Environmental 
Protection Committee was established, which often supported increased education 
programs. In addition, it is likely that Xie Zhenhua, who took over the top post at 
NEPA in June of 1993, was supportive of education programs.
Throughout the 1990s, as the new environmental protection apparatus grew 
and environmental laws were put in place, and as scores of educators, enterprise 
workers, and officials were introduced to environmental protection concepts, 
environmental campaigns became more complex and varied.
Mobilized Participation and the Sophistication of Volunteerism
Mobilized campaigns are evidence that Chinese leaders recognize that public 
participation is essential for achieving policy goals and that they seek to maintain 
some level of control over that participation. Campaigns today are more sophisticated 
than they were during the Mao period. This is because authorities have managed to 
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achieve a higher level of “volunteerism” among citizens and because campaigns have 
been de-politicized. Today, the primary goals of campaigns are policy oriented; 
political goals have become much less important.
There are campaigns to mobilize mass participation in activities such as 
planting trees, cleaning up trash, beautifying a city, or killing unwanted pests. Other 
campaigns are more educational in nature such as those to popularize specific 
environmental laws or adopt a certain attitude toward a subject. Some campaigns are 
at the local level, while others are mobilized at the national level and filter down. 
Various groups, such as EPBs, street offices and residence’s committees, the 
Communist Youth League and other youth and women’s groups, are enlisted to help 
mobilize ordinary citizens. These groups are enlisted because the state and the party 
alone cannot accomplish desired policy goals. EPB staff, alone, would be physically 
unable to plant all the trees necessary or be able to “green” an entire city prior to the 
Asian Games, for example. Citizen participation is physically necessary to achieve 
certain policy goals.
Campaigns are more than a tool of direct mobilization, education, and a means 
to a policy end; on a more subtle level, they are a means of communication between 
the state and society. Campaigns “signal” to the population those issues which are 
priorities and which issues are acceptable to address. Campaigns reflect the state’s 
environmental protection agenda and are among the means by which the government 
transmits that agenda to citizens. Campaigns steer citizen participation toward the 
achievement of state-defined policy goals. The state and citizens work together to 
reach policy goals through campaigns. In addition, a side effect of state-mobilized 
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campaigns has been to encourage public participation in policy processes outside the 
campaign structure, although with many of the same policy goals.
Some individuals or groups targeted for mobilization in campaigns have 
become more active in promoting environmental protection outside the state-
mobilized campaign structure. One example of this is the Ma Ma Environmental 
Protection Volunteer Association, in Xiaanxi province, whose members first became 
exposed to participating in environmental protection activities while in the All China 
Women’s Federation. These women became so excited about promoting 
environmental protection that they took the initiative to hold their own educational and 
various other activities outside of mobilized campaigns.
Another example of how participation in state-mobilized campaigns inspired 
citizens to initiate activities outside of the campaign structure can be seen in the 
increasing participation of China’s youth. Some of the students involved in setting up 
the first autonomous school environmental groups were involved in the early state-
organized China Youth Environmental Forum.4
Chinese officials needed the help of women’s and youth GONGOs in 
numerous campaigns in the 1970s, 80s and 90s, but during the 1990s many officials 
recognized that additional participation would be needed. Authorities in some areas 
began to welcome the efforts of the Ma Ma Environmental Protection Volunteer 
Association and other groups in activities above and beyond state-mobilized 
campaigns.
Campaigns, specifically environmental campaigns, have changed since the 
days of Mao in that they have become less politicized, more sophisticated, and more 
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focused on policy goals. The emphasis on volunteerism, or having people participate 
freely in a campaign, as being induced by some acceptance of communist ideology has 
been replaced by the notion that citizens are motivated because they have some 
acceptance of the relevant governmental policy goals. Action campaigns, while still 
working to instill group unity, “socialist spiritual values,” nationalism, and citizen 
awareness, are focused on achieving concrete policy goals such as reforestation. 
Participation in campaigns is not enforced through coercion, but by appeals to one’s 
patriotism and sense of duty toward the environment. Volunteerism has taken off. 
When Earth Day and World Environment Day were first introduced into China, the 
majority of events were sponsored and organized by governmental and party 
authorities. Now, while there are still state-mobilized-activities, individual citizens and 
ESOs organize many of their own events.
Beyond Mobilized Campaigns: The Recognition of the Need for 
Participation Grows
In the post Tiananmen era, Chinese leaders acknowledge that they need the 
assistance of social organizations to meet the needs of China’s growing population 
and the environment sector is no different. Quasi-autonomous and popular 
environmental social organization participation helps to legitimize and reinforce state 
efforts in environmental protection. The government needed quasi-a tonomous 
groups for their ability to attract funding for environmental protection activities from 
both domestic and foreign sources, many of which were not open to governmental 
agencies. Increasingly, the government is aided by the technical and managerial 
expertise of Chinese social organizations and the foreign expertise and resources they 
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accumulate. A top environmental protection official’s encouragement led to Liang 
Congjie’s efforts to establish one of the first popular ESOs.
Authorities have not only encouraged participation in campaigns and ESO 
activities, they also have encouraged citizens to utilize the standardized 
environmental complaint system. Leaders have put a great deal of effort into 
institutionalizing the complaint process and in setting up complaint hot lines and 
offices. Authorities within the environmental protection apparatus, as well as NPC 
members and government officials, want citizens to use the pollution hot lines set up 
in major cities and to notify EPBs when pollution problems emerge. Citizen 
participation in the system helps authorities to catch pollution problems early and to 
prevent major disputes from erupting. It helps them to implement environmental 
protection laws and policies. When citizens complain, it justifies official enforcement 
efforts to those in the relevant polluting enterprises.
The recognition of top leaders and environmental protection officials of the 
need for participation was a major political opportunity for citizens and is one of the 
main reasons why activism has increased. It also helps to explain why participation 
has increased in some provinces and not as much in others. In provinces and cities 
where leaders at the local level did not recognize this need, there is less participation. 
The Taiyuan example illustrates this most clearly. In Taiyuan, authorities had not yet 
recognized the need for public participation in the year 2000; consequently, they did 
not encourage it, resulting in less participation in Taiyuan.
Top-down encouragement of public involvement in the implementation of 
environmental protection policies led to increases in public participation. This bottom-
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up pressure and top-down pressure from central level authorities to deal with 
grievances at the local level helped to make local authorities more accommodating to 
citizens. This in turn led to increased public confidence that local officials would 
address their grievances. This confidence increased feelings of efficacy and led to 
increased use of regime-sanctioned channels of participation, especially the complaint 
system. The result is a positively reinforcing cycle of increased participation and 
accommodation.
While official encouragements of participation and increased responsiveness to 
citizen grievances have been the most important political opportunities, these openings 
are not the only factors leading to increased participation.
Other Factors Contributing to Participation Increases
At least five other factors contributed to increasing levels of participation. 
First, in addition to official encouragement, other political opportunities exist. Top 
leaders have made environmental protection a basic national policy. In addition, the 
government’s capacity to manage participation has increased. Environmental 
protection is considered a topic of “low politics,” so there is relatively wider openness 
for participation. The environmental protection sector is considered an appropriate 
area for “advanced social development.”
Second, changes in China’s legal framework open opportunities for more 
participation. Starting with the 1979 Trial Environmental Protection Law, legal 
protection for citizens who voice their environmental grievances has increased, 
making it more likely that citizens will get involved. Several laws thereafter have 
strengthened, or at least reinforced, citizens’ rights to confront polluters. 
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Demonstration projects in Shenyang, Wuhan, and Chifeng, involving local laws that 
promote public access to information and enable public participation, represent the 
future possibility of even stronger legal support for participation.
Third, measurable increases in pollution contribute to the increase in 
participation to a significant degree. The quantitative analysis of environmental 
complaints detailed in chapter four clearly illustrates that as pollution levels increase, 
the numbers of complaints also increases. The generally positive relationship between 
pollution and complaints is a statistically significant one.
Fourth, higher levels of economic development also contribute to increasing 
participation, although this is not a significant factor in explaining increasing citizen 
complaints as shown in chapter four. This factor is of greater importance in predicting 
participation in some channels and not as important in other channels. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that economic barriers inhibit some citizens from making 
complaints at higher administrative levels (shangfang) and filing legal suits.
Fifth, growing numbers of ESOs have helped to mobilize participation and so 
have become important in explaining increased levels of participation. In other words,
ESOs have been both a dependent variable and an independent variable in this study. 
The membership ESOs and informal networks of volunteers are particularly important 
for helping to explain increased levels of participation. Starting in the late 1990s, 
ESOs have been instrumental in framing environmental issues. Their framing of the 
Golden Monkey habitat and Tibetan Antelope problems, combined with successful 
mobilization efforts, have been important in accounting for the rise of China’s nature 
and wildlife conservation proto-movement.
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In summary, political opportunities, due to official recognition that 
participation is necessary to meet environmental protection goals, are necessary to 
account for variation, but other factors are important as well. Among these are other 
types of political opportunities, legal opportunities, higher pollution levels, rising 
standards of economic well being, increasing opportunities for citizen mobilizing 
structures and control over framing processes. It should be noted that while 
environmental groups have been producing more of their own literature to give to 
citizens, about 79 percent of citizens polled by SEPA in 2000 said they get their 
information about environmental issues from television and radio programs, 
newspapers and magazines, and governmental education materials.5
The Need to Shape, Channel, and Control Participation
As participation increased in the 1980s and 1990s, officials developed ways in 
which to shape, channel and control this participation. It became clear to scholars and 
officials in the early 1980s that environmental disputes and complaints were inevitable 
and they sought ways in which to keep these from disrupting production and social 
stability. Also, in the late 1980s, as the numbers of social organizations began to 
increase, authorities had to act to ensure participation did not become too zealous.
Party and governmental actors routinely use a variety of methods to shape, 
channel and control these and other forms of participation.  These methods inclue
suppression, repression, institutionalization and routinization of participation, and 
regulatory measures, as well as enhancing the legislative framework to prevent 
pollution, improving enforcement, and promoting environmental education.
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Repressive and suppressive measures are most often used in instances of 
highly contentious politics, such as citizen protests or demonstrations against a 
polluting facility. While citizens are no longer put in prison for counterrevolutionary 
crimes, they are still sometimes put in prison for disrupting production, as noted in 
chapter three. News stories of disputes and protests are often suppressed in favor of 
stories that emphasize positive events and outcomes. This is not to suggest that all 
stories are suppressed or that the media has not become much more assertive in 
reporting the downsides of pollution, but some stories are still suppressed. It is state 
policy to report the positive over the negative. The reason for suppression is simple: 
authorities are concerned tha stories of protest will breed more discontent, 
demonstrations, and social instability.
Authorities have institutionalized and routinized participation in a number of 
ways in order to channel and diffuse it. Environmental protection campaigns, while 
encouraging participation, also work to channel and guide it. Campaigns provide a 
vehicle for citizens to participate when they have no other alternatives. Campaigns are 
unwritten guidelines for citizens when they are trying to determine ways in which they 
can participate, and about which issues. Institutionalization of the environmental 
complaint system, by setting up pollution hot lines in major cities and encouraging 
people to report pollution problems early, has been a major push to prevent more 
disruptive disputes and simply to routinize the complaint process.
Authorities around the world utilize laws and regulations to set the boundaries 
of acceptable behavior and China is no different - but in China’s case, the laws 
regulating citizen participation are more stringent, giving authorities a larger measure 
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of control. This is most evident in the laws and regulations regarding the establishment 
of social organizations. As described in chapter six, organizations must be approved 
by two government bodies before they can become registered. This and other 
stipulations severely limit the number of organizations that can register. Rules 
regarding making complaints to authorities limit the number of citizens that can visit 
government agencies in person, helping to prevent mobs from descending upon 
complaint bureaus, which could lead to collective protests. These regulations have 
been quite effective. If the regulations restricting the establishment of social 
organizations were more lenient, there would probably be many ore environmental 
social organizations; Student environmental groups have proliferated very quickly 
precisely because these laws do not apply to them.
The state’s projected image, in relation to environmental affairs and its 
response to environmental problems, has also helped to keep environmental activism 
from becoming overly zealous, simply because many people believe the state is doing 
the best job it can to manage China’s vast environmental problems. About 49.5 
percent of citizens polled in a SEPA survey said that the measures taken by 
governmental officials are the primary reason for environmental improvements in 
some areas.6 Chinese leaders have passed a comprehensive set of laws regulating the 
environmental sector, have tried to educate enterprises on the need for environmental 
protection, and, since 1993, have tried to improve enforcement of environmental laws 
and regulations. These actions have all helped to portray the government as caring 
about environmental protection. While the regime’s stated position that environmental 
protection is a basic national policy and its efforts to protect the environment help to 
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make the environmental sector one safe for public participation, this policy also has 
the effect of shaping participation. If citizens feel the government is doing a good job, 
then it negates one reason for citizens to take collective action in contention with 
governmental actors. Instead, citizens try to assist the government in its efforts to 
manage pollution. There are of course many exceptions. There are times when citizens 
do not trust the government to take appropriate action and there are instances when 
citizens confront authorities regarding their negligence, inaction, or corrupt behavior.
However, many people are satisfied with governme t action in the 
environment sector and this keeps more people from taking a confrontational stance. 
This is not the only reason why participation has not been more confrontational. Other 
reasons include China’s political culture shaped by centuries of relatively authoritarian 
rule, Confucianist traditions, and repression.
In some ways, by heavily channeling and controlling participation, Chinese 
leaders have hampered the influence participation can have on policy and project 
outcomes, but this is by design. Most participation takes place in the implementation 
phase of environmental policy processes because it helps the state achieve its 
environmental protection goals without messing up the processes of policy formation.
Patterns Across Channels and The Influence of Participation
Public participation does make some difference in environmental policy 
outcomes, although primarily during the implementation phase. Most participation 
occurs after policies have been set and after pollution or environmental degradation 
has already become a problem.
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Citizen influence during the implementation phase is most obvious with the 
state-mobilized campaigns, which often follow the promulgation of new policies and 
laws and are a deliberate tool of implementation. Disputes, on the other hand, are not 
planned and typically influence single policy outcomes, such as the relocation of a 
specific enterprise. Complaints help authorities implement pollution prevention 
standards by helping authorities locate non-c mpliant or even illegal enterprises. In 
addition, citizen complaints help to justify authorities’ enforcement activities to 
enterprises. Most of the activities of ESOs take place while policies are being 
implemented, such as monitoring logging bans. It is fair to say that partici tion in 
each channel enhances the chance that environmental protection policies and laws will 
be implemented successfully.
While most participation takes place during the implementation phase of the 
policy process, some forms also may influence policy decision-making. Some 
influence can be had through institutional official channels in the policy making phase, 
such as GONGO input regarding preferable pollution prevention equipment. Some 
influence before policy decisions also takes place through personalized ties. It is not 
outside the realm of possibility to think that the rise in the numbers of environmental 
disputes have made officials aware of the social consequences of industrial policy 
decisions, which may have influenced industrial policy decisions more generally, such 
as deciding to locate polluting enterprises further away from residential 
neighborhoods. However, there is no direct evidence to support this assertion. The 
complaint system may also influence decision-making. Numerous complaints about a 
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specific enterprise are taken into consideration when environmental protection 
authorities decide which enterprises they will suggest be moved or refitted.
Which of the channels is more effective? It depends upon which type of 
outcome one is discussing. One could ask several different questions. Which channels 
allow citizens to exert the most pressure on authorities to promote environmental 
protection? Which channels help to legitimize government policies? Which channels 
are more effective at influencing specific policy outcomes? Which channels are more 
likely to promote environmental quality? Which channels contribute the most to 
raising citizen environmental awareness levels? Which channels contribute the most to 
mobilizing citizen action in support of environmental protection? Which channels are 
more effective at developing civic consciousness? Often the answers to these 
questions are issue or problem specific. Disputes, complaints, and some campaigns 
focus on industrial pollution problems, while other campaigns and ESO activities 
focus on “green life” and conservation issues, so to ask which channel is best would 
be like comparing apples and oranges. Some of these questions are rhetorical or are 
too broad for meaningful answers. 
This section focuses on discussing five of the above questions. It will discuss 
which channels provide citizens with greater means to pressure authorities, which 
channels legitimize government policies, which channels contribute the most to 
increasing environmental awareness and in mobilizing citizen action to protect the 
environment, and which channels are more effective at developing civic 
consciousness.
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In general, disputes are more effective at pressuring authorities to enforce and 
improve pollution prevention policies; when citizens become embroiled in a fight or 
when they file administrative or court suits, the process involves more actors and 
focuses more attention on environmental protection authorities and practices, thereby 
applying more pressure. As one authority put it “bu gao, bu li,” “if they do not file 
suit, then they can be ignored.” It is inferred that the desire to avoid scrutiny from the 
media, government officials, and higher-l vel EPB officials has been one reason why 
authorities have become more responsive to citizen complaints. Both complaints and 
disputes probably put some pressure on planning authorities to adjust industrial 
policies to take the social consequences of pollution into consideration. ESO’s have 
had some influence in pressuring local authorities o implement conservation and 
natural resources politics. ESO efforts to bring illegal logging to light are but one 
example.
While some popular ESOs may put pressure on authorities to implement 
policies and laws, they also effectively legitimate some governmental policies. For 
example, monitoring illegal logging has the effect of legitimizing central government 
logging policies because the act of monitoring implies support for a policy; it also 
pressures local government authorities to adhere to those policies. At the same time, 
when ESOs refrain from bringing attention to potentially environmentally harmful 
activities, or by refraining from engaging in conversations about specific issues such 
as nuclear power, they are lending tacit legitimacy to governmntal policies in these 
areas, as well as legitimizing state-d fined boundaries on participation. ESOs 
legitimize policy when they cooperate with governmental actors, such as when they 
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mobilize people to plant trees or work with companies to bring them into compliance 
with ISO 14000 standards. Citizens that complain about polluting enterprises are often 
legitimating government pollution-prevention policies as well as legitimizing 
government definitions and framing of public participation. Perhaps most obviously, 
when citizen participate in mobilized campaigns, they are legitimizing campaign goals 
and processes.
State-mobilized campaigns are very efficient at mobilizing citizen action 
because state structures to implement campaigns already exist and they reac down 
into nearly every local area. ESOs have only been active since the early 1990s and so 
have not yet developed the ability to reach such large numbers of people. The 
GONGOs are one exception to this because they are linked with government 
structures through corporatist bonds. However, ESOs do touch people’s lives and can 
make a difference in shaping citizen behavior. Friends of Nature publishes letters from 
citizens that often talk about how they changed their behavior after participating in 
ESO activities. Campaigns also have been effective in educating citizens about 
environmental laws and policies and environmental issues in general. It has been 
shown that many citizens involved in disputes are very knowledgeable about 
environmental laws.7 One explanation is that they learned about legal issues through 
the numerous campaigns to popularize environmental laws.
Participation in each of the channels contributes to developing citizens’ civic 
consciousness, but in very different ways. Participation in state-mobilized campaigns 
is likely to cultivate the sense that one is doing one’s civic duty by helping the state 
meet its environmental protection goals. The same is often true with filing complaints. 
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Participation in disputes develops a different civic sense. I tead of emphasizing one’s 
civic duty to the state, participation in disputes involves defending one’s 
environmental rights. Making demands on enterprises, authorities, and the legal 
system cultivates one’s “rights consciousness,” a different aspect of civic 
consciousness. Filing complaints and disputes, as well as participating in ESO led 
vigils, marches, and petition activities, focus on demanding government and enterprise 
accountability, other aspects of rights and civic consciousness.
Generalizations About Influence
Can we generalize about when participation makes a difference? It is possible 
to generalize to some degree. There are a few variables that influence the degree of 
difference participation makes across all channels of participation. First, it matters 
who is participating, supporting the notion that personalized ties, or guanxi, (although 
in this case not clientelist ties) is still important in Chinese society. Second, the level 
of commitment of citizens and the number of citizens participating are important 
factors, which indicates that social action can have some influence if the number of 
actors involved is large enough and if they are dedicated enough. Third, it helps to 
have pressure from a number of different sources, including the government, the 
media, ordinary citizens, and ESOs. Fourth, the attitudes of officials and government 
priorities are paramount. Fifth, the degree of the pollution or environmental issue and 
the tractability of the problem in relation to local conditions both make a difference. 
Sixth, the probability or existence of social instability is crucial in determining when 
participation makes a difference, again which supports the notion that social action can 
make a difference. Finally, institutionalized channels are still a way in which actors 
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can influence policy outcomes – specifically, professional GONGOs and other 
GONGOs utilize official channels to make suggestions and comments to higher level 
officials, and citizens make complaints through the institutionalized complaint system; 
both actors can influence decisions regarding areas needing attention and 
governmental priorities among other issues.
China is not unique regarding the conditions under which participation makes a 
difference, although there are obviously variations across countries depending upon 
the type of political, economic and legal systems that are in place. The attitudes of 
officials and businesses are crucial to some degree in determining when participation 
makes a difference in policy outcomes in any country, but because of China’s 
authoritarian political system and relatively inconsistent implementation of 
environmental laws, the attitudes of officials are more important in China than they 
are in the U.S., for example.
It does matter who is participating. As discussed in chapter four, complaints 
from prominent persons, the media, National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Committee, as well as from higher levels of government, are 
given more weight and are considered more credible. A letter from Liang Congjie, the 
head of an ESO and member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, carries more 
weight than a letter from the leader of a college student group. In addition, the 
determination of citizens to follow through and thenumber of citizens participating 
makes a difference. Citizens are more likely to see governmental action and have their 
dispute resolved if they are determined to invest the time, energy, and resources to 
take the complaint to higher levels of government or to the courts.
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Authorities and other social actors are more likely to change the status quo if 
they are pressured from a number of different sources. As Tony Saich discovered, 
local authorities did not take efforts to protect the Golden Monkey until ESOs, student 
environmental groups, the media, and central government authorities pressured them. 
Efforts to get more environmentally friendly utensils in college cafeterias worked only 
after prolonged pressure from student groups, utilizing a number of methods. The 
students pointed out that the Beijing government had issued regulations outlawing 
non-biodegradable materials and were willing to enforce the regulations.
The attitudes of officials and enterprise managers and owners are still 
important factors that determine whether participation makes a difference. This 
includes attitudes toward environmental protection, economic development, and the 
law. There are numerous complaint and dispute cases in which a dispute dragged on 
for years simply because enterprise mangers refused to do anything about a pollution 
problem. These managers had little respect for new environmental laws or the infant 
environmental protection apparatus. Furthermore, some officials are more concerned 
with profit; others feel China should develop economically first and then clean up the 
environment. When officials and enterprise owners have some respect for the law, 
support environmental protection, and can sympathize with the plight of citizens 
harmed by pollution, they are more likely to w rk with citizens and other officials to 
resolve a dispute and reduce a pollution problem. The attitudes of officials also are 
important in determining the number and effectiveness of government mobilized 
environmental campaigns. If officials are just “doing their jobs,” and do not 
wholeheartedly support environmental protection or are more concerned with 
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economic development, they will not be very proactive; hence, there will be fewer 
educational programs and environmental protection campaigns. Concerning 
environmental social organizations, because the approval of a supervisory 
governmental organization is needed, the attitudes of officials are crucial. Officials 
must support the ideas of both public participation and environmental protection in 
order to be willing to be responsible for an environmental social organization.
The severity of the pollution problem and the tractability of the problem in 
relation to local conditions both make a difference in policy outcome. These factors 
are most obvious in environmental disputes and complaints. Both chapters three and 
four illustrated that when a pollution problem is clearly in violation of standards or 
when the polluting enterprise is operating illegally, officials act more decisively to 
resolve a problem. The hardest disputes to resolve are those in which citizens are 
affected by an environmental problem, but the pollution is not in violation of 
standards, or there are no clear regulations or standards regulating the problem – as in 
the case with coal dust.
The tractability of the problem can certainly affect the outcome. It has been 
harder to resolve disputes regarding extremely large enterprises, such as Shougang 
(Capital Steel) in Beijing and Taigang in Taiyuan, which have multiple sources of 
pollution and are difficult to move. There is no doubt China has had more trees 
replanted with public participation than without, but the success of these programs is 
sometimes questionable. One reason environmental groups were successful in getting 
the government to take action to save the Golden Monkey habitat in Yunnan is 
because it was a manageable problem.
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The probability or existence of social instability is important in determining 
when participation makes a difference. This factor is most obvious in disputes and 
complaints. When citizens take matters into their own hands, authorities have to pay 
more attention to their grievances. It is state policy. EPB directors only get involved in 
disputes if they cross administrative boundaries or if they have the potential to le d to 
social unrest. While the outcome of a case may not always be in favor of citizens, 
especially those cases in which they have been arrested for disrupting production, 
authorities generally believe environmental complaints are credible if citizens ar  
willing to risk disruptive action. As chapter three notes, citizens generally use 
disruptive tactics as a last resort. Tony Saich argues that it was the threat of social 
unrest on college campuses that influenced the government’s decision to ban logging
in Golden Monkey habitat.8
There is a general debate in the social movement literature regarding the 
effectiveness of disruptive tactics in movement success and the terms of the debate are 
relevant to participation in general.9 It may be that disruptive tactics are more effective 
in authoritarian countries given the need these regimes have to maintain control over 
the population. While it is true that disruptive tactics may land citizens in jail in strict 
authoritarian states, such tactics also can lead authorities to make policy changes, even 
though they may not admit that it is due to citizen pressure. This is especially true in 
countries, such as China, which have made some political and economic reforms and 
which some scholars have called a “soft authori arian” country.10
Public participation undoubtedly makes a difference, primarily in the policy 
implementation stage, and it is clear that participation in non-democratic states is as 
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important in implementation success as it is in democratic countries. Perhaps it is the 
newer forms of participation in the policymaking process being instituted on a trial 
basis in China that hold the most promise of public influence. Some forms of 
participation that are just emerging in China include public input in environmental 
impact assessment processes, public comment processes – including public meetings 
and solicitation of comments by authorities - and informal channels of influence. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to describe and analyze these channels of
participation, but they are areas ripe for future research.
Participation and Influence in Decision-making Processes: Areas for Future 
Research
Chinese authorities have strengthened the laws and regulations guiding 
environmental impact assessment processes ince 1986 and public participation has 
become a more important component in these processes. The new Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law includes several provisions that encourage expert and public 
opinion in assessment processes. Provisions eleven and twe ty-one state that the 
company writing the assessment for special projects and those projects that potentially 
could harm the environment (projects requiring an environmental impact report -
baogaoshu) should solicit expert and public opinion and include polled opinions in the 
assessment report (or explain why they were not incorporated). Before a report is 
approved, opinions should be solicited through lunzhenghui or tingzhenghui
(testimonial or hearing)11 Provisions four and five call for open and fair impact 
assessment processes and state that participation by the public is encouraged. It should 
be noted that participation is only encouraged and should be included (ying ang), but 
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is not absolutely required (bixu). It is also notable that the state resticts participation 
in projects that involve state secrets. This undoubtedly includes projects with a 
military dimension and projects with a nuclear dimension, but could include other 
projects as well.
The role of experts and the public is an area ripe for future research and there 
are several questions one should ask: Who attends testimonials or hearings and how 
are they chosen? How informed are the opinions of those who participate? What role 
does the construction entity play in testimonials or hearings? How much weight is 
given to public opinion in the assessment process and in the project outcome? Can 
citizen objections to a project change its nature or even halt its progress? Does public 
participation in the assessment process help to alleviate problems after a project is 
finished? These questions also are relevant for other forms of public participation in 
environmental policy processes.
There are two main forms of public comment in environmental policymaking, 
public meetings and the solicited public comment process for new laws. Numerous 
types of public meetings exist. There have been meetings to discuss specific pollution 
accidents to get public input regarding the fate of a polluting enterprise. 
Environmental protection and other authorities have called meetings to discuss water 
and electricity pricing issues. Resident committees have called other meetings to 
discuss decisions to site polluting enterprises. These meetings cry out for examination. 
Why do some areas hold these types of meetings while others do not? What happens at 
these meetings and how genuine is public input? How are the outcomes of these 
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meetings incorporated into decisions that are implemented? How do these meetings fit 
with pluralist and mass-line models of policymaking?
The other type of public comment process, soliciting comments for proposed 
new laws, has recently been established through legislation in China. The new 
Legislation Law that went into effect in January 2001 includes a provision that 
requires public comment on certain types of laws before they are passed. Major 
environmental laws fall in this category. In 1999, The State Environmental Protection 
Administration instituted the public comment process on a trial basis for the new Land 
Law and should utilize it to a greater degree in the future. As of yet, no detailed 
research has been conducted regarding the use of the public comment process in the 
environment sector, but some research has been done on the comment process in the 
financial sector.12 The government instituted the public comment process to help 
decide the best way to reduce the government ownership stake in corporations listed 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The China Securities Regulatory 
Commission posted a notice on its website soliciting public comments and in only a 
month received 4,100 suggestions. The proposals were discussed at a meeting of 
economists from eight financial research firms. The point is that the suggestions were 
not only collected but were seriously discussed by policymakers, pos ibly indicating a 
new openness in the decision-making process.13
Beyond the notion that a new openness in the decision-making process is 
emerging, there are a couple of other explanations for increased use of the public 
comment process. The process could be framed as an example of the “mass-line,” or 
more aptly, the “expert line.” If the practice is meant to garner input from experts or 
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the general public in order to increase expert and public respect and support for the 
resulting policies or laws, then it can be said to conform to the “mass or expert line” 
model of policy-making which would ensure easy implementation. In theory, because 
experts and/or the general population participated in the mass line process, by which 
citizen attitudes and preferences were polled and taken into consideration when 
designing policies, then they should be more easily implemented.
Another conceptual lens would be to view the public comment processes 
through the developmental theory of participation lens. According to this theory, 
citizens that participate in the making of policies and laws will be more supportive of 
these measures as well as supportive of the ruling regime. Some argue that one of the 
functions of participation is to develop “democratic” characteristics of the participant. 
Participation increases the awareness of political practices and the political system and 
basically works to raise one’s civic sense.”14
Yet another explanation is that authorities in various sectors are utilizing the 
public comment process simply because they have to. Along these lines, while the 
effects of participation on the specific policy or law would be rendered nearly 
meaningless, the very act of participation itself may or may not build citizens’ civic 
sense depending upon whether they b lieved their input was actually being utilized or 
not.
Sophistication of the Mass-Line and of State-Society Relations in China
There is no doubt that each of the channels of participation in the environment 
sector has changed over time by becoming more s phisticated. Authorities have 
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standardized, rationalized, and routinized channels of participation by creating 
regulations, institutions, and accepted practices.
For example, authorities have standardized and institutionalized the 
environmental complaint system by creating regulations for EPBs to follow when they 
manage complaints. They have set up complaint offices and telephone hotlines for 
citizens, which expanded citizen access to officials. The institutionalized complaint 
system operates as a sophisticated, modern form of the mass line. When citizens 
complain, they are making their concerns known to lower-level authorities, who then 
include these concerns in reports to higher-level authorities, or take them into 
consideration when determining specific enterprises to be relocated, altered, shut 
down, or targeted for clean up.
As outlined in chapter four, in the early 1990s, some officials were still very 
unsympathetic to citizen environmental complaints, but officials can no longer ignore 
citizen complaints; the situation has become more complex. There is pressure from 
higher-level authorities to be more responsive and citizens have become more 
knowledgeable about environmental laws and their environmental rights, which 
emboldens them to voice their grievances. Standardizing the complaint process has 
routinized management of citizen grievances and functions to prevent violent disputes.
Dispute resolution processes have gone from being ad hoc in the early 1980s to 
being standardized and institutionalized in the late 1990s. This does not mean, 
however, that all disputes are resolved and that there are no problems with dispute 
resolution processes. One problem with the system is that, for a variety of reasons, 
some disputes never get resolved. Other looming problems with dispute resolution 
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include the lack of regulations regarding victim compensation, government 
intervention in court cases, self-interested courts, and lack of authority on the part of 
EPBs to enforce dispute resolutions, especially compensation claims. However, 
overall, citizens have more voice now than they did in the late 1970s because the right 
to accuse polluters was codified into law. While there are still instances where citizens 
are put in prison by police authorities for disrupting production as a means to 
protecting their environmental rights, there is greater leeway in protecting one’s 
environmental rights than there was in the 1970s. In addition, there are specific 
procedures through which citizens can get themselves out of jail and press charges 
against polluters. The court procedures in dispute cases have become more rational 
and sophisticated. Currently, science is used to back up competing claims by both the 
plaintiff and the defendant, instead of being used by one court-appointed investigative 
team as was done in the 1970s and 1980s.
Even mobilized campaigns have become somewhat more sophisticated. 
Campaigns have been depoliticized, which has decreased the tension associated with 
campaigns as well as made them more routinized. While off cials still mobilize 
participation, citizens have more of a choice whether to participate or not (except, of 
course, the individuals involved in the mobilizing, such as Street Office personnel). 
The repercussions of not participating for ordinary citizens are not as severe as they 
were in the Mao years. The choice factor indicates that those who do participate do so 
willingly, for a variety of motivations, which means there is a higher level of 
volunteerism. Volunteerism in modern China stems not so much from “communist 
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consciousness” as from a socialist, nationalist consciousness. To be “green” is to be 
patriotic.
Chinese authorities have evolved considerably in their dealings with citizen 
groups, representing a sophistication of state-society relations. While there are still 
strict regulations guiding the establishment of ESOs, Chinese leaders have at least 
acknowledged the need for social organizations in society and in some cases have 
encouraged them. This in itself is a sophistication of state- ociety relations. The state, 
however, still requires social organizations to find a sponsoring governmental 
organization in its professional field that will take responsibility for it; a gu kao body 
still grants social organizations monopoly power within their profession by 
disallowing two social organizations that perform the same function to register in the 
same administrative area. This shows that while relations have become more 
sophisticated, there has not been a fundamental change in state-society relations since 
the early 1980s. Given that the fundamentals of state- ociety relations have not really 
changed, can anything but a state-sponsored social movement emerge in China?
Public Participation, Political Participation, and Social Movements
This research as sought to discover why participation in the environment 
sector has been increasing and has also sought to discover the emergence of an 
environmental movement in China, but did not take such a movement as a given. One 
of the difficulties in researching social movements is that one can only examine 
positive instances of movement emergence. Researching participation is one way to 
get around this problem. By examining participation in general, one can explore the 
potential for a movement to emerge; not justany participation, but primarily political 
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participation.  Without political participation, there can be no social movement. Not all 
action within a social movement is contentious, so focusing only on contentious 
politics to search for the possible emergence of a movement is limiting. Therefore, this 
research focused on a variety of participatory forms.
Another problem in social movement research is falling into the trap of setting 
up movements as dichotomous variables. One way this problem has been framed is to 
ask how can researchers study “non-movements?” The characterization of the problem 
as a dichotomous variable, i.e., movements or non-m vements, leaves little room for 
varying cultural contexts and variation in movement phenomenon. Cultural, political, 
and economic contexts deserve some consideration, such as considering the social 
construction of contention. However, too much flexibility destroys the meaning of a 
definition of social movements, making the category meaningless.
Proto-Movements in the Chinese Context
A solution to this problem has been to maintain a rather rigid definition of a 
social movement, but to allow for more gray area between non-movements and 
movements by creating a new category of movements, that of proto-movements. 
Proto-movements exhibit the elements of a social movement, as defined by Sidney 
Tarrow, to some degree, but are constrained by the lack of political opportunities. The 
paucity of political opportunities leads the movement type phenomenon to be small, to 
be nascent, or to be less contentious. Some proto-movements may develop into 
traditional movements, but some may not depending upon the configuration of 
political opportunities shaping it. If there are no changes in the political opportunity 
structure, then the proto-movement remains in the proto phase. This framework takes 
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movement phenomenon not as a dichotomous variable, but a continuous variable with 
political participation on one end to social movements at the other end. One change 
that would facilitate the development of China’s conservation proto-movement would 
be to lift the governmental requirement for approval by two governmental ministries 
to establish an ESO.
In seeking explanations for the emergence of proto-movements and for 
explaining participation in authoritarian regimes, it is quite useful to apply concepts 
and theories used in the social movement literature. As discussed in chapters two, 
three, and six, political opportunities and threats have been the most important factors 
to influence levels of participation and the emergence of proto-m vements. This is not 
to say that other factors are not important; as discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, several other factors have been important. It must be stressed that although 
many political opportunities have opened up in China, the political opportunity 
structure remains the primary limiting variable to the emergence of a traditional 
movement.
In China, there is a nature and biodiversity conservation proto-m vement 
based in Beijing and other large cities. A handful of popular ESOs and student groups 
have mobilized citizens in a number of campaigns to protect specific species and 
specific areas of habitat. They have acted collectively to preserve Golden Monkey 
habitat and to stop poaching of Tibetan antelop  by participating in investigative 
teams, holding candlelight vigils, writing letters to government and party officials, 
aiding anti-poaching teams, working with the media, and a number of other activities. 
These groups engaged in contentious politics with local- level officials seeking to 
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preserve economic inputs through illegal logging in Sichuan and Yunnan, and by 
illegally selling Shatoosh fabrics made from Tibetan antelope in Qinghai province.
The proto-movement is small when compared to China’s population, but it has 
been effective in meeting its goals. Golden monkey habitat was spared first by a ban 
on road building in 1995 and by a general ban on logging from Zhu Rongji in 1998.15
And, although the anti-poaching team was disbanded in Qinghai, the area is now a 
nature preserve where poaching is illegal.16
It is questionable how many citizens in China are aware of ESO activities or of 
the emergence of a nature and biodiversity proto-movement. Even students in Beijing 
that are active in environmental protection activities on campus put on by student 
groups may not be aware of popular ESO or GONGO activities off-campus. Many 
students cannot name an environmental organization outside of their university. This 
indicates that China’s environmental proto-m vement is very small scale in relation to 
China’s huge population.
China’s ESOs have not mobilized action to protest industrial pollution and, 
unlike China’s neighbors in East Asia, an anti-pollution movement has not emerged. 
Local instances of protest regarding pollution remain isolated episodes of contentious 
politics. There are significant barriers to the growth of these episodes:  China’s ESOs 
have not become involved in mobilizational efforts, there is a shortage of political 
opportunities and political repression is still a risk, the prevailing “ideology of 
economic growth” has led to the belief that pollution is inevitable, authorities have 
channeled disputes through the complaint system in an effort to curb collective action, 
and finally, state control of the media has precluded environmental accidents or 
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pollution cases from “resonating” with the Chinese public, since there are no symbols 
around which to mobilize.
The Ramifications of Increased Participation For State-Society Relations, 
Democratization and Environmental Quality
One could argue that increasing participation contributes indirectly to 
“creeping” democratization.17 Creeping democratization is manifest through citizens 
increasing use of legal remedies to assert their legal rights, including their 
environmental rights.It also is manifest in decreasing repression of pollution victims 
since 1979 and in citizens’ access to representatives of the National People’s 
Congress, which has been growing in political power, albeit slowly and 
inconsistently.18 There is some evidence that Chinese leaders may continue to 
encourage participation. Most recently, President Hu Jintao said the Communist Party 
“must undertake a sweeping systemic project to increase public participation in 
government and enforce the rule of law.”
We must enrich the forms of democracy, make democratic 
procedures complete, expand citizens’ orderly political participation 
and ensure that the people can exercise democratic elections, 
democratic decision-making, democratic administration ad 
democratic scrutiny.” (Hu Jintao on the eve of China’s National Day 
holiday, October 2, 2003)19
Since increased participation is partially a result of encouragement by 
authorities and of increased responsiveness on the part of authorities, then citizens
heartened by positive feedback to their environmental grievances may become more 
demanding in other areas, such as requesting a larger role in policymaking in a variety 
of sectors. Increased responsiveness by authorities could lead citizens to have higher
expectations regarding more accountability in government. Increased citizen activism, 
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partially fueled by government encouragement and by greater governmental 
responsiveness, should lead to even greater governmental accountability in a positive 
reinforcing cycle.
Implications for Environmental Quality
While participation is increasing overall, it is increasing more in some areas 
than it is in others. It is increasing primarily in China’s urban areas, which has 
consequences for the expansion of environmental aw reness and citizen activism, and 
for environmental quality. There is often a stark contrast in the attitudes of officials in 
inner city districts to those in outer city districts, even in Beijing, where inner city 
officials are much more supportive of environmental protection. When polluting 
enterprises are moved out of inner districts, they often end up in outer districts that are 
willing to sacrifice environmental protection for economic opportunities, despite the 
fact that a portion of the population will be adversely affected by pollution, without 
being compensated. With the opening of western China in accordance with the “Go 
West” campaign, it is highly probable that enterprises moving out west will enjoy 
lower environmental standards. Moving industries to outer districts or to China’s 
western region is just displacement of China’s pollution problems, not their resolution. 
With environmental awareness and activism at lower levels in outer districts, 
including China’s northwestern (and probably northeastern) areas, there is less 
pressure on authorities to impose environmental laws and policies on incoming 
enterprises. 
Given that increased participation is correlated to the attitudes of officials and 
to official encouragement, the variability of outcomes is once again dependent upon 
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Chinese authorities. This means that while public participation does make a difference 
in promoting beneficial environmental outcomes, it currently only works in a small 
portion of China’s vast territory.
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Appendix A – Description of Case Cities
Beijing’s Environmental History
The city of Beijing emerged around 1000 B.C. as a trading town for Chinese, 
Korean, Mongolian, and Manchurian merchants. Later, the town became the capital of 
the Yan Kingdom and was called Yanjing. Genghis Khan burned Yanjing to the 
ground in 1215 AD, only to rebuild it in greater splendor. During the Ming Dynasty, 
the flourishing city came to be called Beiping (Northern Peace), but was renamed 
Beijing (Northern Capital).1 Currently, it is the political, cultural, intellectual, and 
economic capital of China. It has been a model to display the nation’s environmental 
protection efforts. 
The city is an independent municipality directly under the control of the central 
government and has the same political status as a province. The city proper has four 
districts, Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chongwen, and Xuanwu. There are four suburban 
districts, Chaoyang, Haidian, Fengtai, and Shijingshan and four “outer” suburbs, 
Mentougou, Fangshan, Tongzhou, and Shunyi. Finally, there are six outlying counties, 
Miyun, Huairou, Pinggu, Changping, Yanqiong, and Daxing. Getting to the outer 
districts and counties without a car is still difficult. It requires about a half a day’s 
journey by bus. 
The municipality’s population had increased dramatically since the founding of 
the People’s Republic. In 1952, the population was almost 2.5 million. In 1978, it 
jumped to over 8.7 million. In 1989, it was over 10.2 million and by 1999, it had 
reached 12.3 million. The city is roughly 16,800 sq km and sits in at the junction of 
the North China Plain and the Taixing and Yanshan mountain ranges. About 62% of 
municipal Beijing is mountainous and 38% is flat. More than 100 rivers traverse 
through some part of Beijing. In the winter, Beijing is affected by the weather coming 
from the North, while in the summer; it is affected by the weather coming from the 
East China Sea. There are four distinct seasons. It can be bitterly cold in the winter 
because it is subject to cold fronts coming from Mongolia. It is windy during the 
spring and the winds bring notorious dust storms from the Northwest. In the summer, 
it is hot and rainy. Autumn is the balmiest. The sun shines about half the year and the 
average annual precipitation is 640 millimeters, although this varies greatly. 
Beijing’s outlying districts and counties have abundant resources including 
coal, iron, copper, lead, and gold. In addition, marble is plentiful as is limestone, 
dolomite, and refractory clay. Because of the abundance of clay and other rocks and 
minerals, the brick industry is thriving. When driving out of Beijing’s inner and outer 
districts into the countryside, brick kilns can be seen dotting the landscape.
Development of the Environmental Protection Apparatus
Beijing is home to the early pioneers of China’s environmental protection 
efforts so, over the last three decades, the city often has been the first city to establish 
policies and institutions critical to these efforts. City officials were the first to set up a 
municipal “three wastes” (sanpai) office in 1971. From the early 1970s onward, 
Beijing garnered the attention of top Chinese Communist Party officials and 
government leaders. Premier Zhou Enlai himself emphasized that Beijing should be a 
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“clean” city, so officials should limit the number of polluting enterprises that could 
move there (at least in the inner districts). He ordered enterprise specific water, air, 
and solid waste pollution problems to be cleaned up. In addition, in the 1970s, the 
Beijing Environmental Science Research and Monitoring Institute were established. 
The city published it’s own “environmental protection” magazine and began modest 
environmental education efforts.2
In 1980, Deng Xiaoping declared that Beijing would “transformed into the 
nation’s cleanest, most sanitary, and most beautiful city.” These “guiding principles” 
had some impact on city early on. The city Environmental Protection Commission (a 
sub-commission under the (Chengjian weiyuanhui) was established in the early 1980s. 
By 1983, environmental issues were included in the city government’s annual agenda. 
By 1989, an Environmental Protection Commission also had been established in some 
districts and counties.3
By 1990, deadline cleanup orders were included in the city’s broader economic 
and social development plans. The city Environmental Protection Commission was 
revamped in 1991 and expanded to 33 members. Every ministry and state level 
corporation established a department dedicated to environmental protection issues.4 In 
1993, higher-level authorities encouraged those districts and counties that had not yet 
established an EPB to do so. In addition, higher-level authorities got tough with 
Tongxian County for not including environmental protection indicators into 
government term targets for higher-l vel county officials.5 The city established a City 
Environmental Protection Law Enforcement Inspection Leading Small Group and the 
city EPB established the Inspection Brigade.6 The next year, environmental protection 
criteria were added to county and village leaders’ “term targets” (renqimubiao) in 
Tongxian County. In addition, that year, environmental protection coursework was 
added to the city level “Party school” general curriculum. Following the city’s lead,
Chongwen, Xicheng, Dongcheng, Fengtai, and other districts and counties included 
environmental protection issues in local-level Party schools.7
In 1995, several districts and counties established “regulatory enforcement 
leading small groups.” Members of these groups included representatives from local 
Environmental Protection Commissions, People’s Congresses, governmental 
ministries, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. These groups 
conducted an overall assessment of policy and law enforcement in their respective 
administrative areas.8 After government restructuring in 1998, the Beijing Municipal 
EPB could communicate directly with the municipal government and relevant 
ministries. The EPB no longer had to issue notices or call meetings through the 
Shizheng Guanli Weiyuanhui or the Chengjian Weiyuanhui. In addition, the city EPB 
had more authority over the environmental impact assessment processes.9
Linked to the administrative and service arms of the city’s environmental 
protection aparatus, authorities built a community “volunteer” environmental 
network very early. In 1989, 350 of Beijing’s 400 Street and Village and Township 
Offices, had “deployed” people with the specific duty of monitoring environmental 
protection in neighborhoods, because of commitments made in Environmental 
Protection Responsibility System Contracts. These street level monitors linked 
Resident’s Committees with the local population. Special efforts were made to educate 
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“information officers” for Residence Committees in environmental issues so they in 
turn could educate the general public.10  In some districts, polluting enterprises 
established “coordinating groups” which mutually monitored each other and shared 
experiences and information.11
These “volunteers” have been very important in mobilizing support for 
environmental protection in Beijing and in carrying out specific campaigns designed 
to “clean the face” of the city. Early environmental activists responsible for acting as a 
“bridge” or a “transmission belt” were a crucial link between the government and the 
citizenry. 
Earlier, I discussed how campaigns were a manifestation of the state’s 
environmental protection agenda. While SEPA draws up an environmental plan each 
year, including educational goals, and local EPBs base their own plans on the goals set 
out by the national level, there is some latitude in carrying them out in accordance 
with “local conditions.” In other words, campaigns in one city may or may not be 
similar to campaigns in another city or province. 
The environmental protection agenda in Beijing is particularly influenced by 
national objectives and the wishes of national leaders, because it is the capital. 
Therefore Beijing is the exception among Chinese cities, it is not the norm. In the 
1980s, cleaning up Beijing was a national priority. Again, in the late 1990s and early 
2000, Beijing’s environmental protection, especially air pollution, became a high 
national priority.12 It is due to the attention, supervision, and support of the central 
government that Beijing has made substantial improvements in environmental quality. 
Another reason why Beijing has been relatively successful in mitigating its 
pollution problems, compared to other cities, has been a constant influx of foreign 
investment over the years. In the late 1980s, the city was the recipient of World Bank 
loans to improve environmental management and pollution control, improve drinking 
water sources and distribution, and improve the city’s infrastructure.13
Another reason why Beijing’s environment has improved is that it began to 
relocate polluting enterprises early. In accordance with the directives of national 
leaders and environmental protection officials, tens of polluting enterprises were 
moved out of the city each year in the mid 1980s.14 According to one environmental 
protection official, many of these enterprises were moved to any area that would 
welcome them, often ending up in Tongxian County.15
Basic Agenda and Major Campaigns
From 1989 through 1991, Beijing environmental protection authorities 
considered the following their top priorities in environmental protection: establishing 
some of the eight proposed implementation mechanisms including the Three 
Simultaneous Policy, the Environmental Protection Target Responsibility System, th  
Comprehensive Environmental Improvement Assessment System, the discharge fee 
and pollution permit systems; building institutional capacity; getting environmental 
indicators added to the list of items to be examined when leaders were to be 
considered for promotion; including environmental targets and deadline cleanup 
orders in the city government’s economic and social plan; safeguarding city drinking 
water supplies; moving heavily polluting enterprises out of the city; discussing 
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environmental education curriculum for elementary and middle schools; surveying 
town and village enterprise pollution sources; developing the city’s environmental 
regulatory framework; and the Asian Games clean-up campaigns. Specific tasks 
included building production lines tomake soft coal briquettes, eliminating small coal 
fired boilers, planting trees, and testing automobiles on exhaust standards.16
The most important campaign that took place in Beijing in 1989 and 1990 was 
the “maintain social stability, welcome the Asian Games” (bao wending, huang 
yayun), which was to prepare the city for the upcoming Asian Games. The “maintain 
social stability, welcome the Asian Games” campaign was reinforced in 1990 with 
three sub-campaigns, the “300 days to the Asian Games” the “200 days to the Asian 
Games” and the “100 days to the Asian Games” activities. During the last, county 
environmental protection bureau directors proceeded with “practice drills” (h zhan 
yanlian). Each district and county conducted several drills at various levels to nsure 
that environmental protection people gradually took “environmental protection to 
heart” (huanjing baohu zhujian shenru renxin).17 For the “maintain social stability, 
welcome the Asian Games” campaign, the city Environmental Protection Committee 
requested assistance from the municipal government. The government called upon 
every work unit, district, county, bureau, company, and ministry to do what the city 
environmental protection commission requested. Three separate ad hoc systems were 
set up: 1) the “supervision management system” (jiandu guanli tixi) 2) the “self-
guarantee system” (ziwo baozheng tixi), and 3) the “environmental monitoring 
system” (huanjing jiance tixi). The environmental “activists” and responsible parties 
in Street, Village and Township Committees played important roles in getting these 
“systems” set up. 
For the “supervision management system,” “full time environmental protection 
personnel in every city, district, county environmental protection office, street, village, 
and town” were paired with part-time information personnel from Residents and 
Village committees to form a system to monitor local pollution sources. The 
Environmental Yearbook lists the number of organizations and individuals with 
“responsibility” for the Asian games and who participated in the (ad hoc) system of 
supervision. Altogether there were 14 district and counties, 96 streets, 120 villages, 28 
towns, and 4,551 Residents and Village Committees. Personnel from these 
organizations worked with about 341 full-time environmental protection personnel and 
3,234 part time people from propaganda organs to form 3rd level management and 4th
level supervision teams. These supervision teams were made up of professionals and 
ordinary citizens working together.18 For the “self-guarantee system,” unit managers 
got personnel from every enterprise to police each other in order to strengthen 
management and ensure that no environmental accidents occurred.  For the 
“environmental monitoring system,” existing monitoring station cotingents were 
strengthened at each administrative level. In addition, volunteers from businesses and 
the citizenry helped with the work of the monitoring stations. The three systems 
implemented were not only to help control environmental quality during the Asian 
Games, but also represented the “new road” [xinlu] of environmental management and 
supervision for the future.19
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The “maintain social stability, welcome the Asian Games” campaign was 
reinforced in 1990 with three sub-campaigns, the “300 days to the Asian Games” the 
“200 days to the Asian Games” and the “100 days to the Asian Games” activities. 
During the last, county environmental protection bureau directors proceeded with 
“practice drills” (haizhan yanlian). Each district and county conducted several d ills at 
various levels to ensure that environmental protection people gradually took 
“environmental protection to heart” (huanjing baohu zhujian shenru renxin).20
The international theme for World Environment Day was “children and the 
environment,” so most efforts were focused on China’s youth, but the influence of the 
Asian Games campaign was obvious. In Chaoyang, Xuanwu, and Chongwen districts, 
students formed the “Welcome the Asian Games Red Scarf Environmental Protection 
Group” (Ying yayun honglingdai huanjing baohu dui) and held all sorts of 
environmental protection activities. In Xicheng District, the 5th graders in all of the 
district’s elementary schools formed the “Red Scarf (Young Pioneers) Environmental 
Protection Brigade” (Honglingbu huanjing baohu dadui). Dongcheng, Fengtai, 
Shijingshan and Haidian elementary school students organized all sorts of education 
activities to popularize knowledge about environmental science and to raise the 
environmental awareness of youth.21
Leading up to and during the Asian Games, Beijing’s leaders showed more 
concern for the environment and its citizens were very active in environmental 
protection activities.22 The government mobilized every citizen, from company 
presidents to factory workers, to become involved in the cleanup of Beijing. Personnel 
from district, county, city, and provincial environmental protection bureaus, as well as 
environmental workers from every street, village, township, and community 
committee worked overtime to make sure the city was clean. All of the environmental 
employees that had been laid off were called back to work. The municipality canceled 
all holidays for city, district, and county environmental protection managers.
The government set four main goals for environmental quality during the 
Asian Games (si ge dadao), 1)”no black smoke, no foul smells, nor soot on the 
ground; 2)cars on the road must meet emission standards; 3)drinking water must be 
clean; 4)there should be no environmental accidents.” This was the first time that the
government had made these requests of enterprises, but it was not to be the last. For 
every major event in Beijing, the government has been successful in getting the city’s 
most polluting enterprises to suspend production so that Beijing’s skies could be blue 
for the events.
In 1992, the first annual “Green Streets Working Meeting” (Jiedao Luhua 
Gongzuo Huiyi) was called and over 6,000 people attended the meeting. “Green 
awards” were given out to individuals and units in several categories who performed 
well during last year’s “Green and Beautify the Capital City” campaign.23 I  1992, the 
State Council Environment Protection Committee passed a decision that called for 
authorities in Beijing to mobilize the city’s citizens to clean up Beijing’s environment 
in anticipation of China’s Olympic bid.24 Citizens were mobilized to clean up the city 
much as they were during the city’s Asian Games Campaign. In addition, the 
government kicked off the “clear skies” campaign (huangtu bu lutian – literally loess 
soil will not shroud the skies). Also in 1992, the government focused on completing 
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public works projects, strengthening government capacity and supervision, motivating 
public participation, training enforcement personnel, developing the administrative 
review system, aggressively pursuing fines that are due. Beijing increased the number 
of enterprises included in the trial water pollution permit system.
In 1993, the government focused on building the city’s infrastructure, 
“realizing the five transformations,” popularizing environmental awareness, getting 
laggard counties to incorporate environment work into governmental targets, 
continuing the “clear skies” campaign, responding to citizen complaints, beginning a 
trial for “clean production” facilities, and improving youth environmental education. 
There were several goals in “realizing the five transformations and propelling 
environmental protection work in the capital to a new level” (shixian wuge zhuanbian, 
tuidong shoudu huanjing baohu gongzuo shang xin taijie) campaign. First, overcome 
shortsighted thinking about environmental protection and correctly manage changes in 
environmental protection and development. Second, begin strictly enforcing the “three 
simultaneous” and total pollution control by surmounting the following beliefs 
“pollute first and clean up later” and “pollution is inevitable.” Third, overcome the 
fear that economic development will slow down if environmental measures are 
implemented. Dare to manage courageously and strengthen legal and macro controls. 
Fourth, Overcome the planned economy management model and make environmental 
management more scientific and standardized. Fifth, overcome the fear of self-
gratification and the fear of difficulty, strengthen environmental protection 
infrastructure, hold high standards and sternly demand transformation.25 Each district 
and county came up with its own policies and slogans to implement this campaign. For 
example, Chaoyang district declared that development and economics could not trump 
environmental protection.  
In addition, in 1993, leaders mobilized Communist Youth League members 
during a week-long campaign to “green and beautify” Beijing called “Green the 
Capital, Be the Vanguard, Contribute to the Bid for the Olympics” (Luhua Shoudu 
Dang Xianfeng, Zhengban Aoyun Zuo Gongxian).26
In 1994, the government concentrated on protecting drinking water sources, 
responding to citizens’ complaints, and reducing water and air pollution. More 
enterprises were relocated, shut down or converted. Authorities urged increased 
participation on the Environmental Protection Target Responsibility System and 
strengthened the other eight-implementation measures. Authorities cracked down on 
companies buying and selling wild animal parts, reviewed implementation of the Wild 
Animal Protection Law, uncovered illegal pig killing and smuggling activities, and 
rescued wild animals from captivity. Environmental protection curriculum was added 
to the party school curriculum. Because there were several changes in governmental 
positions, education and training activities were stressed. Education and media shows 
and activities focused on several topics including protecting forests and wild animals, 
environmental laws and regulations, clean production, and environmental wrongs. 
Beijing became one of 5 provinces and municipalities to develop and promote green 
labeling for products.27
In 1994, Beijing’s governmental leadership changed, so environmental 
protection officials put lots of effort into presenting Beijing’s environmental 
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conditions and making suggestions to the new cadres in power. In addition, 
environmental protection authorities concentrated on training the new cadres about the 
city’s environmental protection laws. In addition, the media worked more closely with 
environmental protection agencies to promote environmental awareness. The Central 
Television Station, Beijing Television Station and the city EPB worked together to 
provide programming for several newspaper stories and TV shows. These shows, 
including “zhonghua huanbao shijixing,” “ Jiaodian Fangtan” and “shifu yu shimin” 
focused on 10 recent environmental wrongs, including building materials companies 
that had broken environmental protection laws, and parties that had dumped garbage 
in protected areas near water sources. In total, the media had over 365 environmental 
media stories and propaganda activities, a higher number than last year. In addition, 
the media published more exposes. The city Party Commission and government used 
over 30 pieces of information provided by district and county EPBs. Among those, 
city leaders wrote comments on 10, further promoting environmental protection 
work.28
In 1995, the guiding spirit for environmental protection was “seize 
opportunities, deepen reforms, expand opening, promote development, and maintain 
social stability” (guazhu jiyu, shenhua gaige, kuoda kaifang, zhujing fazhan, baochi 
wending). Law enforcement and supervision management structures were 
strengthened. The priority issues for the year were preventing air pollution and 
protecting drinking water resources.29 Authorities initiated new and additional efforts 
to protect Beijing’s drinking water sources. Again, this year, authorities focused on 
improving environmental quality and resolving citizen complaints. The city 
Environmental Protection Commission ordered the establishment of regulatory 
enforcement leading small groups. Authorities continued efforts to clean up polluting 
enterprises or relocate them. Environmental education programs and activities focused 
on preventing automobile pollution and raising the environmental awareness of 
youth.30
Citizens were mobilized to monitor environmental conditions before and 
during the Fourth World Women’s Conference around Huairuo, to make sure the 
conference went smoothly. Measures were taken to increase government responsibility 
for environmental quality, such as revising regulations guiding the assessment system. 
For the conference, in 1995, the city government and EPBs mobilized 12,000 people 
to monitor polluting enterprises in each district and county, especially around Huairuo 
to ensure that the Conference would run smoothly. Several high- evel officials 
participated on environmental law enforcement inspection teams.31 Over 100,000 
Communist Youth League members were mobilized to pick up delegates and their 
luggage, prepare information packets, clean up trash around the city, and plant grass 
and flowers.32
In 1996, Authorities strengthened environmental management measures, utilize 
efficient measures to reduce pollution, to complete public works, to resolve citizen 
complaints, to complete planned cleanup orders and other tasks, and improve the 
city’s ranking in the Comprehensive Environmental Improvement Assessment System. 
Responsibilities for the 27 indicators in the assessment system were re-allocated and 
indicators measuring decreasing pollution levels were added. Assessment 
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implementation measures were strengthened. Tens of enterprises were either cleaned 
up, shut down, or relocated. 
In 1997, Beijing and central officials revitalized efforts to clean up Beijing. 
The mayor emphasized that Beijing was the nation’s capital and therefore should be a 
leader and a model in environmental protection efforts. Authorities concentrated on 
controlling air pollution, improving performance in the Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System, strengthening environmental regulations and 
enforcement. Beijing enthusiastically implemented the national campaign to close 
fifteen types of small scale polluting enterprises. The government banned the sale of 
leaded gasoline within the city proper. The government issued two notices calling for 
restricting the use of non-biodegradable food containers and certain types of plastic 
bags, requiring containers be recycled. The city government began to publicly report
air quality indicators on a weekly basis. The theme for the year’s “Greater Beijing 
Environmental Protection Drive” that included numerous media programs and articles, 
and inspection tours by high level officials and reporters, was “treasure water 
resources and protect our lifeline,” (zhenxi shuaiziyuan, baohu shengmingxian” This 
year the China Environmental Protection Foundation and the Women’s Federation 
were very active in supporting environmental education events through elementary 
and secondary schools. Other popular social organizations and schools supported other 
education activities.33
Of significance is that city officials began a trial period of reporting air quality 
indicators to the public on a weekly basis.34 It is significant because it represents a 
new level of transparency in providing information to the public. Beijing was only one 
of a handful of cities to participate in the trial program that was later to be 
implemented in over 30 major cities.
In addition, a handful of citizen popular environmental social organizations 
had been slowly developing in the city and their efforts were beginning to be 
recognized. The government for their environmental protection education activities 
praised environmental social organizations like Global Village Beijing and Friends of 
Nature. The city Environmental Protection Foundation and the Women’s Federation 
contributed a great deal in holding education activities aiming to get citizens to change 
their lifestyles and consumer habits at local elementary and secondary schools. A lot 
of volunteers showed up at the activities. The city EPB, the Beijing Environmental 
Protection Foundation and the Beijing Evening News joined forces to organize a 
public environmental survey (gongzhong huanjing yishi wenzhuan diaocha). The 
1,187 returned surveys showed that Beijing residents cared about the environment and 
supported efforts to improve environmental quality.35 During the next year, the 
government and the city’s social organizations, EPB officials held a meeting with over
50 representatives of environmental social organizations and volunteers to discuss 
plans to clean up the city.36
In June of 1997, the Beijing government announced its campaign to wipe out 
“white trash” this included a notice requiring that “one time Styrofoam lunch boxes” 
be recycled. Beijing had “learned” from the experience in Wuhan where the 
government had banned the Styrofoam lunch boxes, but the campaign did not work 
because the government just banned the selling and the use of such containers, it did 
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not ban the production. The products that could be used as substitutes were more 
expensive than Styrofoam. In addition, governmental bodies themselves continued to 
use Styrofoam. The notice issued by the Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection 
Administration banned the production of such containers. Units that produced or sold 
the containers were required to recycle or get someone to recycle the used containers 
they sold, otherwise that unit would lose its license to manufacture and sell the 
containers. The industry had to act or perish. It worked in connection with the EPB to 
quickly set up the Beijing City “triumphant” environmental protection center. In 
September 1997, the center recycled 49 tons of the containers; in October, it recycled 
170 tons, in November, it recycled 280 tons and in December, it recycled 283 tons. 
The recycling rate reached 50%, which was 20% more than the projected target.37
1998 marks a watershed year for environmental protection in Beijing. The 
State Council approved emergency measures to control air pollution in Beijing and the 
city’s environmental quality became a central government priority. In 1998, cleaning 
up Beijing became a national priority, primarily because of the upcoming 50th
anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the city’s upcoming Olympic bid. The 
national government authorities made decreasing Beijing’s air pollution on of the 15 
priority projects for the year and promised that Beijing’s summer air and water quality 
in the city proper should meet standards by 2002. The city enacted energy measures to 
achieve air pollution prevention targets including promoting the use of high quality 
coal, outlawing old cars, more stringent management of construction sites, and 
promoting the use of clean energy in busses. 
Authorities called upon citizens to contribute to the effort. One popular slogan 
was “let us act to bring blue skies back to Beijing” (rang women xingdong, huan 
jingcheng lantian).38 The municipal party commission, the Ministry of Propaganda, 
and the People’s Congress, Construction Environmental Protection Committee 
promoted the theme of “return blue skies to Beijing” (hai shoudu yipian lantian) 
during the 1998 capital city environmental protection drive. The drive’s supervisory 
group visited over 40 enterprises in 11 districts and counties, and issued about 160 
essays. 39 In March, the Environmental Education Center, Mei Hou Corporation, and 
Beijing People’s Broadcasting Station held a series of 42 programs and interactive 
media events. Experts discussed environme tal problems in some shows and in others, 
citizens were encouraged to call into the hotline to air their grievances and 
experiences. In addition, people nominated “green guards” and told stories of how 
these “green guards” had contributed to environmental protection work.40
In addition, further steps were taken to protect underground and above ground 
drinking water supplies. The city emphasized the need to eliminate “white trash” from 
the city. A very high number of enterprises were given deadline cleanup orders, over 
1,125. 18 enterprises were either shut down or relocated. High-level officials from 
SEPA, NPC and CPPCC got involved in enforcement inspections.41
In 1999, Cleaning up Beijing’s air pollution remained a national priority. Zhu 
Rongji and Jiang Zemin declared that all the ministries under the State Council should 
cooperate in this effort. Even the People’s Liberation Army became involved in 
Beijing’s cleanup. The city People’s Congress passed other regulations to further 
reduce air pollution. The mayor declared that air quality index reports were to be 
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issued on a daily instead of a weekly basis. Reportedly, citizens responded well to the 
stepped up reports and they enthusiastically reported pollution violations.42 With the 
help of the central government, the PLA, all levels of government, every ministry, 
each work unit, and all the citizens of the city, Beijing’s air quality improved to be at 
least “level 3,” 75 percent of the year.
While preventing air pollution was the major focus of efforts, o her areas were 
not ignored altogether. The city Central Committee of the People’s Congress passed 
several regulations and notices regarding the banning the sale of certain types of 
plastic bags and food containers that contributed to “white trash.” The long-standing 
projects to protect the Miyun and Huairuo reservoirs were completed and some 
progress was made in cleaning up local rivers. Some advances in dealing with solid 
waste were made as almost 56% of the city sold waste was treated. The city revamped
the environmental impact assessment process so it would be in accordance with 
national regulations. Beijing formed the “one control, two targets” (yi kong shuang 
dabiao) leading small group in accordance with the national campaign. Plans for 
Beijing’s ecological infrastructure were drawn up and included short, mid, and long-
term goals. The city Ministry of Propaganda, the city People’s Congress, and the city 
EPB helped support the “1999 Capital City Environmental Protection drive” (Jingdu 
dadi huanbao xing) with the theme “let us work together, to return clear water and 
blue skies to Beijing” (rang women gongtong xingdong, huan jingcheng bishui 
lantian). This slogan could be heard everywhere. Again, numerous media outlets 
participated by leading discussions and in monitoring. Another popular slogan was 
“environmental protection begins with me” (huanbao congwo zuoqi). Levels of 
environmental awareness increased and citizens enthusiastically supported 
environmental protection efforts. A large number of “environmental protection model 
districts” (baohu huanjing de xianjing shechu) and activists came to the fore.  
Table A.1 Beijing Pollution Data: Changes Over Time




70.1 (3rd) 79. 07 (17th)
% effluent within 
standard
54% 83%
SO2 emissions 340,000 tons (total) 161,674 tons (industrial 
only)
Solid waste produced 6170,000 tons 1,1610,000 tons
Conclusions
One reason why Beijing has been relatively successful in achieving its 
environmental protection goals has been that from 1989, onwards, Street, Village, and 
Township Offices were included in the Environmental Protection Target 
Responsibility System and so signed “contracts” with relevant governmental organs. 
Including these “street level” organizations in the system heightened environmental 
awareness and stimulated more public participation. This is not to imply that 
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mobilized participation turned each and every citizen into an environmental protection 
activist, on the contrary, many people probably shunned mobilization efforts. 
However, the responsibility contracts brought more people into contact with the 
concepts and values associated with environmental protection than otherwise would 
have occurred.
Crucial to the efforts to build a citizen monitoring system and to provide 
environmental education, was the work of the education division or section within the 
local EPB, be it at the city or district level. The Beijing government and EPB 
supported education activities very early on and gained the aut ority to implement 
education plans. 
Chengdu’s Environmental History
The city of Chengdu has had a long history and is currently the capital of 
Sichuan province, the most populous province in China. The word “Chengdu” means 
the “perfect metropolis.” The city grew up around the Dujiangyan dam and irrigation 
system that was created by engineer Li Bing during the late Warring States Period 
(Zhou dynasty). During the Han dynasty, the city became famous for its craftsmen and 
artisans. Sometimes it is called “brocade city” because of its thriving brocade silk 
manufacturing and trade. During the 19th Century, Frenchmen called it the “Paris of 
China.” Chengdu residents boast that the city has been the political, economic, 
military, and cultural capital of Southwestern China for over 2,000 years.43
The city is located on the Sichuan Basin and the Chengdu plain and is about 
12,389 sq m, with the city proper being 87 sq. m. The city is mainly flat, with over 40 
percent being plains, 28 percent being hills, and 32 percent being mountainous. It is 
subject to the Asian monsoon rains in the spring and it is relatively warm and muggy 
even in the winter, although it snows in the mountains occasionally. It gets quite hot in 
the summer. It gets an average of about 997 to 1300 cm of rain annually, but it is 
sunny for most of the year.44
The area is flush with water, both underground and above ground; 40 different 
rivers flow through parts of the city, so it is lush and green. The pride of the province, 
and the city, is the massive dam and irrigation system that channels the Du River on 
the Chuanxi plain. The system is credited with supplying plentiful drinking and 
irrigation waters to the entire province.
The area is known for its agriculture and over 37 percent of Chengdu’s land is 
farmable. Crops can be grown year round and the largest products are rice, wheat, and 
cabbage. The area is also known for its Chinese medicine, its fruit, and tea.45
Chengdu’s flora and fauna are abundant and diverse. Numerous endangered 
and rare species, including the panda, make their home in the area, which is almost 21 
percent forest. Numerous national parks and wildlife refuges can be found there, as 
well as one of the International Heritage Sites.46
Chengdu has plentiful natural rock and mineral resources, which are quite 
concentrated in certain areas. In about 400 mines, over 60 types of minerals are found 
including iron, titanium, vanadium, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, gold, silver, 
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strontium, marble, coal, and natural gas. Most of the coal deposits are along the 
mountains near Pengzhou, Dujiangyan, and Chongzhou city. 
Administrative Development and Economic Growth
Chengdu has grown significantly between the founding of the People’s 
Republic and the present, both geographically and economically. It was among the 
first inland cities slated for development during the 1950s. At that time, the primary 
manufactured goods were machines and electronics. However, other types of factories 
were quickly established to manufacture automobiles, tools, construction machinery, 
chemical products, and wood products. During the subsequent decades, steel foundries 
and other heavy industry moved into the city. The city grew substantially in 1983 
when it annexed Wenjiang prefecture. By 1993, the city ranked 11th among the 50 
economically strongest cities in China. It is well known for its electronic, aerospace, 
airplane, machine manufacturing and gold foundries. It produces a fourth of the 
nation’s seamless piping. 85% of the city’s revenue is generated in the industrial 
sector. The ratio of light to heavy industry is 43 to 57.47
In 1989, the government designated the city as an independent municipality 
under the direct supervision of the central government, effectively limiting provincial 
control over the city. By 1993, there were 17 districts, counties, and small cities in the 
Chengdu Municipal area including Jinjiang, Qingyang, Chenghua, Jinniu, Wuhou, 
Qingbaijiang, and Longquanze districts; Dujiangyan city, Pengzhou City, Xia, and 
Chongzhou city; Wenjiang, Yan, Xindu, Dayi, Xinjin, Shuangliu, Jiantang, and 
Pujiang counties. That year, the city’s population reached 9.08 million people, which 
grew to about 10 million by 1999.48
Chengdu’s Environment
Chengdu’s environment has improved in some respects, but worsened in
others. Between 1979 and 1988, the annual average milligrams of sulfur dioxide per 
cubic meter decreased from 0.15 to 0.07, but fluctuated greatly in the 1990s. The 
amount of particulate matter increased from 0.30 mg/m3 in 1982 to 0.42mg/m3 in 
1988. By 1985 the heavy metals in the underground aquifers had been controlled to 
meet “2nd level” national standards.49 The city had numerous chrome plating factories 
and as a result had quite a problem with chromium slag waste.50 By 2000, air pollution 
had been stabilized to the point where air quality was at the second index level 51 
weeks out of the year, and 92 percent of the city’s drinking water met standard. 
Table A. 2 Chengdu Pollution Data: Changes Over Time
Indicator  1990 or 1992 1999
Comp. Env. Improvement 
Assessment System
Score
62.0 (15th) 82.83 (6th)
% effluent within 
standard
62% (1992) 66%
SO2 emissions 43,420 47,544 tons
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Environmental Protection Apparatus
In 1972, the city created the Three Simultaneous Leading Small Group. It 
established an office, which carried out its day-to-day work. At that time, there were 
12 people working at the office. In 1973, the Three Simultaneous Leading Small 
Group and the corresponding office became the Chengdu Environmental Protection 
Leading Small Group and the Environmental Protection Office (EPO) respectively. 
The number of workers expanded to 15. In March of 1979, the city formally 
established the Chengdu Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) and employed 25 
people. EPB replaced the EPO The city established an environmental monitoring 
center station and began to conduct environmental monitoring of air, water, 
underground aquifers, radioactive wastes, noise pollution, and soil health.51
In the early 1980s, there were some setbacks and some victories for the 
development of the environmental protection apparatus in Chengdu. In September 
1983, the EPB came under the purview of the Urban and Rural Commission of 
Construction and Management (Shichengxiang Jianshe Guanli Weiyuanhui) and was 
reduced to a division, although it kept the name of the Environmental Protection 
Bureau (EPB). In April of 1984, two Deputy Mayors were among 15 prominent 
Chengdu officials that formed the Chengdu City Environmental Protection 
Commission. In May 1984, the EPB once again became independent, although it was 
still a second tier organization under the Construction Commission. At that time, it 
employed 40 people. Several associated institutes were also established at that time 
including, the Chengdu City Ecological and Environmental Science Res arch 
Monitoring Institute, the Environmental Protection Scientific Research Institute, and 
the Environmental Pollution Supervision Institute. By that time, the environmental 
protection system employed about 248 people. Of that number, 68% or 169 people 
were technical people.52
Lower administrative areas in Chengdu were quick to establish their own 
EPBs. Xicheng district was the first district to open an EPB in 1988. Several other 
districts, counties, and small cities followed suit in 1989 including Jinniu, 
Longquanze, Dongcheng districts; Wenjiang, Peng, Dayi, Xinjin counties, and the 
small city of Dujiangyan. By 1989, 9 of Chengdu’s 17 lower administrative areas had 
established EPBs. In 1990, after gaining the approval of the “City Organization 
Establishment Committee” (Shi Jigou Bianzhi Weiyuanhui) and the city government, 
four new environmental protection bureaus were established in Bei County, 
Qingbaijiang District, Shuangliao County, and Zongqing County. This brings the total 
number of EPBs in Chengdu to 13 (out of a total of 17). The remaining four districts 
and counties had EPBs in the planning stages.
In 1989, Chengdu became an independent city under the direct supervision of 
the central government (danlie chengshi), which provided it with more autonmy. At 
the provincial level, the EPB was still under the purview of the Ministry of 
Construction, and was so until 1996, but because Chengdu was a danlie chengshi, city 
authorities could grant the EPB more authority, so the EPB became independent 
earlier than it otherwise would have. In 1989, the Mayor, also the chairman of the 
Environmental Protection Committee opened the 3rd city wide Environmental 
Protection Meeting where he and other environmental protection authorities grappled 
436
with how to reconcile economic and environmental protection goals. Also discussed 
was a draft of the “Chengdu City People’s Government Decision to Strengthen 
Chengdu’s Environmental Protection Work”.
In 1990, the “City Organization Establishment Committee” (Shi Jigou Bianzhi 
Weiyuanhui) approved the establishment of an “Environmental Protection Propaganda 
and Education Center.” The center was a county level “professional” work unit under 
the leadership of the city EPB and employed 15 people.53 Within the EPB, the 
responsibility for education activities fell to officials in the Division of Organization 
and Personnel (Zhuzhi Renshi Chu). In addition, that year Chengdu strengthened the 
Environmental Supervision System (Huanjing Baohu Jianchayuan Zhidu) so that the 
whole city, every district, county, village, town, and street would participate (all three 
levels yiji- whole city; erji- districts, counties, and small cities; sanji– village and 
townships). That year, for the first time 59 inspectors were certified at the city and 
district levels.
In 1991, the city took major steps to upgrade its environmental protection 
industrial sector and increased the number of firms working in the sector to 100. 
Chengdu firms were often among those winning prizes for innovations in pollution 
prevention in 1991 and 1992. In addition, in 1992, 14 of Chengdu’s 19 districts, 
counties, and small cities got their environmental monitoring stations certified by 
provincial authorities. By 1993, two city-level and 17-district/county level monitoring 
stations received certification to operate (CMA – Zhongguo jiliang renzheng).54
In 1995, the EPB grew from eight divisions and offices to nine (Office of 
General Affairs, Organization and Personnel Division, Planning and Finance Division, 
Policy and Law Division, Construction Management Division, Pollution Management 
Division, Technology and Monitoring Division, the Office of Industry, and the Office 
of Records and Supervision. The number of employees increased from 39 to 55. In 
addition, that year, the city authorized the establishment of the “Chengdu Construction 
and Environmental Protection Supervision Unit” (Chengdushi Chengjian Jiancha 
Zongdui Huanjing Baohu Jiancha Dadui). The brigade was a “county level” 
administrative unit under the city EPB responsible for enforcement of environmental 
protection laws.55
In 1996, the city EPB became one of the “demonstration” organizations for the 
trial use of the new “sanding” organizational restructuring theory.56 In addition, the 
EPB tried a new competitive system to hire 9 new employees from among retired 
military personnel and people out of a job because of industrial restructuring.57
Chengdu has two formal government-li ked “social organizations,” 
(GONGOs) the Society for Environmental Science (Huanjing Kexue Xiehui) and the 
Environmental Protection Industry Association (Huanjing Baohu Chanye Xiehui). As 
of 2000, there were nine university student groups in the city and all of them 
networked with the education division at the EPB.58 A burgeoning popular social 
organization, “Green Rivers Environmental Conservation Promotion Society” 
(Sichuan Luse Jianghe Huanjing Baohu Zhujinhui) became a registered group in 1999 
(the Sichuan Environmental Protection Bureau was the sponsoring organization). The 
city and provincial EPBs work directly with GONGOs, student groups, and popular 
social organizations.
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The city EPB works with numerous foreign NGOs and state actors on 
environmental protection projects, but all of these linkages were arranged through 
EPBs at the provincial and national levels.59
Chengdu’s Environmental Protection Agenda and Major Campaigns
In 1989, the EPB set up the “Environmental Protection Responsibility System” 
(EPRS), primarily based on the indicators set out in the “Urban Environment Rating 
System.” The Deputy Mayor represented the city government, the Economic 
Commission, Dongcheng District and Xicheng District Governments, the city EPB, 
the city Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Public Utilities, and several other 
ministries or bureaus in signing 10 Environmental Protection Target Responsibility 
System contracts. 
The city started early to upgrade investment in environmental protection, and 
to relocate or modify heavily polluting enterprises. In 1989, investment in pollution 
prevention equipment in new, enlarged, or altered facilities was about 3.2%. In 1989, 
62 pollution sources were fitted with pollution prevention equipment. In addition, 32 
facilities, which had serious pollution problems and were the targets of citizen 
complaints were closed, forced to stop production, combined with other enterprises, 
forced to modify their production products, or moved to a different location. Facilities 
that moved included the Bingjiang Chemical Plant. Of these 8 were relocated. Other 
polluting enterprises, including the Seamless Steel Tube Factory, the Chengdu 
Alcohol Factory, and the Chengdu Textile Factory were all modified or outfitted with 
water pollution prevention equipment and so, were “basically” no longer a problem. In 
1989, there were 256 electroplating facilities in Chengdu. After a year of research and 
experimentation, a research group, consisting of company representatives and EPB 
experts, came up with process that would eliminate hazardous chromium by six 
valence.60
In 1989, city authorities had several concerns rega ding the environment. Even 
though air pollution was not the subject of the most complaints, Chengdu’s reputation 
for air pollution was growing. And city residents called Chengdu “chendu” or “dust 
capital.” City, provincial, and national level authorities were quite concerned about the 
water pollution problems in the inner city districts. In 1989, the Environmental 
Protection Committee formed a 4-person inspection team that evaluated Chengdu’s 
performance and determined priorities for environmental protecti n work. The 
priorities for the year included protecting water resources, reducing particulate matter, 
and providing proper guidance in the development of Village and Township 
enterprises. The city EPB conducted an environmental survey of the Dujiangyan dam 
and weir system as a first step in stepped up efforts to preserve the system and ensure 
good water quality.61
In the late 1980s, Chengdu placed emphasis on including environmental 
education into the regular school curriculum at the elementary and jr. high school 
levels. For example, in 1988, one district created an Environmental Small Group and 
principles from all jr. highs were called together to plan environment education 
strategies. Principles of each school became responsible for establishing a school 
education small leading group and implementing environmental education plans. 
438
District educators worked with a provincial publishing house to create an 
environmental education book appropriate to the area’s unique conditions. Middle 
school students were quired to attend environmental education classes after their 
regular “test period” and then were tested on their environmental knowledge. Their 
scores were incorporated into their overall grade.62 By the end of 1990, over 30,000 jr. 
high school students had received some environmental education.
Within the EPB, responsibility for education fell to officials in the Division of 
Organization and Personnel (Zuzhi Renshi Chu) until 1990 when the “City 
Organization Establishment Committee” (Shi Jigou Bianzhi Weiyuanhui) approved the 
establishment of an “Environmental Protection Propaganda and Education Center.” 
The center was a county level “professional” work unit under the leadership of the city 
EPB and employed 15 people. Since 1989, in conjunction with Chengdu Evening 
News, the center has sponsored an “art contest” called “the environmental cup” 
(huanjing bei) to challenge peoples’ environmental knowledge. Students send in 
poems, stories, and comics related to science, as well as paintings and pictures that 
promote environmental awareness. Over 400 students entered the first contest. The top 
15 contestants were eligible to enter the nation wide contest.63 The center received 
some financial support from the EPB, but the center’s employees were also 
responsible for seeking funding from various sources themselves.
Starting in 1990, the center coordinated an “environmental protection 
education week” (xuanchuan zhou) during which time, the Environmental Protection 
Law was popularized through a number of activities. In addition, leaders from the city, 
from each district, county, and small city gave speeches on television commemorating 
the week. Other education efforts include TV programs about controlling air and water 
pollution, activities to promote awareness of the noise pollution law, tree plantings, 
and cleaning up trash along rivers and streets. 
In 1990, the priorities for the year included developing the Comprehensive 
Environmental Improvement Assessment System, establishing the Environmental 
Protection Target Responsibility System network and achieving environmental 
protection targets, clarifying the responsibilities of each member of the city 
Environmental Protection Committee, advancing pollution mitigation efforts and 
strengthening environmental management.64
Chengdu qualified to be named one of China’s “10 most hygienic cities” and 
was designated a “clean city” (weisheng shi) in 1990, which helped to put 
environmental protection and sanitation on the city’s agenda.65 Chengdu’s designation 
as a “clean city” provided a good vehicle for enlisting the help of enterprises and 
citizens to improve the city’s ratings in the national Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System. Throughout the early 1990s, authorities 
emphasized that the EPB needed to work closely with other ministries, needed to 
broaden education programs, and needed to mobilize the public to participate in 
“weisheng chengshi” activities. It was important to city officials that EPB officials 
mobilized the public to achieve good ratings in the Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System. Authorities told subordinates that this would help 
to build a strong relationship between the central party and the people. “There are 
concrete benefits in serving the public. Not only are there economic benefits, there are 
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also political benefits. If we provide good environmental quality, then citizens will be 
satisfied and they will see that the central government is working to serve them and 
will realize the advantages of a socialist system. So, us leaders need to pay attention to 
environmental protection to ensure economic and social progress.”66
Authorities utilized the city’s designation as a “clean city” to encourage work 
units and enterprises to focus on reaching their Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System infrastructure targets. Authorities strengthened the 
assessment system and consolidated industry. This year the overall “grade” for the city 
in the national system was 62.2. Although this was an improvement from the previous 
year, Chengdu still ranked 18th of 32 cities. Even Taiyuan ranked higher than Chengdu 
that year. 
At the annual Citywide Environmental Protection Meeting in October of 1990, 
representatives discussed the Environmental Protection Target Responsibility System 
and the deputy mayor represented the governments of all 17 districts, counties, and 
small cities in signing responsibility contracts. The mayor declared that a priority goal 
was to integrate environmental protection work into economic and social plans, into 
daily work of every governmental sector, into each governmental target responsibility 
system, and in the official “grading and promotion” system.67 City authorities set up 
the Environmental Protection Work Target Responsibility System Network” 
(Chengdushi Huanjing Baohu Gongzuo Mubiao Zeren Wangluo). This group decided 
which units were to participate in the responsibility system at lower administrative 
levels and established concrete measures to ensure targets were met.68
Other developments that year include the establishment of a city Automobile 
Emissions Management Office by the EPB in cooperation with the Public Security 
Bureau. The Bureau issued a notice regarding controlling emissions and Street Offices 
worked to check the emissions of thousands of cars. In addition, the city EPB, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Statistics undertook a survey of pollution 
sources in villages and townships. The Chengdu Shengtai Huanjing Keyan Jiancesuo 
completed a survey of endangered and rare plants and animals in Sichuan province 
and then undertook a report on flora and fauna in the Chengdu watershed.
In 1990, there were two relatively serious (jiaoda) accidents, in both inner 
districts and outer counties. The first occurred on November 21st in Shuangliuxian. A 
paper factory next to a stream, discharged wastewater that had not been treated, which 
seriously pollute the Luxi River. The second occurred on April 23rd in city when a 
solvent factory discharged ten tons of phenol and coal tar contaminating the Qingbai 
River. The first accident, the Shuangliuxian paper factory spill, polluted the water 
sources in the village and about 2,000 people exhibited symptoms of vomiting, fever, 
loss of appetite and diarrhea. The factory was forced to shut down on the 22nd, 
incurring severe economic losses. After the accident, city and county governmental 
and environmental protection bureau leaders went with the Ministry of Industry 
representatives to investigate the accident. They formed an investigative group 
consisting of environmental protection and other ministry officials to investigate and 
manage the accident. The second incident, the Qingbai River accident occurred when 
the Minjiang Dongli Rongji factory discharged tens of tons of phenol and coal tar into 
the Du River. The spill polluted the drinking water source for 10,000 people and shut 
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down the water supply plant for three days. All together, 78 mu (13 acres) of land 
were affected causing economic losses due to crop failure. A “portion” of the residents 
suffered severe symptoms including vomiting and diarrhea. Citizens complained 
loudly. Leaders from the EPB and the “epidemic prevention station” (fa gyizhan) 
immediately went to the scene to investigate. The Minjiang Dongli Solvent Factory 
was “shut down and reorganized” (tingchan zhengdun).
Chengdu’s environment improved on a couple of fronts the next year. There 
were no “serious accidents in Chengdu in 1992, but there were three “relatively large” 
accidents.69 Last year’s focus on the Comprehensive Environmental Improvement 
Assessment System worked, because the city went from being ranked 18th to being 
ranked 13th in the nation. Chengdu was the number one rated city in Sichuan 
province.70
Environmental protection obviously had stepped up a notch on authorities’ 
agendas because it was among the “10 high priority” projects for the city.71
Authorities designated 78 enterprises for deadline cleanup orders. 20 enterprises that 
had been sources of citizen complaints were closed down, merged, altered, or 
relocated.72
The city Planning Commission and the EPB jointly issued the “Trial 
Regulations Regarding the Management of Chengdu’s Environmental Protection 
Planning” The regulations helped pave the way for environmental protection measures 
to be integrated into economic and social development plans and to balance 
environmental protection and economic growth. The regulation stipulated that 
environmental planning targets had to be met and that environmental protection work 
was one of the criteria by which districts, counties, small cities, and ministries would 
be evaluated. Also, it stipulated environmental protection criteria be included in 
enterprise promotions and in decisions to designate “exemplary work units.”73
In 1992, emphasis was placed again on improving Chengdu’s score in the 
Comprehensive Environmental Improvement Assessment System, especially in the 
areas of air pollution and noise pollution. The city moved up in the national ranks 
from 13th to 7th and again got the highest score of all the cities in Sichuan province. It 
was honored as being the city that made the best progress of all participating cities 
between 1989 and 1991.74 It was voted the second “cleanest” city in the nation. 
Chengdu was among the top cities in the nation in terms of switching from raw coal to
coal briquettes. Campaigns to make Chengdu a clean city tapered off in the mid-1990s 
because the objectives of such campaigns had largely been achieved.
Major investments were made to improve the environment of the town of 
Dawan in Qingbaijiang district, which is northeast of the city proper.75 Over 
13,000,000 Yuan was invested between 1992 and 1995. There were several aspects to 
the project including building a forested buffer zone between the industrial zone and 
residential areas, reducing hazardous air pollutants, water treatment plants, ethylene 
containment facilities. In addition, in 1992, the city passed local regulations to 
implement the national water pollution prevention law. The regulations were meant to 
help protect the city’s drinking water supplies. The city government issued rules 
relating to the management of underground water supplies.76
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In 1993, Chengdu dropped a little in the National Comprehensive 
Environmental Improvement Assessment System rankings. This year Chengdu was 
ranked 11th of the 37 cities participating in the Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System and was the #2 ranking city in Sichuan province.
In keeping with the national trend to strengthen enforcement measures, Xinjin 
county court established a “resident” enforcement division (zhixing ting) at the county 
EPB. The division was charged with helping to implement regulations and to pressure 
reluctant actors to fork over money for the pollution levy system Quickly thereafter, 
Qingbaijiang district, Xindu county, Shuangliu county, Longquanze district, 
Dujiangyan city, and Chengdu city established enforcement divisions (or offices) at 
local EPBs (or EPOs).77
1994 was the first year that the city tried out the socialist market economy 
system,78 and while efforts to strengthen economic and environmental “infrastructure” 
continued, the city did not improve its standing in the national Comprehensive 
Environmental Improvement Assessment System rankings. It remained in 11th place. 
In the category of pollution prevention, the city ranked 26th (out of 37). 
Authorities issued 105 deadline cleanup orders and invested more than 
17,689,200 Yuan in the cleanups. 75 of these cleaned up voluntarily. Authorities took 
care of 13 pollution problems about which citizens loudly complained. 18 enterprises 
were relocated, closed, merged, or modified. In addition, officials held criticism and 
training sessions for 250 enterprises.79
Over the year, new Environmental Protection Target Responsibility System 
contracts were signed with 19 district, county, and small city governments. In contrast, 
only 10 city level ministries signed new contracts. Naturally, lower level extensions of 
these also signed contracts. A demonstration project for dealing with electroplating 
sludge was established in the city to combat the practice of illegal dumping of 
sludge.80
The city established a “quality inspection and supervision station” to ensure the 
quality of environmental protection industry products and environmental protection 
projects. In addition, the Chengdu monitoring center took samples of underground 
water aquifers to be tested in the 2nd national underground aquifer testing activity. 
Chengdu’s water passed in each category of tests. In accordance with requests from 
the UNEP, a training session was held for women regarding handling pesticides 
safely. The training was held at the UN University Technology Transfer Center in 
Sichuan province. The city EPB and the Environmental Education Center organized a 
study sessions focused on “China’s Environmental Protection Legal System 
Television Education Talks.” Over 300 people from 10 districts, counties, and small 
cities attended the study sessions. Of these 300, 232 passed required examinations.81
1994 was the first year that a Sichuan group of the national environmental 
protection enforcement investigation team visited Chengdu. The group examined 
environmental protection enforcement organs, the coal dust problem at the Chengdu 
power plant, the Chengdu seamless cooper tubing factory water pollution 
management, the Panda Reserve, the Dujianyan dam and weir system, and the upper 
reaches of the city’s main river.82
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In 1995, the city improved it’s standing somewhat in the national 
Comprehensive Environmental Improvement Assessment System. Chengdu was 
ranked 9th in the national system. The city still had severe air pollution problems, 
especially with automobile exhaust. Noise pollution increased, especially around 
construction sites. The EPB took care of 96 old pollution problems. Seven of these 
were closed, merged, modified, relocated, or temporarily shut down. The EPB planned 
to complete five deadline cleanup orders, but outdid themselves by completing eight 
projects.83
In 1995, the city Education Commission and the EPB circulated a notice 
calling on educators to rganize environmental education activities for elementary and 
secondary school students around the slogan “leave some healthy land for younger 
generations” (hai wo yipian jingtu) for Earth Day and World Environment Day. 
District EPBs worked with over 20 work units and schools in the inner districts to set 
up environmental education “stations” around the city. Emphasis was placed on 
including environmental education in “social studies” classes (hehuixue). In addition, 
mobilization efforts were carried out through existing government sponsored social 
organizations such as the Young Pioneers (shaoxiandui) or (honglingjindui). 
“Environmental essay” contests (huanbao zhengwen) became a popular vehicle to 
promote environmental awareness among young people.
In 1996, the city EPB, the city Education Commission, and the Tongyi 
Corporation held a “Tongyi Huanjing Bei” (Tongyi Environment Cup). About 50,000 
students from 200 different elementary and secondary schools in Chengdu’s 17 
districts participated. 43 schools and 495 individuals won prizes for their paintings and 
prose on environmental topics. 77 of the participants got to go to Summer 
Environmental Camp activities.84 Several other campaigns took place including the 
“Funan River Cleanup and Greening” campaign,85 and various campaigns to that 
organized study sessions focused on environmental protection laws.
Elementary and Jr. High School students made various pledges during 
environmental protection campaigns including “be a transmitter of environmental 
protection knowledge” (zuo huanbao zhishe de xiao xuanchuanyuan); be a young 
guardian of flowers, grass, and trees,” (zuo hua cao shumu de xiao jianhuyuan); be a 
young protector of wild animals” (zuo yesheng dongwu de xiao baouhuzhe); “be a 
young caretaker of your environment” (zuo shenbian huanjing de xiao qingjiyuan); 
“be a young supervisor of resource conservation” (zuo jieyue ziyuan de xiao 
jianduyuan).86 Numerous slogans were employed to motivate support for 
environmental protection including “call upon everyone to act as loyal protectors of 
mother earth, environmental protection begins with me” (haozhao dajia cong wo 
zuoqi, cong shenbian zuoqi, jiji xingdong qilai, zuo diqiu muqin de zhongcheng 
weishi). 
In 1996, the city maintained its rank of 9th in the national Comprehensive 
Environmental Improvement Assessment System. Some environmental problems 
worsened, however, including higher pollution levels in village and township 
enterprises. At the 13th City Environmental Protection Committee Work Meeting in 
April, committee members stressed the need to attract foreign and national investment, 
while prohibiting polluting enterprises from moving into the city. City authorities 
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closed down 434 enterprises that fell into the 15 categories of polluting enterprises the 
central government ordered to be closed down.87
In 1997, the city experienced growth of over 11% and some progress was 
made in controlling pollution. According to environmental protection authorities, 
however, the city’s overall environmental quality was still hort of national standards. 
The focus of environmental protection efforts remained the city proper and attention to 
agricultural villages lagged behind. In some areas, environmental degradation 
expanded. The continued use of traditional operating methods exacerbated the 
inefficient use of natural resources and high level of inefficient energy use. Financial 
resources for cleanup were at a critical level and technological know how was lacking. 
In addition, in some areas, the environmental protection system and apparatus was 
incomplete.88
Authorities forwarded several important environmental protection 
advancements. The city finally passed regulations to implement Agenda 21. The 
government outlawed the sale of non-biodegradable plastic food containers. Chengdu 
became of the 12 trial cities to implement ISO 14000. In addition, it became one of the 
trial cities in the East Asian Acid Rain Monitoring Network (along with Chongqing). 
The first school in Sichuan province to participate in the GLOBE program opened in 
city. At the 4th city wide Environmental Protection Meeting, authorities approved the 
“Chengdu Government Decision Regarding Strengthening Environmental Protection” 
and generated four general policies. 1) Uphold both environmental and development 
policies together and strengthen the environmental legal system. 2) Uphold both urban 
environmental protection and protect the natural environment to improve 
environmental quality. 3) Utilize market measures to protect the environment and 
open up new channels of financing to raise more money to invest in environmental 
protection. 4) Adhere to the sustainable development line of thinking and the strategy 
of improving science and technology in the city.89
In addition, in 1997, the Education Commission and the EPB conducted a 
survey of 10 schools, grades 3-5 and their families (total of 3,000 students and 6,000 
family members). The survey sought to find out how air pollution problems in 
different districts of the city influenced the health of students and their fam lies. This 
was the second such survey since 1991. Not only did the survey provide information 
to authorities about the effects of air pollution, it also helped to educate citizens about 
environmental protection.90
In 1998, Chengdu enjoyed relatively good economic growth with GDP 
increasing by 10.1 percent over last year. Yearbook staff claimed that the city’s 
environmental quality had been stabilized and Chengdu ranked 4th out of 46 cities in 
the overall ranking of the national Comprehensive Environmental Improvement 
Assessment System. The number of enterprises from which pollution levy fees were 
collected increased from 554 to 601. However, pollution levels continued to increase, 
especially in villages and townships. The city fell far short of reaching its goals for the 
national “yikong, liangzhi” (one control, two targets) campaign. The city had to 
designate over 50 deadline cleanup orders for the ninth five-year plan. Water flow in 
rivers decreased and drinking water supplies were in danger of contamination. Levels 
of acid rain increased and noise pollution from cars, construction sites, and enterprises 
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had not yet been controlled. Noise pollution was particularly bothersome to citizens. 
Wastewater seepage from landfills was still a problem and posed a health danger.91
Starting in March of 1998, weekly air quality indicators were made public, which was 
considered”environmental and socially efficient.” 
In 1999, Chengdu’s success at reaching the “one control, two targets” was 
lower than national average. Of Chengdu’s 1,711 enterprises, 870 (50.85%) met 
standards. Of the 183 city level enterprises, 63 (34.34%) met standards. Of the 532 
county level enterprises, 207 (38.90%) were up to standard. The city landfill 
contaminated both underground aquifers and rivers, which caused numerous citizen 
complaints in Longquanze, Qingbaijian, Jintang and other districts and counties. Over 
1,000,000 have been affected by the contamination of water sources. Overall, 
however, Chengdu ranked 6th in the National Comprehensive Environmental 
Improvement Assessment System and got first place among Sichuan’s cities. The 
system of environmental law enforcement was strengthened and the city created 
addition oversight measures of environment inspection teams.92
Environmental issues often show up in more general “spiritual and cultural 
development” (jingshen wenming jianshe) campaigns such as the “six nos” (liu bu) 
drive. This education effort attempted to get people not to “spit, throw trash, smoke in 
public, curse, damage public property, violate traffic laws, and illegally occupy public 
land.”93
Taiyuan’s Environmental History
Taiyuan is the capital city of Shanxi province, which was once part of the 
center of Chinese civilization. During the Spring and Autumn Period (770-4 6 B.C.), 
the Taiyuan area was called Jinyang City. It became the capital of the State of Zhao 
during the Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.). By the 13th century, Taiyuan had 
developed into a prosperous city. Unfortunately, it lay directly in the path of northern 
invaders, so it was often the location of military battles.94 When the Tang Dynasty fell, 
the area lost much of its vitality. Jinyang City was destroyed and a new city was built, 
Taiyuan. 
Although 70% of Shanxi is mountainous, Taiyuan itself is flat. The city lies 
west of the province’s main mountain range, and is surrounded on three sides by low 
mountains. Taiyuan is just east of the center of Shanxi province, which is landlocked 
and borders Hebei, Henan, Inner Mongolia, and Xiaanxi. Taiyuan’s climate is 
somewhat different from nearby areas. The annual mean temperature is 9.5˚ C. It is 
not very cold in the winter and it rains mainly in the fall. There are a high number of 
sunny days and the area is very dry. 
The city is cut in half by the Fen River, which runs north to south. However, 
the riverbed is dry much of the time. The Fen River does not have many tributaries; 
therefore, there is no influx of fresher water to dilute the river’s pollution. In other 
words, the river has little capacity for bio-purification. The city faces daily water 
shortages and water is rationed. There is a project to divert water from the Yellow 
River to the city, but it will not be completed until at least 2003.95
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For many years, the Taiyuan administrative area had five inner city districts, 
and one city, and three outer counties. By 1998, the administrative area had been 
changed significantly. The inner city became much larger and had 6 districts including 
Yingze, Xiaodian, Jinyuan, Wanbolin, Fencaoping, and Xianghualing. The outer city 
now includes three counties, Qingxu, Shouyang, and Yangqu, and two cities, Gujiao 
and Yuci. 
In 1994, the whole city area had 41 “Subdistrict Offices” (Jiedao Banshichu), 
1,155 Resident’s Committees (Jumin Weiyuanhui), 83 Town Committees (Xiang or 
Zhen Weiyuanhui), and 1,281 Village Committees (Cun Weyuanhui).96
Taiyuan is the richest city in the province. In 1993, the per capita GDP of 
residents was 5,528 Yuan, but grew to 10,487 by 1998. Between 1989 and 1998, the 
population grew from 2.5 million to 2.9 million. In 1993, the population was 
2,713,500, of which, 993,900 worked in agriculture and 1,719,600 worked in other 
sectors. Shanxi province is not rich, despite its ample natural resources, namely coal 
and minerals.
Taiyuan has been is a major national center for heavy industry for nearly a 
hundred years.  In the early 20th Century, the Chinese began to industrialize the area 
around Taiyuan. The Japanese further built up industry in the area during their 
invasion of China in the 1930s. After 1949, theChinese government concentrated on 
developing the area’s resources and industry.97 Many of the early facilities were built 
without pollution prevention equipment because at that time, the health and 
environmental hazards were unknown. Water treatment facilities and other forms of 
infrastructure have not been built to keep up with the city’s industrial development, 
leading to more pollution. Not only are there very large scale polluting enterprises in 
Taiyuan, there are also many small and medium sized ones. While these enterprises 
were built in the suburbs, Taiyuan’s population has grown so much that these factories 
are now surrounded by residential areas.98
In 1992, the central government approved Taiyuan as an “inland open city” 
(neilu shenghui kaifang chengshi) and coastal city policies applied to the city. It was 
now open to overseas investment. In just one year, the city established 500 joint 
ventures with foreign companies. This opening marked a new phase in Taiyuan’s 
development and stimulated economic growth.99 In 1994, the central government 
designated Taiyuan as an “international city.”100 The goal was to transform Taiyuan 
into a modern international city by the turn of the century or a little beyond. Part of 
this transformation requires the city to “create the three optimums” (chuang san you), 
which are to “beautify the environment, provide excellent service, and maintain social 
order.”101
Taiyuan is the political, economic, cultural, and transportation center of Shanxi 
province and is still one of China’s main industrial cities. The four “pillar” enterprises, 
coal, metallurgy, machinery and chemicals are especially strong. It has developed a 
wide range of related industries including coke, mining equipment, machine tools, 
automobiles, fertilizer, paper, food stuffs, textiles, and electronics. Taiyuan is probably 
the biggest manufacturer of “special” steel (mostly stainless steal) in the country, but 
the metallurgical industry produces more than 5,300 different products. Taiyuan 
exports large quantities of aluminum ingots. The chemical industry can make 15 of the 
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17 major categories of chemical products.102 Between 1992 and 1994, the percentage 
of GDP contributed by heavy industry decreased from 4.8% to 4.2%. Light industry 
increased from 60.4% to 60.8%. The s rvice sector increased from 34.8% to 35%.103
In addition, China’s largest coalmines can be found around Taiyuan and nearby 
Datong. A third of China’s known iron and coal deposits are located in Shanxi. Shanxi 
province is one of the three provinces, Inner Mongolia, Xiaanxi, and Shanxi, that 
make up the “black triangle” because of the abundance of coal, the designation as 
energy producing areas, and the black coal which has caused various forms of 
environmental degradation and pollution. The coal industry of Taiyuan is often held 
up as a development model in which large state-owned coalmines play the major role, 
but are supplemented by local and township mines. 
The inner districts of Taiyuan, once small and compact, have expanded to meet 
previously isolated industrial areas. Polluting enterprises that have not been re-located 
further away from the city now surrounds the city proper. Taiyuan Iron and Steel 
Works (Taigang) is located just north of the most densely populated areas, which is 
unfortunate, because the winds blow northwest to southwest carrying pollutants into 
parts of the city. Taigang occupies miles of land and is a small city unto itself. Almost 
a 5th of Taiyuan’s land area is devoted to various facilities connected to Taigang, 
including the Mineral Wool Factory, the Taiyuan Steel Manufacturing Plant, Taiyuan 
Coking Plant, Taiyuan Steel Machinery Factory, and Taiyuan Steel Research Institute. 
Other industries in the area include the Shanxi Chemical Plant, and the Jingan 
Chemical Plant. Other large enterprises that surround the city include the Taiyuan 
Heavy Machinery Group, Taiyuan Mining Machinery Works and Taiyuan Chemical 
Group. 
Taiyuan’s Environment
Taiyuan is a classic example of a polluted city in the north of China. The city’s 
pollution problems are exacerbated by the area’s geography and the “unsound” 
(buheli) structure industry. In 1997, a World Bank report named Taiyuan’s air 
pollution problem as one of the world’s worst. It had six times the World Health 
Organization’s standard for suspended pollutants. It had ten times the sulfur dioxide of 
LA. The main cause of this horrible air pollution problem is the burning of coal. 
Shanxi residents burn three to four times more coal than the national average per 
person. A lot of Shanxi’s coal is very high in sulfur, exacerbating the problem. 
However, Shanxi and Taiyuan have little else to use as energy upon which to base 
their economic development.104
Reducing air pollution in and around Taiyuan associated with mining, 
processing, and burning coal has been the focus of national attention. The city became 
a center of air pollution research and monitoring during the 6th five-year plan. Even as 
early as 1984, when Li Peng applauded Gujiao’s experience in coal mining, the area 
has been a priority city in environmental protection. In 1987, the city was the location 
for the first annual national air pollution prevention working meeting, further 
indicating that it was a priority for officials. The provincial government provided 
Taiyuan with special environmental protection financial assistance on an annual 
basis.105 In the 1990s, there have been strong research efforts to reduce the area’s air 
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pollution problems, including international project in clean coking technology, coal 
washing, flue-gas desulphurization, cleaner combustion technologies, coalmine 
methane, and coal conversion.106 Despite international, national and provincial 
assistance, in 1999, Taiyuan’s composite air pollution index still regularly toped the 
list among China’s 42 major cities.107
There are certainly technological reasons for the slow progress in combating 
Taiyuan’s air pollution problem. However, a brief review of the development of the 
city’s environmental protection system and an analysis of the city’s development and 
environmental protection agendas show that there are other reasons as well. The first 
thing one notices is that the inner city is still surrounded by heavily polluting 
enterprises, which have not been relocated as they have in other cities. Second, it 
becomes obvious that city government and environmental protection officials have 
been dragging their heals in implementing environmental protection initiatives, 
improving environmental management, building the capacity of the environmental 
protection apparatus, educating the city’s leaders and citizens about the environment, 
encouraging public participation, and responding to citizen grievances. In essence, the 
ideology of economic reforms has somewhat hindered efforts to reach environmental 
protection goals. 
Development of the Environmental Protection Apparatus and Taiyuan’s 
Environmental Protection Agenda
Taiyuan’s environmental protection apparatus grew very slowly compared to 
other cities and the city government is largely responsible because it did not grant 
permission for specific committees and sections to be established and it was slow to 
incorporate environmental protection measures into the city’s economic and social 
development plans. City authorities established the city Environmental Protection 
Bureau in 1976. However, the bureau did not really begin its planning or work until 
after the Communist Party’s 3rd session of the 11th plenum in 1979. In the 1970s, only 
Shanxi University had an “environmental science research room. ”In 1982, the bureau 
designed the first three-year plan to prevent pollution. However, a five-year 
environmental plan was not incorporated into the city’s economic and social 
development plans until 1991. 
In 1983, there were institutional changes across the country, which placed the 
governmental agencies responsible for environmental protection under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Construction. Many EPBs, including Taiyuan’s, lost their 
independent status and became Environmental Protection Offices under the Ministry 
of Construction.108 In Taiyuan, the environmental protection work was negatively 
impacted by this structural change. While the Taiyuan EPO became an EPB in 1989, it 
was still under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Construction and remained so until 
1994.109 The 1990 Environment Yearbook asserted that Taiyuan created an 
Environmental Protection Commission in 1984, which was responsible for organizing, 
coordinating, and supervising the whole city’s environmental protection work.110
However, in actuality, the City Construction Commission probably carried out these 
duties.111 Similarly, within the Taiyuan City People’s Congress, the City Construction 
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Committee (Chengjian Weiyuanhui) was responsible for environmental protection 
matters.112
During the 1980s, while the city environmental protection structures remained 
impoverished, some progress was made in setting up pollution control measures and 
Taiyuan received support from higher levels. High-level provincial officials expressed 
support for environmental protection work in Taiyuan, including Provincial Party Vice 
Secretary, Wang Maolin113 and Premier Li Peng. Li Peng praised the work in the coal 
mining area of Gujiao and proclaimed it a national model. The details of this 
“campaign” are discussed in the chapter on government- obilized campaigns. The 
primary objective of EPO officials was to implement the “three simultaneous” policy 
on all medium and large development projects. In 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 the 
government focused on getting a handle on air pollution from boilers, building public 
sanitation facilities, and providing residents with heat. The “environmental science 
research room” at Shanxi University expanded into an Environmental Protection 
Department and a Biological Sciences Department. As early as 1989, environmental 
protection officials were aware of some of the barriers in achieving environmental 
protection goals. These barriers included the lack of environmental awareness on the 
part of governmental officials and the general public, the lack of EPB resources, 
capacity, and internal efficiency. While authorities were aware of these problems, it 
took years for them to be addressed, illustrating Taiyuan’s lack of political will to 
proactively pursue environmental protection goals. 
During the 1990s, the Taiyuan City EPB improved its overall capacity 
somewhat, but it was not until the later half of the decade that significant changes 
were made in the environmental protection apparatus structure and in the 
environmental agenda. Between 1990 and 1994, the number of environmental 
protection authorities at all levels increased from 372 to 448.114 Officials concentrated 
on enforcing the “three simultaneous” policy, establishing the Comprehensive 
Environmental Improvement Assessment System, and other pollution control policies. 
The primary focus for the first three years was on building the Environmental 
Protection Target Responsibility System. In 1989, the city Mayor signed a 
responsibility contract for the remainder of his term and then signed contracts with 
eight commissions and ministries, three inner city district governments, and 33 
enterprises.115 These numbers expanded to eleven commissions and ministries, eight 
districts and counties, and 30 priority enterprises by 1993.116 In addition, during the 
1990s, Taiyuan slowly built up its monitoring capabilities and was one of the trial 
cities for the Pollution Permit System, which began in 1990 and expanded in 1991. 
In the early 1990s, environmental education activities were very basic and 
included character posters, plays, contests, expert symposiums, and anti-pollution 
campaigns. As with other cities, Taiyuan emphasized noise pollution prevention. 
There was no independent section of the EPB dedicated to environmental education, 
nor was there an Environmental Protection Education Center, which hindered 
education activities and was to have profound effects on the development of 
environmental awareness among both governmental officials and the general public. 
During the late 1990s, some advances were made in building the EPB’s 
educational capacity. The structure of the EPB was modernized and independent 
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monitoring and education sections were established. Education campaigns were 
expanded and more citizens became involved in pollution cleanup projects and in 
“monitoring” polluting enterprises. The city began to participate in the national “green 
school program” in 1999. The first phase of the Fen River cleanup was completed. 
Authorities completed a survey of pollution sources in village and township 
enterprises. Significant advances were made in imple entation and enforcement 
activities, including deadline cleanup projects. Supervision work was standardized, 
making it more difficult for corruption to occur. There was broader recognition that 
environmental pollution is a barrier to further economic development. Officials began 
planning for reducing the number of polluting enterprises inside the city and for 
restructuring the city’s industrial structure. Despite these structural and ideological 
advances, the city was still one of the most polluted in the world in 1999. 
In 1997, officials pointed out that Taiyuan still had problems in achieving 
environmental protection goals because of the fact that some officials have limited 
understanding of basic national policies, sustainable development strategies, and the
severity of pollution problems. In addition, they tend to focus on short-term interests, 
are unable to strictly undertake environmental duties and enforce environmental laws 
and regulations. Finally, there are financial and other resource shortages.
In the new millennium, provincial and city authorities have redoubled efforts 
to clean up Taiyuan’s image, focusing primarily on technological fixes. The city 
banned the sale of unleaded gasoline within city limits. In 2000, there was a major 
campaign to crack down on polluting enterprises, which demanded that they meat 
national emissions standards or close.117 To avoid closure, Taigang alone reportedly 
invested 327 million Yuan on pollution control – more than in the previous 10 years 
combined. In 2001, “minibus” taxis (miandiche) were banned from the streets. New 
liquid natural gas powered buses are to be introduced. A large heating plant will be 
built to replace 150 existing coal-fired, highly polluting boilers. If pollution is 
“moderate” to “heavy” (level IV or V) on three consecutive days, authorities claim 
they will institute driving restrictions. In addition, the city is experimenting with 
tradable emissions permits.118
Throughout the 1990s, the same problems kept cropping up in Taiyuan’s 
efforts to slow environmental degradation, managing pollution, and cleaning up the 
city. While it was known early on that environmental awareness was lacking, the city 
dragged its heels in approving an independent environmental education section in the 
EPB. City officials were also relatively less responsive to citizen environmental 
grievances and officials displayed a weak legal ethic. There were relatively fewer 
opportunities for the public to participate in environmental protection activities. The 
role of public participation in implementation processes was not recognized until the 
end of the decade. Shanxi did not publish its version of Agenda 21 until 1999, five 
years after the national version was completed. One of the stated goals in the 
province’s Agenda 21 is to have 85% of the population understand the concepts 
behind sustainable development and to have 80% of the population participating in 
Agenda 21 related activities. 
The director of one district EPB was more proactive then the others. He 
conducted his own environmental awareness survey of district residents. He worked 
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very hard to establish relationships with people in his community who showed an 
interest in environmental protection. He paid over 40,000 Yuan a year to provide 
books, the China Environment News and/or Shanxi Environment News to individuals, 
schools, enterprises, and People’s Congress representatives in his district. He chose 
particularly enthusiastic people in the district’s neighborhoods to work with him on 
environmental protection affairs and to be his eyes and ears on the streets.119
If Shanxi and Taiyuan are to meet environmental goals, more officials will 
need to be as proactive as the head of the Yingze District EPB, to be more responsive 
to citizen grievances, allow opportunities and organizations for the public to 
constructively participate in environmental protection activities, and recognize the 
importance of participation in implementing environmental laws and policies.
Taiyuan’s Environmental Campaigns
Of the three case cities, Taiyuan’s governmental and environmental protection 
authorities sponsored the least number of environmental campaigns, placed the least 
emphasis on environmental education, and did not encourage public participation in 
environmental protection affairs until the late 1990s. As a result, there was far less 
public participation in any of the available channels in Taiyuan when compared to 
Beijing and Chengdu.
Gujiao Jingshen and Li Shuangliang Jingshen Campaigns
It is ironic that a couple of the most famous national enviro mental campaigns, 
“Gujiao Jingshen.” and “Li Shuangliang Jingshen” (or Li Shuangliang daolu) are 
based on experiences in the Taiyuan area and did not seem to have much of an effect 
on overall environmental quality in the city. The first is particularly famous. To this 
day, officials invoke the “Gujiao Jingshen” (Spirit of Gujiao) slogan to remind people 
to copy the model of Gujiao and to promote respect for and adherence to 
environmental laws and policies.120
Other than the two examples outlined above, Taiyuan had very few 
environmental campaigns in the 1980s. One of the few campaigns was based on the 
national example of a special “environmental protection month.” Taiyuan had an 
environmental education month,” but the campaign drew little attention. Other
campaigns that were initiated were very targeted and involved mainly government 
officials and enterprises. For example in 1985, there was a campaign to clean up the 
“one noise, two skies, and three streams” (yi sheng, er qi, san gushui). Cleaning up the 
“one noise” (pollution) referred to switching loud car horns for quieter ones. Cleaning 
up the two skies referred to cleaning up the yellow smoke from the Taiyuan Fertilizer 
Company and the red smoke from Taigang. The targets of the water pollution 
campaign included Taigang, the Taiyuan Paper Company, and six hospitals.121
1990 alone stands out as the only year which educational activities are 
mentioned in the yearbook until the mid 1990s. This indicates that the Environmental 
Education Center was still up and running. That year, the city EPB worked with local 
artists to put on the “sound of environment” (huanjing zhi sheng) play. EPB officials 
worked with the State Education Commission to sponsor the “Environmental Cup” a 
sports contest. Officials also sponsred environmental literary and painting contests. 
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The city “Society for Environmental Science (Huanjing Kexue Xuehui)122 invited 
environmental experts to participate in an informal symposium. Also during 1990, the 
city held a campaign called “Control Noise Pollution Month.” This no doubt coincided 
with school entrance examinations. Typically, in cities around the nation during 
examination time, city officials attempt to create “ideal” conditions for students. The 
city government circulated a notice strictly controlling noise pollution.
In addition, the City Environmental Protection Committee organized a “war on noise” 
with the help of the City Commission of Construction, Commission of Finance, EPB, 
and Ministry of Public Security. This group worked closely with the media. The group 
conducted surprise inspections at night, investigated citizen noise complaints, and 
published the names of offenders in the paper. This month long campaign spurred 
momentum in the public’s role as monitors.123
By 1997, Taiyuan was famous in the international community as being one of 
the most polluted cities in the world. The New York Times mentioned the horrible 
environmental conditions in Taiyuan in an article on the dirtiest cities in the world. By 
1998, city officials were facing more pressure from central authorities to clean up the 
city and were embarrassed by Taiyuan’s now international reputation as one of the 
dirtiest cities in the world so, they launched a program to “clean up Taiyuan’s image” 
(Taiyuan yao xilian).124
To polish Taiyuan’s tarnished reputation, the Mayor announced that it was 
time to clean up Taiyuan’s environment; it could not be put off anymore. Also, it must 
be done so under less than optimal conditions. “Taiyuan’s pollution is extremely 
serious, there is a lck of funding, state owned enterprises have hit hard times, and 
most of the polluting enterprises in Taiyuan are managed by the province”125 (so there 
is a limit to what the city can do about them). He laid out the order in which 
environmental protection goals were to be met and for the first time, more emphasis 
was placed on restructuring or relocating polluting enterprises. 
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Appendix B - Environmental Casebooks Description and Analysis
Data on Environmental Dispute Cases and Associated Implications
Air and water pollution cases are included in the survey and originate from 
four distinct casebooks compiled and written by professionals who have some 
expertise in environmental disputes. These casebooks include data on cases from the 
early 1970s through the mid 1990s. 
A survey of cases from different time periods will tell us a great deal about the 
development of the environmental dispute resolution system, the changes in the ways 
environmental disputes were handled and viewed by authorities, and how outcomes 
changed over time. 
First Casebook
The first casebook is entitled Huanjing Jiufen Anjian Shili. The Environmental 
Law Institute at Wuhan University published the book in 1989. The Institute is 
associated with the now defunct National Environmental Protecti n Administration 
(NEPA). NEPA was upgraded to a “near ministerial” status in March of 1998 and was 
renamed the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). At that time, the 
head of SEPA, Xie Zhenhua, received a minister’s portfolio. The Environmental Law 
Institute has national compendia of environmental disputes that were voluntarily sent 
to them by environmental protection bureaus and judicial organs from around the 
country. The Institute has run training workshops for Environmental Protection 
Bureau staff from different provinces and municipalities regarding the complexities 
involved in environmental disputes
The initial impetus for the casebook came from the National Commission on 
Education. At the time, there was a need to teach students about the emerging field of 
environmental law and the special characteristics of environmental dispute cases. 
The commission requested that Zeng Zhaodu, a scholar at Wuhan University 
Environmental law Institute, edit a casebook that could be used as a textbook by 
students at the university level. Zeng Zhaodu had collected data on many cases from 
all around the country. He chose 164 cases which he felt were “classic.” “Classic” 
cases would include those that are “model” cases and those that are representative of 
the special characteristics of environmental disputes. 
The casebook is divided into two parts. The first part contains cases that were 
handled through “administrative means” (xingzheng anzi). The cases are listed in 
chronological order. Several cases were chosen for each year. The second part 
contains cases that were handled through the judicial system. The cases are then 
further categorized by the environmental medium involved (air, water, solid waste 
pollution etc…). Again, the cases are in chronological order. There were very few 
cases channeled through the courts during the 1970s and early 1980s included in the 
casebook, so all of these cases are included in the survey. The cases illustrate the 
variety in the nature of disputes that occurred in the past, their causes, and the proper 
administrative response. The cases illustrate the finer points of environmental law as 
they relate to environmental disputes. The titles of each case describe the reason why 
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the environmental damage occurred and thus useda  a form of moral exhortation or 
warning.
One might assume that because the Wuhan Environmental Law Institute is 
associated with the governmental environmental protection apparatus that the cases 
may be biased in that they show the environmental protectin officials in a favorable 
light and focus on cases that have a “happy ending”. However, this may not 
necessarily be true. After all, a scholar and not a governmental official compiled the 
casebook. In several of the cases, citizens affected by the air pollution reported the 
problem to the polluting enterprise and the local government, but their complaints 
were left unheeded. Even when the local environmental protection office got involved, 
the relevant work units and ministries often ignored the complaints. This illustrates the 
unresponsiveness of the local government to citizen demands and environmental 
protection office’s low level of authority relative to other governmental bodies and the 
willingness to disclose this to the public.
Second Casebook
The second casebook entitled Huanjing Jiufen Anli (Environmental Dispute 
Case Studies), was written by, Yue Yongkang, the director of the Guizhou Provincial 
Environmental Protection Bureau. The China Environmental Sciences Press published 
it. Scholars from Guizhou University, Beijing University, and China University of 
Politics and Law reviewed drafts of the book. Director Yue, who has a strong interest 
in environmental law and collected data on all of the cases. He divides the book into 
several sections based on the case’s legal category: administrative, civil, criminal, 
mixed, and misjudged. Each section has examples of environmental cases involving 
different mediums including air, water, and noise pollution, solid waste pollution, and 
poaching. The order of the cases is primarily chronological and secondarily according 
to the pollution medium.
The author compiled and wrote the book to popularize environmental 
protection and to help improve the implementation of environmental laws. The author 
intended the book as a tool to help train personnel in environmental protection 
bureaus; factories; mining operations; enterprises; village and township enterprises; 
and justice departments, workers, and managers how to manage environmental 
disputes.126 The cases are “classic” examples of more serious environmental disputes 
from various regions of the country, which have some “practical” meaning. 
The direct connection of the author to the governmental environmental 
protection apparatus may raise the probability that the caseshosen will reflect the 
environmental protection apparatus in a favorable light. 
Third Casebook
The third casebook is entitled Zhongguo Huanjing Dianxing Anjian Yu Zhifa 
Tiyao (Classic Environmental Cases in China and a Synopsis of Implementation). The 
primary editor of the third casebook was Xie Zhenhua. He worked with two other 
assistant editors and a number of contributors who are scholars of environmental law 
or work in China’s environmental protection apparatus. The China Environmental 
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Science Press published the book in 1994. The editors categorize the cases by type of 
law: criminal law, administrative law, civil law, and cases involving foreign nationals.
The editors hope the book will be used as a reference by anyone who may be 
involved in managing environmental dispute cases. The book’s 100 cases are “classic” 
cases and occurred in various parts of China. One of the goals of the book is to share 
the experiences of enforcement officials from different parts of the country with their 
colleagues. The ditors hope their reference book will strengthen the implementation 
of environmental laws, help to make implementation more based on law, and help to 
improve the standard of environmental supervision and the quality of enforcement 
officials.
Finally, the last cases are taken from a larger volume entitled: Huanjing Jiufen 
Fangfan Yu Chuli Shiwu Quanshu (Environmental Disputes: A Practical Guide for 
Prevention and Management). The Zhongguo Yanshi Chubanshe (China True Word 
Press) published this compendium in 1999, which contains many of the laws relevant 
to environmental disputes, a general discussion of China’s legal system, and chapters 
outlining dispute resolution processes. The 47 cases included in the compendium are 
categorized by legal type, civil, administrative, and criminal. 
The editors of the compendium come from a different background than the 
editors of the previous casebooks. This volumes’ lead editor, Wang Manzhuan, is a 
Ph.D. in the Environmental Economics Research Institute at Renmin University. There 
are two assistant editors: Li Tianwei, a Ph.D. at the Center for Environmental 
Assessment Engineering associated with the State Environmental Protection 
Administration; and Zeng Jingang, a Ph.D. in the Environmental Economics Research 
Center at Renmin University. Other contributors to the volumes include experts from 
China University of Politics and Law, the highest level of the People’s Court, and the 
State Environmental Protection Administration. These editors are not environmental 
law scholars, but they are nonetheless engaged in work, which would require detailed 
knowledge and understanding of environmental laws. The editors note the trend is that 
environmental disputes increase in number each year. They believe the majority of 
disputes arise because: 1) enterprises ignore environmental laws and emit pollutants 
beyond what is allowable; 2) environmental protection officials either do not enforce 
laws or they act in an improper manner.
The editors compiled the compendium as a reference to be used by 
environmental protection organs at all levels, public security agencies, the People’s 
Courts, the People’s Procuratorate, and enterprise personnel on how to prevent and 
manage environmental disputes. 
Assumptions and Implications
It was assumed that ll of the pertinent information regarding a case was 
included in the case write-up. For instance, if the case write-up did not include 
information about compensation for the victims of pollution, then it is assumed there 
was no compensation given. 
Each casebook targets an audience that is inclusive of actors from a number of 
professions, which may not always be on the same side of an environmental dispute. 
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This indicates that a bias in one direction by the editors is less likely; all actors are 
equally praised and criticized. 
Different people edited each of the four casebooks, so any bias in case 
selection caused by one individual is minimal, or at least “diluted” by the use of four 
sources. 
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Appendix C – National Environmental Dispute Data














1986 128,823 39,752 33,644 30,500 5,265
1990 131,851 48,878 32,654 33,423 8,208 7,125 9,743
1991 111,359 36,340 35,331 27,814 3,935 7,939 4,109
1992 95,309 35,027 21,606 28,517 3,079 7,080 5,190
1993 98,207 35,585 22,999 29,862 2,910 6,851 4,124
1994 107,338 33,537 59,848 35,410 3,322 6,903 4,451
1995 109,650 38,433 22,688 39,991 3,684 5,835 3,855
1996 114,982 40,432 19,885 43,025 3,978 7,009 2,624
1997 135,226 47,244 23,825 54,921 3,606 5,630 2,694
1998 187,924 63,739 28,279 85,017 4,618 6,271 1,852
1999 252,398 88,924 33,369 116,484 7,176 6,445 2,116
Data for this table came from Canfa Wang, Kezhu Xu, and Min Liu, "A 
Summary of Policy and Legal Analysis on Dealing with Environmental Disputes in 
China," Studies on Environmental Pollution Disputes in East Asia: Cases From 
Mainland China and Taiwan, Canfa Wang, Jing Hu, Tadayoshi Terao, Kenji Otsuka, 
Kezhu Xu, and Min Liu, (Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan 
External Trade Organization, 2001). It is based on statistcs contained in the Annual 
Environmental Statistics Gazette published by the National Environmental Protection 
Agency of China.
As Wang Canfa points out there are a few caveats attached to the data. It 
pertains only to disputes mediated by EPBs at various levels and does not include 
disputes resolved through the courts and by other administrative agencies. Likewise, 
the compensation figures do not show awards made in court cases or for disputes 
resolved by other administrative agencies.
The numbers of environmental disputes are masked because of record keeping 
strategies. It is unclear what percentage of “environmental complaints” are disputes 
mediated by the EPB. In addition, it is unclear how many disputes are settled through 
the courts because statistics recording court cases do not disaggregate the numbers of 
environmental disputes from other categories.127 The number of disputes is 
extremely close to the number of complaints each year, but disputes are theoretically 
different from complaints. Added togeth r, complaints and disputes equal the total 
number of environmental citizen grievances. As with the number of complaints, 
disputes declined slightly in 1991 through 1993. Wang Canfa attributes the decline to 
a corresponding decline in economic development and a change in the type of 
enterprises developed after 1989. Wang Canfa attributes the steady increase in the 
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numbers of disputes from 1994 through 1999 to higher pollution levels and greater 
citizen awareness of pollution.128
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Appendix D – Environmental Dispute Cases
Environmental Dispute Cases
1) Lanzhou Dispute Leads to Tragedy129
In 1993, villagers living downriver of the Lanquan Chemical Company in 
Lanzhou, Gansu province, complained that the plant’s sulfurous effluent had polluted 
the local water supply, poisoning fish and livestock and causing many local residents 
to suffer from dizziness and respiratory illness. Municipal authorities moved to halt 
production at the company on several occasions, but each time their demands were 
ignored by the plant’s politically connected managers. Left with no other recourse, 
frustrated local residents took to the streets last August 14, sparking a pitched battle 
between demonstrators and an army of chemical plant worker. Hundreds of riot police 
eventually restored order, but not before two people were killed and a dozen wounded.
2) Smoke, Dust, and Noise Pollution Impact Citizens’ Lives in a city in Jiangsu 
Province
In November of 1980, a Mr. Chou from the city’s fuel oil machine factory in a 
city in Jiangsu province came to the EPO to complain about the dust, noise, and smoke 
from the copper furnace in this factory’s foundry workshop. Mr. Chou lived in the 
Zhongxingang Eighth Brigade, which was separated from the foundry by a wall. Mr. 
Chou’s main complaint was that the factory moved the copper furnace from another 
location in the factory and put it next to the foundry workshop. When the furnace was 
fired up, the smoke would affect several of the resident’s homes. In addition, the low 
height of the wall, the sound and the dust all affected the residents. He hoped that the 
factory would relocate the furnace.
On November 26th, officials from the EPO along with representatives from the 
monitoring station, and the Health and Disease Control Station went to inspect the 
situation. They found that the noise pollution was excessive, and the dust emissions 
exceeded the national standards. The smoke and fumes from the furnace also were 
excessive. The EPO requested that the factory take measures to mitigate the dust, 
noise, and other pollution. The factory was enthusiastic about resolving the problems. 
BY May 1981, the factory had made a noticeable improvement in reducing noise and 
dust pollution and was in the process of implementing measures to reduce the 
remaining pollution problems. During this process, a leader from the Eighth Commune 
Brigade put forth an order commanding that the factory could not build the wall higher 
than 3.5 meters and requested that the factory move the copper furnace. The reason for 
this being that the wind would be blocked by the higher wall and the poisons from the 
copper furnace would no longer be harmlessly blown away, causing harm to the 
workers in the eighth Brigade. 
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Around this same time, the workers of the eighth Brigade tore down the wall 
and while the furnace workers were working, they poured night soil across the 
remaining wall into the factory. This affected the production work at the furnace 
(probably because of the smell and the muck). Because of this, the furnace workers 
requested that the environmental monitoring station repeat the test to see if the 
emissions from the furnace were poisonous. If the emissions were poisonous, then 
they would move the furnace; if not, then they would not move it. 
While the testing was going on, a member of the commune once again poured 
night soil into the factory area. On June 6the, the EPO went to the area to convince the 
commune members not to resort to illegal means to resolve the dispute and to 
convince them to allow the factory to build the higher wall. ` The results of the 
monitoring tests indicated that the emissions were within standards. However, in order 
to ensure that the smoke did not harm citizens and to help repair the guanxi between 
the factory and the masses, the authorities requested that the f c ory move the furnace. 
The factory agreed to the request. In order to promote legal awareness, the EPO 
mailed copies of the future monitoring reports to the commune, the district public 
security bureau, the Yaxi Paichusuo, and to Mr. Chou. The EPO remind d the 
members of the commune that if there were a problem with pollution in the future, 
they should go to the proper governmental authorities to complain, and not take illegal 
steps to resolve the problem. They also suggested that the relevant governmental 
bureaus in the area should be supportive and enthusiastically work together with the 
members of the commune to improve their thinking. The final suggestion put forth by 
the EPO was that the commune member’s homes not be moved; the factory should 
build up the wall three more meters; the factory should move the copper furnace; and 
the factory should reimburse Mr. Chou the money they deducted from his salary for 
the “night soil” incident. With these measure, all parties felt they had reached a 
satisfactory resolution to the dispute. 
3) Strange Sickness Besets Village Due to New Waste Dump in Chengdu130
The “incident” occurred in Wenjiang Yongquan Zhen Shuang Cun in 2000 
involving a solid waste dump that the County Environmental Sanitation Management 
Institute built on “twice rented” land. In January of 1999, Shuang Cun San Zu rented 
nine mu to the Jiang Mou Gao Nursery. Later that year the company built a cement 
pool to raise fish. It then leased the land to the County Environmental Sanitation 
management Institute. In January of 2000, dump trucks started delivering trash. 
It only took a few months for the nearby water wells to become polluted. Over 
1,000 farmers put up with foul smells, polluted water, and swarms of flies for months. 
The head of the Institute claimed that he wanted to improve the conditions at the 
dump, but before he could take the necessary steps, the site had already become 
polluted. On April 20th, residents finally took matters into their own hands. Residents 
first blocked trash trucks from entering and then commandeered the truck. The truck 
driver found some people to help him get his truck back. A fight broke out and three 
villagers were hurt. 
460
The residents called the Sichuan Youth Daily hotline to complain and hired a 
lawyer to file a suit. When the reporter arrived at the location, hundreds of residents 
gathered around. One woman claimed she had become ill from drinking the water, but 
her doctor could not diagnose her illness. Seventy percent of the residents claimed to 
have suffered ill effects from drinking the water. 
At some point the County Committee and the County Government got 
involved. They consider the matter important and are working to clean up the area. 
The head of the sanitation institute has proclaimed that if need be, the dump will be 
closed. The residents have still hired a lawyer, who claims that the institute has broken 
various environmental laws including the “PRC Environmental Protection Law” and 
the “PRC Water Pollution Prevention Law.” The residents are suing for damages and 
demanding that the relevant ministry cease its “infringing behavior.” 
4) A Tuoli Coal Sifting Facility is a Constant Nuisance131
Tuo Li Zhen is about 35 kilometers southwest of Beijing proper across the dry 
Yong Ding River. It is only a few miles away from the mountains of Fangshan 
District. Fangshan District is southwest of Fengtai District, which is home to many of 
the polluting enterprises still left in the “inner” suburban Beijing districts. It is zoned 
for industrial uses, which has creat d a very different development path for this area, 
compared to other areas around Beijing that are zoned for farming.
Tuo Li Zhen and the surrounding area has been home to several industrial 
enterprises and at least three major companies which have set up “coal sifting” and 
sales stations. Two of these companies are the Beijing Shi Mei Co and the Beijing 
Municipal Difang Meitan Kaifa Jingying Gongci (local coal development operations) 
(hereafter called Di Mei). Shi Mei closed most of its operations at the Tuo Li facility 
in the fall of 1999, although a skeleton crew still operates there and the company still 
has piles of coal on its property. 
Housing for the companies was built in close proximity to the areas where coal 
is dumped by 10, 15, 50, 60, and 70-ton dump trucks, which bring in the coal from the 
mountains. The housing for Shi Mei and Di Mei is only meters away from where Di 
Mei stockpiles and “sifts” its coal. Housing consisted of two buildings. Two long 
single level buildings with about six units and one several story building just behind 
the lower building. 
Di Mei completed its stockpiling facility in 1988. It expanded it in 1991 and 
again in 1993. The residential dwellings were built in 1986 and had all the proper 
approvals. Di Mei purchased one row of single level residential dwellings in 1993 and 
built offices and quality inspection facilities. 
The road leading to Di Mei’s truck scale and uncovered storage area passes 
right by one end of both housing units. Trucks passing the housing units are very loud, 
with the 70 tonners being the loudest. The trucks cause the windows of the taller 
building to vibrate. The road itself has been torn up by the weight of the trucks and is 
covered with coal bits and dust. 
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In 1998, several residents contacted he Fangshan District Environmental 
Protection Bureau to complain about the noise pollution from the trucks and the 
“sifting” machines, and the coal dust pollution from the trucks and the facility. The 
EPB requested that Di Mei put tarps over the coal as it was being transported, that the 
company should wet the road to keep the coal dust down, should only operate during 
business hours, and put up protection over the piles of coal so that coal dust would not 
blow over into residential apartments. While Di Mei would satisfy these demands 
during inspections, most of the time the company ignored the demands. The residents 
continued to complain to the EPB and to relevant district and city ministries and 
governmental offices. Di Mei is a well off company with some influence, so 
authorities did not act on the complaints.
In 2000, the residents filed a civil case against Di Mei. The residents claimed 
the facility was breaking the noise pollution and air pollution laws and sought to get 
the company to stop its polluting behavior and to pay the court costs. The court 
refused to hear the case saying it should be taken care of through administrative 
means. The residents appealed the case. 
The residents appealed to Beijing city court, which ruled that Fangshan district 
court should re-investigate the case. The Fangshan court accepted the appeal and in 
July of 2001 announced its ruling. It found that there was particulate and noise 
pollution and that there was some impact, but that it was within national standards. 
The defendant voluntarily gave each person 1,200 RMB. The plaintiffs had to pay the 
court costs of 921 RMB. The resident were not satisfied with the ruling and appealed 
once again. The residents lost the second appeal, but continue to complain the EPB 
and relevant governmental departments. 
5) Cancer-Stricken Chinese Village Tries to Pierce a Wall of Silence132
The village of Dragon Range in the Qin Mountains in Xiaanxi province is 
primarily a farming village, but there are four factories on the edge of town. The two 
fertilizer plants, a radio plant and a steel mill were built between the 1960s and the 
1980s. Villagers have only recently come to realize that these four plants are probably 
responsible for the astronomical cancer rates that have plagued the village since the 
early 1970s. For years, the villagers thought their home was cursed. According to 
village records, of the 59 people who died in 1974, 36 or 60 percent, of them died of 
some type of cancer. Different types of cancer, liver, lung, throat, and stomach, 
affected people of all ages. Nationally cancer accounts for 15 to 19 percent of deaths 
in rural China. 
In January of 2000, Wan Yinggong, a recently elected village chief decided to 
do something about the village’s problem. He called a community meeting to which 
all thirty families of the village attended. They all signed a petition requesting an 
investigation of the possible link between pollution and the high cancer rates. He sent 
it to the county government and several local newspapers. County officials came to the 
village and collected water and food samples. The officials never returned and never 
notified Mr. Wan of the results of the investigation. 
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A reporter in Xian did publish the story and called a fellow reporter in Beijing 
named Zhang Yi who worked for the Beijing Youth Daily. Zhang fought with his 
editor to get permission to visit the village. He made the trip and wrote an article about 
the “Caner Village.” As a result, other reporters followed suit.  A young 
environmental activist named Lin Yi, a member of Friends of Nature, was moved by 
Zhang’s story and called him. Zhang put him in touch with another caller, a scientist at 
the Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, named Lin Jinxing. 
The activist, Lin Yi went to Dragon Range to collect samples for the scientist 
to analyze. Lin examined the samples and found level of lead and arsenic in the flour 
and soil that far exceeded safety standards. He called the village and told the citizens 
his findings. Beijing Youth Daily reported his findings. 
In May of 2001, a reporter for the official New China News Agency filed a 
report on Dragon Range for internal circulation. Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo 
member Wen Jiabao read the article and ordered the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) to conduct an investigation. SEPA sent investigators to the 
village to collect samples. The investigators did not report their results to people in the 
village. The outcome of this pollution disputes is unknown at this time. 
6) Chemical Waste in Lin County
In 1989, wastewater from a chemical factory in Lin County destroyed the 
wheat crops of local farmers. The farmer’s complaints finally reached the county 
magistrate, the county Party Secretary, the head of the People’s Consultative 
Committee and the head of the local People’s Congress. These top local leaders 
investigated the dispute and expressed their anger at the actions of the chemical 
factory. In the end, the chemical firm was fined and forced to stop production.133
7) Lion’s Head Concrete Factory Does Not Keep Its Promises: The People Are 
the Ones to Suffer134
Taiyuan, Xishan District
Shitou Shuini Jituan You Xianzeren Gongce (Lion’s Head Cement Group Limited)
This facility has been the “smoking dragon” of the area for many years. Lion’s 
Head Cement (LHC) is a large facility under the jurisdiction of the provincial, city, 
and district EPBs. The president of the enterprise is Deng Shouxin. The party secretary 
is Cheng2 Yuguang and the director of the facility’s engineering and environmental 
protection division is Mai Liao. 
China Environment News received several calls regarding the “smoking 
dragon” and in December of 1998, it sent a reporter out to investigate the situation. 
When the reporter arrived, he/she discovered “concrete snow” in the air and “concrete 
rain” on the clothes of the residents. The reporter noted the factory was engulfed in a 
cloud of dust and the #2 boiler was spewing thick gray smoke. Officials at the 
provincial and city EPBs just shake their heads at the facility. The Mayor of Taiyuan, 
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saw several young girls playing near the facility and commented, “if the government 
does not manage this type of issue, nobody else will.” At a meeting of the standing 
committee of the city government, he reiterated his opinion that the government 
should manage this type of issue. 
In 1994, a reporter visited the facility and was assured by the president that “if 
the factory had not improved its environmental performance within a year, then it 
could not be done, and he would step down.” In 1995 the Sanjin Huanbaohang 
Jizhetuan visited the factory again. While some improvements had been made, the 
facility was far from being a model facility. The president promised that within three 
years the facility would be a “garden” facility (huayuanshi gongchang). However, in 
1998, while some environmental improvements had been made, Deng Shouxin had not 
fulfilled his promise of turning the factory into a “garden factory.”
Cheng Yuguang and Mai Liao told the reporter that the pollution was caused 
by a management problem and that the #4 boiler was still in a “trial production” stage. 
The #4 boiler was fired up in 1996 (January 1st) and over 1.9 million yuan has been 
invested in pollution prevention equipment. According to environmental law, the “trial 
production” stage can only last for one year. Typically, after a year, if the pollution 
problems have not been resolved, the machinery should be shut down. The facility 
illegally obtained the check and acceptance (yanshou) for pollution control. 
Environmental officials repeatedly requested to check the situation, but were 
constantly put off. 
After this story appeared in the newspaper, the factory purchased modern 
pollution prevention equipment for the 4th boiler. 
8) The Dismantling of Phosphate Removal Equipment Without Authority 
Created Serious Environmental Pollution
At the Shanghai City Metallurgical Measurement Instrument Factory 
(originally the Fourth Cold Rolled-strip Steel factory), when steel strips are placed in 
an acid bath in the strip-steel workshop, it releases a large cloud of acid fog and acidic 
effluent, which pollutes the environment and endangers nearby residents. Long 
exposure to acid fog and acidic effluent has corroded the factory building. There are 
cracks in the walls, the foundation is sinking, and the building has become a general 
danger. The acid has damaged underground water pipes. 
In 1874, this factory with assistance by the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry, 
Communications University, and Jilin Research Institute of Practical Chemistry 
successfully developed an “electrolytic phosphate removal” technique after an effort 
of several years. Professionals at a conference to exchange experiences with 
metallurgical systems and treatment of acidic effluent highly praised the new 
technique. In 1976, xxx city “Three Wastes Office” and the Ministry of Metallurgy 
Industry gave this factory 390,000 Yuan to build experimental “electrolytic phosphate 
removal” equipment. After workers made the equipment compatible with production 
processes and the equipment became operational, it reduced emissions of acid fog and 
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acidic effluent. In 1978, at a national scientific meeting, the technology was awarded a 
research prize.
In the later half of 1978, the Metallurgical Measuring Equipment Factory 
leaders approached the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry requesting that the 
“electrolytic phosphate removal” equipment be dismantled because the factory wanted 
to change the products it manufactured. People at the Environmental Division of the 
ministry reasoned that the factory would continue to produce cold strip-steel and 
should continue to use and improve the “electrolytic phosphate removal” technology. 
However, the factory leaders did not heed the warning and in February of 1979 gave 
written notification to the Environmental Division at the Ministry of Metallurgy 
Industry requesting permission to dismantle the equipment. Without getting 
permission, the factory leaders dismantled the “electrolytic phosphate removal” 
equipment in the later half of 1979, which once again created a serious pollution 
problem. 
In July of 1980, while the Ministry of Metallurgy Industry Environmental 
Division was conducting a routine inspection of the factory, about 50 nearby residents 
surrounded the factory to protest against the hazard of acid fog emissions. The 
residents demanded immediate remedial action. Because of this protest, the Ministry 
of Metallurgy Industry had no alternative but to provide additional financial assistance 
to the factory to complete remediation.
When the xxx city metallurgical Measuring Equipment Factory dismantled the 
“electrolytic phosphate removal” equipment without permission, it caused the country 
a significant economic loss; it re-polluted the environment and endangered the 
people’s health. On October 31, 1980, the xxx City EPB fined the factory 20,000 
Yuan (Shanghai Municipality 1980)
9) Water Pollution in Pizhou, Jiangsu Province135
On November 26, 1993, pollution discharges from the upper reaches of the 
Fangting River killed a number of fish and other animals that were being bread by 
more than 100 households. Again in March 1994, there was another more dangerous 
pollution accident. “The river became ink dark in color and gave off a terrible smell.” 
Every living creature in the river was killed. Estimated economic damages from the 
discharge in nine villages and towns equaled RMB 2.85 million. Also, over twelve 
thousand hectares of rice and 3,300 hectares of cotton and other crop yields were 
damaged. Indirect economic damages reached RMB 3.43 million, bringing the total 
amount of damages to over RMB 6.28 million. As they did in 1993, the victims of this 
pollution accident appealed to various government bodies for help and requested 
compensation. The Pizhou media, both print and television, covered the pollution
incidents. The Pizhou EPB sent a monitoring team to the site to collect samples. They 
found that the river was seriously polluted with a dissolved oxygen reading of zero 
and chemical oxygen demand exceeded national fishery standards by between 12 and 
22 times. The investigation showed that the pollution discharges did not come form 
within Pizhou and so must have originated in Xuzhou city and Tongshan counties 
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upstream. The team found that the F. Brewery located in Tongshan County was 
discharging large amounts of distillers’ grain (fermentation waste) was being dumped 
at the rate of about ten thousand tons per day. They also found that the Xuzhou W. 
Food & Drink Ltd. Co. (of the Jiangsu Group) and a vegetable oil factory (of the D. 
Group Company) were also discharging pollution into the river. The preliminary 
finding was that the brewery was the main polluter. The brewery was the largest 
brewery in Jiangsu province and was an important contributor to taxes in the county. 
The Pizhou EPB reported the incident to the Xuzhou EPB and issued a request 
to the Pizhou People’s government to get the brewery to halt production and to pay 
compensation. In April of 1994, the Xuzhou EPB formed an investigative group with 
the Pizhou and Tongshan county EPBs and commenced monitoring of river water 
quality. The party vice secretary general of Xuzhou city held a meditative meeting 
with departments from all the administrative areas. The Xuzhou EPB also submitted a 
report to the Xuzhou city government. The meeting did not produce a result. The 
victims of pollution demanded compensation and they wrote more than 50 letters to 
various governmental and party organizations including the Municipal Party 
Committee and Municipal Government of Xuzhou, the Party Committee and 
Government of Jiangsu Province, the State Council, the Environmental Resources 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, to various newspapers, and to all 
relevant EPBs. After an exhaustive investigation, the relevant EPBs submitted a report 
to the Xuzhou government detailing both the 1993 and the 1994 pollution incidents 
and found that total economic damages in Pizhou reached at lease RMB 12.98 million. 
With the report in hand and increasing pressure from the pollution victims, the 
Xuzhou People’s Government held a mediation meeting attended by all the relevant 
authorities including government, EPB, Water Conservation Bureau authorities, and 
the vice-mayor of Pizhou. In the meeting it was confirmed that the pollution damages 
were caused by the discharges from the entrprises in question. It was determined that 
the enterprises would be shut down if they did not bring effluent discharges into 
compliance by 1995. In addition, the enterprises were to pay no more than 150 
thousand RMB to pollution victims. The decision was not put in writing, however, and 
the pollution victims were not satisfied with the paltry compensation package, so the 
dispute remained unresolved. 
Subsequently, Mr. Lu, a duck breeder, and Mr. Li, an aquatic fisherman filed 
sued in the Pizhou People’s Court in October of 1994. Mr. Lu wanted compensation of 
more than two hundred thirty five thousand RMB and Mr. Li wanted just over four 
hundred and eighty three thousand RMB. The defendants were named as the Xuzhou 
F. Brewery, the Jiangsu W. Bean Milk Group’s Damiao Branch, and the D. Group’s 
vegetable oil factory. The Pizhou court accepted the case, but due to government 
interference, the case was not tried. The plaintiffs continued their appeals for justice. 
They traveled to Beijing twice, to Nanjing twice and to Xuzhou more than 70 times. 
Finally in 1995, the Xuzhou Intermediate People’s Court informed the Pizhou 
people’s Court that it could try the cases. There was confusion and conflict over the 
venue for the trial, but it was finally decided that the Pizhou People’s Court would try 
the case. During the first trial held in 1996, Mr. Li increased he and his partner’s 
466
demands for compensation. In addition, Mr. Lu, another duck farmer added his 
petition. 
The court decided the fish and duck cases differently. I  both cases, the court 
found that pollution discharged into the Fangting River had caused the harm.  Xuzhou 
F. Brewery was found to be mainly liable. The former Jiangsu W. Bean Milk Group’s 
Damiao Branch and the D. Group’s vegetable oil factory should assume secondary 
liability. In the fish case, the defendants paid damages of RMB 500,275 and paid court 
costs of RMB 10,014 and court action costs of RMB 6,000. In the duck case, the 
defendants paid compensation of RMB 204,921 and paid court costs of RMB 5,583 
and court action costs of RMB 3,000. 
The defendants appealed the case and the appeals hearing occurred in March of 
1997. The defendants (appellants) made the same arguments as they did in the first 
trial. The plaintiffs (appellees) then rebutted the arguments. It is important to note that 
the court prohibited media to attend the trial and from gathering materials related to 
the trial. The court did not hold another hearing, but did not make a judgment. Both 
the appellants and the appellees requested that the court make a decision several times, 
but all the court said was that the case was being decided by the relevant government 
organs. In effect, the government again intervened in the case. Finally in the spring of 
1998, the court announced that the total amount of compensation that would be 
allowed in the cases would be RMB 400,000. The lawyers for the appellees suggested 
that they take the compensation, which they did. The suits were finally resolved. 
10) Long-Term Pollution Problem Exacerbates A Conflict Between an Enterprise 
and the Community
Managing Agency xxx District Environmental Protection Office, xxx City, Hubei 
province
In the residential district of Diaomi on Renshou Lu of xxx city there is a 
branch factory of the xxx City Enamel Plant. For many years, in the course of 
production has released poisonous gases, emitted soot and ashes, and made terrible 
noise pollution, which has been serious enough to disrupt the lives of nearby residents 
and threatened their health. On March 12 of 1983, the conflict came to a head when 
the residents wrecked the plant causing hundreds of thousand of Yuan in damages. 
The factory emitted poisonous gasses included hydrogen fluoride and silicon 
tetrafluoride among others. Air quality testing revealed that the level of hydrogen 
fluoride in the atmosphere exceeded national standards by 2.7 to 13.7 percent 
(officials tested the air from 50 to 150 meters from the workshop and the amounts of 
pollutants varied accordingly). The amount f dust and soot in the atmosphere was 
about 10.6 milliliters per meter, which is over 5 times the national standard. In 
addition, the vibration and noise pollution was very severe. The blank workshop had 
12 punching machines weighing 15 to 80 tons apiece. These machines produced noise 
pollution at 95 decibels (category A), which greatly exceeds the national standard. 
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The poisonous gases emitted by the factory caused the trees around the plant to 
wilt and die. It also caused the windows of resident’s houses to corrode making them 
look like “cut glass.” Many residents in the area experienced chronic itching, 
emotional anxiety, their nostrils became enflamed, their throats hurt, their mouth 
cavity’s developed ulcers, their teeth bled, their hair fell out, and they had very low 
red blood cell counts.
Since 1976, area residents have negotiated with the enamel plant 
representatives and complained to officials at all levels of the government. Some 
residents have even filed class action suits. The residents have made considerable 
efforts to demand that the factory mitigate its pollution problems and clean up the 
surrounding area. In 1980, the Ministry of Light Industry invested 100,000 Yuan to 
help the plant mitigate its hazardous air pollutant and dust emissions. The investments 
succeeded in reducing the hazardous gases and particulate pollution by about half. The 
city and the district EPBs directed the plant to build upon these successes and continue 
to decrease their pollution emissions. In the end, factory leaders did not build upon the 
base, continued to engage in bad management practices, and in fact, discontinued the 
operation of the pollution reduction equipment already installed, citing economic 
hardships as the reason. As a result pollution problems increased significantly, 
reaching their previous intensity. Disputes among plant employees and nearby 
residents occurred frequently. Finally, in March of 1983, residents who had seen their 
complaints go unheeded took matters into their own hands and gathered to throw 
bricks and rocks at the plant. The plant managers did not report the incidents to the 
EPB. Instead, they set up spotlights within the factory walls to illuminate the activities 
of the victims. They also dispatched militia to “guard the safety of the plant.” On 
March 12th, three residents of the xxx Match Factory were throwing rocks at the 
factory. Militia from the branch factory captured them and kept one person as a 
hostage. They also snagged an assistant division chief from the match factory who had 
gone to the enamel factory gate to exchange ideas. This exacerbated the situation and 
took the conflict to the next level. Residents of the match factory acted as a mob and 
tore off the roof of the enamel workshop, broke open the door and rushed into the 
workshop. Their actions disrupted production and forced workers to stop the glazing 
and shelving processes. Their actions damaged about 50 tons of enamelware worth 
hundreds of thousands of Yuan that was to be exported. In total the damages to 
product, equipment, and the buildings equaled about 500,000 Yuan. 
After the incident, the enamel plant was under tremendous pressure, so they 
wrote a letter to the city Ministry of Light Industry Office to request funding in the 
amount of 900,000 Yuan in assistance to resolve their noise, particulate, and 
hazardous gas pollution problems. After an exerted effort the factory was relocated in 
1984. 
At the time the xxx District People’s Government Environmental Protection Office 
suggested that the factory take the following emergency measures: 
1) During the “transition period” the fluoride gas that passes through all of the 
baking furnaces have to pass through absorption towers, increase the alkali 
fluid levels, and increase mitigation efficiency. In addition, the EPO requested 
that all four of the furnaces not be operated at the same time, to prevent the 
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absorption towers from being overloaded, which can reduce operation 
efficiency. 
2) All of the pollution prevention equipment that is currently installed must be in 
operation whenever production is in process. If the pollution abatement 
equipment breaks, production processes must be stopped. It is forbidden to 
continue production while repairing the equipment.
3) The plant must build a wall separating the residents living quarters from the 
pollution source in order to mitigate the pollution and reduce the hazards of 
noise and particulates. 
4) Before moving the punching machines to the new plant, they cannot be used 
during the night hours, so that it does not disturb the sleep of nearby residents.
5) Plant leaders must convene a meeting of representatives from the residents’ 
committees, local public security bureaus, and affected citizens. At the meeting 
plant representatives need to listen to resident’s suggestions, to seek their 
forgiveness, explain how the plant will mitigate pollution. The plant must 




In 1976, residents living near the Renshou branch of the xxx city enamel plant 
requested that the plant clean up the hazardous air pollutants, the dust, and noise 
pollution that posed a hazard to the health of nearby residents. The plant made some 
improvements because of these demands. However, the plant did not continue to 
improve their pollution prevention measures, arguing that they were experiencing 
economic hardship. The plant even discontinued using the pollution prevention that 
had already been installed. Pollution from the plant became worse each day and the 
plant paid no attention to residents who begged them to mitigate their pollution. This 
enraged the residents who then began to hurl stones and bricks at the plant. The plant 
did not report the incidents; instead, it positioned a spotlight on the grounds and called 
in militia to protect the safety of the plant. Plant leaders considered residents their 
enemies and even held one resident hostage, making the situation intolerable as it 
could be. In anger, residents started to tear apart the factory, which was unlawful. The 
five penalty measures imposed by the xxx city EPB were needed and appropriate 
because it broke environmental protection laws, made enemies of the people, used 
militia, and kidnapped someone. However, it should have been strict in assigning legal 
liability to responsible persons.
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Appendix E – Comparison of Complaints, Emissions, GDP, and 













































































































































































































Appendix F - Major Environmental Campaign Themes
Table F.1 World Environment Day Themes (Huanjingri) (June 5th)
1989 Guard Against Global Warming (Jingti Chuanqiu Biannuan)
1990 Children and the Environment (Haizi Yu Huanjing)
1991 Global Climate Change Requires Global Cooperation (Chuanqiu Biannuan 
Xuyao Chuanqiu Gongtong Hezuo)
1992
1993 Poverty and Environment-Breaking Free From the Vicious Cycle (Pingchong 
Yu Huanjing - Baituo Exing Xunhuan)
1994 One Planet, One Home (Yige Diqiu, Yig jiating)
1995 Women and the Environment (Funu Yu Huanjing)
1996 Our World, Our Dwelling, Our Home (Women de Diqiu, Zhuzaidi, Jiayuan)
1997 Act For Life on Earth (Wei Diqiu Shengming Xingdong) 
1998 Drive Toward a Greener 21st Century (Maixiang 21 Shiji Luse Shenghuo 
Xingdong)
Table F.2 PRC Century Environmental Protection Drive Themes
1993 Declare war on Pollution (Xiang Wuran Xuanzhan)
1994 Protect the Ecological Balance – Leave a Clean Environment to the Next 
Generation (Weihu Shengtai Pingzhong – Wei Zisun Houdai Liuxia Gengduo 
de Luse)
1995 Cherish (Our) Natural Resources (Zhuxi Ziran Ziyuan)
1996 Protect the Waters of Life (Baohu Shengming Zhi Shui)
1997 Protect our Natural Resources and Use Them Sustainably (Baohu Ziyuan, 
Yongxu Liyong)
1998 Protect and Develop the Oceans” (Baohu Haiyang, Kaifa Haiyang
1999 Declare War on Air Pollution” (Xiang Daqi Wuran Xunzhan) and “Love our 
Yellow River” (Ai Wo Huanghe)
Century Environmental Protection Drive Priority Locations & Issues
1994 Henan, Anwei, Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, Xiaanxi, Shanxi, Jilin, Ningxia, Inner 
Mongolia, Fujian, Guizhou, Zhejiang, and Guangxi. The inspection teams 
concentrated on assessing compliance to 7 major laws including the 
Environmental Protection Law, the Forestry Law, the Law Protecting Wild 
Animals, and the Water and Soil Conservation Law.
1995 Heilongjiang Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and 
Shanxi.
1996 Hainan, Shandong, Sichuan, Hubei, Liaoning, Qinghai, Xiaanxi, Henan, Inner 
Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Jiangsu, and Anwei.
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1997 Fujian, Shandong, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Henan, Jiangsu, Anwei,
Guizhou, Hebei, and Jiangxi
1998 The groups visited 11 provinces, autonomous zone, and municipalities; 54 
cities, 210 harbors, enterprises, and townships along China’s coastline.
1999 Shandong, Hebei, and Henan provinces. Priority cities included Lanzhou,
Taiyuan, Yinzhou, Xining and other highly polluted cities.
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